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This dissertation is a comparative history of imperial land allotment in the ancient 
Mediterranean world. Living in a profoundly agrarian world, the Athenians c. 510-413 BCE, 
Syracusans c. 483-380, and Romans c. 396-264 each created imperial territories by dividing up, or 
“allotting,” land they confiscated in war. They also experimented with forms of republicanism: as 
citizens, they participated in popular assemblies, fought together, and shared access to imperial 
land. By exploring the historical links between land allotment and shared governance, I 
reconstruct how the citizen communities at Athens, Syracuse, and Rome developed alongside 
new ideas about imperial territory, mobility, and the value of labor.  
Because land allotment moved people to and from confiscated land, and in and out of 
each republic, it also reorganized, concentrated, and displaced people within each empire. 
However, the way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land had drastically 
different effects on how people moved across the three empires: the Athenians went to great 
lengths to keep their citizen lotholders at home in Attica, whereas the Syracusans brought the 
people they dispossessed back to Syracuse to become citizens, and the Romans sent their 
citizens away from Rome, all across central Italy. I develop a new heuristic model for historians 
to explain why each group allotted land as they did by drawing on recent trends in 
Francophone political geography and the macroeconomic concept of human capital. By 
reframing historical texts with archaeological case studies, I show how each group collectively 
drew lessons from their own political culture to imagine their imperial territory, and then how 
they used land allotment to find their citizens’ place within it. As such, land allotment was a 
means to an end, more self-reflexive than aimed at imperial control: instead, I argue that the 
three patterns of land allotment can be distinguished, first and foremost, in the way each 
community valued and accumulated human capital.  
Comparing the three approaches to land allotment allows us to confront and turn on its 
head the consensus among historians that people in antiquity allotted land primarily as a state-
strategy of imperial control. Altogether, it recaptures some of the many ways people in antiquity 
reconciled empire with citizenship and, in doing so, how land allotment helped shape the political 
and economic history of the ancient Mediterranean world.  
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Mediterranean empires before the Hellenistic period were not much to look at. Among 
the Greeks, empires were relatively small, short-lived, and lacked the bureaucratic reach that 
modern historians often associate with empires. Yet like the Romans in the mid-Republic, the 
Athenians and Syracusans were unique in the pre-modern world in how they tried to balance 
their conquests abroad with shared governance at home. Living in a profoundly agrarian world, 
the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans created their empires by dividing up by lottery, or 
“allotting,” confiscated land. All three groups also lived in city-states and experimented with 
forms of republicanism: their members were citizens who participated in popular assemblies, 
fought together in war, and shared access to imperial land. “Land allotment,” as historians like 
to call it, was the most common way for citizens living in republics to share in their empires. 
Greek and Latin authors from Classical Athens to the high Imperial period at Rome added to 
the sense of shared history by drawing from the same vocabulary to describe Athenian, 
Syracusan, and Roman land allotments. For them, the terms klēros and ager divisus referred to 
something so common, so understood, that they needed no further explanation.  
The history of empires in the ancient Mediterranean world before the Hellenistic period 
was thus, in many ways, a history of land allotment. As an imperial institution, land allotment 
was the act of confiscating land from another group and dividing it up among new landholders. 
As a cultural institution, land allotment was also at the heart of Greco-Roman political culture. 
Classical authors like Aristophanes and Ovid saw power, above all else, in the division of land: 
 2 
ἥκω παρ᾽ ὑµᾶς—γεωµετρῆσαι βούλοµαι τὸν ἀέρα / ὑµῖν διελεῖν τε κατὰ γύας.1 
I have come to you—I want to survey the plains of the air for you and to divide them 
into lots. 
Communemque prius, seu lumina solis et auras / cautus humum longo signavit limite mensor.2 
And the land, which up to that point had been a common possession like the sunlight 
and the air, the careful surveyor now marked out with long boundaries. 
In Aristophanes’ satirical empire in the sky, the surveyor hoped to divide up the air just as he 
might the land: his power over nature made the “plains of the air” fair game for allotment. For 
Ovid, the surveyor signaled the final stage of human decline from the peaceful Golden Age, as he 
saw it: the surveyor conquered the land with the same force and regularity that an army might 
defeat its enemy. Both authors wrote with a similar ideology of allotment in mind, one that joined 
the power to confiscate land with the willingness to share it. Citizens fought together to confiscate 
land from the people they defeated in war, then came together again to divide it up.3  
For most modern historians, too, land allotment brings to mind imperial power. But 
historians of Greco-Roman antiquity often have in mind a very particular kind of power: the 
power to control a territory. As we will see, historians tend to treat land allotment as an 
instrument of control in service of a central state. In this approach, historians like to take imperial 
success as their object of inquiry, explaining how land allotment helped certain states control the 
land within their imperial territory better than other states. Whereas the Athenians and 
Syracusans pieced together empires that soon floundered, the Romans achieved a form of durable 
                                                        
1 Aristoph. Birds 995. In this scene, Meton, a famous Athenian geometer, arrives with surveyor’s tools and interrupts Pisthetairos. 
2 Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.135-136. Ovid described the fourth and final stage of human existence, the “ruthless and hard” Iron Age. 
3 It is no wonder that the republics of the ancient Mediterranean produced some of the strongest legal traditions for property rights 
in the pre-modern world, see Horden and Purcell 2000: 279. For the legacy of Greco-Roman imperialism in medieval and early-
modern Europe, see Pagden 1995; Muldoon 1999. 
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imperial stability that lasted, in one way or another, for a thousand years. Consequently, 
historians tend to impose a sort of retroactive coherence on the Romans’ empire that presupposes 
its ultimate success in central Italy and beyond—a sense that Roman land allotment made the 
Romans uniquely prepared to become an imperial power long before it was clear that they were 
on a path towards Mediterranean empire.  
In contrast, a student of Greek history could easily forget that far more Greeks 
experienced Athenian and Syracusan land allotment than Socrates’ intellect or the splendor of 
the Parthenon. Even though land allotment was common to all three empires, historians have 
shied away from comparing the three institutions because they assume that Roman imperialism 
was successful because it emerged as a different species of empire. The problem of comparative 
empires is itself ancient: already in the first century BCE, Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote in 
the introduction to his Roman Antiquities that “it is not appropriate to compare the Greek 
powers to those just mentioned, since they gained neither magnitude of empire nor duration of 
eminence equal to [the Romans].”4 This problem has made it so we really have no idea why the 
Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land the way they did: we simply assume that the 
Romans had a different way of doing it because they were better imperialists. 
The problem, however, is not one of success and failure, but rather periodization. If we 
explore how each group allotted land during corresponding periods of their imperial 
development we begin to see how all three were variations on a particularly rare species of 
empire in world history that was unique to the Mediterranean: empires in which the imperial 
                                                        
4 Dion. Hal. 1.3.1. It is worth noting, however, that this kind of teleological approach made sense for a historian with Dionysius’ 
historical interests, since he wanted to show his audience why the Roman empire at the time he was writing was so unique in history. 
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community was both a city-state and a participatory republic. Of course, the Roman empire at 
its height was unique among ancient empires in its durability and geographical extent. But the 
Romans’ long-term success does not change the fact that their initial transition to empire had 
more in common with the Athenian and Syracusan empires than any other in world history. 
Rather, a more appropriate comparison would be the three empires just during their transitions 
from city-states to empires, not at their “greatest extents.” 5   
In broad terms, the periods of imperial transition for the Athenians in the Aegean c. 510-
413, the Syracusans in Sicily and Kalabria c. 483-367, and the Romans in central Italy c. 396-264 
all followed similar, though certainly not identical, patterns. Beginning with comparable citizen 
populations, each state set out on an initial phase of conquest, briefly set back after an 
exogenous shock to its main urban center, and resulting in political experimentation at home 
and territorial gains abroad in areas with no prior history of imperial landownership. The 
Athenians began allotting confiscated land at the end of the sixth century in the excitement of 
the new democracy, prevented for a time by two Persian invasions into Attica, only to take off 
again after Ephialtes’ reforms for the rest of the fifth century until they failed to take Sicily. The 
Syracusans first allotted land under the Deinomenid tyrants, though the pace of allotment 
slowed after the democratic coup, stopped when the Athenian besieged their city, and then 
accelerated after Dionysios I’s military reforms until his death. Shortly after the Romans first 
allotted confiscated land at the beginning of the fourth century, they too were set back when an 
army of mercenaries ransacked Rome, though they set out again across central Italy after a 
series of popular reforms until the First Punic War. From then on, the Romans were 
                                                        
5 For recent comparisons of ancient Greco-Roman empires at their greatest extents, see Bang 2008; Scheidel 2009; Bang and Bayly 2011. 
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transitioning again to something that the Athenians and Syracusans never created: a 
Mediterranean-wide empire.   
But despite all they had in common in their transitions, each group allotted land in their 
own distinctive ways. Because they were the first empires in their regions to systematically 
confiscate land, they could not build on any existing imperial institutions in the places they 
allotted land, as the empires that came after them often did.6 Instead, the Athenians, Syracusans, 
and Romans, had to be creative when they allotted land: the twin dynamics of shared-governance 
at home and land confiscations abroad led the three imperial republics to experiment with how to 
divide up land. Of course, land allotment was not unique to ancient republics. Far from it. In fact, 
nearly every empire in world history has allotted land in some capacity: from Achaemenid Persia 
in Mesopotamia to the Inca in the central Andes; from Ithaca in upstate New York to Senegal in 
western Africa. But, as we will see, it was much more difficult for republics to pull off: citizens 
made a strong distinction between themselves and those outside their immediate political 
community, even as the movement of the new landholders and the people they dispossessed 
blurred the lines between one community and another. Only by exploring land allotment within 
the highly specific context of city-state republics, I argue, can we see why each group allotted land 
the way they did. From a broader historical perspective, we also get to see in high relief how the 
development of republican institutions in the ancient world went hand-in-hand with a very 
specific kind of imperialism. 
Central to all three patterns of land allotment is what I am calling “imperial neighbors,” an 
historical shorthand to focus our attention on the people of land allotment, their movement, and 
                                                        
6 For land tenure in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, for example, see Monson 2012a; 2012b. For British India, see Travers 2009; Stern 2011. 
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the relationships between settler and dispossessed. The term plays on two levels of what it means 
to be a “neighbor.” First, land allotment physically drew people together in new ways as the 
Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans confiscated land in “neighboring” territories. It is in this 
sense, of imperial landowners becoming “neighbors” to the people they dispossessed, that the 
fourth-century BCE author Duris of Samos used the Greek word paroikos as a term of contempt to 
describe the Athenians: in his view, the proverbial “Attic neighbor” referred to the unwelcome 
arrival of Athenian lotholders.7 Second, and in a more structural sense, the Athenian, Syracusan, 
and Roman states grew up alongside, in contact with, and sometimes fighting one another. The 
imperial histories of the three states and their citizens were intertwined, connected in ways that 
will become clearer with each chapter. Together, the view of “imperial neighbors” concerns the 
personal and human quality of land allotment, its mutability, and the wider Mediterranean world 
in which all three empires emerged. 
At its heart, then, this dissertation is a story about historical difference in a highly 
connected world. By comparing imperial transitions rather than imperial success, the story is 
less concerned with ranking outcomes than understanding why three imperial republics 
allotted land the way they did. Such a story can offer a rich, new perspective on how republics 
became empires in antiquity by recapturing how their transitions were contingent, often 
unplanned, emerging from crisis only later to take on some semblance of coherence. But before 
the story of imperial neighbors can begin, we need to pause and consider what exactly the three 
empires had in common.  
                                                        
7 Duris, FGrHist 76 F 9, with Moreno 2009: 215. For similar uses of the word, see also Craterus FGrHist 342 F 21; Arist. Rhet. 1395a18. 
Duris (b. 350) lived on Samos in the second half of the fourth century, when Athenian cleruchs still occupied the island, see Cargill 
1995: 17-21. 
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1.1. Comparative Empires  
For ancient historians, the term “empire” says too little and too much: too little because 
it is a monumentally imprecise term, and too much because it evokes assumptions about size, 
control, duration, and success. Though modern historians commonly use “empire” to sort and 
classify states, the term carries with it a great deal of modern baggage that would have been 
unfamiliar to the Greeks and Romans. It should come as no surprise that the Greeks did not 
have a word for empire as modern historians treat it: the Athenians and Syracusans referred to 
what we call the Athenian empire and the Syracusan empire as their archē. For the Greeks, archē 
literally meant “the first place of power” or “rule,” but it encompassed a wide continuum of 
state-based exploitation, as we will see. The Greeks liked to distinguish between archē and 
hegemonia, which implied “leadership” in a summachia (or “alliance”), because archē was more 
heavy-handed and unchecked. The Romans also had a word for the power to rule over other 
people: imperium originally referred to the command given to a general, but by the mid-
Republic it also came to mean the actual area of operations in which that military command 
held authority. Hence the extent of Roman command was the imperium Romanum. Still, for all 
their cultural significance, the terms archē and imperium do little to advance our comparative 
understanding of what the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were doing when they were 
creating their empires.8    
 Instead, as a point of departure I use Michael Doyle’s definition of empire that is widely 
used among ancient historians. Doyle argued that an empire is “a system of interaction between 
two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the 
                                                        
8 For a discussion of the words archē and imperium and how they differed in use and meaning, see Finley 1982: 41-42; Pagden 1995: 11-28. 
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internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, the subordinate 
periphery.”9 In this view, empire emphasizes the relationship between two or more groups of 
people, a relationship that is necessarily rooted in organized violence and an asymmetry of 
power. 10 In our case, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans used that power more often than 
not to confiscate land. Thus, their empires consisted of territories only insofar as the people at 
the center had relationships with the people they subjected within that territory. As Lori 
Khatchadourian recently put it, empires “are not themselves things,” fixed in time and space: 
we should never lose sight of how empires are human creations, always in a state of becoming.11 
This lesson is important for how we study ancient empires: the twenty-five hundred years that 
separate us from the early days of the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires make it all too 
easy for us to reify and romanticize what they were when they first started out. 
Even more, the ancient Mediterranean world was home to a historically rare kind of 
empire: an empire in which the central state was both a city-state and a republic. Generally, 
ancient city-states were known for their close link between people and place: a community, a 
main urban center, and its surrounding territory.12 One step further down the city-state’s 
taxonomy were city-state republics, or what Walter Scheidel has aptly called “citizen-city-
states,” in which members considered themselves citizens.13 Though most republics in antiquity 
                                                        
9 Doyle 1986: 12. For discussions of empire in the ancient world, see Doyle 1986: 19-51; Morrison 2001; Goldstone and Haldon 2009; 
Scheidel 2013: 27-30. For a recent textbook on ancient empires that uses Doyle and social-scientific theory, see Cline and Graham 2011. 
10 The sources of that power can be, as Michael Mann has shown, ideological, economic, military, political, or any combination of the 
four. The four sources of power work together to form the unique qualities of a particular imperial relationship, see Mann 1986: 22-28.  
11 Khatchadourian 2016: xxxviii, with Stoler and McGranahan 2007: esp. 8-9.  
12 For a synthetic study of the city-state, see Hansen 2000: esp. 19; 2002. For city-states in world history, in later periods, and outside 
of the Mediterranean and, see also Griffeth and Thomas 1981; Burke 1986; Molho et al. 1991; Nichols and Charlton 1997; Parker 2004. 
13 For the typology of the ancient “citizen city-state,” one form of the “micro-state,” see Scheidel 2006b: esp. 6; 2013: 30-32; forthcoming.  
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were city-states, not all city-states were republics.14 What set apart city-state republics were their 
political institutions—in particular, popular assemblies where citizens could meet, vote on 
important decisions, and elect officials to carry out the day-to-day business of the state. In 
practice, they could be popular democracies or even restricted oligarchies, just not hereditary 
monarchies.15 Though the term republic as we know it today was a creation of early modern 
political philosophy, not antiquity, I use it here instead of city-state republic or citizen-city-state 
for the sake of simplicity.16 In keeping with the original meaning of res publica, I use republic to 
refer to states in which members shared a strong sense of citizenship and participated in a form 
of shared-governance. We can think of citizens living in republics as being shareholders who 
could reasonably expect land as their dividends. Republics also liked to distinguish between 
citizens, who could receive land, and everyone else, who often could not: republics were thus, 
by necessity, divided societies. Even though a fairly wide range of different political regimes in 
world history fit these criteria, there were few in antiquity that could, and fewer still that went 
on to form empires. Given that Athens, Syracuse, and Rome can be characterized by these 
criteria, I call them republics with no further ado.  
On the list of republics in world history that started out as city-states and went on to form 
empires, to Athens, Syracuse, and Rome can only be added Carthage, Genoa, and Venice.17 The 
list is quite short, in my view, because republics made for unusual imperial neighbors. On the one 
hand, city-states were naturally suited to exploit the people they conquered because they already 
                                                        
14 For a comparison of city-states in world history, see the publications of the Copenhagen Polis Centre, esp. Hansen 2000: esp. 611-614.  
15 Sealey 1987: ix. As he put it simply, the category of republics “excludes the arbitrary rule of a despot,” with no popular recourse. 
16 Typically when historians refer to republicanism, they use it in contrast to liberalism in early-modern Europe to mean the civic virtues 
that privilege the common good over individual rights. For an overview of republicanism in modern political thought, see Nadon 2009.  
17 There were, of course, other city-states in antiquity that made empires like Ur during the Third Dynasty and Hammurabi’s Babylon. 
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had an urban center that could become an extractive imperial center, and a critical mass of citizens 
who could become an imperial elite. The Republic of Venice in Italy, for example, owned land in 
faraway places like Corfu and Crete, but allotted it to citizen landholders as their own personal 
fiefs.18 On the other hand, as I explain in Chapter 2, the transition to empire was particularly 
difficult for republics because they made such strong distinctions between the community of 
citizen landholders and the people they dispossessed, even as land allotment blurred the lines 
between the two. Consequently, comparing Athens with Syracuse or Rome would not be the 
same as comparing Athens with Achaemenid Persia, where soldiers received land because they 
fought, not because they were members of any particular citizen community. Though the 
Achaemenids also allotted land, they did not make much of a distinction between the soldiers 
who got land and the people they dispossessed, they allotted land in areas with a long history of 
imperial land tenure going back at least to the Neo-Assyrians, and those areas were not connected 
in the same ways because they did not border the Mediterranean Sea. 
Still within the Mediterranean basin, the Carthaginians and the Spartans seem equally 
well suited for comparison with the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans. Both were famous even 
in antiquity for their republican institutions and their imperial conquests. But for the 
Carthaginians, who had colonies spread across the western Mediterranean, we have virtually no 
evidence for how, or to whom, they actually allotted land. 19 Despite recent advances in rewriting 
Carthaginian imperial history using Punic inscriptions and archaeological sources, Carthaginian 
                                                        
18 For Venetian imperialism, see Lane 1973; O’Connell 2009; Crowley 2011. For Venetian land allotment, see Gasparis 2014. 
19 For a recent reinterpretation of Carthaginian history that draws mostly from Carthaginian, not Roman, sources, see Pilkington 2013. 
The only source for land allotment is Aristotle (Pol. 6.1320b5-9), who mentioned that the Carthaginians were “always sending out some 
of the dēmos to the surrounding territories and so make them wealthy.” He may have been referring to land allotment nearby in Libya.  
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land allotment remains a total mystery. And the Spartans, whose land allotments in Messenia 
have likely received more interest than any other land allotments in world history, showed no 
signs of ever wanting to confiscate more land beyond the southern third of the Peloponnese. 
Spartan land allotment, for all of its infamy, was less of a transition to empire than a one-off 
process of Archaic state-formation.  
For comparative historians, then, the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires stand 
apart in antiquity. All three shared the highly specific imperial contexts and republican criteria for 
comparing like with like. Even so, no historian has ever compared them, much less their patterns 
of land allotment, despite them being the three best-documented empires before the Hellenistic 
period. In all likelihood, this is because historians and political thinkers since the early 
Renaissance have given special treatment to the Athenians and Romans, considering them unique 
in their contributions to the Western canon. Machiavelli, who probably spent more time than 
anyone else in world history thinking about imperial republics, made no mention of the 
Syracusans in his Discourses except to express his disapproval of their tyrants. Instead, he used 
Athens, Rome, and Sparta to derive “principles of political action,” as Maurizio Virioli put it, that 
could help his native Florence become a successful empire.20 The rapid rise and fall of Athens, in 
his view, was a foil to conservative republics like Sparta and more successful imperial republics 
like Rome: the Athenians, like his fellow Florentines, were too heavy-handed so they made too 
many enemies, the Spartans did not expand so they were doomed to be conquered, but the 
Romans made allies out of enemies so they were successful in the long run.  
                                                        
20 Virioli 2000: 184. For Machiavelli’s Discourses and ancient republics, see also Bock et al. 1990; Hörnqvist 2004; Andrew 2011: 18-26. 
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The way Machiavelli compared and categorized ancient republics remains popular to this 
day. For example, J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, whose research program mobilized a 
generation of intellectual and political historians, traced the genealogy of republican ideology 
from its origins in Sparta, Athens, and Rome, through Machiavelli’s Florence, all the way up to 
Thomas Jefferson. For Pocock and Skinner, it was worth going all the way back to antiquity, just 
as Machiavelli did, because they wanted to recapture the full range of historical possibilities for 
achieving “political liberty.” 21 But their specific interest in this concept of political liberty, as 
opposed to the history of popular institutions, meant that they also ignored examples like 
Syracuse, where popular institutions could coexist with tyrants. Consequently, normative 
arguments for republicanism, which are just as central to Anglophone political thinking today as 
they were when Pocock and Skinner were writing, have made it difficult for us to compare 
imperial republics by limiting our field of vision. 
Machiavelli and his intellectual heirs, for all of their brilliant historical insights, too 
easily dismissed the Syracusans. True, tyrants were in charge at Syracuse for most of its 
imperial history. But Dionysios’ military consolidation not preclude the existence of popular 
institutions and shared-governance: though Dionysios held more power at Syracuse than 
Pericles ever did at Athens, we would do well to remember that Pericles’ hold on power did not 
undermine his city’s democratic institutions.22 When Dionysios came to power at Syracuse in 
406, Syracusan democratic institutions had been in place for two full generations; afterward, the 
Syracusan popular assembly under Dionysios presided over the city’s finances, used sortition to 
                                                        
21 See especially Pocock 1975; Skinner 1978. In doing so, they were also pushing back on the Whiggish interpretation of political thought 
that, as Nadon (2009: 529-530) put it, “understood it as a progressive march toward greater and more secure individual rights and liberties.” 
22 After all, Pericles was often portrayed in Athenian popular culture as a tyrant figure, especially in Old Comedy, see McGlew 2006. 
 13 
fill public offices, and took pride in Syracusan citizenship.23 This is not to say that Syracusan 
citizens enjoyed the same kind of broad political enfranchisement as the Athenians. But then 
again, neither did the Romans. As far as land allotment is concerned, at least, the Syracusans 
faced the same kind of difficulties as the Athenians and Romans.  
For that reason, I think that Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment are best 
studied together. Taking a comparative approach that includes the Syracusans not only 
broadens our historical field of vision, it also challenges long-held assumptions about Athenian 
and Roman imperialism. Because Athens and Rome have, since antiquity, been the two best-
known imperial republics, their imperial histories are often understood in opposition to one 
another. As ancient historians often teach it today, the story goes that the Athenians were 
driven by their exclusive citizenship to segregate their empire whereas the Romans championed 
a kind of “open society” to create an integrated, stable one.24 In other words, the difference 
between the two empires came down to the difference between Athenian autochthones (literally, 
“born from the earth”) and the Roman tradition of cultural heterogeneity. The Athenians 
believed that they were the direct descendants of Erichthonios, who was born from the soil of 
Attica and raised by Athena herself.25 The Romans, however, considered their society to be 
mixed from the very beginning, going all the way back to the legendary rape of the Sabine 
women.26 In this view, the Athenians were unwilling to integrate the people they defeated, so 
                                                        
23 Diod. 13.94.5–95.1, 15.20.6, 19.1.4. The Syracusan assembly elected Dionysios I “stratēgos autokratōr,” the city’s only general. For 
popular institutions at Syracuse under Dionysios, see Caven 1990: 159-161. For citizen identity under the democracy, see Thatcher 2012. 
24 For Athenian and Roman imperial ideology in opposition, see Champion 2009. For “open society,” see Ampolo 1970-71; 1976-77. 
25 For Athenian autochthony, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1993: esp. 1-21; 2000: esp. 13-27, 115-118; Hall 1997: 51-56. For autochthony 
in Athenian history and drama, see Thuc. 1.2.5, 2.36.1; Eur. Ion 29, 267, 543, 589–90, 737, 1000, 1057–60, 1466; Aristoph. Wasps 1071-1078. 
26 For Roman imperial identity, see Dench 2005. For the rape of the Sabine women, see Livy 1.13.4–8; Dion. Hal.  2.46.2–3; Plut. Romulus 19.7. 
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Athenian land allotment was doomed to never work as an instrument of imperial control. 
Conversely, the Romans were used to integrating new people into their society, so Roman land 
allotment was a way for them to create stable communities with the people they defeated. 
But those standard narratives are not as convincing if we take a comparative approach. 
Other Greek societies, like the Arcadians, also had traditions of autochthony, so it is unclear if 
the Athenians created the empire they did just because they were Greek and polis-life made 
them path-dependent. It is also unclear if the Romans privileged heterogeneity just because 
they were better imperialists, as many historians would lead us to believe. This is why the 
Syracusan case is so important. The Syracusans lived in a Greek polis, but treated citizenship 
much more in the vein of Roman open society than Athenian autochthony. Herein lies the 
advantage of studying the three empires comparatively: the three patterns of land allotment 
share just enough in common that historians can find meaning in their differences. So instead of 
getting caught up in the very real differences in their political cultures, I hope to show that we 
should revel in them. A comparative history of Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment 
can go a long way in rethinking, and ultimately clarifying, our standard narratives of how 
republics became empires in the ancient Mediterranean world.  
 
1.2. Historiography: Problems and Prospects 
Though modern historians have shied away from comparing Athenian, Syracusan, and 
Roman land allotment, they tend to think about each individual case in remarkably similar terms. 
By and large, historians treat land allotment as purely instrumental to the imperial state. Treated 
this way, it is tempting to imagine that the citizens of those states allotted land to serve the best 
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interests of their empires, that their control was strategic. The temptation is even stronger for 
empires that achieved some degree of stability, like the Roman empire. Hence modern historians 
take for granted why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land because they assume 
it must have been all about controlling imperial territory. Accordingly, historians tend to focus on 
how land allotment enabled certain kinds of control rather than asking what land allotment was 
really doing in each case or how one case might have been different from another.  
The prevailing view among historians is that land allotment acted as a projection of 
force against another group of people and therefore the recipients of allotted land guarded the 
unruly frontier of their imperial territory. Russell Meiggs wrote in The Athenian Empire that the 
Athenians established “cleruchies,” the colloquial term for a group of Athenian land allotments, 
“to act as garrisons and maintain security” throughout their empire.27 For the Syracusans, 
Sebastiana Consolo Langher argued in Un imperialismo tra democrazia e tirannide that land 
allotments gave the Syracusans “influenza diretta sulla Magna Grecia” (direct influence over 
Magna Graecia).28 In his highly influential Roman Colonization under the Republic, Edward Togo 
Salmon maintained that the Romans allotted land to citizens who settled in colonies to protect 
Roman territory: “All these sites were skillfully chosen, and defense considerations were 
uppermost in their selection. All of them were militarily useful… They formed a network of 
fortresses.”29 In all three views, people allotted land to control their imperial territory.  
                                                        
27 Meiggs 1972: 124. Similarly, Nicoletta Salomon (1997: 121) argued that Athenian cleruchies served a purely military purpose: “la 
funzione militare, che si concentra nella garanzia della φυλακή dei siti in cui i cleruchi sono inviati, è una prerogativa costante.” 
28 Consolo Langher 1997: 234. Furthermore, he argued that ““Il risultato fu la graduale edificazione di una struttura politica unitaria, 
che stava al di sopra delle comunità sottomesse e che rappresenta sostanzialmente ‘il primo Stato territorial di impronta greca.’” 
29 Salmon 1969: 43. 
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Meanwhile, three separate historiographical approaches complement the idea that land 
allotments served as imperial projections of force. First, cultural historians tend to see land 
allotment as an ideology of power, where orderly land divisions were emblematic of civic 
republicanism and an imperial identity. Second, other historians prefer to focus on the ways 
that land allotment created new forms of state-sponsored economic exploitation and 
agricultural intensification. A final approach uses land allotment to think through political 
conflict within the state in an attempt to understand how garrisoning the frontier could also be 
a populist masterstroke that lifted the urban poor from poverty and provided relief from 
demographic overload. For all their variety, however, all three approaches adhere in one way or 
another to a fairly rigid instrumentalist tradition that treats land allotment as a state strategy of 
imperial control.30  
But taking this kind of approach makes it hard to explain any differences in the way 
three different states—much less three different republics—experimented with land allotment. 
As we will see in Chapters 3-5, Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment had drastically 
different effects on how, and indeed where, people moved across each empire. The Athenians, 
for their part, went to great lengths to keep their citizen landholders at home in Attica, whereas 
the Syracusans brought the people they dispossessed back to Syrakousai to become citizens, 
and the Romans sent their citizens away from Rome, all across central Italy. In our current 
understanding of land allotment, it is difficult to explain the different patterns that created these 
movements because the instrumental approaches all assume, but never show, that the 
                                                        
30 For land allotment as an ideology of power, see Lomas 2006; Torelli 1999. For land allotment and economic exploitation, see 
Moreno 2007; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004; Harris 1979. For land allotment as a political masterstroke, see e.g., Pais 1923; Berve 1967; 
Figueira 1991. 
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Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had the same thing in mind for their imperial territory: to 
control territory. It is easy to see, then, why historians tend to focus on the impact of Roman 
power during the mid-Republican conquest of Italy and then to emphasize the shortcomings of 
Greek political culture as a vehicle for imperial control. Therefore, one of the central problems 
preventing a comparative history of land allotment is that ancient historians too often fall back 
on the assumption that land allotment worked in similar and fairly predictable ways.  
This view is understandable given the refractory evidence we have to work with and the 
inescapable lens of modern empires through which we interpret the evidence. Only in the last 
generation or so have developments in urban excavations and rural archaeology allowed us to 
test and reexamine the limited written sources we have for such a broad subject. As we will see in 
each chapter, ancient authors writing about empires and land allotment took a lot of historical 
details for granted. Besides, those authors often drew from the same imperial vocabulary: within 
a single history, the first-century BCE historian Diodorus Siculus referred to Athenian, Syracusan, 
and Roman land allotment using only the term klēros and its cognates.31 With a similar vocabulary 
for each case, it is easy to assume a similar imperial logic. For modern historians writing since the 
Second World War, our experience with modern empires and global struggles through 
decolonization has only reinforced the idea that empires are chiefly about controlling territory in 
faraway places.32 And they are, without a doubt. But not every part of an empire is necessarily 
about control.  
                                                        
31 See, for example, Diod. 12.55.10; 11.49.1; 14.102.4, for references to Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment, respectively. 
32 Though this kind of modernism is often more implicit than explicit, it is seldom difficult to find. For example, Edward Salmon 
used the Allied advance up western Italy during the Second World War to think about Roman strategy, see Salmon 1956: 99 n. 2.  
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In fact, in recent years, ancient historians and archaeologists have begun to chip away at 
this very idea. A leading trend in ancient imperial studies over the last decade has been to 
decenter power and innovation, emphasizing local variations to imperial power as a way to 
challenge the reach and intentions of the central imperial state. By focusing on historical 
difference, this trend has gone a long way in deconstructing the old dichotomy between 
imperial control and subjugation, between settler and dispossessed. Roman archaeologists, in 
particular, like Nicola Terrenato, Jeremia Pelgrom, and Tesse Stek, have begun to rethink the 
role of the state in Roman imperialism, downplaying its importance: they emphasize the local 
variations to colonial and rural landscapes as a way to challenge the idea that the Romans 
exported a single “dirigiste” model of imperial power across their empire in Italy.33 But those 
advances have also left historians empty-handed: it remains unclear what land allotment 
actually meant to those societies, if it was not simply instrumental to the imperial state. Still, for 
historians of empires in the ancient Mediterranean world, this trend has been an important 
reminder that empires do not appear out of thin air, one day a city-state the next day an empire. 
For republics that confiscated land in areas with no prior history of imperial landownership, 
especially, it also reminds us just how much citizens experimented with their imperial 
institutions while they were transitioning to empire.  
Seen this way, the Mediterranean basin becomes a new space for comparing empires. As 
we will see in Chapter 2, the Mediterranean’s natural environment made land allotment an 
especially common institution in the region. But even though Mediterranean conditions put a 
premium on allotment, there was still a great deal of room for people to experiment with 
                                                        
33 For example, see Terrenato 2005; Pelgrom 2008; Stek 2009.  
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allotting land in different ways. Therefore, the Mediterranean becomes a space not just for 
studying similar and interconnected activity, as Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell did so 
well in The Corrupting Sea, but also for understanding historical difference—in this case, for 
understanding why three imperial republics within the region allotted land in such different 
ways. The answer, I hope to show, can be found by shifting our attention to the people of land 
allotment and what the citizens at the center of it all hoped to get out of their imperial territory. 
By focusing more on the people of land allotment than the land itself, this dissertation offers a 
new way of studying how republics became empires in the ancient Mediterranean world. 
 
1.3. Argument and Roadmap 
 What follows, then, is a story about three imperial republics and their citizens deciding 
what exactly they valued in a citizen. In this dissertation, I argue that the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans used land allotment to model their respective empires on what they 
valued in their own republics. Land allotment, therefore, was more about creating and 
managing opportunities for people at the center than controlling land on the frontier. As such, 
land allotment was a means to an end, more self-reflexive than aimed at imperial control. 
Through four chapters, I show how each group drew lessons from their own political culture to 
imagine their imperial territory, and then how they used land allotment to find their citizens’ 
place within it. But because land allotment moved people to and from confiscated land, and in 
and out of each republic, it also reorganized, concentrated, and displaced labor. Therefore, I 
argue that the way the three imperial republics allotted land can be distinguished, first and 
foremost, in the way each accumulated and organized human capital.  
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 In Chapter 2, I set out by arguing for a theoretical shift in how we study imperial territory 
and, thus, compare different patterns of land allotment. To do so, I draw on two new heuristics 
from political geography and macroeconomics. First, I draw on the Francophone concept of 
territoire, which tries to understand the different ways people conceive of imperial land rather 
than assuming that they treated imperial land as something that needs to be directly controlled. In 
other words, territoire prompts us to deconstruct the idea of imperial land allotment by focusing 
on the political, social, and cultural processes through which people interacted with the land they 
took through war. In doing so, it draws our attention to each republic’s relationship with the land 
it confiscated so we can determine what its citizens may have hoped to get from the land.  
Second, I draw on the concept of human capital as a way to distinguish one pattern of 
land allotment from another. Unlike territoire, which pushes us to question our standard 
narratives about imperial territory, human capital opens up new avenues of inquiry and directs 
my attention to new sources. Human capital refers to the intangible resources, like craft, and 
specialization, which give labor economic value. The way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans 
treated human capital, I argue, can tell us how, and in what ways, they were committed to land 
beyond their own hinterland because it helps us track the movement of settlers and dispossessed. 
Human capital also invites us to use material evidence that historians studying land allotment 
have neglected: with archaeological evidence for the production and movement of economic 
goods, I use carefully selected case studies to test what was unique and what was not so unique 
about land and landowners across each empire. In other words, human capital invites me to see 
the landowners in all their economic complexity. Together, the concepts of territoire and human 
capital help us scale and compare the three empires.  
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 In Chapter 3, the story begins in the eastern Mediterranean with the Athenians, who went 
to great lengths to keep their citizen landholders at home in Attica. This was because, I argue, the 
Athenians saw imperial territory as a way to distance themselves from the people they 
dispossessed so they could preserve their closed citizen society. The Athenians had developed 
such an integrated political community and such an active export market by the time of their 
imperial expansion that they were more interested in the money they could extract from land 
allotments than controlling the people living on it. Consequently, they created a centralized tax 
structure that allowed lotholders to collect their own private rent while still living in Attica. 
Cleruchies, as an alternative to settler colonies, became desirable to elite and entrepreneurial 
citizens who wanted to benefit from the perks of Athens’ markets and metropolitanism. They had 
the added benefit of helping Athens stay the metropolitan center it had become by maintaining a 
critical mass of human capital in Attica and taxable land to fund the navy. Hence the Athenians 
wanted their citizens to live in Attica so that their private entrepreneurialism could support 
metropolitan life in Athens. 
In the Athenian case, human capital helps us see how land allotment reinforced the 
Athenians’ sense of political insularity while simultaneously extending the reach of their markets 
in the western Mediterranean and beyond. On Lemnos, for example, excavations at Hephaistia 
and rural settlements show an abrupt shift from indigenous material culture to Athenian imports 
and imitation wares after allotment to Athenian settlers. Security stones from sacred land 
reserved for Artemis show how new temple banks could have helped settlers on Lemnos and 
lotholders living in Athens coordinate their investments on the island with capital back in Athens. 
On Euboea, excavations at Karystia and Eretria show a shift to ceramic imports from Athens 
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mixed with local imitation wares, though there is no evidence that any Athenians garrisoned or 
even lived on the island as settlers—except at Histiaia, which was the only forested and fertile 
part of the island. Meanwhile, economic activity moving in and out of Piraeus continued to grow 
as the Athenians garrisoned the outer reaches of Attica with naval stations at Rhamnous, Oropus, 
and Atalante. From them, the Athenian navy protected the distribution of Athenian goods to 
places like Lemnos and Euboea, and ensured the regular payment of taxes back to lotholders 
living at Athens. In the end, Athenian land allotment was a vehicle for metropolitanism and 
private enrichment. 
 In Chapter 4, the story moves westward to Sicily, where the Syracusans brought the 
people they dispossessed back to Syrakousai to become citizen landowners. This was because, I 
argue, the Syracusans saw imperial land as external to their state so that the people of their 
empire could become internal to their state. For the Syracusans, human capital, not taxable land, 
was the most valuable commodity, which is why they gave away imperial land and 
concentrated imperial labor. Syracusan territory had long been an underpopulated frontier 
economy, which meant that there was more available land than people to work it. The 
Syracusans were also open to political synoikism, if it meant that they could internalize an 
empire’s share of human capital without disrupting the idea of the state. Consequently, the 
Syracusans repeatedly allotted land to the people they dispossessed back at Syracuse with 
citizenship, and then allotted the land they left behind to foreign mercenaries and allies. Hence 
the Syracusans valued their citizens’ contributions to production and manufacturing for 
Syracusan markets, so they required that their new citizens to move within Syracusan territory.  
 23 
In the Syracusan case, human capital directs our attention to the concentrating effects of 
land allotment. At Naxos, for example, the kilns and workshops at the kerameikos went out of 
use after allotment, at the same time as evidence for imports from all around the Mediterranean at 
the harbor disappears. At Katane, which had long been a center of distribution for Athenian 
wares, there is no evidence for economic activity after allotment, despite the thousands of 
imported ceramics from the eastern Mediterranean at the temple of Demeter from before. At 
Leontinoi, all evidence for local production of ceramic, terracotta, and metal wares cease after 
allotment. In Kalabria, the Syracusans allotted land to their Lokrian allies only after transferring 
the region’s human capital to Syracuse. Meanwhile, at Syracuse, evidence for the city’s first 
workshops start to show up during the period when Dionysios was going to great lengths to 
invest in military production and the Syracuse was becoming one of the Mediterranean’s leading 
economic centers, rivaling Athens and Carthage. Thefore, land allotment became a vehicle for the 
Syracusans to concentrate people from around their empire within Syracusan territory.  
  In Chapter 5, the story crosses over into Italy, where Roman citizens, unlike their Greek 
counterparts, mostly moved away from their metropole. This was because, I argue, the Romans 
who hoped to receive land allotments saw imperial territory as an escape from the elite economy 
at Rome, where economic opportunity and access to land remained limited to a narrow elite even 
after a series of popular reforms at Rome. By the mid-Republic, Rome’s competitive political elite 
of old patrician families and upwardly-mobile plebeians came to distinguish themselves among 
their peers above all by their achievements in war and, by extension, the land they confiscated. 
They learned that land outside of Roman territory was expendable but soldiers were not, so they 
gave away land further from Rome as long as the settlers moving away from Rome would still 
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show up to fight for them. Over time, Roman land allotment became a compromise between 
Rome’s generals, who had a lot to gain in political prestige at Rome from the act of confiscating 
land, and the plebeians, who hoped to make more money by moving away from Rome’s elite 
economy. The Roman citizens who received land allotments moved out into a network of 
communities that shared a kind of commercial citizenship. When they moved out across Italy 
they hoped to make more money with their labor than they could at Rome by taking advantage of 
existing networks of exchange and economic structures. Hence the Romans valued their citizens’ 
commitment to fight for Rome, even as they moved away from it. 
 In the Roman case, human capital shows how Roman land allotment, unlike Athenian and 
Syracusan land allotment, reoriented regional economies around Roman hubs instead of 
concentrating human capital at the metropole. At Fregellae and Interamna, for example, surveys 
show that most landowners lived in agricultural villages among the existing communities of the 
Liri Valley. Though neither city was built to house or defend all the landowners, each had a 
massive forum well suited to act as a business center for regional trade of goods produced in the 
valley. At Paestum and nearby Roccagloriosa, the sites went from being a major center of 
Mediterranean trade and non-agricultural production before allotment to centers of regional 
agricultural exchange so the settlers could specialize what they were growing. At Cosa, evidence 
for the thriving wine export industry at nearby Vulci and Doganella in the Albegna Valley 
disappeared after allotment; trade at Vulci and Orbetello was instead directed towards the 
landowners at Cosa, who slowly took over the wine industry. Over time, Roman land allotment 
created an intensive form of decentralized imperialism because Roman human capital became 
entrenched all across Italy. 
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 Taken together, Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment offer a rich perspective 
on how ancient republics became empires. The implications for a comparative history of land 
allotment are numerous and far–reaching, with resonance for issues as diverse as the 
development of empires and republics, Greco-Roman political culture, and Mediterranean 
economic history. In sum, what we see is that imperial republics did not allot land just to 
maximize their control over the people they dispossessed; rather, their citizens modeled their 
empires on their own experience with republicanism. Hence land allotment was a very human, 
and indeed very creative, process. By understanding that process, we can also see how it shaped 
the political and economic history of the ancient Mediterranean world. And thanks to a wealth 
of new archaeological material, we can even see how these models played out materially in the 
production and movement of economic goods. But before we can do that, first we need to 
develop a new methodology for comparing the three patterns of land allotment.   
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Chapter 2  
LAND ALLOTMENT 
 The Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had a lot in common: they lived in and around 
city-states, they came together in popular assemblies, they took pride in farming, and they sailed 
the Mediterranean Sea. The same goes for their empires: they confiscated land from the people 
they defeated in war, they divided the land into lots, and they shared the lots among each other. 
All three were imperial republics, but the lotholders in each group moved to and from their land 
in remarkably different ways. The Athenians went to great lengths to keep their citizens in Attica, 
whereas the Syracusans brought the people they dispossessed back to Syrakousai to become 
citizens, and the Romans sent their citizens away from Rome, all across central Italy. The ancient 
Mediterranean world was home to more imperial republics than anywhere else in world history, 
but among imperial republics there was still a great deal of variation in how they allotted land. 
For historians, therefore, it remains unclear how we should compare different patterns of land 
allotment within a region known for its shared qualities as well as its internal divisions.   
This is because the Mediterranean is itself a paradox: it demands but also defies 
comparative history. Like so many other regions, the Mediterranean basin is a zone of contact 
and conflict, of perpetual exchange where economic, cultural, and political currents meet. To 
many historians, the Mediterranean is also a protagonist, an active agent in human history. 
Since Fernand Braudel pioneered the view of Mediterranean unity, in which human history is 
really geohistory, there has been no shortage of historians and archaeologists looking to show 
how Mediterranean geography and climate shaped human behavior and decision-making 
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within the region.1 For most ancient historians, though, The Corrupting Sea has pride of place. 
For Horden and Purcell, the Mediterranean helps us explain human behavior within the region 
because, in their view, it is uniquely fragmented but also uniquely connected across the central 
sea: the region is broken up into ecological micro-regions in such a way that people exchange 
with one another across great distances to offset risks, like crop failure.2 Seen as a bold lesson in 
historical agency, The Corrupting Sea created a cottage industry of historians and archaeologists 
devoted to finding evidence for connectivity and comparable behavior in every corner of the 
basin.3 At the same time, Mediterraneanism has made it easy to lose sight of the historical 
differences that distinguished individual patterns of land allotment within the region if those 
differences can be explained away by Mediterranean-wide trends and conditions.  
That is to say, Mediterraneanism can help us explain why all sorts of people allotted land 
within the region, but it is less helpful when it comes to explaining why those people used 
allotment in such different ways. Horden and Purcell argued to great effect that the 
Mediterranean’s natural environment was fundamental to land allotment within the region. They 
showed how the combination of fragmentation and connectivity pushed Mediterranean powers 
to diversify, overproduce, and exchange—a productive logic that encouraged allotment: “The 
                                                        
1 Purcell 2014: 3-4. Braudel’s timeless “Mediterraneanism” has since evolved along disciplinary lines, as globalization destabilizes 
traditional geographic frameworks, as transnationalism sees everything as “entangled,” and as post-colonialism de-centers agency and 
innovation. Some historians now prefer to talk about comparable processes of “Mediterraneanization” within the region; others point to 
a number of “Mediterraneans,” like the Caribbean and the Sea of Japan, that seem ripe for comparison with the Mediterranean world. 
For the process of “Mediterraneanization,” see Morris 2003. For the many “Mediterraneans,” see Abulafia 2005. 
2 It is worth noting that Mediterranean historians are not the only ones to notice this kind of economic behavior. Similar arguments have 
been made for other regions outside the Mediterranean, like the monsoon regions of the Indian subcontinent, see Washbrook  2007. 
3 For increased interest in the Mediterranean, see Morris 2003; Alcock 2005. See also Harris 2005; Abulafia 2011a; Broodbank 2013; 
Concannon and Mazurek 2016; De Souza and Arnaud 2017; Manning 2018. Purcell (2014) recently warned against treating the 
Mediterranean as a “flag of convenience,” a plea for relevance when an argument has little to do with the region’s natural environment. 
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division and maintenance of property are indeed linked with the need to control extraneous 
landscapes, places at a distance, resources to which control can only be extended by virtue of the 
connective Mediterranean.”4 In their view, the only way big groups of people living in micro-
regions could get by was to redistribute resources from around the Mediterranean; elites did this 
by assigning shares of whatever land they might have, even in faraway places, to laborers. 
Horden and Purcell called this redistributive strategy “structural absenteeism.” In their view, 
allotment was therefore a logical response to fragmentation: by controlling production in multiple 
places, elites could redistribute surpluses back to themselves to protect against grain shortages in 
whichever micro-region they happened to live in.5 This helps explain why land allotment was so 
common in the Mediterranean as populations ballooned during the first Millennium BCE and 
states tried to offset the risk of crop failure.   
But almost every empire in world history has had some form of land allotment, even in 
regions with nothing in the way of Mediterranean fragmentation and connectivity. In 
Mesopotamia during the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, for example, Achaemenid kings 
regularly confiscated land from their enemies and then allotted it to their soldiers as payment 
for military service; two millennia later, the Inca in the central Andes awarded land to people 
from all over their empire so the landowners could support themselves while also working on 
state farms.6 Consider also the early history of the United States, when Congress confiscated 
land from the Cayuga Iroquois in upstate New York and divided it among veterans of the 
                                                        
4 Horden and Purcell 2000: 278, with 278-287. Earlier in The Corrupting Sea, they argued (2000: 254) that “The landscape of the micro-
region is a landscape of power.” In other words, people are powerful insofar as they are able to control and rework microregions. 
5 Horden and Purcell (2000: 279-280) argued that “Redistribution, whether of things or people, is the ultimate Mediterranean strategy.”  
6 For the Achaemenids, see Stolper 1985. See also the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. For the Incas, see D’Altroy 2015: 392-408. 
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American Revolution.7 The list goes on. Though land allotment was clearly a mainstay of the 
Mediterranean, it is unclear how historians should compare what appear to be three variations 
on a Mediterranean phenomenon when that phenomenon was not unique to the Mediterranean. 
So the question remains: how should we compare different patterns of land allotment?  
On the one hand, the Mediterranean view of land allotment, as important as it may be, is 
too broad to meet the challenge. Though Mediterranean conditions may have helped shape 
imperial behavior within the region, those conditions cannot begin to explain the differences 
between empires. The Mediterranean view holds that every micro-region was different, and that 
people used land allotment to rework those micro-regions to suit their needs, but it does not ask 
why people reworked them the way they did. On the other hand, the instrumentalist view we 
saw in the Introduction is too narrow. It assumes that people used land allotment as a tool to 
control their imperial territory, so it is only really interested in how different patterns of land 
allotment were more or less controlling, and thus more or less successful at running an empire. 
Whereas Mediterraneanism privileges structure over difference, the rigid instrumentalism we 
saw earlier only seems values historical difference insofar as it can help explain success. In neither 
case is there room for a comparative history of land allotment. 
Rather, the Mediterranean should be treated more as a heuristic: it is only as helpful as 
historical questions are good. For ancient historians, Mediterraneanism is still tremendously 
important because it draws our attention to the remarkable connectedness of peoples living in 
the Mediterranean basin and how those peoples exerted power on their neighbors in ways that 
                                                        
7 For the Military Tract of 1792, see The Balloting Book and Other Documents relating to Military Bounty Lands, in the State of New York. 
For land divisions in early American history more broadly, see Price 1995. 
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cannot be explained by simple reference to endogenous state institutions—that is, to the 
assumption that the intentions of central state actors alone can explain imperial behavior. In 
doing so, it challenges us to question the instrumentalist approaches by showing just how 
mutable and porous ancient empires actually were. Mediterraneanism also prompts historians 
to think through the many layers of historical causation behind land allotment, and therefore it 
puts the intentions of state actors in proper perspective. Most importantly, it helps ancient 
historians decide who to compare: whereas the structural conditions for the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans were roughly similar because they all lived within the same region, 
the same cannot be said for the Achaemenids, Incas, or New Yorkers. Horden and Purcell’s 
view of Mediterraneanism was the crucial first step because it opened up a field of vision for 
historians to study land allotment as a common institution. Since they were not focusing on the 
history of imperialism, it is understandable that they presented land allotment as a fairly stable 
and interchangeable institution. But for historians of empire, the differences between and 
within the three empires require our attention. As helpful as Mediterraneanism is as a first step, 
it is not a theory of comparative history.  
Quite the opposite: Mediterraneanism presents an exciting historical problem that any 
study of land allotment must confront, but requires new theoretical tools to help solve it. If 
conditions were roughly similar for the various groups living within the region, and those 
conditions put a premium on allotment, why did those groups experiment in such different ways 
with allotment? Was it because particular locations were naturally suited to have surpluses in 
certain kinds of resources but ill suited for other kinds of resources, so people allotted land in 
ways that reflect their ecological context? Or was it about certain kinds of labor, or some kind of 
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combination of resources and labor? But to explain imperial land allotment solely in terms of 
ecology or manpower assumes that decision-makers chose to maximize their ability to overcome 
the natural environment, that culture played little to no role at all. Perhaps people acted in ways 
that were actually at odds with their ecological context, because particular political, social, or 
cultural traditions demanded otherwise. Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to any of these 
questions, nor are the tools to answer them readily available. As a result, ancient historians are left 
empty handed without a comparative theory of land allotment. 
This chapter offers a new way for historians to compare the three patterns of land 
allotment. In order to make a genuine historical comparison, I argue for a theoretical shift in how 
we study the territoriality of land allotment, a new way of interpreting how the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans thought about imperial land and the relationships they formed with the 
people already living on that land. To do so, I draw on two new heuristics from political 
geography and macroeconomics. First, I draw on recent trends in Francophone geography, 
which try to understand the different ways people conceive of their territoire rather than 
assuming that imperial territory and state strategies of control are one and the same thing. In 
other words, territoire prompts me to deconstruct the idea of imperial land allotment by 
focusing on the political, social, and cultural processes through which people interacted with 
the land they took through war. In doing so, it draws my attention to each republic’s 
relationship with the land it confiscated so I can determine what its citizens may have hoped to 
get from the land.  
Second, I draw on the concept of human capital as a way to distinguish one pattern of 
land allotment from another. Unlike territoire, which pushes me to question our standard 
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narratives about imperial territory, human capital opens up new avenues of inquiry and also 
invites me to use material evidence that historians studying land allotment have neglected. 
Human capital refers to the intangible resources, like craft and specialization, which give labor 
economic value. The way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans valued human capital, I argue, 
can tell us how, and in what ways, they were committed to imperial land because it helps us track 
the movement of settlers and dispossessed to and from that land. For example, depending on how 
a particular community valued things like non-agricultural production and economic 
specialization at their metropole when they were allotting land in faraway places, that community 
might try to centralize human capital by limiting movement to allotted land. In effect, human 
capital is the conceptual link that connects ideas about imperial land, the movement of people to 
that land, and economic change in a highly connected world.  
To explore the historical links between ancient Mediterranean empires and land allotment, 
this chapter is divided into five sections. Section one explores the Francophone concept of territoire 
to rethink the role of imperial territoriality and deconstruct the reach of ancient imperial states. To 
begin unpacking what territory meant in each of the three imperial republics, section two looks at 
the relationship between land and property ownership in ancient republics, and theorizes how 
relatively small differences in that relationship greatly affected the way the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans thought about their imperial territory. Section three then explores the 
concept of human capital as a way to connect ideas about territory to the actual movement of 
people to and from imperial land. Drawing on what we learned from territoire and human capital, 
section four charts a methodology for comparing empires of allotment. Finally, section five offers 
a hypothesis to explain why people moved to and from land allotments the way they did. 
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2.1. Territory and Territoire 
 The concept of territory reminds us to think about how humans act on physical 
landscapes. For social scientists, and historians in particular, territory can be a useful tool 
because it gives logic to those actions—it emphasizes the relationships people have with land 
and the people living on that land.8 At first glance, the concept of territory is fairly straight 
forward: when a group makes a claim on a certain region or piece of land, that group is also 
giving meaning to what would otherwise just exist in the abstract sense of “land.”9 In other 
words, land becomes territory when a group makes a claim to it. For example, when the 
Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land outside of their own hinterland, they were 
asserting their collective ownership of that land. The act of allotment meant that the 
dispossessed owners no longer had legitimate claim to the land; the Athenians, Syracusans, or 
Romans could then claim the land as part of their own collective territory. In this sense, 
“territory is a bounded meaningful space,” as David Delaney recently put it.10 Territoriality, 
then, is what the territory signifies, what the land means to a group. When it comes to imperial 
territory, the land often signifies the power and asymmetric relationships that created it in the 
first place. In fact, imperial territory is often a stand-in term for the all the land controlled by a 
central power. For many students of history, imperial territory brings to mind the old 
nineteenth century British maps showing a third of the world shaded red, or the partition of 
Africa at the Berlin Conference, with colonial borders traced in bold.  
                                                        
8 For the concept of territory and social science, see Knight 1982: 517; Paasi 2003: 110; Ozouf-Marignier 2009: 34; Del Biaggio 2015: 43. 
9 For the “social translation of space as an abstract category into territory,” see Vaccaro et al. 2014: 2. See also Delaney 2005; Storey 2012. 
10 Delaney 2005: 15. 
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 So when historians refer to territory, more often than not they really mean state territory. 
Or so it would seem given the fusion of territory with state interests and central institutions in 
so many Anglophone histories. In the last two generations, Anglophone social scientists 
interested in territory have mostly focused on how states use territory as way to control land 
and the people living on it.11 The fusion of territory with state control can be seen most 
prominently in Robert Sack’s Human Territoriality. In what has become one of the seminal texts 
on historical geography, Sack emphasized how states tend to assert their power over other 
people or another state by surveying and partitioning the landscape for private ownership. For 
him, territory and territoriality are first and foremost instruments of power—they are strategies 
of control. According to Sack, territoriality is “the attempt by an individual or a group to affect, 
influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control 
over geographic area.”12 In a similar vein, Peter Taylor has described the territory of modern 
states as “containers” of power, enclosed spaces that produce wealth, among other things.13 
Altogether, the prevailing sense is that state actors create territories so they can organize, and 
then put into effect, institutions of control over people and their land.  
Though no ancient historian studying land allotment has ever directly engaged the 
literature on territory, it is easy enough to see its impact on studies of ancient empires. In fact, 
Sack’s definition of territoriality could be mistaken for a loose definition of land allotment: 
territoriality is how one group of people controls land to form a relationship to another group of 
                                                        
11 Klauser (2012: 110, cit. in Del Biaggio 2015: 36) argued that Anglophone social scientists have been “concerned, predominantly, 
with the study of geopolitical strategies of control / defence of space and with the resulting political-territorial arrangements.” 
12 Sack 1986: 19. In Human Territoriality, Sack was very explicit that territoriality is a strategy that must involve an attempt at control. 
13 Taylor 1994; 1995. 
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people. Because Sack showed how mundane acts like land surveying and partitioning are part 
and parcel of territoriality, and territoriality is really an act of control, then land allotment also 
becomes an act of control. This logic lies at the heart of the military explanations of land 
allotment that are so common in histories of ancient Mediterranean empires: state actors 
allotted land so that the recipients of that land would guard against an unruly frontier and, 
collectively, the new landholders were a projection of force. The same logic is perhaps more 
implicit, but certainly no less essential to, the other instrumentalist approaches to land 
allotment. For all their variety, the instrumentalist approaches to land allotment have adhered 
in one way or another to the idea that Mediterranean states wanted to control the people living 
around them by confiscating and then allotting their land. However, at no point has it ever been 
clear whether or not the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had a different kind of control in 
mind, or if they even thought about territory in terms of control. 
In my view, ancient historians rely too much on territory: by giving the concept so much 
explanatory power, we have shifted the burden of explanation onto a remarkably empty term. 
Even though the evidence for ancient empires is messy and refractory, the reality of doing ancient 
history does not mean that terms like territory and territoriality should do much of our explaining 
for us. Instead of assuming that the state and state control were the referents of Athenian, 
Syracusan, and Roman imperial territory, it is the historian’s job to explore what imperial territory 
variously meant in each case. What would it mean, for example, if the central state had little to do 
with imperial land after the moment of allotment? Or what if central state actors never actually 
intended to defend the land they allotted outside of their own hinterland? The complications do 
not end there: as we saw in the Introduction, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans each created 
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a historically rare kind of empire, an empire with a city-state republic at its center. Unlike most 
other states in world history that went on to form empires of allotment, ancient republics were 
rare in their emphasis on citizenship, political participation, popular military mobilization, and 
access to imperial land. In fact, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans all would have denied 
that the state was even something distinct from society. Popular institutions ensured that 
authority within the state was dispersed across multiple layers of decision-making bodies; it also 
ensured that there was never a single authority in charge of controlling people outside of the 
state. And as pre-modern states, Athens, Syracuse, and Rome never had the kinds of 
compartmentalized bureaucracies or monuments to state control that supported the British fiscal-
military state, for example. Hence it is not all that clear what territorial control even means for 
ancient republics. Ancient historians have a territory problem, it seems.  
 Still, the territory problem is a problem of theory, not of evidence. Since the 1970s, 
Francophone geographers have taken a drastically different approach to the concept of territory. 
Whereas Anglophone geographers like Sack and Taylor used territory to think through state 
sovereignty, a generation of Francophone geographers has tried to understand how people 
conceive of territoire—to deconstruct the political, social, and cultural processes through which 
people interact with land. In the Francophone tradition, territoire is still a bounded space, but not 
necessarily a state-bounded space: it does not start and end with the state.14 Territoire is messy, 
multi-layered, and infused with cultural and symbolic meaning. But in that messiness is a new 
theoretical space to think through alternative approaches to land allotment. What emerged since 
the 1970s is an epistemological split between Anglophone territory and Francophone territoire.  
                                                        
14 For a recent historiographical review of what distinguishes the Anglophone and Francophone traditions, see Del Biaggio 2015. 
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 For several decades, Claude Raffestin and Bernard Debarbieux have been at the vanguard 
of Francophone geographers claiming territoire as a new frontier for the social sciences. For 
Raffestin, territoire was ultimately about people’s relationship to the world around them, a 
relational concept he drew heavily from Heidegger’s “theory of the real” and Lefebvre’s “social 
production of space.”15 As a social theorist, Raffestin was less interested in geography as a field of 
scientific research than as a field of spatial ontology, how people form ideas about the material 
world in everyday life. And as a Foucauldian, Raffestin also saw in territory a theory of everyday 
power.16 He was interested in how people immerse themselves in ideas and information—what 
he called the “semiosphere”—and then use those ideas and that information to organize the space 
around them into territoires. This led him to argue that territoire is “produit à partir de l'espace par 
les réseaux, circuits et flux projetés par les groupes sociaux” (produced from space through the 
networks, circuits, and flows projected by social groups).17 And when people project meaning 
onto the material world, they often contradict how other people project meaning onto the same 
material world. In this sense, the production of territoire is also an act of power. Territoire was a 
way for Raffestin to close the conceptual gap between people and the material world. 
 More recently, Debarbieux has argued that people create territoires when they infuse 
geography with social symbols, like political and economic value.18 According to Debarbieux, 
social symbols, unlike physical geography, are not tied down to actual space. So depending on 
which social symbols people attach to a particular space, that space will have a very different 
                                                        
15 For territoire as a relational concept, see Raffestin 1977; 1980; 1986; 1989. See also Heidegger 1977; Lefebvre 1991, with Klauser 2012.  
16 Raffestin 1980: 44-56, with Foucault 1990; 2007. For territoire and the social sciences, see Alphandéry and Bergues 2005; Douillet 2003. 
17 Raffestin and Turco 1984: 45, cit. in Del Biaggio 2015: 41. 
18 Debarbieux 1995a; 1995b; 1999; 2003. For a more recent reiteration of territoire as a fundamentally social action, see also Giraut 2008. 
Paiis (2003: 110) recently summarized the view of territoires as “social processes in which social space and social action are inseparable.” 
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meaning or a very different value. He argued that “La relation entre spatialité symbolique et 
espace géographique devrait plutôt être conçue sur le mode de l’ajustement interactif” (the 
relationship between symbolic space and geographic space should rather be conceived of as an 
interactive adjustment).19 And because every social group has different social symbols, every 
social group thinks about how they relate to physical geography in different ways. Hence, in his 
view, there is no single way that people think about land and their relationship to it. Though this 
single insight is unlikely to surprise many historians today, it stands in stark contrast to the 
Anglophone conception of territory that animates so many histories of ancient imperialism. For 
both Raffestin and Debarbieux, territoire is a collective project, a process of applying the social 
world to the material world. Most fundamentally, a move from territory to territoire means that 
we cannot take the state for granted: though in many cases the state figures prominently in a 
group’s territoire, it is seldom ever the only referent. Rather, it is the historian’s job to explore and 
unpack the many layers of meaning that a group gives to their territoire and then what actions 
they take on behalf of those meanings.  
In a particularly insightful example of territoire in action, Marie-Cristine Fourny showed 
how several European countries recently constructed a sense of economic territoire based on the 
natural environment rather than the nation-state. The story goes that the eight Alpine countries 
came together at the Alpine Convention in 1991 to encourage economic cooperation, sustainable 
development, and tourism. To help create a network of Alpine cities, an organization called la 
Communauté de Travail des Villes Alpines promoted a new territorial identity, “l’alpinité.” By 
tracking the growth of l’alpintité, Fourny argued that the Alpine cities began to situate 
                                                        
19 Debarbieux 1995b: 110. The symbolic sense of territoire marked a major break from Anglophone territory, see Del Biaggio 2015: 41. 
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themselves within two different territoires: their national territoire and the more symbolic Alpine 
territoire. What was important for Fourny was how the convention members invested in the 
territoriality of the Alps just as they were investing in the territoriality of their own nation-
states. Even as the eight members countries had their own national territories, they also saw 
themselves as part of an economic territory, a different kind of territory that gave new 
meanings to the cities. Fourny argued that “Les villes se perc ̧oivent dans une situation 
géopolitique nouvelle où le fondement n'est plus l'État, la hiérarchie institutionnelle, mais où 
des concurrences nouvelles (Europe, métropoles), leur donnent ou redonnent une position 
mineure” (the cities see themselves in a new geopolitical situation where the foundation is no 
longer the State, the institutional hierarchy, but where new competitors (Europe, metropoles) 
give or restore to them a minor position).20 For the eight member countries, land outside of each 
of their own national territoires had economic value because, together, the countries were more 
marketable. That land had a particular value because the member countries infused it with 
l’alpinité—the Alpine territoire.  
Of course, a world of difference separates the Alpine Convention from the ancient 
Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires. Still, the example of l’aplinité has much to offer ancient 
historians. Instead of treating imperial land simply as proxies for state power, it is possible to see 
each empire as a series of creative projects with their own networks of land and people. Territoire 
is useful because it does not presume a certain role for the state or a certain type of power. 
Historians can learn a great deal about a society by studying its territoire because it gives us more 
room to see the layers of relationships, meaning, and power connecting people to their land. 
                                                        
20 Fourny 1999: 179. 
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Because the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans differed so drastically in how they exchanged 
land and people across their empires, and they all did so by allotting land, then they may also 
have differed in their conceptions of territoire. In other words, land allotment may well have been 
territoire in action. Practically speaking, this means that we need to pay more attention to the 
people of allotment, what kind of relationships they had to land at the time of allotment, and 
what they hoped to get out of their land, both collectively and individually. For this reason, in 
each of the three following chapters I reconstruct each pattern of land allotment only after 
deconstructing each group’s imperial “prehistory” to understand how particular political, social, 
and cultural traditions helped shape what they thought about imperial land. To do so, we can 
begin by thinking broadly about what kind of relationships people living in ancient city-state 
republics had to their land.  
 
2.2. Imperial Republics and the Construction of Territoire 
 For the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, the state was really nothing more and 
nothing less than a community of citizens. The problem that all three republics faced during their 
transition to empire was how to treat the link between community and citizenship, as one 
community conquered others and then confiscated their land. This was especially problematic 
because all three republics were also agrarian societies, where a citizen was a citizen partly 
because he could own land and participate in assembly debates about how to divide up land 
confiscated in war. It is easy to see, then, how land allotment could destabilize the foundational 
institutions of ancient republics. On the one hand, land allotment blurred the lines between one 
community and another, as land traded hands and landowners moved from one place to another. 
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On the other hand, the citizens “inside” citizen-city-states often made a strong distinction between 
themselves and those “outside” their immediate political community. The Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans projected certain kinds of meaning on conquered people and their 
land because of the way they thought about their own community and citizenship. In other 
words, they drew from their experiences with community and citizenship when they were 
developing their sense of territoire. So it is here, at the intersection of community, citizenship, 
and land, that any discussion of imperial territoire must begin.  
 Like empire, the term “community” refers to a central arena of social interaction in 
antiquity but it often does more work than it should: even though each community experience is 
unique in many ways, the term tends to give a false sense of coherence and familiarity. To many 
modern readers, community paints a rosy picture of unity and cooperation, a far cry from the 
bitter infighting and sprawling populations of Athens, Syracuse, and Rome. In recent years, 
revisionists like Edward Cohen and Greg Anderson have pushed back against the romantic idea 
that ancient city-states like Athens were face-to-face societies, arguing instead that Athens was 
much more permeable, diverse, and mobile than we often imagine.21 In that sense, to say simply 
that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were communities would betray the remarkable 
complexity of ancient societies.  
But the term community remains an invaluable historical tool, as anthropologists continue 
to show. Jason Yaeger and Marcello Canuto, for example, have pointed to the “interactional” 
                                                        
21 Cohen 2000; Anderson 2003. Cohen argued that Athens was more like what we think of as a nation than a polis: it was too large 
and too open to horizontal and vertical social mobility to be considered an ideal-type Aristotelian polis. In a very different tack, 
Anderson argued that by the beginning of the Classical period the Athenians constructed a broad sense of political community, 
though they only did so by underwriting all the local-and economic-based self-identities beneath that sense of Athenian community.  
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sense of community which, they explain, “focuses our attention squarely on the relationship 
between the interactions that occur in a given space and the sense of shared identity that both 
fosters and is fostered by these interactions.”22 So just as empires are not themselves things, the 
same can be said about communities: they are interactions, never one single thing fixed in time 
and space. Hence we can only study instances of community, like going to war or trial by popular 
jury. The one instance of community that probably would have been familiar to nearly everyone 
living in the ancient Mediterranean was, of course, land allotment. As we will see, for the 
Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, in particular, land allotment was a central part of their 
community experience.  
In fact, it could be said that land allotment was a central part of what made the 
Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman communities into states. Over the last generation, ancient 
historians have gone back and forth over whether or not we should refer to Greek poleis and the 
Roman civitas as proper states. Anderson, for one, has argued that our experience of modern 
states, with all of our freestanding government institutions, has tricked us into thinking that the 
Greeks and Romans also saw communal action in the same way—that there was something 
called the “state” that was somehow separate from “society.”23 Perhaps a better way of thinking 
about it is to say, as Ian Morris did, that “the community was the state.”24 In other words, there 
was no structural differentiation between the community of citizens and those citizens coming 
together in an assembly to debate, make laws, decide to go to war, and so on.  
                                                        
22 Yaeger and Canuto 2000: 6. See also Varien and Potter 2008, who emphasize the “social actions” and interactions that make community. 
23 Anderson 2009, with refs; 2015: 798; cf. Scheidel 2006: 6-7; 2013: 30-32. Scheidel (2013: 32) described Greek poleis, like Republican 
Rome, as having “only weak horizontal and lateral insulation for citizens, strong insulation for slaves, and peripheralization of 
aliens. Stratified military, administrative, and clerical classes were absent.” 
24 Morris 1987: 5. For similar interpretations, see also Osborne 1995: 7-8; Ober 1996: 163-164; Manville 1994: 24; Cartledge 1998: 468. 
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During the Classical period, at least, citizen volunteers at Athens, Syracuse, and Rome 
took turns governing according to the principles debated in the popular assemblies: the state was 
thus, in a very real way, whoever showed up. In practice, of course, the Athenians, Syracusans, 
and Romans differed greatly in who actually had the opportunity to govern. Still, Athens, 
Syracuse, and Rome were all states only insofar as their citizens participated in self-governance 
and in doing so created a sense of commonality, a political community.25 Living in agrarian 
societies, citizens in all three communities made that sense of commonality—that sense of “the 
state”—especially pronounced when they came together to divide up land into allotments: there 
were few decisions people living in an agrarian society could make that impacted their daily lives 
more than decisions about land.26  In this regard, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were 
members of citizen communities because they shared access to the same confiscated land. Land 
allotment, therefore, helped define the boundaries of the citizen community.  
At the same time, land allotment could also transform the citizen community. When the 
Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans confiscated land, there was no set strategy for what to do 
next. Rather, the way each community allotted land had a lot to do with how its members saw 
the relationship between their own citizen community and land ownership. The Athenians had 
a very strong sense of autochthonous citizenship, in which only citizens could own land in 
Attica. They also almost never gave citizenship to foreigners. As we will see, this meant that the 
Athenians only allotted land to Athenian citizens, except under very special circumstances; it 
                                                        
25 For the role of citizenship in the creation of community, see Staehli 2008. See also Mann 1986b, who argued that the state is 
essentially an “arena” that a group of people, a political community, has agreed on so they can pool resources and generate power.   
26 In ancient republics, like in modern ones, citizenship was more than just access to certain legal rights and privileges. Citizenship 
was also an act: Isin 2002; Ehrkamp and Jacobson 2015: 154-155. 
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also meant that the new communities of imperial landowners were entirely made up of 
Athenians who gave up their citizenship. The Syracusans, who were themselves colonists, did 
not have a tradition of autochthonous citizenship like the Athenians, but still seem to have 
required all landowners in Syrakousai be citizens. This meant that they would allot land within 
Syracusan territory to foreigners, so long as they also gave those foreigners citizenship; 
likewise, land allotments outside of Syrakousai often went to people from all over the Greek 
world. The Romans also had a long history of granting citizenship to foreigners, but land at 
Rome was in short supply. As a result, the Romans often allotted land to mixed groups far away 
from Rome. So even though land allotment was fundamental to all three communities, it could 
also transform them in very different ways.  
Of course, it was individuals who actually benefitted from land allotment. But even then, 
land allotment was never as easy as simply transferring property from one private owner to 
another. The act of allotment presupposed that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans 
collectively took ownership of the land before dividing it back up among new landowners. Hence 
land allotment created private property insofar as a community decided to delegate authority to 
individuals to earn their own “private” wealth from the land. Consequently, allotted land also 
carried with it all the relations and symbols the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman communities 
attached to land and citizenship.27 As we will see, each community delegated authority in very 
different ways—with different taxes, different obligations, different citizen statuses, and different 
kinds of access to the metropole and its institutions. Depending on how the community delegated 
                                                        
27 In his anthropological approach to property, Chris Hann (1998: 5) put it this way: “The word ‘property’ is best seen as directing 
attention to a vast field of cultural as well as social relations, to the symbolic as well as the material contexts within which things are 
recognized and personal as well as collective identities made.”  
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authority, and then where the landowners actually lived after taking ownership of their 
allotments, those landowners could either extend or even restrict the reach of the community that 
allotted the land in the first place. For example, landowners who could lease their land allotments 
from back at the metropole would have a very different impact than landowners who lived in the 
same village as the people they dispossessed.  
 Any history of land allotment must take into account the entire web of the interactions 
within each community and also with the people whose land was confiscated. For each case, this 
involves untangling the web and organizing it in a way that can be compared to the other cases: 
first, Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman ideas about community, citizenship, and land before the 
period of imperial transition; second, how those ideas fed into the development of an imperial 
territoire; and third, how land allotment affected the movement of people within it. By organizing 
the web in this way, we can begin to reconstruct how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans 
may have thought about their territoire—for example, the extent to which they were committed to 
preserving or expanding the original community, to attaching economic value to the land itself or 
to the people living on it, or to defending imperial land as a collective effort or as an individual 
responsibility. This is important because the way each group conceived of their territoire affected 
how people and things moved within and beyond it. The next step, then, is to see how exactly the 
different approaches to land allotment could have affected the movement of people and things.  
 
2.3. Peopling the Land 
 Historians too often forget about the people who received land allotments. Some 
historians, like Hugo Jones and Nathan Rosenstein, have studied how the recipients of land 
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allotments could make enough money from the land to afford the arms and armor required for 
infantry service, and therefore make popular military participation worthwhile.28 Others, like 
Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz and Alfonso Moreno, have taken a more post-colonial perspective 
to see how land allotment could create new forms of exploitation and slave-like labor, which 
afforded the new landowners much greater profits. 29  Both lines of inquiry have greatly 
expanded our appreciation for land allotment as a republican institution, but neither can 
account for what it meant for large groups of people to move from one place to another at a 
time when local and regional economies had relatively small labor forces and a finite number of 
merchants, craftsmen, and specialists. Not only could land allotment destabilize republican 
institutions, it also shuffled, reorganized, concentrated, and displaced labor.  
It is worth recalling that small-scale farmers in the ancient Mediterranean world were 
never only agriculturalists: they also had “part-time occupations,” as Horden and Purcell called 
them, like leatherworking, wool-spinning, and even ceramic production.30 For example, the 
Roman Peasant Project recently found in their excavations at Marzuolo that Roman smallholders 
living in rural Tuscany during the Imperial period had a sizeable ceramic workshop that 
produced enough pottery to sell at urban markets.31 It seems, then, that the actual movement of 
people and their labor must also factor into territoire: when the Athenians, Syracusans, and 
Romans came together as communities to decide how and to whom they should allot land, they 
also had to consider what it would mean for so many people to move from one place to another. 
                                                        
28 Jones 1957; Rosenstein 2004. 
29 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004; Moreno 2007: esp. 87-143. 
30 For the “part-time occupations” of farmers, see Horden and Purcell 2000: 268-271. See also Garnsey 1988: 43-68; Grey 2011: 25-46. 
31 For the Roman Peasant Project, the Marzuolo site, and evidence for non-agricultural production, see Bowes et al. 2013; forthcoming.  
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Depending on how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans each valued community compared to 
economic centralization or specialization, for example, they might be more or less willing to see 
their own citizens move away from the metropole. In other words, if their view of territoire put a 
premium on keeping their community closed to the people they dispossessed, but they also 
valued a centralized economy, they might find a creative way for citizens to get an allotment but 
not have to move away from the metropole.  
For historians to understand why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land 
the way they did, therefore, we need to start “peopling” the land.32 This involves seeing the 
landowners themselves as productive agents instead of focusing so much on the land as a natural 
resource to be exploited. Land can be owned, confiscated, divided up, and worked to produce 
wealth. But what about the people who worked the land? What happened to the group of 
people who confiscated land when part of that same group moved away to work it? As we have 
seen, the act of allotment was always political because the movement of people acted against 
ideas about community. It was also economic because land traded hands and there was money 
to be made. It remains to be seen, however, how the movement of people was itself economic.  
One way of thinking about the movement of people is with the concept of human 
capital. As the term suggests, human capital is a form of capital, a primary factor of production 
alongside land and labor. Capital refers to the goods that people use in the production of other 
goods. Nearly two-and-a-half centuries ago, Adam Smith recognized that capital could be fixed 
and realized in a person. In his Wealth of Nations, he distinguished between four different types 
                                                        
32 For the idea of ”peopling” agriculture, see Erickson 2006. He argued that historians tend to take a “political-economic” approach 
to ancient agriculture, which assumes a central state pushes intensification so farmers passively produce surpluses that can be exploited. 
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of fixed capital which afford “a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters”: the 
machines that help people work, the buildings where people work and store their goods, the 
improvements people make to their land, and then the people themselves: 
 [Fixed capital consists] of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or 
members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer 
during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a 
capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of 
his fortune, so do they likewise of that of the society to which he belongs. The improved 
dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of 
trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, 
repays that expense with a profit.33 
Unlike other forms of capital, human capital refers to the intangible resources, like craft and 
specialization, which give labor economic value. Human capital is fixed because a person’s 
skills are inseparable from the person him-or herself. But the person can also move from one 
place to another, bringing their skills with them.  
Since the late 1950s, leading economists in the Chicago School of Economics like Jacob 
Mincer, Theodore Shultz, and Gary Becker have drawn on Smith to show how human capital is 
fundamental to economic change.34 They were reacting to the brand of Neo-Classical growth 
models that privileged physical capital over skilled labor, and therefore could not account very 
well for why certain kinds of labor could be more profitable. This was because those models 
treated labor as a fairly uniform input. In a pioneering study of the subject, Shultz took a 
political economic approach to labor markets, showing how firms invest in human capital to 
stimulate economic growth. In a similar tack, Becker focused on how education and job training 
                                                        
33 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2.1.17. By using the term fixed capital, he was distinguishing 
between it and what he calls “circulating capital,” which covers all kinds of operating expenses like wages and the price of materials.  
34 For some notable examples, see Mincer 1957; Shultz 1961; Becker [1964] 1993. For the first use of the term human capital, see Pigou 1928.  
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affect a person’s wages and aggregate economic growth: he showed that earnings tend to rise 
with a person’s level of education and training; firms also tend to do better in the long run 
when their employees have skills that allow them to adapt and be more productive with the 
same time, equipment, and resources. Modern firms recruit people they think will supply them 
with the best human capital: in theory, an investment in human capital can lead to greater, or 
more marketable, output in the future. Large firms often choose to pay a new employee’s 
moving expenses so they can hire the best people regardless of their geographic location. It is no 
wonder that human capital remains an important topic as globalization and the Internet make 
new links between firms, information, people, and mobility.35  
Human capital is also a valuable concept for thinking about land allotment because it 
helps us move from labor and land as static inputs to labor being a dynamic, fluctuating variable 
reliant up the movement of certain people and their skills to and from confiscated land. But it is 
not without its limitations. Some critics have argued that the concept of human capital covers up 
how and why people decide to invest in education, training, and learning certain crafts: the idea 
of an investment seems to presuppose economic motives when various cultural motives may also 
be at work.36 Other critics have argued that the expression and the concept itself are demeaning 
because, as Margaret Blair put it, “they reduce human experience to a type of commodity.”37 For 
antiquity, a period for which historians have precious few descriptions of economic life, we 
cannot escape the fact that we know very little about how or why certain people became 
specialized, skilled, or trained in a craft—it is only too easy to commodify human behavior.  
                                                        
35 For a recent synthesis of the enormous body of economic and historical work on human capital, see Burton-Jones and Spender 2011. 
36 Blaug 1987. He argued that the expression “investment in human capital” covers up the actual reason for education and training. 
37 Blair 2011. 
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Consider the so-called Lentini Painter from fourth-century Sicily: using the name given 
to him by art historians, economic historians have fused the artist with his craft and the local 
market that distributed his vases. True, the name is concise and it does a good job identifying 
the artist’s defining attributes: where most of his vases were found and that he was a vase 
painter rather than, say, a metallurgist. But we hear little about the growth of a “Lentini technē,” 
the story about a group of artists from around the western Mediterranean who came together to 
train, produce, and innovate. Instead, ancient historians often focus on production and 
distribution because that is what most of our evidence represents—things like pottery 
distribution, ceramic wasters, and shipwrecks.38 We have enough trouble working out patterns 
of production and distribution, much less the motives and context behind a person’s ability to 
produce or distribute a certain good.  
Still, keeping these limitations in mind, human capital can serve as the conceptual link that 
connects how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought about land to the people moving 
to and from that land. Human capital opens up new avenues of inquiry by carving out human 
agency from totalizing discourses of power and control. By focusing more on the people of land 
allotment and how they moved across each empire, we can see how investments in certain skills 
and decisions about where to live had very tangible effects on imperial development. In other 
words, small investments and decisions could have been just as important in the long run as 
grand strategies. Human capital also invites us to use material evidence that historians studying 
land allotment have neglected: with archaeological evidence for the production and movement of 
                                                        
38 For example, production and distribution feature prominently in recent influential works like Scheidel and Von Reden 2002; 
Scheidel et al. 2007; Monson and Scheidel 2015. The recent emphasis on quantification was largely a response to Finley [1973] 1999. 
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economic goods, we can see what happened when land allotment shuffled, reorganized, 
concentrated, and displaced people. By drawing our attention to the people receiving the land 
allotments and how they fit into metropolitan and local economies, human capital is well suited 
to help historians think through an ancient Mediterranean world known for its connectivity, 
citizen landowners, and part-time occupations. 
More specifically, human capital can help us distinguish what set apart one conception of 
territoire from another. As we will see in each chapter, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans 
were committed to human capital in different ways. Some went to great lengths to concentrate 
certain crafts and specializations near their metropole whereas others allowed them to diffuse 
away from it. Yet others preferred something of a middle ground between the two approaches. In 
all three cases, they used land allotment to do the shuffling, reorganizing, concentrating, and 
displacing. Herein lies a crucial insight into what may have distinguished the three empires from 
one another. The way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans treated human capital can tell us 
how, and in what ways, they were committed to land beyond their own hinterland—for instance, 
the extent to which they were willing to find ways to let landowners stay at the metropole; or to 
give imperial land away to foreigners in exchange for the actual people dispossessed from 
imperial land; or to streamline the movement of citizens away from the metropole to imperial 
land. In each case, the decision-makers were infusing imperial land with cultural, economic, and 
political values in very different ways.  
Practically speaking, this means that we need to pay more attention to how land 
allotment moved human capital across each empire. In his widely influential Coercion, Capital, 
and European States, Charles Tilly explored how European cities developed depending on how 
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people accumulated and concentrated physical capital. He argued that processes that 
accumulate and concentrate capital, like manufacturing and banking, benefit from proximity to 
each other, hence the development of cities. He also argued there are degrees of accumulation 
and degrees of concentration: “The form of urban growth depends on the balance between 
concentration and accumulation. Where accumulation occurs quite generally, but concentration 
remains relatively low, many smaller centers develop. Where a single concentration of capital 
emerges, urban population concentrates around that center.”39 In other words, depending on 
how a group centralizes capital at one place or lets it accumulate across a region affects the 
growth of cities and, over time, the capacity of one of those cities to exert its power over others.  
Recently, Mark Dincecco and Massimiliano Onorato have reworked Tilly’s framework 
to focus more on human than physical capital. They argued that constant warfare in pre-
modern Europe pushed people to move to cities where they could protect their capital, which 
led to the accumulation of human capital at centralized hubs—many of which later became 
Europe’s capitals. The centralization of human capital was important because it drove regional 
economic development: proximity made it easier to exchange ideas, invest in specialization, and 
move goods to market.40 Where land allotment is concerned, centralization is also important 
because it draws our attention not only to the movement of people from one place to another, 
but also what kind of proximity they had to each other, the metropole, and the people they 
dispossessed. Land allotment, therefore, could create different types and degrees of 
                                                        
39 Tilly 1990: 17-18. For Tilly, capital includes “any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable claims on such resources. Capitalists, 
then, are people who specialize in the accumulation, purchase, and sale of capital. They occupy the realm of exploitation [his 
emphasis], where the relations of production and exchange themselves yield surpluses, and capitalists capture them. Capitalists have 
often existed in the absence of capitalism, the system by which wage-workers produce goods by means of materials owned by capitalists.” 
40 Dincecco and Onorato 2017. For human capital in cities, see also Mokyr 1995; Acemoglu 2009: 380-382; Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani 2015. 
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centralization depending on how members of political communities and their human capital 
were shuffled, reorganized, concentrated, and displaced. 
In sum, what we have seen already is that, for people living in the ancient Mediterranean, 
imperial territoire was a continuum. On one end, land allotment could accommodate very insular 
views of territoire, where decision-makers reinforced cultural, economic, and political barriers 
between them and imperial land. On the other end, land allotment could accommodate very 
expansive views of territoire, where decision-makers made cultural, economic, and political 
bridges between them and imperial land. Across the continuum, land allotment allowed each 
group to explore different ways of giving away land and interacting with the people of empire. 
And as we saw earlier, the state could play very different roles. Land allotment could involve a 
heavy-handed approach to demographic engineering. It could also involve something resembling 
a diaspora. This is not to say that any large movement of people away from the metropole was a 
diaspora. Rather, land allotment could create a diaspora by providing an escape for marginalized 
citizens who might then maintain actual and imagined connections to their community of origin. 
As many historians of early modern imperialism now recognize, diaspora has been one of the 
most historically common forms of imperialism—the early colonial history of North America 
shows this clearly enough.41  
If we allow ourselves to entertain different approaches to imperial territoire, 
Mediterranean land allotment takes on a whole new life. By thinking through all the layers of 
community, citizenship, and land, and then reconciling those layers with the full economic 
significance of the actual people receiving the land, we can begin to see substantial differences 
                                                        
41 For diaspora, see Dufoix 2008: 21; Quayson and Daswani 2013: 3-4. For a recent use of diaspora in Roman history, see Eberle 2014.   
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in the way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought about imperial land. The final step, 
then, is to articulate a comparative methodology that sets the stakes for why historians should 
care about this kind of historical difference.  
 
2.4. Comparative Land Allotment 
At its heart, comparative history pushes ancient historians to move outside of their own 
chosen corner of the Mediterranean basin, outside of their hyperspecialization. As Walter 
Scheidel put it recently, “Comparison defamiliarizes the deceptively familiar… By observing 
alternatives, the characteristics of one’s ‘own’ case becomes less self-evident, and appreciation 
of what is possible increases accordingly.”42 Comparative history forces us to see familiar 
material in a new light, drawing our attention to other forces at work that we may not have 
recognized had we not taken the time to do comparative history. Crudely put, comparative 
history helps us see the forest for the trees. But once we have been defamiliarized, what are we 
supposed to do with our new appreciation? To start with, the reason for doing comparative 
history is not merely to find differences or analogies in historical experience. Rather, comparative 
history takes historical difference and analogy only as its starting point.    
In what has become one of the best-known works of comparative history in recent years, 
Jack Goldstone’s Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World articulated a comparative 
history “manifesto.” In it, Goldstone compared early modern political revolutions in Europe 
                                                        
42 Scheidel 2013: 2. He also wrote that hyperspecialization in ancient history is “the great bane of modern professional scholarship.” 
Elsewhere, Scheidel (2015: 8) argued that the study of empires often generates “questions that cannot be (well) answered by looking 
at any one empire, by judging variable A or variable B to have been ‘important’ just because it happens to be conspicuous in the 
record or has received a lot of attention by experts in the applicable area of academic specialization.” 
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and Asia, hoping to figure out what triggered each revolution. He argued that what sets 
comparative history apart from other forms of history is that it is necessarily case-based—it uses 
several carefully chosen case studies that share something in common, like a common situation 
or a common institution. For Goldstone, it was political revolution. After identifying which 
cases are comparable, the historian’s job is then to identify the differences among those cases 
that call for explanation: 
Given that historical variation reveals both continuity and change, comparative history 
proceeds by asking which elements of the historical record were crucial. Thus to study 
merely the history of two cities, or of two countries, is to practice parallel, but not 
comparative, history. The latter depends on identifying some key difference between the 
cases and asking which of the many distinct elements in these cases were responsible for 
the particular difference in question.43 
In the case of ancient Mediterranean empires, land allotment was common to the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans. As we have seen, each group likely accumulated and concentrated 
human capital in different ways. This was because each group had a web of distinct elements that 
helped form a unique approach to community, citizenship, and land. Distinct elements could be 
things like poor ecological conditions, a frontier economy short on manpower, an insular political 
culture, or little investment in non-agricultural production. Though they may seem tangential or 
even superfluous details to the history of land allotment, those elements are the reason historians 
can say one case is different from another (why the Athenians are not like the Syracusans) or, at a 
more basic level, why one case is the way it is (why the Athenians did the things they did). To 
paraphrase Scheidel, historians get from description to explanation by thinking through 
contrasts.44 So how should ancient historians find contrasts in land allotment?  
                                                        
43 Goldstone 1991: 52. 
44 Scheidel 2013: 2. He noted “When Weber asked why capitalism arose in Europe, the question was also, Why did it not arise elsewhere?” 
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The obvious way is to mine the written and epigraphic sources for evidence of land 
distribution, political policy, and economic exploitation. But a strictly literary-empirical approach 
is disappointing for three reasons. First, ancient authors only rarely developed a technical 
vocabulary for land allotment: alas, most authors moved freely among a variety of nonspecific 
terms—though this has not kept historians from torturing the semantic field for meaning. For 
those historians, the technical vocabulary gives a false sense of uniformity to land allotment 
among the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans. Second, such an approach only works on the 
assumption that a particular state’s use of land allotment developed in isolation, mirroring 
endogenous institutions according to the intentions of its citizens. But Mediterranean connectivity 
gave rise to all kinds of peer-polity interactions and entanglements that complicated whatever 
intentions central state actors may have had. Third, as we have seen, land allotment was never 
only about the actual land, but also involved movements of people and human capital. Not 
surprisingly, the written sources say very little about changes in production and exchange. What 
we need is a mixed toolbox of evidence that incorporates written with archaeological sources. 
 As we will see in each chapter, the written sources for land allotment are essential, but 
only get us so far. On the one hand, historical sources like Thucydides, Diodorus, and Livy 
provide scattered accounts of land allotment that, when assembled, can give a useful framework 
and chronology. On the other hand, the fact that our information about land allotment comes 
almost exclusively from scattered accounts means that we are recreating patterns of imperial 
behavior from circumstantial and possibly even unrepresentative evidence. Perhaps more 
troubling, most of the authors who wrote about land allotment did so many centuries removed 
from their subjects. The main outlier is Thucydides, but he was not at all systematic in his 
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treatment of land allotment anyway. So when we read the written sources for contrasts in land 
allotment, we should not get too hung up on what they had to say about the motivations and 
intentions behind land allotment. Rather, the written sources help modern historians know where 
to look for land allotments and who received them. They also help us see what institutional roles 
land allotment played in the creation of imperial territory: as we saw earlier, we can tell a lot 
about a community’s sense of territory by the way it delegated, protected, taxed, and invested in 
imperial land—all the things from the web of interactions. Hence we find in the written sources 
contrasts in institutions, but not necessarily contrasts in experience.  
 This is where archaeological evidence can help us ask different questions about land 
allotment. Using written sources to identify the known cases of land allotment, we can then 
develop case studies for sites where archaeologists have added a critical mass of material 
evidence. Whereas the written sources may only preserve one or two cases with any kind of 
detail, and therefore we cannot tell whether they are representative or outlier cases, the amount 
of excavated and survey material from relevant sites is growing to the point now that we can 
see distinct trends in imperial behavior from the material evidence alone. As Carla Sinopoli 
argued some two decades ago, archaeology is well suited to test the internal complexity and 
local variability of empires, which, by their very nature, exist on a large scale.45 In many cases, 
archaeology can help move the discussion of ancient imperialism beyond top-down questions 
of control and impact towards more mundane—though no less important—questions about 
how people lived and worked on the land at any given site. As Lori Khatchadourian put it, 
“Empires are reproduced not only through the actions and institutions of kings and other ‘Great 
                                                        
45 Sinopoli 1994; 2001. For what archaeology can offer the study of empires, see also Alcock et al. 2001; Stein 2005; Khatchadourian 2016. 
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Men,’ but also through daily practices in towns, villages, and centers of power within provinces 
of the empire.”46  
Then again, this is not to say that material evidence for land allotment offers easy 
solutions to historical questions. Far from it. For example, without the context we get from 
historical and epigraphic sources, we would have no way to tell what land was allotted and 
what was not. We also would have little way of knowing what a particular community’s 
relationship was to the land or what its members hoped to get from it. A good example of this is 
Carthaginian land allotment: we know it must have existed given the proliferation of Punic 
colonies in northern Africa and the western Mediterranean, but it is hard to make much of the 
institution with the limited written evidence we have. For the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman 
cases, at least, it is in our best interest to make use of the full range of sources wherever they can 
enrich our understanding of land allotment. 
After exploring the institutional and political context of land allotment with the written 
sources, we can then test what we know about the institution against archaeological evidence 
from allotted land. Most importantly, using material sources we can get a better idea of what 
kind of relationship land allotment may have had with changes in human capital. One way of 
doing this is to see how the movement of people to and from imperial land may have affected 
local production or reoriented regional trade networks. For example, by looking at changes in 
ceramic types and distributions over time at a given site, we can see how the arrival of the new 
landowners may have affected trade and economic activity.47 From kilns, ceramic wasters, and 
                                                        
46 Khatchadourian 2008: 455.  
47 For distribution of ceramic types, sources of supply, and the identification of sources of supply, see Orton and Hughes 2013: 235-245. 
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identifiable typologies, we can also see if the movement of landowners had any effect on local 
production, workshops, and specialization.48 From settlement patterns, we can get a better sense 
of whether or not the arrival of new landowners also created new kinds of sites or affected 
distribution and density. Another way of exploring the significance of land allotments is by the 
extent to which landowners protected their land, either individually or collectively. For 
example, we can track the development of defensive architecture that may suggest an effort to 
garrison the area. With each added element, we get closer to finding out what was unique and 
what was not so unique about the land and the landowners at any given site.  
Only by integrating written evidence for institutions with archaeological evidence for 
experience can we move from description to explanation. Once we determine what 
distinguished the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman cases from one another, we can then make 
historical arguments to explain the different outcomes. Of course, because the historical sources 
can be so refractory, and the archaeological evidence can be so varied from one site to another, 
the comparison is fundamentally interpretive. Still, such a comparison puts the study of all 
three empires on an equal footing. In this regard, it holds a comparative advantage for a region 
that so often defies comparative history.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
As we have seen, the point of a comparative history of land allotment is to call into 
question the assumptions and premises we take for granted about land allotment for each 
                                                        
48  For modes and scale of ceramic production, archaeological evidence for specialization, and ways of organizing non-
agricultural production, see Rice 2011. 
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individual case, and then to resolve some of the problems associated with them. It also helps 
ancient historians gain an appreciation for why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought 
of land and allotment the way they did. Indeed, the point of the comparison is not to decide 
which empire was more successful with all the benefits of hindsight or to settle scores between 
Hellenists and Romanists. Instead, comparative history helps us see patterns of imperial behavior. 
To begin with, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans seem to have built their empires 
to exchange people and their land. This may not have been exactly what they thought they were 
doing when they first went to war beyond their borders, but it is probably what came to mind 
when most people in the Greco-Roman world thought about archē or imperium—at least during 
the initial transition to empire. In fact, during periods of transition, the exchange of people and 
land was so common probably because the reach of the state was so often limited. Instead of 
folding imperial land into some central state institution, the Athenians, Syracusans, and 
Romans delegated authority to individuals to earn their own private wealth from the land. 
Afterwards, the movement of people to and from that land was itself economic because changes 
in human capital affected production and exchange. And depending on what kind of value 
decision-makers gave to their imperial territory, they could use land allotment as a way to 
centralize human capital or allow it to become more diffuse. Clearly, we can learn a lot about a 
particular community’s use of land allotment by paying more attention to territoire and human 
capital. We also learn that there was no single form of land allotment or even imperial territory 
in the ancient Mediterranean. Rather, the history of ancient Mediterranean land allotment was a 
history of one form, Roman land allotment, enduring long past its rival forms.  
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Altogether, there was room for so much variation in land allotment for two likely reasons. 
First, as Horden and Purcell articulated so well, redistribution was so common in the ancient 
Mediterranean world because the region was so connected and also so fragmented. Though land 
allotment was perhaps the most common form of redistribution, communities could use it as a 
vehicle to exchange other goods between regions: each community could also use land allotment 
to redistribute labor through relocations, wealth through property taxes, and military force 
through levies of landowners. Second, centralized communities were probably able to redistribute 
land in a way that more immediately benefited people living at or near the imperial center. As we 
will see, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were politically and economically centralized in 
vastly different ways, despite all being agrarian republics. Each state differed in how its decision-
makers developed a strong sense of political community, allowed for producers and merchants to 
be vertically integrated with decision-makers, concentrated production at the imperial center, and 
occupied a central hub for regional economic activity. Each community might also be more or less 
centralized because of its political, social, or cultural traditions. Taken together, the different types 
and degrees of redistribution and centralization give reason to believe that each community had 
very different projects in mind when it allotted land.  
It remains to be seen how these two factors actually played out among the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans. But based on what we have learned about the broader significance of 
land allotment, it seems that the following hypothesis should hold true: in the ancient 
Mediterranean world, the more politically and economically centralized a community was at 
the time of its imperial transition, the more likely it was to concentrate human capital at the 
imperial center. This would mean that a centralized community would tend to allot land in a 
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way that allowed skilled laborers to stay at, or even required them to move to, the imperial 
center. In other words, land allotment would not become a force for economic diffusion or 
regionalism. A kind of centralized redistribution, however, would probably be more likely to 
create networks of exchange based on power rather than profit, conditions of subsistence in 
frontier regions, and little political or economic cooperation among conquerors and 
dispossessed. Of course, it becomes more complicated if a community was more politically 
centralized than economically centralized, or vice versa. As we saw earlier, this is why we need 
to pay attention to the types and degrees of centralization.   
This hypothesis can be tested, and potentially falsified, by working through the 
Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman cases in turn. It can also be retested when future 
archaeological projects in the Aegean, Sicily, and central Italy produce new evidence for other 
cases of land allotment. Though the Mediterranean may have been fundamental to land 
allotment, with each case we will see just how contingent, crisis-driven, and creative a process 
land allotment actually was—a process that nevertheless shaped the political and economic 
history of the ancient Mediterranean world. 
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Chapter 3  
THE ATHENIANS 
Let us begin the story of Athenian land allotment where it almost ended: in the fields 
north of Athens, at a time when no Athenian could any longer call himself an imperial lotholder. 
A generation after losing their empire, the Athenians in 377 worried that they might also lose their 
metropolis, famous in its day for being the economic and cultural center of the eastern 
Mediterranean. In the spring of that year, a Spartan general named Sphodrias led his army under 
the cover of darkness to capture the Athenian harbor at Piraeus. Ten years had passed since the 
Athenians agreed to the King’s Peace of 388/7 with Sparta, and Sphodrias intended to spoil the 
détente.1 But at daybreak, the Spartan army was still miles outside of Athens, exposed in the 
Thyrian plains. The Athenians now ready to take the field, Sphodrias lost the element of surprise 
and abandoned his campaign.  
Though the raid failed before the Spartans ever reached Athens, the plot was evidence 
enough to the Athenians that they were still recovering from their defeat in the Peloponnesian 
War.2 When the Athenians assembled at the Pnyx later that spring, Aristoteles took the 
speaker’s podium and pled for his audience to resist the growth of Spartan power.3 He hoped 
that the Athenians would dare to revisit their fifth-century alliances, lost a generation earlier 
																																								 																				
1 For Sphodrias’ failed raid on Piraeus in 378/7, see Xen. Hell. 5.4.20-34; Diod. 15.28-29. Sphodrias was the Spartan governor (ἁρµοστήν) 
of Thespiai to the north of Leuktra in Boeotia. For the Peace of Antalkidas, or the “King’s Peace,” of 388/7, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.29-31. 
2 In 378/7, the Athenians were still rebuilding the Piraeus fortifications, which the Spartans ordered torn down at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War. For the new walls, see IG II2 1656-8 (with commentary, Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 46-49); IG II2 1658-64; Xen. 
Hell. 2.2.20-23; 4.8.9-10. 
3 For the prospectus for the Second Athenian League, c. 378/7, see IG II2 43; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 92-105. For Athens’ political 
and economic recovery after the Peloponnesian War, see Strauss 1987a; Burke 1990; Badian 1995; Whitby 1998; Moreno 2007; Sorg 2015. 
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after a long and hard-fought war. With the Athenians at the helm of a new defensive coalition, 
his proposal staked Athens’ leadership on the promise that none of the most detested practices 
of the Delian League would be renewed.4  
When the first summit of the Second Athenian League convened at Athens, the Athenians’ 
imperial legacy hung in the balance. Prospective members of the new league read in simple terms 
that the Athenians would no longer set up garrisons, send out imperial officials, require tribute 
from members of the alliance, or hold land in allied territory. Yet among all the grievances 
addressed in the prospectus, Aristoteles took care to describe in detail the final prohibition against 
Athenian property in allied territory—the detested allotments of confiscated land.5 The 
recognition of this last grievance was a political move aimed to restore Athenian accountability 
and bury the memories associated with the Athenians’ fifth-century empire. Therefore, to most 
Athenians, the prospectus for the Second Athenian League meant that a coercive imperial income 
was a thing of the past. Meanwhile, the allies were eager to check the Spartan advance, so long as 
the Athenians respected the territorial integrity of each member polis.  
Aristoteles’ gamble paid off. Within a year, the defensive alliance had the support of 
nearly sixty member poleis, and first moved to secure the island of Euboea with an allied fleet 
under Athenian command.6 The Histiaians, mindful of the Athenian conquest seventy years 
																																								 																				
4 In 384/3, the Athenians made a defensive alliance with the island of Chios (IG II2 34), followed by several others minor treaties such 
as Thebes in 378. Cargill (1981: 190) suggested that the Second Athenian League brought these alliances together into a formal sunedrion. 
5 IG II2 43, ll. 25-44: “For those who make alliance with the Athenians and the allies, the people shall renounce whatever Athenian 
possessions there happen to be, whether private or public, in the territory of those who make the alliance.... From the archonship of 
Nausinicus, it shall not be permitted either privately or publicly to any of the Athenians to acquire either a house or land in the territory 
of the allies, either by purchase or by taking security or in any other way.” Trans. Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 92-99. See also Diod. 15.29.8.	
6 IG II2 43 lists 58 members. At the league’s height, Diodorus (15.30.2) mentioned a total of 70 members, and Aeschines (2.70) mentioned 75. 
For the expedition to Euboea, Skiathos, and Peparethos, see Diod. 15.30. The league elected the Athenian general Chabrias as commander.  
	 	
 
	
65 
earlier, were stubborn in their opposition and assured a Spartan foothold on the island’s northern 
shores. But after suffering a second defeat, the Histiaians agreed to the terms of the prospectus 
and joined the league.7 Though the Athenians were careful not to disrupt the terms of the alliance, 
they soon set out on a new path to empire—one that put a premium on maintaining consensus 
among member states while simultaneously confiscating land from states outside of the league.8 
The years after the creation of the Second Athenian League were crucial in the imperial recovery 
of Athens: in what followed, the Athenians began to reimagine the league as a vehicle not just of 
Aegean defense, but of a revived, albeit redirected, form of territorial empire. To do so, the 
Athenians drew lessons from what they considered to be the failures of the Delian League. At the 
center of their political reimagination was the memory of their fifth-century land allotments.9 
The Athenians of the fifth-century empire lived two imperial lives. First, they 
commanded an anti-Persian coalition of 250 or so Greek states. An alliance born out of fear and 
matured through coercion, the defensive network pooled membership dues and demanded 
loyalty.10 In return, the Athenians defended the conditions for peaceful trade in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Second, they individually held allotments of confiscated land as imperial 
landowners and rentiers. Only when a member state failed to appreciate the true asymmetry of 
																																								 																				
7 IG II2 43 lists Skiathos and Peparathos on ll. 85-86, and Histiaia on l. 114. 
8 Sorg 2015: 70-72. The Peace of Antalkidas at the end of Corinthian War had included the provision that the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, 
and Skyros were to remain Athenian possessions. As a result, the three islands never appear as participating members in the prospectus 
for the league. For Athenian klērouchoi on Lemnos, see IG II2 30. During the mid-fourth century, the Athenians also confiscated land from 
Samos, Poteidaia, and the Chersonesos. For Samos, see IG II2 1609.89; 1952; Philoch. FGH 328, F 154; Diod. 18.18.9; Nepos, Tim. 1; 
Dem. 15.9; Aesch. 1.53; Strabo 14.1.18. For Poteidaia, see IG II2 114. For the Chersonesos, see Diod. 16.34.4; Philoch. FGH 328, F 158. 
9 Badian (1995: 90-1) argued that the “ghost of the fifth-century empire” was never quite shaken off in the fourth century. Because 
exploitation had been one of the main reasons for empire in the fifth century, the Second Athenian League sought new forms of income. 
10 Strauss (2009: 215) explained that Athens had reason not to count on cooperation: “of the hundreds of Greek city-states in the Aegean 
basin, only thirty-one poleis had united against Xerxes in 480 BCE. As many Greeks fought for the Persians as for the Hellenic League.”  
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the league did the two lives intersect, coming together at the business end of a revolt. The 
Athenians frequently decided to punish members of the unruly ally by confiscating a portion of 
their land, which then became the property of the Athenian state. Afterwards, the Athenians 
cast lots for who among them would receive a share of the confiscated land. The Greeks had a 
name for this kind of land: they called it a klēros, and a community of individual klēroi was a 
klērouchia (or “cleruchy”). Imperial klēroi, most simply put, were plots of land taken through 
conquest from other poleis and divided up by lot among Athenian citizens.  
The Athenian practice of allotting confiscated land went back to the end of the sixth 
century in the excitement of the new democracy. Around 506, and still a generation before the 
formation of the Delian League in 479, the Athenians’ first voted to allot imperial land at Chalkis 
and on the islands of Salamis, Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros—together making an expressway to 
the grain-rich Black Sea. During the course of the fifth century, the Athenians allotted land on 
over twenty occasions (see Table 3.1, with Maps 3.1-2). For many Athenians, land allotment 
became the League’s raison d’être. Land allotment was also why, in no uncertain terms, their allies 
came to hold Athenian leadership in contempt: at each confiscation, the Athenians undermined 
the Greek ideal of property ownership and the autonomy of the dispossessed community.11  
																																								 																				
11 For Classical Greek ideas about property ownership, dispersed authority, and personal wealth, see Ober 2015: esp. 45-100; Miller 2005. 
Table 3.1. Dates and locations of Athenian land allotments in the historical sources 
Date Location Main Sources 
506  Chalkis Hdt. 5.77.2, 6.100.1 
510-500 Salamis IG I3 1 
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It should come as no surprise that the allies in the Second Athenian League wanted 
assurances that the Athenians were done confiscating land. Even so, the allies’ memory of such a 
common grievance took for granted what exactly was so detestable about Athenian imperialism 
in the fifth century. Most historians today assume it was because land allotments were a 
c. 500 Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros (?) Hdt. 6.137-140 
476 Skyros Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.60.2; Plut. Cim. 8.3-7 
465 Ennea Hodoi 
Thuc. 1.100.3; 4. 102. 2; Diod. 11. 70. 5; Plut. 
Cim. 8. 2  
452-446 Chalkis, Eretria, Histiaia, Karystos (?) Diod. 11.88.3; IG I
3 39-41; Thuc. 1.114.2–3, 
7.57.2; Aesch. 2.175; Plut. Per. 23.4 
448-446 
Chersonesos, Naxos, Andros, Thrace, 
Sybaris 
Andoc. 3.9; Aesch. 2.175;  Plut. Per. 11.5; 
19.1 
446 Thurii Diod. 12.9 ff.; Plut. Per. 11.5 
445 Brea IG I3 46.9 
437 Amphipolis 
Thuc. 1.100.3, 4.102.2; Diod. 11.70.5, 12.68.2-
3, 12.32.2 
430s Sinope Plut. Per. 20.1-2. 
430s Amisos Theopomp. fr. 389 apud Strabo 12.3.14 
430s Atakos Strabo 12.4.2 
431 Aigina 
Thuc. 2.27, 8.69.3; Diod. 12.44.2; Plut., Per. 
34.1; Strabo 8.6.16 
430 Potidaea Thuc. 2.70.4; Diod. 12.46.7 
427 Lesbos 
IG I3 66; Thuc. 3.50.2; Diod. 12.55.1, 
12.55.10, 12.72.2 
427 Kolophon Thuc. 3.34.1–4 
421 Skione Thuc. 5.18.7-8; 5.32.1; Isoc. 4.100, 109 
416 Melos Thuc. 5.116; Plut. Alc. 16.5-6; [Andoc.] 4.22. 
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projection of imperial power much like Roman colonies in Italy. Though the Athenians were 
certainly using their monopoly on violence to confiscate land, ancient historical sources are 
notoriously thin on what the Athenians actually did after allotting it. In fact, the only thing our 
sources for the Athenian empire really agree on is that the Athenian imperial project failed at the 
end of the fifth century, despite all the land the Athenians confiscated. It is easy to see why 
cleruchies have since taken on an enigmatic position in Athenian history, known more as failed 
predecessors to the Roman colonies of the mid-Republic than as an imperial institution in and of 
themselves. For that reason, modern historians tend to think about cleruchies only in 
instrumentalist terms, remaining prisoners to narratives of success and control. 
In this chapter, I show that questions about success and control are the wrong questions to 
ask about Athenian land allotment. This is because, I argue, the Athenians never intended for 
land allotment to serve as a projection of force. Rather, the Athenians went to great lengths to 
keep their citizen lotholders at home in Attica. This chapter shows how, over time, the Athenians 
found ways to allot land in order to reinforce their sense of political insularity while 
simultaneously extending the reach of their markets. To do so, they created a centralized tax 
structure that allowed lotholders to collect their own private rent without moving across the 
Aegean. Cleruchies, as an alternative to settler colonies, became desirable to elite and 
entrepreneurial citizens who wanted to benefit from Athens’ markets and metropolitanism. They 
also helped Athens stay the metropole it had become by maintaining a critical mass of human 
capital in Attica and taxable land to fund the navy, which ensured the regular flow of taxes and 
trade to and from Athens. Through this process, the Athenians saw their imperial territory as a 
vehicle for metropolitanism and private enrichment. 
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Above: Map 3.1. The western Aegean. Below: Map 3.2. The eastern Mediterranean. 
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This story of Athenian land allotment requires us to rethink our standard narratives of 
Athenian imperial history. First, we see that, when it came to land allotments, the Athenian state 
pursued the private interests its citizens because there was little interest in controlling an imperial 
territory. But because public equality in democratic Athens never meant economic equality, 
private interests allowed land allotment to become a source of private inequality, a holdover of 
Archaic elite competition after Kleisthenes’ reforms in 508/7. Second, land allotment often lacked 
the appearance of the state because Athenian power was more economic than political: Athenian 
land allotment was so disruptive not only because it undermined the sovereignty of native 
communities and displaced people from their land, but also because it helped create a monopoly 
on human capital in the Aegean. By creating new markets for Athenian goods at settler colonies, 
and transferring wealth to Athens with cleruchies, land allotment helped centralize the 
productive potential of the Aegean at Athens. 
I have divided the story of Athenian land allotment into six sections. After 
deconstructing the sources and historiography of Athenian land allotment in section one, 
section two surveys the Archaic prehistory to Athenian land allotment to understand why the 
Athenians developed an alternative to settler colonialism. Building on Athenian ideas about 
private wealth and metropolitanism, section three shows how they developed an approach to 
imperial territory that privileged political insularity over imperial control. Section four then 
explores how this approach helped the Athenians accumulate human capital at Athens and 
expand their markets in the Aegean. Two final sections use recent archaeological evidence from 
the islands of Lemnos and Euboea to track the movement of people and economic goods to and 
from Athenian land allotments. 
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3.1. Sources & Historiography 
Allotments, or klēroi, did not only refer to the division of land. In fact, the act of allotment 
was central to Greek political culture. In Homeric epic, for example, justice and honor meant that 
elites took turns taking lots, or klēroi, to lead the charge into battle, and then afterwards they 
divided the spoils of war.12 Essentially, the klēros signaled membership to a political community, 
and as such it referred to a member’s own share of that community. In this sense, a klēros could 
also become a form of inheritable property.13 For the Spartans, a klēros of Messenian land was the 
mark of citizenship: the land freed each citizen to participate in community life, and it passed 
from one generation to the next as the family’s share of Spartan society. The same culture of 
shareholding held true in democratic Athens. For much of the Classical period, popular 
sovereignty meant that citizens took turns in shared governance: individuals ruled and were 
ruled in turn.14 Because most government officials were selected by lot, not by election, a broad 
cross-section of citiznes got to try their hand at some sort of civic administration—as a magistrate, 
a member of the Boulē, a juror, and so on.15 Allotment was the political institution that ensured 
popular participation. For the courts alone, hundreds of lots were drawn each day the juries sat. 
Each lot became an invitation to share in public life and, by the 460s, earn a public wage.16  
Just as the klēros was fundamental to Athenian political life, so too was it part and parcel 
of Athenian imperialism. For the Greeks, the foundation of a colony began with a division of 
																																								 																				
12 Hom. Il. 3.316, 7.175-205, 23.351-354. For ideas on equality and political thought in Homer, see Raaflaub 1988; 1997; Balot 2006: 16-37. 
13 For klēros as property, see Hom. Il. 15.499; Hes. W&D 37, 341. For property laws and inheritance, see Plato, Laws 923d; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 9.2. 
14 For popular sovereignty, see Ostwald 1986. For the democratic politics of “going on together” and citizen unity, see Ober 1987; 2005.  
15 For Aristotle (Pol. 1273b40-41, 1294b7-9), elections were undemocratic because they favored the elite. For sortition in democratic 
politics and sociology, see Hdt. 3.80; Headlam 1933; Finley 1973a: 19; Ober 1987: 7; Taylor 2007. For the sortition process, see Dow 1930. 	
16 For the public wage, or misthos, in Athens, see Loomis 1996: 9-31. Public wages were paid in cash, which stimulated monetization. 
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land by lots, and each recipient was known as a klērouchos  (or “lotholder”). The Athenians 
freely used the same terminology for the allotment of confiscated land. The klērouchos shared in 
Athenian imperial life through his share of the confiscated land. If a lotholder decided to live on 
his allotted land or become member of a new apoikia (or “colony”), he was also called an apoikos 
(or “settler”), literally someone who lived outside of Attica and no longer “at home.”17 The klēros 
was central to Greek political culture, but the idea of allotment behind Athenian cleruchies was 
also fundamental to, and indeed cognate with, the democratic institution of sortition: political 
life at Athens seemed to parallel the division of imperial benefits abroad.  
Yet despite the importance of allotment to Athenian culture, the ancient historical 
evidence for Athenian land allotment leaves much to be desired. As far as we can tell, not a 
single ancient author ever wrote more than a few sentences in a row about Athenian land 
allotment. Instead, we are left with a mixed bag of isolated stories, fragmentary decrees, off-
hand remarks, and tantalizing anecdotes—some probably more representative than others. Still, 
the evidence for Athenian land allotment is actually uniquely good for the Classical period, 
compared to Syracusan and Roman land allotment. In large part because of their empire, the 
Athenians in the fifth century enjoyed a remarkable period of cultural efflorescence with an 
incredible output of historical writing, political theater, and oratory. Scattered throughout were 
references to land allotment. What really set apart the Athenians was that even at the beginning 
of their empire they had an “epigraphic habit,” a habit of inscribing in stone all the things they 
were up to at Athens and elsewhere in the Aegean.18  
																																								 																				
17 As Brunt (1993: 115) put it, for the Athenians, “the same persons could from different standpoints be called apoikoi, epoikoi, or klerouchoi.” 
18 For Athenian political culture and the comparative wealth of epigraphic evidence, see Meritt 1940; Mattingly 1992; 1996; Hedrick 1999. 
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 Even so, a strictly empirical approach to the historical evidence for Athenian land 
allotment can be misleading. Though historical writing first developed as a distinct genre at 
Athens to document the rise and fall of empires, Athenian historians were not all that interested 
in writing about land allotment. Modern historians working on Athens, as opposed to Syracuse 
and Rome, are fortunate to have access to contemporary authors like Thucydides and 
Herodotus who were actually alive for part of the period they wrote about. But they both took a 
lot of important details for granted. Thucydides (c. 460-400), for one, was an Athenian general at 
the height of the empire and must have participated in countless assembly meetings when the 
Athenians discussed land allotment. But in his monumental history of the Peloponnesian War 
he only once described land allotment in any detail, though he hinted at it several other times in 
his whirlwind account of Athenian imperial history between the Greco-Persian and 
Peloponnesian Wars in Book 1 (the Pentekontaeteia). If we can take him at his word, Thucydides 
was just interested in useful history, or history that Athenian decision-makers could actually 
think with, so he was incredibly selective: in fact, he seems to have avoided redundancy in 
favor of exemplary cases that he could use to showcase human behavior.19 Like Thucydides, 
Herodotus (c. 484-425) also took Athenian land allotment for granted. In his history of the 
Greco-Persian wars we only get a single mention of land allotment, buried in one of his many 
digressions on Athenian democracy at war. For Thucydides and Herodotus, land allotment was 
a symptom of Athenian democratic energy, a narrative detail probably so well known among 
																																								 																				
19 For Thucydides’ selectivity, see De Romilly 2012: 2-3, 178-179. For example, Thucydides used the single example of Corcyra to 
showcase the effects of stasis in the Greek world more broadly. That way, he could describe something like stasis only once instead 
of describing it every time stasis came up in his history. For Thucydides and useful history, see also Rawlings 2016. For Thucydides’ 
use of technical vocabulary, see Ehrenberg 1952; Jones 1957: 175; Brunt 1993: 115; Welwei 1996, contra Figueira 1991. 
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their contemporary readers that they could describe it once and move on. Thucydides and 
Herodotus are invaluable for modern historians because they described in great detail the 
world around Athenian land allotments, but we must check their isolated descriptions of the 
institution itself against other sources. 
 Whereas Thucydides and Herodotus were heavy on historical context and light on 
institutions, inscriptions found during excavations at the Athenian Agora have a lot to say about 
the institutions governing land tenure and imperial taxes but with little context. From the 
thousands of published inscriptions from fifth-century Athens, several dozen of them focus on 
confiscated land, imperial taxes, and dispossessed landowners. Most important for the study of 
land allotment are the imperial decrees, lease agreements, and horoi (or “boundary markers”). 
From inscriptions like the Chalkis Decree and the Athenian Tribute Lists we get a sense of what 
kind of legal and economic securities the Athenians imposed on defeated people who lost some if 
their land to Athenian lotholders. From lease agreements we can see how the Athenians taxed 
different kinds of property. And from the horoi found out in the fields we can learn who may have 
actually owned the land. Altogether, the epigraphic material gives detail to the institutions that 
the historical sources often took for granted. But because they were state documents, they only 
really show the intentions of the state: we never really get a sense from the inscriptions of what 
land allotment actually did, only what the Athenians intended to do from Athens. As such, the 
inscriptions give the impression that democracy was deeply implicated in empire. 
 The link between democracy and empire is further reinforced by contemporary political 
theater and oratory. Aristophanes (c. 446-386) animated his comedies with all kinds of jokes 
about imperial land, surveyors, and taxes—the kinds of subjects his fellow democrats knew 
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well. As Russell Meiggs explained, “His primary purpose was to please his audience and win 
the prize, but his audience expected topical comment and were not disappointed.”20 For that 
reason his plays offer an unparalleled look into the political culture of land allotment: his jokes 
play on the Athenians’ motivations, anxieties, and even disappointments in land allotment. In 
doing so, he portrayed land allotment as symbolic of democracy in all of its contradictions. The 
speeches of popular orators like Antiphon, Andocides, and Isocrates also situated Athenian 
land allotment within democratic discourse. Like Aristophanes, they wrote their speeches for 
popular audience so the stories they told about land allotment relied on popular justifications. 
Unlike Thucydides and Herodotus, the orators told stories about actual people who received 
and also lost land in a rare level of detail. But because most of their extant speeches came after 
the Peloponnesian War, the impressions they gave of land allotment were often memories 
shaded by defeat and loss. Still, the evidence from Aristophanes and the orators goes a long 
way in humanizing Athenian land allotment. 
 During the fourth century, a time when the Athenians were reinventing their imperial 
legacy in the Aegean, a number of political theorists drew lessons from fifth-century land 
allotment and political culture. Xenophon (c. 430-354), for example, included in his Socratic 
dialogues several anecdotes of wealthy Athenians who had to give up their land outside of 
Attica at the end of the Peloponnesian War. In another series of Socratic dialogues, Plato (c. 428-
348) explored Athenian political life during the final quarter of the fifth century. Though he 
never discussed land allotment explicitly, Plato offers a glimpse—albeit a tendentious one—into 
the values of metropolitan and civic life at Athens that may have affected where people chose to 
																																								 																				
20 Meiggs 1972: 2. For Aristophanes’ audience, see MacDowell 1995: 7-26. 
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live. Sometime after 330, Aristotle (c. 384-322), or one of his students, wrote a political and 
institutional history of the Athenian state. The Athēnaiōn Politeia described in great detail things 
like the number of imperial officials during the fifth century, how the Athenian state collected 
taxes, and how private citizens leased land. Taken together, the details help us interpret the 
epigraphic material from the fifth century by showing how the institutions may have actually 
worked. But because it was so thorough, and so focused on state institutions, it gave coherence 
to a phenomenon that may not have been so strategic at the time.   
 A final group of sources for Athenian land allotment come from much later Greek authors 
writing during the Roman period. Written some four centuries later, Diodorus Siculus’s Bibliothēkē 
Historikē preserves the only continuous narrative history of the fifth century. Diodorus was 
writing a “universal history” that united the Greek and Roman pasts into a single narrative, so his 
chronology sometimes broke from fifth-century authors like Thucydides, much to the chagrin of 
modern historians. Still, where Thucydides was selective, Diodorus was thorough: he often 
recorded the events leading up to land allotments that Thucydides left out. Another century later, 
Plutarch (c. 46-120 CE) wrote a series of parallel biographies of famous Greeks and Roman 
statesmen, including one on Pericles. Plutarch intended for his Lives to educate his contemporary 
Roman audience in the qualities of a good statesman, so he used a rhetorical strategy to 
emphasize the similarities between Greek and Roman history. On several occasions, Plutarch 
explained why Pericles allotted land in the way he did, but those motivations often shared a great 
deal with the motivations behind Roman land allotment at the time he was writing. Drawing on 
centuries of Roman political discourse, Plutarch saw Athenian land allotments in functional and 
moral terms: confiscations of land provided demographic relief to Athens’ urban center, gave a 
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sense of purpose to the poor, and established garrisons beside unruly coalition states. Because 
Diodorus privileged narrative over historical difference, and Plutarch privileged moral lessons 
over historical reconstruction, they both saw land allotment as a story about Athenian statesmen 
strategically building an empire.  
Even though the historical sources for Athenian land allotment are diverse in their 
purpose and level of detail, they share a common theme: land allotment united democratic and 
imperial politics. This is not surprising since the Athenians were, after all, a democracy for much 
of the time that they had an empire. Because Thucydides and Herodotus took land allotment for 
granted, and the inscriptions and later authors all somehow implicated democracy, it makes sense 
to explain Athenian imperial institutions as democratic institutions—or, rather, as state 
institutions. Since the historical sources tend to point towards an instrumentalist approach to 
Athenian imperialism, modern historians have understandably followed suite.  
Drawing on the close connection between democracy and empire, modern historians 
tend to see Athenian land allotment as a political masterstroke that served the interests of the 
Athenian state: it was a populist handout that appeased the masses and provided imperial 
stability abroad. For much of the twentieth century, this standard approach depicted the 
Athenian empire emanating outward from Athens and forced on its subjects as forms of 
political control and economic exploitation. Arnold Gomme, in his monumental commentary on 
Thucydides, argued that the Athenians expected cleruchs to fulfill their military service by 
living on their new land, and therefore cleruchies served as garrisons on the frontier. Similarly, 
Russell Meiggs and the editors of the Athenian Tribute Lists drew from fragmentary epigraphic 
evidence to suggest that the Athenians were dependent on cleruchies to exert control over 
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members of the Delian League, but they were willing to give compensation in the form of 
tribute reduction to those communities who lost their land. This model of a “citizen-garrison” 
became the standard explanation for Athenian cleruchies.21 
But Athenian narratives that stress the political motivations of the state have brought with 
them their own conceptual problems. Victor Ehrenberg has emphasized the limitations of 
positivism in Athenian imperial history, showing how Thucydides’ use of technical vocabulary—
especially for apoikiai and klērouchiai—cannot be mapped onto epigraphic sources. Consequently, 
Hugo Jones suggested that when historical sources spoke of the Athenian state “sending out” 
lotholders to their new land, we should not necessarily assume a form of settler colonialism. 
Instead, Jones offered an alternative explanation: the problem in Athens was essentially 
demographic, and traditional colonialism would have drained the democracy of its participating 
citizens. Therefore, klērouchoi often rented out their lots from back at Athens as “absentee 
landlords,” and the rent raised them to hoplite status—a form of social mobility for citizen-
soldiers. In a similar tack, Alexander John Graham argued that the basic difference between 
apoikoi and klērouchoi was that apoikoi became members of a new political community and thus lost 
their citizenship, whereas klērouchoi retained their citizenship and upheld their civic and military 
obligations to Athens.22 
For Jones, Athenian democracy was not implicated in imperialism. The initial critiques 
of the citizen-garrison model tried to show how the Athenians could profit economically from 
																																								 																				
21 For the historiographical shifts in Athenian imperialism in the early twentieth century and after the Second World War, see Kallet 
2009. For the standard explanation for Athenian cleruchies, see Gomme 1945: 344-347, 373-380; Meritt et al. 1950: 286-297; Meiggs 
1972: 261-262. For recent textbook uses of the citizen-garrison assumption, see Pomeroy et al. 2011: 237; Morris and Powell 2010: 284. 
22 Ehrenberg 1952; Jones 1957; Graham 1964. 
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imperial markets and land allotments, but empire itself was not a necessary condition for 
democracy at home. Returning to the instrumentalist premises of Gomme and Meiggs, Moses 
Finley argued that control of the Aegean was an instrument of Machtpolitik, not Handelspolitik: 
the Athenian state was never concerned with private profits, and there was never anything 
approaching a political economy like early-modern mercantilism. The allotment of confiscated 
land, therefore, did not directly benefit the democracy. For Jones and Finley, land allotment 
remained a story about imperial and military control. Since then, Thomas Figueira, Peter Brunt, 
Nicoletta Salomon, and Christophe Pébarthe have continued to add layers of complexity, but 
their commitment to the instrumentalist approach has done little to advance our understanding 
of land allotment beyond the intentions of the Athenian state.23 
In the last decade, historians have begun to take a more post-colonial perspective, 
looking at how cleruchies created on new forms of exploitation. Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz 
showed how historical sources portrayed cleruchs making an easy profit using dispossessed 
people as slave-like leaseholders, working the same land they used to own. Alfonso Moreno 
expanded on this view, and suggested that cleruchs were mostly elite Athenians who made a 
fortune by controlling the flow of rents and grain back to Athens, becoming tremendously 
wealthy in the process. To do so, he argued, they had to rely on a dense network of garrisons to 
control and coerce the people they dispossessed in frontier regions. By focusing on the 
																																								 																				
23 Finley 1981: 41-61. Figueira (1991), in an exhaustive study of historical and epigraphic evidence, made a strong distinction between 
apoikoi and klērouchoi. He argued that cleruchies were important to the defense of the empire not because they acted as garrisons, but 
because they increased the size of the Athenian army; apoikoi were independent political communities. Brunt (1993) argued that, unlike 
apoikoi, klērouchoi settled in areas where the original community was allowed to remain autonomous. Salomon (1997) assumed a single 
model for the fifth and fourth centuries, and argued that cleruchies were rotating garrisons settled on public plots of land. Pébarthe 
(2009) argued that cleruchies served as instruments of imperial control by ensuring that the elite of subjugated poleis could not amass 
large amounts of territory. For further debate on various technical issues about Athenian land tenure, see Gauthier 1973; Erxleben 1975. 
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exploitative nature of absenteeism, both Zelnick-Abramovitz and Moreno treated colonies and 
cleruchies as fundamentally different phenomena. But for Moreno, absenteeism was still backed 
up by a strong, centralized Athenian presence: the relationship between the Athenians and the 
dispossessed communities was still essentially a relationship between states.24  
Recent interest in global and economic history has prompted some historians to go so far 
as to question the very idea of the Athenian imperial state. Ian Morris has looked to cleruchies 
and the confiscation of land as a sign that the political boundaries of the Greek polis were 
breaking down, and the Athenian imperial project was nothing more than state formation 
taking its natural course across Aegean markets—creating along the way a “Greater Athenian 
State.” For Josiah Ober, cleruchies were symptomatic of larger economic processes at play. By 
harnessing agricultural surpluses and market connectivity, land allotment was a vehicle for 
broad economic growth. Athenian imperialism triggered an economic efflorescence, but the 
Athenians were not the only ones benefitting from it. Morris and Ober both placed Athenian 
land allotment within regional developments, but left unquestioned the reality of imperial land 
allotment: Morris equated economic integration with political integration, whereas Ober 
assumed that economic rationality offset the need for imperial control.25 In both cases, it is 
unclear why the Athenians allotted land the way they did in the fifth century.    
Though the study of Athenian land allotment has inspired a wide range of 
interpretations, the citizen-garrison model is still the standard explanation. Because no single 
ancient historical source discussed Athenian land allotment in much detail, the evidence is 
																																								 																				
24 Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004; Moreno 2007: esp. 87-143. For Moreno, klērouchoi were mostly elites who monopolized the grain trade.  
25 Morris 2009: 148-149. Ober 2015: 198-206. Both authors noted the ambiguities in the sources, but did not bring into question the 
standard explanation.  
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inconclusive at almost every turn: the historical sources do not offer any definitive answers to 
even the most basic historical questions. Consequently, most historians return to the familiar 
approach popularized by Gomme and Meiggs. Land allotment remains tethered to, and a tool 
of, the state, not an institution on its own terms.  
This chapter offers a new way forward: through a combination of historical, epigraphic, 
and archaeological sources, it moves beyond traditional instrumentalist approaches by de-
centering the Athenian state as the primary agent of empire. Far from serving the aims of the 
Athenian state, land allotment was driven by the private interests of its citizens. As we will see, in 
Athenian decision-making, there was no single policy towards land allotment and there was no 
single “Athenian imperialism”—land allotment never mapped neatly onto decisions of the Delian 
League. The andres Athenaioi who assembled each month were surely concerned about the welfare 
of the archē, but this did not mean that individual cleruchs then became representatives of the 
Athenian state, nor did it meant that the Athenians saw land allotment as a matter of imperial 
governance.26 Instead, land allotment was an opportunity for both mass and elite to individually 
pursue a new source of wealth. The main issue that the Athenians could agree on was that they 
wanted to find a way to keep a critical mass of citizens in Attica so that Athens would remain the 
economic and cultural center of the eastern Mediterranean. For that reason, they advanced their 
private interests by creating new markets for Athenian goods produced in Attica, collecting taxes 
from lotholders and tribute from settlers, and accumulating human capital at Athens.  
Through conquest, the Athenian military provided an opportunity for private citizens to 
make money from land confiscated from an unruly state. But the deal essentially ended there. 
																																								 																				
26 For concern about the archē, Thucydides’ speeches are particularly descriptive. The archē is also a recurring topic in Aristophanes. 
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Afterwards, when those who received a land allotment became either a settler or a lotholder, the 
Athenian navy only played a supporting role. Land allotment was thus a compromise between 
public equality and private inequality. Publically, each citizen could weigh in on decisions about 
the archē; but privately, the Athenians competed for a limited supply of imperial land.27 And since 
land allotment was open to all members of Athenian society, the elite could continue to increase 
their personal wealth within the institutional framework of the democracy.  
By reconstructing what the Athenians thought about imperial land rather than imposing 
on them a Roman model of success and control, this approach can accommodate the local 
variations suggested by archaeological evidence on Lemnos and Euboea. As we will see, Athenian 
views on imperial territory had little to do with the state precisely because they had deep roots in 
the Archaic period, a prehistory that had more to do with elite initiatives than state programs. By 
tracing the story of Athenian land allotment back to its origins in the Archaic period, we see that 
the Athenian empire threatened so many in the Greek world not just because it was so disruptive 
or so coercive in everyday life, but because it was so old, a vestige of the way elite competition 
used to play out in the Archaic period.  
   
3.2. The Archaic Origins of Athenian Land Allotment   
 For much of the Archaic period, the residents of Attica looked on as spectators to the 
expansion of Phoenicia and Lydia: unlike their neighbors in Euboea, Corinth, and Megara, they 
did not establish many overseas trading posts or settler colonies. Instead, the Athenians focused 
																																								 																				
27 For public equality and private inequality, see Ober 1989: 192-204. In Athens, there were far more citizens than recipients of klēroi, 
see Morris 2009: 148. Roughly 15,000 to 20,000 Athenians received land allotments, at a time when the total a citizen population of 
30,000 to 40,000 in any given year. 
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their efforts inwards on the intensification of agriculture within Attica by putting regional 
demographic growth to work on the land. Like most Greek communities at the time, the 
Athenians struggled to form a common identity; what set them apart, however, was that their 
chōra (or “countryside,” owned and worked by the citizens of the polis) was extraordinarily 
large by contemporary standards, at roughly 2,500 km2.28 Consequently, the Athenians’ Archaic 
history was a period mostly of “internal colonization” of the Attic countryside, whereby elites 
exploited members of their own community by limiting access to property rights.29 But as the 
Athenians began to experiment with land allotment at the end the sixth century, their 
experience of the Archaic world helped shape how they came to think about land outside of 
Attica. As we will see, Athenian ideas about imperial land came to focus on the private 
enrichment of citizens, a trend that privileged political insularity and economic centralization at 
Athens over any effort to collectively control people and land outside of Attica.  
In Attica, the development of an Athenian citizen community was the turning-point that 
pushed elite members to look beyond it for new sources of wealth. As demographic growth in the 
seventh century drove down the value of labor, Athenian elites were able to take advantage of 
subsistence conditions to bind indebted Athenians in serf-like conditions. But faced with internal 
strife, Athens’ ruling coalition of elites chose reform over collapse. In 594, Solon—armed with an 
elite mandate—made it so citizens could no longer be held in debt-bondage and extended 
property rights to all Athenians.30 Solon’s reforms had a profound effect on Athenian labor 
																																								 																				
28 Anderson (2003) showed that the Athenian political community was not fully integrated in Attica until the end of the sixth century. 
29 Internal colonization was a process in which elites exploited members of their own community by limiting access to property rights. 
30 For Solon’s reforms, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 2.2, 4.4, 6.1, 9.1; Plut. Solon 13.4, 15.2. For Athenian state-formation, debt, and slavery, see also 
Hammond 1961; Gallant 1982; Harris 2002; Morris 2002; Ober 2006: 144-153; 2015: 147; Zurbach 2013; 2017. 
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because, even with the steady expansion of slave labor during the late Archaic period, the costs of 
labor kept increasing as citizens made higher wages.31 The changing labor market, in turn, helped 
shape the early history of Athenian imperialism. At a time when elites were already competing 
for land in Attica, and citizen labor could no longer meet elite demand as before, some wealthy 
Athenians began to look abroad. In what followed, the first Athenians to confiscate land were 
elites acting on their own private initiatives, competing among each other to find new sources of 
wealth.32 For example, Miltiades took over the Gallipoli peninsula in the mid-540s with his own 
private army, and the harvests from his new estates, worked by locals, he sold on Aegean markets 
to become immensely wealthy.33 He also rewarded his recruits with their own land. Beyond just 
enriching himself, Miltiades showed how imperial sources of private wealth did not have to rely 
on a commitment from the entire political community at Athens—Miltiades’ imperialism was 
more elite opportunism than state-sponsored colonialism. After Miltiades, elite initiatives were 
also responsible for confiscations of land at Elaious and Sigeion by the Peisistratids, and later on 
the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, under the Kimonids.34  
Meanwhile, the growth of an Athenian market economy offered an alternative to elite 
opportunism, as Athens became a desirable place for merchants, craftsmen, and free laborers to 
																																								 																				
31 For economic inequality and greed after Solon’s reforms, see Balot 1997: 58-98. For the Classical period, see also Ober 1987: 192-
247. For rising wages, political commitments, and chattel slavery in Archaic Attica, see Scheidel 2008: 115-119; Zurbach 2013: 632-643. 
32 Figueira (1991: 132-142) calls these settlements “patronal” colonies, which were replaced in the fifth century by imperial colonies. 
Kallet (2013: 53) points out that individuals, such as Kimon, still played an important part in fifth-century imperialism. The 
difference was that individuals now could make use of a vast navy. For the Peisistratids in Thrace and the northern Aegean, see 
Sears 2013: 46-68. 
33 Hdt. 6.34-8. Herodotus wrote that Miltiades was disillusioned by Peisistratos’ consolidation of power, and then recruited a private 
army of willing Athenians to join him on an expedition to the Chersonesos. On the peninsula, he walled off the isthmus for 
protection, and soon took on the title of tyrannos. His wealth and successes as a commander earned him the admiration of Croesus. 
34 For Elaious, see Hdt. 6.140.1. For Sigeion, see Strabo 13.1.38; Hdt. 5.94-5. For Lemnos and Imbros, see Hecataeus apud Hdt. 6.137-140. 
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work and do business. The strains of population growth mixed with Attica’s notoriously poor 
conditions for farming meant that the Athenians had to make their import economy a priority, 
developing along the way highly integrated labor markets and institutions to exchange money 
and goods. Because the Athenians could not grow enough grain to sustain everyone, they became 
increasingly reliant on grain imports from across the Aegean.35 In return, the Athenians 
developed and accumulated new kinds of specialization and expertise, especially in the ceramics 
and banking industries, to produce items that could ultimately be exported.36 Under the 
Peisistratids, Athenian ceramic production began to outpace the Corinthians, and Athenian 
painted pottery broke into distant Mediterranean markets as far as Etruria. By the beginning of 
the fifth century, Athens’ three deep-water harbors were already attracting merchants from all 
over the Mediterranean. This allowed entrepreneuring Athenians to choose a life at the center of 
Athens’ market economy over the possibility of finding wealth abroad.  
As the effects of Solon’s reforms and the market economy took hold in Attica, the 
Athenians saw in the Spartans a model of how they could become a regional economic power 
without directly controlling people and land outside of Attica.37 Since the middle of the eighth 
century, the Spartans enslaved the people of Lakonia and Messenia (thereafter called “helots”) 
and divided their land into isoklēroi (or “equal lots”).38 The agricultural surplus from each plot 
																																								 																				
35 For population growth, grain, and the import market, see Osborne 1992; Hansen 2006a: 43-44; Foxhall 2007: esp. 55-83; Moreno 2007: 3-31. 
36 For monetization, see Davis 2011. For specialization, see Ober 2015: esp. 158, 172-174. For Athens’ ceramics industry, see Arafat and 
Morgan 1989; Cook 1997: 259-262; Acton 2014: 73-115. For Athenian pottery in Etruria, see Osborne 2001. 
37 For the Spartan conquest of Messenia, see Cartledge 1979; Ducat 1990a; Luraghi 2002; 2011. For Spartan exploitation of the helots 
and the Spartan klēros, see Hodkinson 1986; 1989; 1992; 2002; 2003; Ducat 1990b; Singor 1993; Alcock 2002; Figueira 2003; 2004a; 2004b. 
For contact between the Athenians and Spartans, see Cartledge 1979; Powell 1988. The Spartans had close contact with the Athenian 
tyrants. Moreno (2007: 320) suggested in passing that the Athenian exploitation of cleruchies may have been similar to Spartan helotage. 
38 The Spartan state technically owned the land, but landholders could pass on their klēros to their children, see Hodkinson 2000: 65-104.  
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sustained a single citizen family living far away in Sparta, and produced a sort of economic 
baseline across Spartan society. Because of their surplus of grain, the Spartans never had to rely 
on overseas imports of agricultural staples or even attempt to diversify their economy, as the 
Athenians had.39 The Spartan empire in the southern Peloponnese was thus an empire of 
surpluses: the Spartans received just enough to sustain each family equally and, in doing so, to 
sustain their militarized society. Consequently, the Spartans showed little interest in imperial 
expansion for much of the Archaic and Classical periods. Even so, the Athenians witnessed 
firsthand just how the Spartans used coercion alone, achieved through annual violent raids, to 
rule over the helots from back in Sparta.40 By coercing the helots from a distance, the Spartans 
remained a closed political community without having to directly govern and settle among the 
helots. The Spartans were thus a quintessentially Greek insular community: a politically 
autonomous city-state insulated, much like an island, from its neighbors. 
What the Athenians saw in Spartan history was the value of coercion from a distance, but 
the way the Spartans actually shared imperial land was at odds with how the Athenians 
prioritized their merchant culture. At the end of the Archaic period, Sparta was undoubtedly the 
predominant Greek state and the Athenians saw it as a model for what a Greek polis could 
achieve. And because most sizeable communities in the Greek world valued insular polis life over 
federalism, Spartan coercion from a distance was also very Greek, as it were, and easily 
transferable to Athens.41 But Spartan allotment emphasized the equality of outcome from empire 
																																								 																				
39 Cavanagh 2009, with Cavanagh et al. 1996-2002. 
40 According to Plutarch (Lyc. 28), the Spartans conducted raids on the helot population each autumn to reinforce the threat of violence.  
41 This is not to deny, of course, the importance of federal political structures, which Emily Mackil (2013) has recently demonstrated. For 
Spartan power as a Greek model, see Cartledge 2001: 153-166. For Greek culture at the end of the Archaic period, see Hall 2002: 172-204.  
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for a relatively small citizen population (hence the isoklēroi), an outcome that the Athenians could 
not easily square with the growing merchant culture at Athens and the reality of private 
inequality for their much larger community.  
To the east, the Achaemenid Persians were experimenting with a more de-centered, or 
even “entrepreneurial,” approach to imperial land that may have appealed to Athenian ideas 
about private wealth and the market economy.42 As Persian armies swept across Mesopotamia to 
the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean in the second half of the sixth century, the Achaemenid 
king himself claimed ownership of all conquered lands. Afterwards, he divided up the land into 
plots of various sizes, with the majority of royal lands going to soldiers as payment for their 
service. The emperor collected taxes from each plot by bundling them into groups, called hatrus. 
Landholders from each hatru then hired “firms” of tax-farmers, who Matthew Stolper aptly called 
“entrepreneurs,” to rent the land to local farmers. The Murašû firm, for example, collected rent 
from sub-tenant farmers in kind, sold the produce on the market, then paid the landholders their 
rent in silver.43 Persian soldiers were free to live away from their plots, and could pay the imperial 
land tax with silver provided for them by the firms. Though Persian land tenure invited a kind of 
imperial absenteeism, the Persians still reinforced rural areas such as Greek Anatolia with a thin, 
but inescapable military presence.44  
																																								 																				
42 For exchanges between the Athenians and the Achaemenid Persians, see Balcer 1984; Carradice 1987; Miller 1997; Raaflaub 2009. For 
the Persian empire in Anatolia, see Sekunda 1985; 1988; Balcer 1991; Bakir 2001; Dusinberre 2003; 2013; Delemen 2007; Roosevelt 2009.  
43 For “entrepreneurs” and empire in Achaemenid Persia, see Stolper 1985. Stolper (1985: 26-27) explained that imperial “taxes paid 
in silver favored the transformation of fiefs from subsistence allotments into cash-producing rental properties. Absentee ownership 
of estates required local management…The Murašû firm provided such a service.” For a recent overview of the Persian empire, see 
Wiesehöfer 2009. 
44 For Persian garrisons in Anatolia, see Dusinberre 2013: 86-113. For the fortified stronghold of Şahankaya in northern Lydia, see 
Roosevelt 2009: 118-120. Roosevelt (2009: 110-115) showed how Persian land tenure led to a rise in rural settlements in greater Lydia. 
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Though living on the opposite side of the Aegean, the Athenians were in contact with 
their fellow Ionians in Anatolia who experienced firsthand the Persian empire of entrepreneurs 
and rentiers. From their short-lived alliance with Persia in 507 and their role in the Ionian Revolt, 
the Athenians must have learned how Persian land allotment accommodated state and 
entrepreneurial interests: on the one hand, the Persian state collected a central imperial tax by 
sharing some of the proceeds with firms of tax farmers; on the other hand, Persian soldiers 
received rents from imperial lands granted through royal charter.45 Unlike the Spartans, the 
Persian state was willing to invest in imperial lands, both institutionally and militarily. 
Furthermore, this was not just an empire of agricultural surpluses: Persian landholders received 
their rents in coin, which placed them within a monetized market of exchange. Though the 
Athenians, like the Spartans, would come to favor coercion from a distance, their familiarity with 
private forms of wealth and a market economy invited them to think about imperial land in a way 
more in line with the Persians. 
Finally, technological and political developments at the end of the Archaic period in 
Attica helped the Athenians make coercion from a distance a reality, but also forced the elite 
among them to extend shares of imperial land to the masses. As the Achaemenids extended 
their empire westwards through Anatolia and the Levant, and then into the eastern 
Mediterranean with their command of the formidable Phoenician navy, the Athenians started to 
replace pentekonters with triremes in the 520s. With the new warships came greater demands 
for material, manpower, and storage: requirements for wood more than doubled, and the size of 
																																								 																				
45 During the democratic coup of 508/7, the Athenians sent an embassy to Sardis to make an alliance with the Persians against the 
Spartans, see Hdt. 5.73. For the Ionian Revolt, see Cawkwell 2005: 61-86.  
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crews nearly quadrupled.46 Consequently, as naval warfare scaled up, Athenian elites found it 
more difficult to recruit and supply overseas expeditions on their own. But after the democratic 
unification of Attica in 508/7, and then the investment in a new navy of two hundred triremes in 
the 480s, the Athenians had the violent means to confiscate more land.47 As we will see, over time 
the Athenians’ commitment to naval power allowed them to confiscate land far away from 
Athens without also having to garrison every corner of the Aegean Sea. In the immediate 
aftermath of the democratic coup, the high levels of intensive power generated by Kleisthenes’ 
reforms pushed Athens outwards in a burst of imperial energy, leading to the Athenians’ first 
imperial confiscations at Chalkis in 506, and again shortly thereafter on Salamis.48 
At the end of the sixth century, the Athenians were just starting their transition from city-
state to empire, a process that would unsettle the eastern Mediterranean for over a century. By 
exploring the Archaic origins of Athenian land allotment, we saw that elite competition under the 
Peisistratids taught the Athenians that imperial sources of wealth could exist in the absence of the 
state and that private inequality was built into Athenian society. We also saw how the Athenians 
drew from their imperial neighbors to devise an alternative way of thinking about imperial land 
than the settler colonialism of their contemporaries: a kind of imperial absenteeism that united 
																																								 																				
46 For secondary state-formation in Athens, the adoption of the trireme, and the politics of scaling up, see Davies 2013: 49-50; Kallet 
2013. With the transition from pentekonters to triremes, Davies (2013: 50) estimated that wood requirements would have risen from 
10 to 25 tons, and crews would have risen from 50+ to 200 per ship. Also, the triremes would have needed new ship-sheds and 
equipment storage at Piraeus. For the importance of Macedonian timber for the Athenian fleet, see Bissa 2009: 111-140; Meiggs 1982: 
126-130, 188-217. 
47 For opportunism, see Davies 2013: 61. For Kleisthenes’ reforms at Athens, see Ober 1996: 32-52; Anderson 2000. For the proceeds from 
the Laureion mines used to build triremes after 483, see Hdt. 7.144. For the navy, see Jordan 1975; Morrison et al. 2000; Strauss 2000; 2004: 
xvii-xxi; Lovén 2012; De Souza 2017; Gabrielsen 2017. For sea power as democracy-friendly form of warfare, see Strauss 1996; 2009: 224. 	
48 For Chalkis, see Hdt. 5.77.2; 6.100.1. For Salamis, see IG I3 1. But because of its proximity to Athens, Salamis became an “unofficial” 
part of Attica and never joined the Delian League, see Taylor 1997; Hansen 2004. This explains their taxes and military service (IG I3 1, l. 3). 
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Spartan coercion from a distance with an entrepreneuring infrastructure adapted from the Persian 
east. As we follow the story of Athenian land allotment into the fifth century, a period when 
Athens matured as a metropolitan center, we can see how this alternative approach to imperial 
land became desirable to elites and entrepreneurs who did not want to give up their standing at 
Athens or who, alternatively, wanted to benefit from the perks of Athens’ markets. The Archaic 
origins of Athenian land allotment presented two separate, though ultimately complementary, 
approaches to imperial land: Athenians could choose to become settlers in an insular colony or 
rentier lotholders living back at Athens. In either case, Athenian land allotment upheld the 
opportunistic approach to elite competition in the Archaic world: it was a decentralized process, 
driven more by private interests than any collective interest in controlling imperial land to benefit 
the Athenian state.  
Even as we acknowledge that Athenian land allotment was firmly rooted in Archaic 
developments and Greek political culture, we must also acknowledge how the practice of 
allotting confiscated land to citizens emerged alongside new ideas about democracy. The 
democratic revolution of 508/7 was undoubtedly a transformative moment for Athenian 
imperialism: democracy was the energy that allowed for an Archaic phenomenon to be fully 
realized—it was the momentum that drove Athens’ transition to territorial empire. As naval 
warfare scaled up and the Athenians experimented with popular sovereignty, the elites 
recognized that imperialism would have to involve the masses.49 Consequently, private sources of 
imperial wealth were built into a democratic institution of allotment. The masses could share 
																																								 																				
49 The elite recognition that empire and naval warfare would have to involve the masses can be inferred from Themistokles’ naval 
law of 483/2, see Hdt. 7.144; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.7. The elites, including Themistokles himself, chose public investment in the navy 
over private gain.  
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more directly in the rewards of their empire, but the elites had found a way to institutionalize 
private wealth. Now, as we explore how Athenian ideas about imperial land matured in the fifth 
century, we will see how the Athenians quickly learned to prioritize their navy so they could take 
a passive role in their imperial territory.  
  
3.3. Compartmentalizing Imperial Territory  
As the Greek allied fleet sailed home from Byzantium in 478, the Athenians among them 
had much to be grateful for at the close of the Persian Wars.50 Two years after Xerxes pillaged 
Attica, their city lay in ruins, their fields unplowed, but the survivors still commanded the 
Aegean’s largest navy. The decision to abandon Athens and take to the sea two years before had 
secured their survival, and two great naval victories at Salamis and Myclae showed the promise 
of Athenian leadership. So when the Spartans shifted their attention to the security of the 
Peloponnese, the new anti-Persian coalition looked to Athens to lead the fight.51 The Delian 
League, as the coalition has come to be known, was asymmetrical from the start. Though the 
members agreed to share the burdens of patrolling the Aegean, only Athens and a few other 
states actually had the capacity to maintain and deploy the warships in large numbers. Before 
long, most members chose to defer active duty and instead pay a tax, or rather tribute, leaving the 
Athenians to man the fleet.52 This left the Athenians with a monopoly on violence in the eastern 
Mediterranean.53 From it emerged a new approach to imperial territory.  
																																								 																				
50 For the Greek siege of Byzantium at the end of the Greco-Persian wars in 478, see Thuc. 1.94.2. Victory meant control of the Propontis. 
51 Thuc. 1.94-96. The Spartans were probably concerned with the immediate threat of the helots and restive neighbors, not the Persians. 
52 But not all rowers of Athenian triremes were Athenian: many rowers were resident foreigners who earned a wage rowing in the fleet. 
By the mid-fifth century, only Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were contributing ships. After revolting, the Samians lost their ships in 439 
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In 476, just two years after the Greeks came together in a show of unity at Delos, the 
Athenians began to test their navy as a tool for coercion from a distance. The first official act of 
the coalition was a great naval victory against the Persians at Eion, led by Kimon, son of 
Miltiades, of Gallipoli fame. Kimon was quick to follow the allied show of force with an 
Athenian show of force. On their return home across the Aegean, the Athenian navy landed at 
Skyros and forcefully removed from the island the local population, who Kimon accused of 
“piracy.” Afterwards, the Athenians allotted the land to settlers, who thereafter decided to live 
on the vacant island and formed a new colony. Kimon then sailed to Karystos on Euboea, and 
forced the community there to join the league. Nearby, the island community of Naxos looked 
on as the tide turned against coalition members, and renounced their membership. The 
Athenian navy promptly set sail, laid siege to the city of Naxos, and forced the Naxians to 
renew their commitment. The success of the Naxian campaign set an important precedent: the 
promise of retaliation from the Athenian navy worked so well as a projection of force that the 
Athenians could enforce the regular flow of taxes and trade from back at Athens.54 Though 
separated from Athens by the Aegean Sea, coalition members could count on being coerced 
from a distance. 55  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
(Thuc. 1.117.3), and the Mytileneans lost theirs in 428 (Thuc. 3.50.1). At its height, the Athenian navy had 300 ships (Thuc. 2.13.8), which 
would have required some 50,000 rowers, comparable to the Carthaginian navy during the First Punic War, see Pilkington 2013: 332-333. 
53 The Athenians were comparatively sparing in their use of violence against allies. Strauss (2009: 16) argues that “Athens’ problem in 
the decades after 479 was not that it used too much muscle against its fellow Greeks; its problem, rather, was that it used too little.” 
54 For recognition that the navy was a deterrent and allowed for coercive from a distance, see Thuc. 1.142-143, 5.97; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 
2.1-6. [Xenophon] (Ath. Pol. 2.2-3) wrote that the navy made coalition members remain loyal through the threat of starvation and fear. 
55 For Skyros, see Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.60.2; Plut. Cim. 8.3-7; Thes. 36.1-2; Nepos Cim. 2.5; Paus. 1.17.6; Ephorus FGH 70 191.10. For 
Karystos, see Thuc. 1.98.3; Hdt. 8.112, 8.121, 9.105. For Naxos and the precedent set by the Athenians’ retaliation, see Thuc. 1.98.4. In 465, 
the Athenians sailed to Thasos to the same effect, see Thuc. 1.100.2, 1.101; Plut. Cim. 8.2; Nepos Cim. 2.2.  
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Because the Aegean Sea allowed them to mobilize their navy so efficiently, the 
Athenians chose to compartmentalize their empire: there was their own citizen territory in 
Attica and then there was their imperial territory of land allotments and tribute-paying allies. 
This distinction meant that the Athenian state—the collective interests of the Athenian political 
community—ended at the borders of Attica: beyond it, as we will see, the Athenians saw 
imperial land as something to be exploited individually and by new communities, distinct from 
the interests of Athenian state. Consequently, as the Delian League consolidated around Athens 
in the second quarter of the fifth century, coalition members could only expect to deal directly 
with the Athenian state in one of three ways: with traveling imperial officials, through local 
proxenoi, and, in rare cases, garrisons. These officials, and the institutions they represented, 
constituted the “official” Athenian empire. But the Athenian empire, still an infant at the time of 
its death, was not just the sum of its official structures. There were also the individual 
Athenians who received allotments of confiscated land in coalition territory. Each one of them 
made money from land confiscated by the Athenian state, but the Athenians’ insular view of 
citizen territory left them on their own once they left Attica.  
This was because the Athenians chose to populate their imperial territory with remarkably 
few representatives of the Athenian state.56 The entire Delian League of around two-and-a-half 
million Greeks had, according to the author of the Athēnaiōn Politeia, no more than 700 imperial 
officials, each community receiving only a handful and often for very short periods.57 The 
Athenians sent out four kinds of imperial magistrates: the archontes, who were mostly arbiters of 
																																								 																				
56 Because Athens controlled subject states without imposing a governor, Doyle (1986: 54-81) deemed it a form of “hegemonic empire.” 
57 For the approximate population of the Athenian Empire, see Ober 2015: 38, table 2.3. For Athenian imperial officials, see Balcer 
1976. [Arist.] (Ath. Pol. 24.3) says that there were 700 imperial officials at the height of the empire. 
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justice; the episkopoi, who ensured the timely collection of tribute and supervised the 
establishment of new governments; the phrourarchoi, the semi-permanent garrison commanders; 
and the kērukes, the messengers who traveled around to introduce new Athenian decrees. Of all 
four groups, the only continual Athenian presence in a community was the phrourarchoi and their 
hoplite retinue, who undoubtedly won little favor among locals as an occupation force. In all, 
imperial magistrates, who came and went throughout the year, had little impact on daily life 
throughout the empire.  
The Athenians had a plan to deal with local affairs when they were not around: they 
repurposed the old Greek institution of proxenia (of identifying “supportive foreigners”) as an 
imperial institution. As elsewhere in the Greek world, a grant of proxenia was a public 
acknowledgment of friendship between the Athenians and a member of another community’s 
elite. When the Athenians voted to grant the title of proxenos to a member of an allied community, 
the recipient had the full political weight of the Athenian state behind him—and he could shift 
that weight to help his standing in the community. In return, the proxenos was expected to defend 
Athens’ interests, steer local opinion, and relay political intelligence.58 For example, in 428 the 
proxenoi on Lesbos first alerted the Athenians to the Mytileneans’ plans to revolt.59  
When both imperial officials and local proxenoi failed to prevent opposition, the Athenians 
occasionally established a garrison somewhere in an unruly community’s territory. In his history, 
																																								 																				
58 For a recent treatment of the title of proxenos, see Mack 2015. There are more than thirty fifth-century proxenos decrees. IG I3 110, 
which honors Oiniades of Skiathos c. 408/7, is the most complete decree. Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 276) explain that “Skiathos, though a 
small island in the northern Sporades and thinly populated, had a good harbor which was important to Athenian ships sailing to and 
from Thrace and Euxine.” Because of the island’s strategic utility, the Athenians could count on Oiniades as a source of local support. 
59 Thuc. 3.2.3. The Mytilenean proxenoi joined the Tenedians and Methymnians to warn the Athenians about the revolt. As a result, 
the Athenians had the opportunity to put down the revolt before it gained momentum. For a proxenos effecting policy, see Thuc. 2.85.5.  
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Thucydides gave the impression that the Athenians took a very active role in occupying their 
imperial territory: he calculated that, at the start of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had 
some 16,000 hoplites split evenly between garrisons throughout the empire and guarding Athens’ 
fortifications.60 But the garrisons he described in his narrative were often very small and operated 
mostly as staging points for the Athenians to harm the surrounding countryside. Furthermore, 
garrisons were rare, and often reactionary measures during wartime—only increasing in number 
during the strains of the Peloponnesian War. Even so, of the thirty or so garrisons throughout the 
empire for which we have evidence, there is no mention of a garrison in a city or territory where 
the Athenians confiscated land. Yet these lands were, in all likelihood, the most contentious 
spaces in the empire.  
For that reason, modern historians tend to assume that the recipients of land allotments 
must have filled in for the Athenian state as imperial garnisaires. In this view, Athenian 
landholders accomplished what imperial officials, proxenoi, and garrisons could not. To be sure, it 
is easy to get this impression reading Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War. For example, 
Thucydides wrote that the Athenians allotted land to settlers at Histiaia (though nowhere else on 
Euboea) in 448 as punishment for the Euboean revolt.61 In the absence of imperial officials, it is 
reasonable enough for us to assume that the Athenians used land allotment as a projection of 
force against unruly coalition members, like the Romans after them. But we must also recall that 
the Athenians began confiscating land well before the formation of the Delian League: for that 
																																								 																				
60 Thuc. 2.13.6. For Athenian garrisons, see Nease 1949; Meiggs 1972: 206-207. Thucydides used the terms phulakes and phrourioi 
interchangeably, see Thuc. 4.96.9; 4.100.5. The Athenians sometimes set up garrisons inside the city of an allied state during the strains 
of wartime, see Thuc. 4.113.2. For garrisons as staging points for raids and incursions into the countryside, see Thuc. 1.142.4; 4.45.2. 
61 For Histiaia, see Thuc. 1.114.  
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reason, land allotment could not have been a simple structural response to the burden of holding 
together a coalition of states. Even more, there is very little evidence to suggest that the Athenians 
set up many garrisons before the onset of the Peloponnesian War, even in areas subjected to land 
allotment.62 And as we will see on the islands of Lemnos and Euboea, when the Athenians who 
received land allotments came together to form a new colony outside of Attica, they only did so 
after forcefully removing the local community or employing its members as laborers, in which 
case there was no longer a state for the Athenians to guard against. Rather, the Athenians used 
their navy to coerce the people in their imperial territory from a distance. 
It is less clear, however, what the Athenians collectively hoped to get from their imperial 
territory if they fought together to confiscate land but afterwards the state had little to do with 
it.  In fact, the three best descriptions of Athenian land allotment from antiquity offer 
contradictory accounts of what they wanted from their imperial territory. First, the only time 
Thucydides ever referred directly to land allotment, he described in some detail how the 
Athenians experimented with different forms of landownership when they punished the 
Mytilenaeans for revolting in 427:  
ὕστερον δὲ φόρον µὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν 
τῆς Μηθυµναίων τρισχιλίους τριακοσίους µὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροὺς ἐξεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς 
ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχόντας ἀπέπεµψαν: οἷς ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι 
ταξάµενοι τοῦ κλήρου ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο µνᾶς φέρειν αὐτοὶ εἰργάζοντο 
τὴν γῆν.63 
After which [the Athenians] imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute; but having 
divided their land (all but that of the Methymnaeans) into three thousand plots, three 
																																								 																				
62 There is only evidence for six garrisons before the Peloponnesian War, none in areas with land confiscations: Erythrae (IG I3 14); 
Aigina (IG I3 38); Megara (Thuc. 1.103.4; 1.114.1); Miletus (IG I3 21, l. 75); Byzantium (Aristoph. Wasps 235-7); Samos (Thuc. 1.115.2-5). 
63 Thuc. 3.50.2 (cf. IG I3 66; Diod. 12.55.10; 12.72.2). This is Thucydides’ only use of klērouchia and its cognates. According to Diodorus 
(12.55.1), the Athenians wanted to prevent a pan-Lesbian synoikismos, hence their intervention. 
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hundred of those parts [of the choicest land] they consecrated to the gods, and the rest, 
they assigned by lot to lotholders sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed 
to pay in silver two minae a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land themselves. 
After tearing down the Mytileneans’ walls, and repossessing their navy, the Athenians 
confiscated all agricultural lands on the island (except the territory of the Methymnaeans, who 
had helped uncover the revolt). Afterwards, the Athenians divided the island into three 
thousand plots, set aside three hundred as sacred property, and “sent out” lotholders to manage 
the rest. But instead of working the land themselves, the lotholders rented out their plots back 
to the Lesbians at two minae a year. Though the Mytilenaeans no longer had to pay 
contributions to the Delian League, instead they paid a tax to individual Athenians for the 
privilege of working their own land. In what Thucydides described, the Athenians who 
received land allotments were actually rentiers and were free to leave the island because they 
did not have to work the land themselves. 
Second, Isocrates promised in his Panegyricus that the Athenians in 380 had finally 
buried their imperial aspirations, and they no longer wanted to take land from their allies. 
Writing just a few years before the first summit of the Second Athenian League, he hoped that 
his readers would recall how the Athenians defended Greek freedom for nearly seventy years, 
but were scorned nonetheless: 
ὑπὲρ ὧν προσήκει τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας µεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν πολὺ µᾶλλον ἢ τὰς 
κληρουχίας ἡµῖν ὀνειδίζειν, ἃς ἡµεῖς εἰς τὰς ἐρηµουµένας τῶν πόλεων φυλακῆς 
ἕνεκα τῶν χωρίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ πλεονεξίαν ἐξεπέµποµεν. 64 
On account of these services it becomes all thinking men to be deeply grateful to us, much 
rather than to reproach us because of our system of colonization; for we sent out 
[lotholders] into depopulated states for their protection and not out of greed.  
																																								 																				
64 Isoc. 4.107. For commentary and intellectual context, see Usher 1999: 298-301. 
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For Isocrates, the allies’ critiques of lotholders were unwarranted because the Athenians were 
only using land in depopulated states—though he said nothing about how it was actually the 
Athenians who often depopulated those states in the first place. The way Isocrates remembered 
it, land allotment offered protection and the Athenians only did it out of concern, not personal 
greed. Isocrates seems to have been actively rebranding, or rather sanitizing, the memory of 
Athenian land allotment to match the uneasy political climate that saw Athenian leadership 
with suspicion. He hoped that his fellow Greeks would remember the Athenian empire as a 
project in moderation compared to their true enemies, the Persians. Athenian citizens may have 
been the most immediate beneficiaries of imperial land, but it was for the greater good of the 
Greek world.  
Finally, Plutarch in his Life of Pericles styled Pericles the populist extraordinaire of fifth-
century Athens because of how he divided up land among Attica’s poor and providing wages for 
naval service. Writing over five centuries after Pericles’ death, Plutarch saw Athenian land 
allotment in functional and moral terms: confiscations of land provided demographic relief to 
Athens’ urban center, gave a sense of purpose to the poor, and established garrisons beside 
unruly coalition states:  
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις χιλίους µὲν ἔστειλεν εἰς Χερρόνησον κληρούχους, εἰς δὲ Νάξον 
πεντακοσίους, εἰς δὲ Ἄνδρον τοὺς ἡµίσεις τούτων, εἰς δὲ Θρᾴκην χιλίους Βισάλταις 
συνοικήσοντας, ἄλλους δ᾽ εἰς Ἰταλίαν οἰκιζοµένης Συβάρεως, ἣν Θουρίους 
προσηγόρευσαν. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραττεν ἀποκουφίζων µὲν ἀργοῦ καὶ διὰ σχολὴν 
πολυπράγµονος ὄχλου τὴν πόλιν, ἐπανορθούµενος δὲ τὰς ἀπορίας τοῦ δήµου, φόβον 
δὲ καὶ φρουρὰν τοῦ µὴ νεωτερίζειν τι παρακατοικίζων τοῖς συµµάχοις. 65 
In addition to this, he dispatched a thousand lotholders to the Chersonesos, and five 
hundred to Naxos, and to Andros half that number, and a thousand to Thrace to settle 
with the Bisaltae, and others to Italy, when the site of Sybaris was settled, which they 
																																								 																				
65 Plut. Per. 11.6. For a similar critique of the Athenian urban poor as lazy and “idle busybodies” in Thucydides, see Thuc. 6.82.1. 
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named Thurii. All this he did by way of lightening the city of its mob of lazy and idle 
busybodies, rectifying the embarrassments of the poorer people, and giving the allies for 
neighbors an imposing garrison which should prevent rebellion.  
For Plutarch, Athenian land allotments, like their Roman equivalents of the mid. Republic, 
involved large population movements and close contact between settlers and dispossessed. But 
the similarities to Rome are not surprising: Plutarch intended for his Lives to educate his 
contemporary audience in the qualities of a good statesman, and therefore he used a rhetorical 
strategy to emphasize the similarities between Greek and Roman history.66 Like his Roman 
counterpart Fabius Maximus, Pericles’ life was a delicate balance of political and military 
leadership at a time of imperial expansion and colonization. As such, his life was a lesson on how 
to govern an unruly mass of citizens—both at home and abroad—and therefore land allotment 
served a dual function of resolving democratic folly at home and securing empire abroad.  
It is hard to reconcile Thucydides’ description of Mytilene with Isocrates’ and Plutarch’s 
later reconstructions of imperial territory. On Lesbos, Thucydides described a fairly localized 
process of extraction between a defeated community and individual Athenian citizens. Though 
the Athenians lotholders initially left Athens to get their affairs in order on the island, they did 
not necessarily have to live on the land themselves. In contrast, Isocrates’ defense of Athens’ 
imperial territory emphasized the movement of Athenian populations from Athens to their 
land. Plutarch envisioned a similar arrangement, where poor Athenians settled throughout the 
empire and, in doing so, secured it. In Thucydides’ view, Athenian cleruchies might be seen as a 
variation on Persian hatrus. But according to Isocrates and Plutarch, the Athenians approach to 
imperial territory was all about imperial control.  
																																								 																				
66 For commentary on Plutarch’s Life of Pericles, his moral and pedagogical purpose, and his Roman context, see Stadlter 1989: xxix-lii. 
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Yet, as Hugo Jones pointed out long ago, if Athenian lotholders were supposed to be a sort 
of ad hoc garrison, as Isocrates and Plutarch suggested, they did a remarkably poor job: neither 
Thucydides, nor any ancient author, mentioned an Athenian on allotted land helping out during a 
revolt.67 Though Jones’ argument from silence is tempting, it does not say what the Athenians 
thought of their imperial territory, just what they did not think of it. More importantly, it is 
unclear whether Thucydides’ treatment of Lesbos held for all other land allotments during the 
fifth century.68 Whereas Thucydides was only describing a single occasion, Isocrates and Pericles 
synthesizing what they considered—or at least what they wanted their audience to consider—to 
be the most salient qualities of land allotment. Perhaps Thucydides described the events on 
Lesbos because they were exceptional. 
In fact, the opposite was probably true: Thucydides was highly selective in his narrative of 
the Peloponnesian War and he chose individual cases to foreshadow and illustrate broader 
trends. As a result, he did not mention every instance of Athenian land allotment: Thucydides did 
not mention the land allotments on the Gallipoli peninsula or the island of Naxos, for example.69 
Just as the chilling effects of stasis at Corcyra foreshadowed the threat of political collapse at 
Athens, so too might the events on Lesbos have foreshadowed what the Athenians hoped to gain 
from their Sicilian campaign twelve years after the events at Mytilene.70 Diodorus, for one, wrote 
																																								 																				
67 Jones 1957: 174-175. Just a few years after confiscation land on the island of Lesbos, the Mitylenaeans were able to seize Rhoeteum 
and Antandrus and raid Lesbos (Thuc. 4.52). Later in the war in 411, the Chians brought about the revolt of Methymna and 
Mitylene (Thuc. 8.22). Also in 411, the Peloponnesian army helped all of Euboea revolt except Histiaia/Oreos, which was an 
Athenian settlement (8.95.7). 
68 Thucydides was very selective in the settlements he mentioned: Skyros (Thuc. 1.98.2); Amphipolis (Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.102.2); Histiaia 
(Thuc. 1.114.2-3, 7.52.7; 8.95.7); Aigina (Thuc. 2.27; 8.69.3); Poteidaia (Thuc. 2.70.4); Kolophon (Thuc. 3.34.1-4); Melos (Thuc. 5.116).  
69 For land allotment on the Chersonesos and Naxos in the middle of the fifth century, see Andoc. 3.9; Aesch. 2.175; Plut. Per. 11.5; 19.1.  
70 Nikias, in his critique of Alkibiades, argued that Athens was too far away from Sicily to exert its power on the island, see Thuc. 6.11.1. 
	 	
 
	
101 
that the Athenians were “looking forward to dividing up Sicily into allotments.”71 In Thucydides’ 
narrative, the Athenians’ campaign on Lesbos came right after Pericles’ death, marking the 
beginning of a series of events that culminated in the disaster at Syracuse and decline of Athenian 
archē. Perhaps, then, Thucydides meant to signal that the Athenians imagined their future selves 
as rentier lotholders when they set sail to Sicily in 415.  
From what we can tell from contemporary evidence, the Athenians were no strangers to 
owning land in their imperial territory from back at Athens. For example, a fragmentary 
inscription from Euboea dating from the 420s and the famous Attic Stelai from 414 show how 
private Athenians possessed agricultural land scattered all over the Aegean in the latter half of 
the fifth century. The first inscription recorded a lease agreement for an Athenian named 
Panaitios, who was renting several temene (or “sacred properties”) from the Athenian state 
across Euboea.72 Though the rest of the inscription is almost completely damaged, save the first 
few words on each line, you can just make out ἐν Χα[λκίδι] (“in Chalkis”), [ἐν Ἑσ]τιαίαι (“in 
Histiaia”), and ἐν Ἐρε[τρίαι] (“in Eretria”). For his property in Chalkis, he agreed to pay twenty 
drachma per year for an olive grove and land to grow wheat and vines. Likewise, the Attica 
Stelai recorded properties from all over the Aegean that were confiscated from Alkibiades and 
his fellow Hermokopidai and auctioned off in 414.73 The register listed properties on Thasos, 
Euboea, and Abydos. Though it is impossible to say whether or not these were originally land 
allotments, what is clear is that Athenians like Panaitios would not have been able to live and 
																																								 																				
71 Diod. 13.2.2, with Thuc. 6.18.3; Diod. 12.54.1; 13.30.1. Diodorus used the verb κατακληρουχέω to describe the Athenians’ intentions. 
72 For rented land on Euboea, see IG I3 418, with Raubitschek 1943: 28-33; Lalonde et al. 1991: 171-2; Wallace and Figueira 2013: 252. 
73 For the Attic Stelai, see IG I3 422, with Pritchett and Pippin 1956. 
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work at each of his properties on Euboea simultaneously.74 One of Alkibiades’ co-conspirators 
named Adeimantos owned a farm on Thasos, and yet he too was living in Athens when he 
helped Alkibiades vandalize the city’s hermai statues. For the Athenians, owning imperial land 
did not mean that they could not also live in Athens.  
This appears to have been the case for the Athenians who had land allotments at Mytilene, 
where the Mytilenaeans continued to live on their land and send payments to Athens. A decade 
after the revolt, Antiphon wrote a speech in defense of a Mytilenaean named Euxitheos, who 
stood accused of murdering an Athenian named Herodes. The young man recalled how his father 
was forced into exile for his part in the revolt, while most Mytileneans were granted an amnesty 
that allowed them to continue living on their own land, so long as they kept paying their taxes:  
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὑµεῖς τοὺς αἰτίους τούτων ἐκολάσατε, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ὢν ὁ ἐµὸς πατήρ, τοῖς 
δ᾽ ἄλλοις Μυτιληναίοις ἄδειαν ἐδώκατε οἰκεῖν τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι 
ὕστερον αὐτῷ ἡµάρτηται [τῷ ἐµῷ πατρί], οὐδ᾽ ὅ τι οὐ πεποίηται τῶν δεόντων, οὐδ᾽ ἧς 
τινος λῃτουργίας ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γεγένηται, οὔτε ἡ ὑµετέρα οὔτε ἡ Μυτιληναίων, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ χορηγίας χορηγεῖ καὶ τέλη κατατίθησιν… ἅπασι γὰρ Μυτιληναίοις ἀείµνηστος ἡ 
τότε ἁµαρτία γεγένηται: ἠλλάξαντο µὲν γὰρ πολλῆς εὐδαιµονίας πολλὴν 
κακοδαιµονίαν, ἐπεῖδον δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα ἀνάστατον γενοµένην.75 
 
From the moment you punished the leaders of the revolt—of whom my father was not 
found to be one—and granted the other Mytilenaeans an amnesty which allowed them 
to continue living on their own land, he has not been guilty of a single fault, of a single 
lapse from duty. He has failed neither the city of Athens nor that of Mytilene, when a 
public service was demanded of him; he regularly furnishes choruses [to Mytilene], and 
always pays his taxes [to Athens]… The mistake will live in the memory of every citizen 
of Mytilene. They traded great prosperity for great misery, and saw their country pass 
into the possession of others.  
																																								 																				
74 Wallace and Figueira (2013: 252, with Gauthier 1973: 169; contra Moreno 2007: 89-90) argued that “These estates should not be thought 
of as part of the allotments to Tolmides’ cleruchs or of the land of the Hippobotai leased after 446, neither of which would be expected 
to be treated as an Athenians’ private property.” For IG I3 418, see Raubitschek 1943: 28-33; Lalonde et al. 1991: 154, 171-172; 
Polinskaya 2009: 251. For IG I3 422, see Pritchett 1953: 232; Erxleben 1975: 84-85; Finley 1981: 52; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004: 328, 332. 
75 Antiph. 5.76-77. Figueira (2008: 441-442) suggested that klēroi came from land owned by local elites, and the rent shifted to Athenians. 
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Euxitheos’ testimony seemed to suggest that the Athenians were “in possession” of Mytilene, 
but the Mytilenaeans still lived there and worked the land. It is also curious that, throughout his 
extended testimony, he never once mentioned an Athenian living on the island. Rather, 
Euxitheos and Herodes were traveling on a ship which sailed from Mytilene to Ainos, on the 
southeastern coast of Thrace, where Herodes planned to sell a number of slaves, perhaps after 
checking on his land on Mytilene.76 What we see is that Euxitheos knew full well that the 
Athenians considered Mytilene to be a part of their imperial territory and, to the Mytileaneans, 
that meant paying their rent to Athenian lotholders. After a decade had passed, Mytilene was 
no longer the prosperous city it had once been because so much of its citizens’ wealth was going 
to the Athenians. So even though Isocrates and Plutarch liked to remember Athenian 
landholders taking an active role garrisoning their empire, the reality of Athenian imperial 
territory was much more complicated than that.  
Overall, what the Athenians seem to have collectively wanted from their imperial territory 
was money to rebuild and invest in their metropole. Even though the Athenians had made 
Athens into an active economic and cultural center during the Archaic period, Xerxes’ campaign 
into Attica in 480 left their city in ruins. It is easy to see, then, why they created a centralized tax 
structure whereby tribute from coalition members and most taxes from land allotments flowed 
directly to Athens.77 As the Athenians increasingly relied on their navy and a small number of 
rotating imperial officials to enforce the regular flow of taxes and trade, they went further to 
entrench themselves in old ideas about what distinguished their metropolis and citizen territory. 
																																								 																				
76 For the likelihood that Herodes was an Athenian lotholder with land at Mytilene, see Schindel 1979: 206-208; Lattimore 1987: 502. 
77 By c. 425-415, the Athenians went so far as to make everyone in the coalition use Athenian coins, see IG I3 1453, with Figueira 1998. 
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It is no coincidence that Athenian popular culture at the height of the Athenian empire 
continually called attention to the autochthonous origins of Athenian citizens: dramatists riddled 
their works with stories about how the Athenians were Athenian because they could all trace 
their lineage back to the soil of Attica.78 For example, Aristophanes joked in his Wasps that true 
Athenians are native to the soil, but also have a stinger.79 On a much more somber note, 
Thucydides began Pericles’ funeral oration by reminding the Athenians of their ancestor’s 
devotion to Attica: he reminded them that they fought and died defending Attica because 
Athenians had lived and worked the same countryside continuously through successive 
generations up to their imperial present.80 The growth of their empire only reinforced how the 
Athenians saw their own citizen territory as separate from the land they confiscated beyond it.  
 In the two generations after the Persian Wars, the Athenians prioritized their navy and 
their ideology of autochthony, a combination that allowed them to compartmentalize their 
empire. Though some of the Athenians who received land allotments on Euboea and Lesbos 
were free to live back at Athens, others became settlers and chose to live abroad at colonies such 
as Lemnos and Histiaia. As we will see in the cases of Lemnos and Histiaia, the new settler 
communities were politically autonomous from Athens, created their own popular institutions, 
and paid tribute just like any other coalition member. Yet even the Athenian settlers lived only 
where the local population was forcibly removed and their political community dissolved. In 
that sense, Athenian settlers mirrored the Athenians living in Attica by distancing themselves 
from the communities they dispossessed. For both settlers and lotholders alike, the Athenians 
																																								 																				
78 For autochthony, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1993: esp. 1-21; 2000: esp. 13-27, 115-118; Hall 1997: 51-56. See also Introduction n. 25. 
79 Aristoph. Wasps 1075-1077, with MacDowell 1971: 271. 
80 Thuc. 2.36.1. Of course, other Greek communities at the time claimed autochthonous origins as well, but that was beside the point. 
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saw their imperial territory in terms of insularity: there was their citizen territory in which they 
prioritized their metropolitan interests, and then there was their imperial territory in which they 
prioritized their individual interests. This meant that the Athenian state played a passive role 
outside of Attica so long as taxes and trade continued to flow to Athens. Over time, the 
Athenians’ approach to imperial territory became a vehicle for a particular kind of economic 
change: as settlers created new markets for Athenian goods produced in Attica, and land 
allotment transferred wealth to Athenian lotholders who then invested it at Athens, the 
Athenians also developed a monopoly on human capital.  
 
3.4. Centralizing Human Capital  
The draw of life in Attica was strong for many Athenians, even when imperial land 
allotments could easily have drawn them away from home. This was never more apparent than 
when, at the onset of the Peloponnesian War in 431, Pericles directed every Athenian living in 
the Attic countryside to leave their homes and move within the walls of Athens. Thucydides 
described how many Athenians living in the countryside hated the thought of abandoning their 
homes, even if it meant they would be safe in Athens.81 Surely the threat of a Spartan invasion 
only increased any anxieties they might have had about leaving their homes; still, for rural 
Athenians who had a strong sense of place within the Attic countryside, moving away from 
Attica may not have been an appealing option. For urban Athenians already living in Athens or 
Piraeus, they may have been committed to staying there because of its economic opportunities: 
																																								 																				
81 Thuc. 2.23-14. For the political community at Athens, see Anderson 2003. He argued that Attica became unified at the end of the 
fifth century as a result of elite competition that drew the countryside into Athenian affairs. For democratic sociology, see Ober 
1987; 2006.  
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the Athenian metropolis that Thucydides and Xenophon knew was home to so many crafts, 
specializations, and manufacturers that people from all around the Mediterranean world 
traveled there to live as metics (or “resident foreigners”).82 Excavations at the Potter’s Quarter, 
for example, have shown that the city had competing ceramic workshops of multi-ethnic 
craftsmen.83 Furthermore, for urban Athenians, a strong sense of political community may have 
been enough to keep some from leaving home. Socrates, for one, believed that citizens entered 
into a sort of political contract with their broader political community, and he refused to leave 
Athens even in the face of death.84 At the end of the Peloponnesian War, a friend of his named 
Charmides admitted that, by losing his properties outside of Attica, he actually had more time 
to travel abroad.85  
The Athenians drew from this sense of metropolitanism when they imagined their 
imperial territory. As we have already seen, the Athenians’ approach to imperial territory made it 
so taxes and trade flowed directly to their metropole rather than being shared or reinvested on the 
frontier.86 The Athenians compartmentalized their empire the way they did because, outside of 
Attica, they were pursuing their private interests, so long as those interests did not negatively 
impact the Athenian metropole. Land allotment was thus a way for citizens to make money 
																																								 																				
82 Thuc. 2.39.1; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.12, with Garland 1987: 22-32, 83-95. For manufacturing at Athens, see Acton 2014.  
83 For the Athenian Potter’s Quarters, see Langridge-Noti 2015, with Hannestad 1988: 222-223; Galinier et al. 2003; Acton 2014: 83-114. 
84 Plato, Crito 51c-53a. At 51d, Socrates equated leaving the state with living outside of (ἀποικέω) Athens or living in foreign polis. 
85 Xen. Symp. 4.31, with Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004: 335-6, contra Gauthier 1966: 65-82. For a similar episode, see also Xen. Mem. 2.8. 
In 405, the Spartan general Lysander steered the Peloponnesian fleet from one Athenian ally or garrison to another on their way to 
defeat Athens once and for all. Their fleet wrecked on the shores of Aigospotamoi, the Athenians had no choice but to return home 
and abandon their imperial territory. Xen. Hell. 2.1.22-28; cf. Diod. 13.105-106. For Lysanders’ campaign, see Xen. Hell. 2.2.2; Plut. 
Lys. 13.2-3. Xenophon said that Lysander gave safe conduct to all Athenians returning. Yet when Xenophon described how Lysander 
sent home the Athenian garrisons and any other Athenian he saw abroad, he did not mention anything about klērouchoi or klērouchiai. 
86 It is worth recalling how Thucydides (2.13.2) thought that the strength of Athens in 431 was in its ability to accumulate revenues. 
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individually and to invest in their metropole collectively. As we will see, no matter how the 
Athenians allotted land, they seem to have always found a way for money to end up back at 
Athens. For the settlers who came together to create new colonies, they did so only after a military 
campaign broke apart the local community by enslaving or forcibly removing its residents. 
Afterwards, the settlers paid tribute to Athens like any other coalition member and exchanged 
primarily for goods produced in Athens. For the lotholders who rented their land to the people 
they dispossessed, I argue below that they paid a small tax to the state for the privilege of being 
imperial rentiers, living at Athens, and investing their earnings however they saw fit. Because the 
people they dispossessed directed their annual payments back to Athens, over time the lotholders 
also directed trade back to Athenian markets, where craftsmen, merchants, and bankers from 
around the eastern Mediterranean gathered to do business. The cumulative effect of these twin 
processes was to centralize human capital at Athens. 
Judging by the amount of land the Athenians confiscated in the fifth century, more 
Athenian citizens probably profited from land allotment than anything else in their empire.87 
But this did not mean that all Athenians benefitted equally. As we saw at the end of the Archaic 
period, land allotment was a formative institution of democratic Athens, a nod to egalitarianism 
still two generations before Ephialtes’ reforms in the 460s.88 Emblematic of the popular buy-in to 
both empire and shared governance, land allotment also ensured private inequality because 
there were more citizens than allotments. Theoretically, the Athenians collectively owned all 
imperial land before they allotted it, but afterwards there is no indication to suggest that the 
																																								 																				
87 Strauss 2009: 219. A third of all Athenian citizens may have received klēroi. For demographic estimates, see Jones 1957: 7, 156-157. 
Other forms of foreign land came from rare individual grants of enktesis and special dispensation, possibly through proxenos status. 
88 For Ephialtes’ popular reforms, imperialism, and the development of democracy at Athens, see Sealey 1981; Ostwald 1986; Raaflaub 1994.  
	 	
 
	
108 
state took any part even transporting lotholders to and from their allotments. When it came to 
imperial land, so long as taxes and trade kept flowing to Athens, the state wanted little to do 
with it. Because Athenian land allotment, unlike Spartan helotage, did not guarantee an 
equality of outcome, it left room for entrepreneuring Athenians living in Athens to invest the 
rents they collected to make even more money.  
This made lotholders especially important for the economic development of the 
Athenian metropole. Even though the Athenians collectively decided when and how to divide 
up the land they confiscated, allotted land became a private investment for many of those who 
received it. Unlike political sortition, in which citizens participated in shared governance and 
earned a public wage for a year, imperial land allotment was a source of income that could last 
a lifetime. For that reason, the Athenians seem to have treated it more like any other financial 
transaction than repayment for a public—or, indeed, imperial—service. For example, we know 
that during the fifth century the state taxed citizens who worked land outside of Attica that had 
been designated sacred property.89 Panaitios, who we met earlier, paid the Athenian state an 
annual tax for the privilege of working—or, more realistically, hiring others to work—a farm 
with olive groves, wheat fields, and vines in the countryside of Chalkis. From what we can tell, 
Panaitios’ arrangement with the Athenian state seems to have been part of a broader trend of 
individual Athenians leasing state-owned land for their own private use.  
In fact, land leases seem to have been one of the main ways the Athenian state made 
money. A complete inscription dating from 418/7 recorded an initiative proposed by a certain 
Adosios for the state to make money by renting sacred property to double as an olive grove:   
																																								 																				
89 For a similar lease for sacred land, see IG I3 402. For how people made money from sacred property, see Papazarkadas 2010: 16-98. 
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ὁπόσεν δ’ ἂν ἄλφει µίσ[θ]οσιν τὸ τέµενος κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν 
ἕκαστον, καταβαλλέτο τὸ ἀργύριον ἐπὶ τε̑ς ἐνάτες πρυτανείας τοῖς 
ἀποδέκ-ται[ς], οἱ δὲ ἀποδέκται τοῖς ταµίαισι το̑ν ἄλλον θεο̑ν 
παραδιδόντον [κ]ατὰ τὸν νόµον… 
µισθο ̑ν δὲ βασιλέα τὸ τέµενος το ̑ Νελέος καὶ τε ̑ς Βασίλες κατὰ 
τάδε· τὸν µισθοσάµενον ε̑̓ρχσαι µὲν τὸ ℎιερὸν το ̑ Κόδρο καὶ το ̑ 
Νελέ-          ος καὶ τε̑ς Βασίλες κατὰ τὰς χσυνγραφὰς ἐπὶ τε ̑ς βολε̑ς 
τε ̑ς εἰσιόσ-   ες, τὸ δὲ τ[έ]µ̣ενο[ς] το̑ Νελέος καὶ τε̑ς Βασίλες κατὰ 
τάδε ἐργάζεσθαι· φυτεῦσαι φυτευτέρια ἐλαο ̑ν µὲ ὄλεζον ἒ 
διακόσια, πλέονα δὲ ἐὰν β-όλεται.90  
Whatever rent the sacred precinct produces in each year, let him 
deposit the money in the ninth prytany with the receivers, and let the 
receivers hand it over to the treasurers of the Other Gods according 
to the law… 
The [Archon] Basileus shall lease the sacred precinct of Neleus and of 
Basile on the following terms: that the lessee fence in the sanctuary of 
Kodros and Neleus and Basile according to the specifications during 
the term of the Council that is about to enter office, and that he work 
the sacred precinct of Neleus and Basile on the following terms: that 
he plant young sprouts of olive trees, no fewer than 200, and more if 
he wishes. 
Acting on behalf of the collective interests of the Athenians, Adosios saw an opportunity to rent 
out sacred property to someone willing to invest the time and money to turn it into an olive 
grove. Whoever won the contract surely expected to turn a profit, but the Athenian state did 
too. Before granting the contract, the Athenian state was not getting anything from the unused 
land; by creating an opportunity for someone to invest in the land, it was. The Athenians may 
have had a similar arrangement in mind when they allotted land on Mytilene. After all, if 
lotholders decided to rent out their land from back at Athens, they were still benefiting from the 
																																								 																				
90 IG I3 84, ll. 15-18, 29-34, with Walbank 1991: 154-155. For the Athenian state making money from lesease, see IG I3 1; 237; 417. For 
public leases in general, see Lalonde et al. 1991: 145-210. There were four categories of lease records. First, allotted land to which Athens 
retained legal title, see above. Second, land confiscated outside Attica for private use, see IG I3 418. Third, land allotted for sacred use, 
see IG I3 84; 386; 395; 402. Fourth, land in Attica owned by political institutions such as demes, see IG I3 243; 258. 
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perks of life in imperial Athens, and they could be expected to make a contribution for the 
privilege of making easy money. A tax would have been a sign of democratic buy-in, an actual 
investment in Athens.  
 It is tempting to think that the Athenians collectively profited from settlers and lotholders 
in different ways: from settlers, they received tribute like any other coalition member; from 
lotholders, they may have received rent in the form of a tax. To support this idea is a fragmentary 
inscription dating from the end of the Peloponnesian War c. 410-404, which distinguished 
between lotholders and settlers—or, to be more precise, between apoikiai and klērouchiai:  
[ℎεµιοβέ]λιον ὑπὲρ ℎεκ[άστ---------------------------------------] 
[] κ̣αρπο ̑ δὲ ℎοπόσος ἂ[ν-----------------------------------ὑ-] 
[π]ὲρ ἑκάστο καὶ το ̑ γλεύκ[ος------------ὑπὲρ ἑκάστο ἀµφ-] 
ορέος ὀβολόν, καὶ µέλιτ[ος-----------------------------------µισ-] 
θόσεος γε ̑ς καὶ οἰκιο ̑ν κα[ὶ-----------------------------------ἀργ-] 
υρίο ℎὸς ἂν µισθο ̑ι ἀποτε[ισάτο----------------------------------] 
ί̣ζει καὶ ἀπολαµ<β>άνει το[-----------------------------------ταῖ-] 
ς ἀποικίαις καὶ κλεροχία[ις-----------------------καὶ τὸς ἀπε-] 
[λ]ευθέρος κατὰ ταὐτὰ ποε ̑[ν-------------------------------------] 
[]ζοντας καὶ ℎοµονοο ̑ντα[ς------------------------------------ἐ-] 
[πὶ] τε ̑ς δευτέρας πρυτανε[ίας------------------------------------] 
[]ριν τε ̑ς βολε ̑ς τ[ε ̑]ι κυ[ρίαι ἐκκλεσίαι---------------------] 
       []σ̣θαι. τὰ δὲ τέλε τ̣------------------------------------------------]91 
Because the inscription is so fragmentary, it is hard to say much about its content. What we can 
say with some confidence is that, unlike contemporary Athenian historians, this state record 
distinguished between two different ways Athenian citizens could make money from imperial 
land. It also referenced different kinds of property, including gē (or “land”) and oikoi (or 
“houses”), after mentioning some kind of misthos (or “payment”) in silver. For that reason, 
																																								 																				
91 IG I3 237. For historical commentary, see Graham 1964: 169; Brunt 1993: 114-115; Lalonde et al. 1991: 155. Figueira (1991: 11) argued 
that “The juxtaposition suggests that these were two discrete categories into which Athenian settlements abroad were classified.” 
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Michael Walbank concluded that the inscription likely dealt “with various kinds of tax, perhaps 
in land overseas controlled by Athens.”92 It is unclear who was being paid or making a 
payment, though it may well have been tax-farmers tasked with collecting taxes on behalf of the 
Athenian state. If lotholders leased their land from the Athenian state, imperial records may 
have had to distinguish between lotholders who owed a certain tax for their lease and settlers 
who had some other obligation.  
 In such a case, the Athenians seem to have found a creative way of allowing their 
citizens who won a land allotment to stay in Attica. We saw earlier how the Athenian state 
made arrangements to lease sacred property to individuals. We also saw at Mytilene how the 
Athenians let the people they dispossessed stay on the land, so long as they paid their Athenian 
lotholder. What the Athenians seem to have done was create multiple layers of lease 
agreements whereby an Athenian lotholder leased his land allotment from the Athenian state 
while simultaneously leasing it again to a local farmer or group of farmers. Though no 
contemporary author provides any details about what this might have looked like, a third-
century CE Roman author named Aelian claimed to have preserved an anecdote of Athenian 
imperial power, immediately followed by a description of Spartan helotage. Aelian mentioned 
that the Athenians confiscated land from the Chalkidian elite on island of Euboea, and leased 
out the land to private citizens. At Chalkis, as we saw at Mytilene, the Athenian state saved 
some land as sacred property. Unlike Thucydides’ account of Mytilene, Aelian’s anecdote 
described how the Athenian state leased out the imperial land to private Athenians: 
																																								 																				
92 Walbank 1991: 155. 
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Ἀθηναῖοι κρατήσαντες Χαλκιδέων κατεκληρούχησαν αὐτῶν τὴν γῆν ἐς δισχιλίους 
κλήρους, τὴν Ἱππόβοτον καλουµένην χώραν, τεµένη δὲ ἀνῆκαν τῇ Αθηνᾷ ἐν τῷ 
Ληλάντῳ ὀνοµαζοµένῳ τόπῳ, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν ἐµίσθωσαν κατὰ τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς 
τῇ βασιλείῳ στοᾷ ἑστηκυίας, αἵπερ οὖν τὰ τῶν µισθώσεων ὑποµνήµατα εἶχον.93 
After conquering the Chalkidians, the Athenians divided their so-called Hippobotos land 
among lotholders, making 2000 allotments; and they made reservations for a temenos to 
Athena in the place called Lelanton and the remainder they let out at rentals at the rate 
shown in the stelai which stood against the Stoa Basileios and contained the accounts of 
these rentals. 
Like sacred land outside of Attica, the Athenian state let out the land allotments in Chalkis at a 
set rate, recorded publicly in the Athenian Agora. The Athenians built the Stoa Baseileios in the 
last quarter of the sixth century in the northwest corner of the Agora to serve as the 
administrative headquarters of the Archon Basileus, who administered public leases. Though 
excavations at the Agora have not found any inscriptions recording lease agreements with 
lotholders, given the frequency of imperial land allotment during the fifth century, there could 
have been thousands of leases if they were not standardized, or bundled, for each region.  
We can get a better sense of how these leases may have worked from the fourth-century 
Athēnaiōn Politeia, which explained the standard lease agreement procedure in some detail, 
beginning with the Archon Basileus. The Archon Basileus kept the leases on whitened boards, 
with the names of the tenants and the amounts and dates of the installments in such a manner 
																																								 																				
93 Aelian Var. Hist. 6.1. It is unclear what Aelian’s sources were for this passage. Unfortunately, Aelian did not distinguish between the 
settlements of 506 and 446. For the settlement of 506, see Hdt. 5.77.2; 6.100.1. For the settlement of 446, see IG I3 40; 1502; Plut. Per. 11.5; 
Diod. 11.88.3; Paus. 1.27.5. Figueira (1991: 259) preferred the latter date because “The leasing out of land with records preserved in stone 
suggested the procedures of the full-fledged democracy and the arkhē, rather than the sixth-century administration.” Zelnick-
Abramovitz (2004: 333) noted that Aelian never mentioned any Athenians ever being sent out or visiting their allotments before the 
land was leased out to local Chalkidians. The editors of the ATL (3.296) argued that Aelian was mistaken because they did not think the 
state could rent out any property except sacred precincts. Their argument rested on the fact that we do not have any comparable lease 
agreements for imperial land allotments. However, even if they were correct, it is unclear why the Athenians would have treated sacred 
property on confiscated land differently from land allotted to private individuals. 
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that he or one of his public slaves could mark individual installments as paid and any debt 
canceled on the due date each year: 
εἰσφέρει δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὰς µισθώσεις τῶν τεµενῶν, ἀναγράψας ἐν γραµµατείοις 
λελευκωµένοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἡ µὲν µίσθωσις εἰς ἔτη δέκα, καταβάλλεται δ᾽ ἐπὶ 
τῆς θ# πρυτανείας. διὸ καὶ πλεῖστα χρήµατα ἐπὶ ταύτης συλλέγεται τῆς πρυτανείας. 
εἰσφέρεται µὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν τὰ γραµµατεῖα κατὰ τὰς καταβολὰς 
ἀναγεγραµµένα, τηρεῖ δ᾽ ὁ δηµόσιος: ὅταν δ᾽ ᾖ χρηµάτων καταβολή… εἰσὶ δ᾽ 
ἀποδέκται δέκα κεκληρωµένοι κατὰ φυλάς: οὗτοι δὲ παραλαβόντες τὰ γραµµατεῖα, 
ἀπαλείφουσι τὰ καταβαλλόµενα χρήµατα ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ, 
καὶ πάλιν ἀποδιδόασιν τὰ γραµµατεῖα τῷ δηµοσίῳ. 
Also the Archon Basileus introduces the leasing of domains, having made a list of them on 
whitened tablets. These also are let for ten years, and the rent is paid in the ninth 
presidency; hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes in. The tablets written up 
with the list of payments are brought before the Council, but are in the keeping of the 
official clerk; and whenever a payment of money is made, he takes down from the 
pillars… There are ten receivers elected by lot, one from each tribe; these take over the 
tablets and wipe off the sums paid in the presence of the Council in the Bouleuterion, and 
give the tablets back again to the official clerk.94 
The process was fairly straightforward: the Archon Basileus announced that there was land to 
lease, the landholders registered their land, paid their tax, the Council approved it, and the 
receivers transferred the money to the state. In many ways, this procedure mirrored what we 
saw in Adosios’ proposal. In that case, the Archon Basileus presided over the lease and the 
receivers collected the rent in the ninth prytany. And as with all Athenian financial transactions, 
the lease also required the leaseholder to provide the Archon Basileus several guarantors to 
ensure the final payment of the tax.95 It is less clear, however, whether these procedures also 
held for imperial lotholders.   
Though the Athēnaiōn Politeia and Adosios’ proposal did not refer directly to leases with 
lotholders, the procedures they described were very similar to how the Athenians collected rent 
																																								 																				
94 [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 47.4-48.1. 
95 IG I3 84, l. 25. The Athenian state required guarantors to ensure that payment was received on time, in full, see Walbank 1991: 163-164. 
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from lotholders under the fourth-century Grain Tax Law of 374/3.96 In the years after Sphodrias’ 
failed raid on Piraeus in 378, the Athenians set out to reclaim some of their land allotments, and in 
374/3 passed a law that farmed out the collection of taxes from the land allotments on the islands 
of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. The legislation required a group of tax farmers to supply 
guarantors, the contract had to pass the scrutiny of the Council, and the payment went to the 
receivers for allocation to the state. If tax farming under the Grain Tax Law mirrored, at least in 
substance, the leases described in the Athēnaion Politaea, and the lease of fifth-century land 
allotments at Chalkis passed through the Stoa Baseileios like other leases, perhaps, then, fifth-
century land allotments followed a similar leasing process to what the Athēnaion Politaea 
described. It is reasonable to think that land allotments, like other public leases, came with a tax, 
so state revenue from cleruchies would have been lumped together with the other returns of the 
ninth prytany, including customs duties and the metoikion (or the “resident foreigners tax”). When 
the Athenians decided on matters of the state, they may have seen land allotments as another 
form of revenue.  
This might explain why the Athenians were willing to lower required tribute payments 
from communities where the Athenians confiscated land, like at Naxos, Andros, Chalkis, Eretria, 
and Karystos, so that the people they dispossessed would not have to pay two separate forms of 
imperial tax.97 If reductions in imperial tribute were connected to the confiscation of land, the state 
may have made up for the lower tribute rates with the rent from the lotholders themselves—that 
is, a small contribution for the opportunity to profit from confiscated land. It might also explain 
																																								 																				
96 Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 118-129; Sorg 2015. The Grain Tax Law made it so the taxes from the cleruchies were in grain, not cash. 
97 ATL 3.287, 294-295.   
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why the Athenians tried to standardize taxes on land allotments, as we saw from both 
Thucydides and Aelian. The Archon Basileus may have set the tax in order to ensure a certain 
amount of revenue for the Athenian state, and also to avoid an otherwise arduous bidding 
process for hundreds of lotholders.  
Altogether, the likelihood that the Athenians bundled leases for land allotments, 
standardized how they taxed the land, and relied on tax farming all point towards a form of 
entrepreneurial empire like what we saw earlier for Achaemenid Persia. The Athenian state, like 
Achaemenid Persia, seems to have only cared whether private lotholders had enough money to 
pay their tax. Also like the Achaemenids, the Athenians invested their imperial revenues back 
into their metropole: the Athenians hired craftsmen to work on public works projects, paid 
citizens a public wage for their participation in shared-governance, and put on dramatic festivals 
like the Dionysia where the finest dramatists and artists came from all over the Greek world. 
Collectively, the Athenians seem to have been less concerned with the land itself than the end 
result: land allotment becoming a vehicle for metropolitanism.  
Over time, this kind of centralized tax structure would have also helped centralize human 
capital at Athens. By experimenting with new ways of allowing citizens to collect imperial rents 
from their land allotments while also living in Attica, the Athenians ensured that more citizens 
remained in and around the metropole than if they had only pursued settler colonialism like other 
Greeks during the Archaic period. With land allotments adding to whatever surplus income 
lotholders may have had, many Athenians were probably more likely to specialize in a particular 
service or invest in their craft. One of the main reasons why the Athenian cultural revolution of 
the fifth century coincided with the Athenian empire was because added wealth allowed people 
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living in and around Athens to specialize. A wealthy, specialized citizenry had the added effect of 
attracting more people to Athens to do business—so much so that, in the 440s, the Athenians 
commissioned the renowned urban planner Hippodamos to help them reorganize and expand 
their commercial port at Piraeus so it could keep up with the growing population of craftsmen, 
merchants, and bankers.98 The commission signaled that the Athenians recognized and 
appreciated how Piraeus was becoming one of the leading commercial centers in the 
Mediterranean: by 430, Pericles famously boasted in his Funeral Oration that Athens, unlike 
Sparta, was an open city, available for anyone to do business, attracting people and imports from 
all over the Mediterranean and beyond.99  
Of course, the Athenians still closely guarded their citizenship, but that did not preclude 
them from centralizing human capital at Athens. Consider Lysias, the Athenians’ beloved metic 
turned orator: around mid-century, his father moved from Syracuse to Athens, where he started 
a factory that made shields; during the Peloponnesian War, Lysias and his brother continued to 
expand their father’s business, putting to work a hundred and twenty skilled slaves.100 Resident 
foreigners were so common in Athens and Piraeus during the second half of the fifth century 
that the so-called Old Oligarch complained that no one could tell the difference between citizens 
and metics; writing a half century later, shortly after the Second Athenian League failed like the 
Delian League before it, Xenophon sifted through Athenian imperial history in the fifth century 
																																								 																				
98 Arist. Pol. 1267b22-1268a14, with Garland 1987: 26-28.  
99 Thuc. 2.38-39: “Because of the importance of our city the products of the whole world all flow in here, and it is our good fortune to 
enjoy with the same familiar pleasure both our home-produced goods and those of other peoples… We keep our city open to the world 
and do not ever expel people to prevent them from learning or observing the sort of thing whose disclosure might benefit the enemy.”  
100 Lysias, Against Eratosthenes 12.4-8, 19. 
	 	
 
	
117 
to find ways to attract more foreign workers to Athens.101 He concluded that the Athenians 
needed to create new incentives for foreigners to live and visit Athens, which would, in turn, 
drive up imports and exports, prices, rents, customs duties, and so on. Though much of our 
evidence for how human capital became centralized at Athens is by necessity anecdotal, the link 
between Athenian land allotment, the development of a centralized tax structure, and the 
accumulation of human capital at Athens is unmistakable.  
Athenian land allotment was therefore part and parcel of democratic metropolitanism. 
Because the Athenian masses controlled popular discourse, the elite were probably more 
willing to endure Kleisthenes’ democracy on the condition that individual citizens, both 
wealthy and poor, could use land allotment for private gain. It is worth recalling how the 
Athenians first allotted imperial land just after the popular revolution of 508/7. By allotting land 
to both mass and elite, perhaps the popular leaders of the time were extending an olive branch 
to the entrepreneuring elite: the elite would have to yield to popular sovereignty, but they 
would have full access to imperial sources of wealth. Like their Archaic predecessors, the fifth-
century Athenians allowed empire to be a source of private inequality. But collectively, they 
expected land allotment to be a vehicle for metropolitanism. As settlers and lotholders profited 
from their land allotments in places like Lemnos and Euboea, the Athenians put their economic 
power to the test: by using land allotment to undermine the economies of their commercial 
rivals, while simultaneously extending their markets to new colonies, the Athenians shifted the 
productive capacity of the Aegean in Athens’ favor.  
																																								 																				
101 [Xen]. Ath. Pol. 1.10; Xen. Poroi 3.5-6: “The rise in the number of residents and visitors would of course lead to a corresponding 
expansion of our imports and exports, of sales, rents and customs. Now such additions to our revenues as these need cost us nothing 
whatever beyond good legislation and measures of control. Other methods of raising revenue that I have in mind will require capital.” 
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3.5. Lemnos: Expanding Athenian Markets  
A fifth the size of Attica, Lemnos was still a titan in the Aegean, naturally poised to 
command trade between the Hellespont and Thrace. In the aftermath of Darius’ Scythian 
campaign in 511, the Persians crossed over to Lemnos to control the entrance to the Black Sea 
and secure the island’s grain production. After the Persians conquered the island, Darius 
appointed a governor, who managed the island’s harvests by enslaving the native “Pelasgian” 
community.102 Over the next generation the island fell in and out of Athenian control: Miltiades 
first conquered the island for the Athenians around the turn of the century, but the island seems 
to have been under Persian control once again during Xerxes’ campaign in 480. Hecataeus 
wrote that Miltiades used his position in Gallipoli and the cover of the Ionian Revolt of 499 to 
take the island as retribution for a group of Athenian women who were kidnapped while 
celebrating the Artemesion at Brauron and taken back to Lemnos as concubines.103 Miltiades 
forced the Lemnians from the island and, in their place, Athenian settlers moved in. Recent 
excavations on the island have dated changes in material culture to a generation later, 
contemporaneous with Kimon’s expeditions in the northern Aegean after the Persian Wars.104 
The Athenians seem to have evacuated the island during Xerxes’ campaign—save a small naval 
contingent that ultimately defected from the Persian fleet—only to return to the island after the 
																																								 																				
102 Hdt. 5.25-27. Greek authors often used the term “Pelasgians” (Πελασγοί) to refer to any pre-Greek, local community, see Munro 
1934; Lochner-Hüttenbach 1960. Unlike Herodotus, Diodorus (10.19.6) called the native Lemnians “Tyrrhenians,” see De Simone 1996.  
103 Hecataeus apud Hdt. 6.137-140; cf. Hdt. 4.145; Diod. 10.19; Nep. Milt. 1-2. Peisistratus’ sons sent Miltiades to the Thracian Chersonese 
c. 520 to secure the peninsula and take over the position of tyrannos after the murder of his brother, see Hdt. 6.34-9. The Pelasgians had 
allegedly ambushed a group of Athenian women in Brauron and taken them back to Lemnos as concubines, see Hdt. 4.145, 6.138. 
104 Culasso Gastaldi 2012a: 141. Inscriptions on three Corinthian helmets dedicated at the Athenian acropolis, the temple of Nemesis 
at Rhamnous, and Olympia may refer to the Athenian conquest of Lemnos, see IG I3 518; 522 bis; 1466. All three record a variation 
of Ἀθεναῖοι ἐγ Λέµνο, and reference the conquest of Lemnos. 
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Persian Wars.105 Afterwards, the Athenian settlers at Hephaistia and Myrina became coalition 
members and fought alongside the Athenians through the end of the fifth century. 
The case of Lemnos shows how an Athenian military campaign could break apart an 
existing political community to make room for Athenian settlers to inhabit the land themselves. 
Afterwards, Athenian imperialism on Lemnos had a lot in common with what we saw with 
Miltiades’ elite opportunism in the Archaic period: the settlers displaced a pre-existing 
community, divided up the land for individual use, and then kept close economic, but not 
political, ties with Athens. Athenian Lemnos was thus a story of Archaic imperialism in 
transition: the Athenian state initially paved the way for the new colonies at Hephaistia and 
Myrina, the settlers became citizens of new political communities, and, as we will see, exchange 
between the Athenians and the settlers on Lemnos helped the Athenians expand their markets, 
sell their goods produced in Athens, and feed their metropolitan population with Lemnian 
grain. The island of Lemnos makes for a particularly good case study of Athenian land 
allotment because its imperial history mirrored several other islands in the Aegean but, unlike 
most other islands, we have a fairly diverse body of historical, epigraphic, and archaeological 
evidence to draw from: these include continuous records of tribute payments to Athens, 
boundary markers from sacred properties, and evidence for imports and local production from 
excavations at Hephaistia, its necropolis, and rural tombs. Altogether, what we see is that land 
allotment on Lemnos prevented the island from becoming a commercial rival to Athens and 
instead turned it into a new market for goods produced in Athens.  
																																								 																				
105  Hdt. 8.11.2. In 480, a Lemnian trireme commander named Antidoros defected to the Athenians after the first day of fighting at 
Artemesium. As a reward, the Athenians gave him land on Salamis, which recently became an Athenian imperial territory, see IG I3 1. 
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The Athenian settlers who won land allotments on Lemnos became known as allies 
rather than Athenian citizens once they moved to the island. In fact, they were among the first 
to join the Delian League and they continued to pay tribute to the Athenians as coalition 
members. The “Lemnians,” as they show up in the tribute lists, paid nine talents in 452/1, and 
thereafter the settlers at Hephaistia and Myrina paid separately at a reduced rate, set at a 
combined four and a half talents.106 During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recorded the 
Lemnians fighting alongside the Athenians at some of most important battles of the war, like at 
Mytilene, Sphakteria, Amphipolis, and Syracuse: at each battle, he recorded them fighting as 
“Lemnians,” not as Athenian apoikoi, epoikoi, or klērouchoi; by the time of the Sicilian campaign, 
Thucydides also made a point to remind his readers that the Lemnians still had the “same 
language and customs as the Athenians.”107 Having come from Athens, the settlers brought with 
them to Lemnos Athenian civic subdivision, judging from inscriptions of deceased Lemnians 
organized under demes like Erechtheis and Hippothontis.108 Still, there is no reason to think that 
the settlers remained Athenian citizens through the fifth century.  
Even though the settlers on Lemnos were no longer citizens, they continued to reinforce 
their shared interests with the Athenians. In Athens, once the building program on the 
Acropolis was underway in the 440s, the Lemnians dedicated a bronze statue of Athena: 
according to Pausanias, “it was the most impressive of Pheidias’ works.”109 Pausanias described 
																																								 																				
106 For 452/1, see IG I3 261.1.3. Graham (1964: 177) argued convincingly that Lemnian tribute payments do not indicate an sizeable Pelasgian 
population because, among other reasons, “a very considerable number of Pelasgians would have had to remain to pay nine talents.”  
107 For settlers fighting as Lemnians, see Thuc. 3.5.1, 4.28.4, 5.8.2, 7.57.2; For language and customs, see Thuc. 7.57.2. 
108 Athenian civic subdivisions: IG I3 1164, 1165, 1477; IG XII suppl. 337; Finley 105 in Finley 1951. IG I3 1477 was a list of names grouped 
by tribe and was likely a list of deceased, like those found at the demosion sema at Athens, see Culasso Gastaldi 2008b: 278-280; 2012a: 140.  
109 Paus. 1.28.2; cf. Lucian, Imagines 4, 6; Himerios, Oratio 68.4. To Pausanias, the statue was τῶν ἔργων τῶν Φειδίου θέας µάλιστα ἄξιον. 
	 	
 
	
121 
the “Lemnian Athena” alongside three other offerings on the Acropolis worthy of note, all of 
which, he said, were dedicated after important milestones in the Athenians’ imperial history: a 
bronze chariot, a dekatē (or “tithe”) from the same Chalkidians the Athenians confiscated land 
from c. 507; a bronze Athena Promachos, a tithe from the Persians defeated at Marathon; and a 
statue of Pericles, whose face became synonymous with Athenian imperialism. The Lemnian 
Athena fit nicely among the other three: Chalkis was the first time the Athenians experimented 
with land allotment under the new democracy, the battle of Marathon was the first real test of 
the Athenian military after Kleisthenes’ reforms, and Pericles probably confiscated more land 
than any other Athenian general. Likewise, the Lemnian Athena was a trophy celebrating the 
Athenians’ conquest of the island. The Lemnians were indebted to the Athenians for the land 
from which they drew their livelihoods. It was only fitting, then, that they paid for the material 
and Pheidias’ labor, likely with surplus income from their land allotments. 
Back on Lemnos, the settlers broke from the native community and transformed the island 
into a new hub of economic exchange, whereby the settlers imported goods produced at Athens 
and sold grain from their allotments. The transformation began with the settlers making the 
island their own, clearly distinguishing themselves from the people they dispossessed. Emanuele 
Greco, who directed the most recent excavations on Lemnos, found that the second quarter of the 
fifth century had “i segni inequivocabili di una brusca discontinuità culturale” (unmistakeable 
signs of a sharp cultural discontinuity), marked by the creation of a new urban community.110 
Excavations at Hephaistia have found that the urban center was fully re-planned, with a new 
																																								 																				
110 For cultural discontinuity on Lemnos, see Greco and Ficuciello 2012: 153. For early excavations, see Mustilli 1938; 1940. For a 
recent synthesis of the changes in material culture at the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth centuries, see Beschi 2000c; 
2001; Greco 2008; Ficuciello 2008; Culasso Gastaldi 2012a. For Lemnos during the Archaic period, see Ficuciello 2012a; 2013: 67-195. 
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orientation of the buildings and the destruction of native sanctuaries.111 The material culture of 
the native population disappeared in urban households and in all the island’s sanctuaries: 
excavations have found no traces of native ceramic production—recognizable for its displays of 
Orientalizing sirens, winged goddesses, and sphinxes—after the first quarter of the fifth 
century.112 Before local production came to a stop, Lemnian figured pottery from the late 
Archaic period was exported across the northern Aegean: excavations have found Lemnian 
exports in Samothrace, Thasos, Kavala, and Antissa.113 This was also a time when most 
imported ceramics on Lemnos arrived from Corinth, Athens’ commercial rival.114 
Contemporaneous with the resettlement of the urban centers and the violent destruction of the 
Hephaistia’s sanctuaries was a change in burial assemblages: though burials dating from before 
the Athenian conquered the island had mostly locally sourced and Corinthian pottery, the fifth-
century burials only contained imported and imitation Athenian black-figure vases, especially 
Athenian lekythoi.115 
 For example, during excavations at the necropolis of Hephaistia, grave 44 dating from 
the second quarter of the fifth century had an assemblage of imported Athenian goods. It 
included black-figure lekythoi, a bronze mirror, a terracotta doll, and an epinetron. This last item 
was a ceramic cover that protected a woman’s thigh while she worked wool, and was often 
																																								 																				
111 Ficuciello 2013: 217-248. The Athenian settlers also built a new wooden theater in Hephaistia sometime during the second half of 
the fifth century. The settler community likely met in the theater on the hill of Hephaistia to celebrate festivals and receive 
messengers from Athens and elsewhere. For the native sanctuary of Hephaistia before the Athenian conquest, see Beschi 2006b; 
2007. For the suburban sanctuary of Kabirion during the fifth century, see Beschi 1997a: 215-216; Beschi 2000b; 2000c: 133; Beschi 2005a.  
112 Culasso Gastaldi 2012: 135. For changes in burial rituals and assemblages from the necropolis at Hephaistia, see Savelli 2008a; 2008b. 
113  For Lemnian figured pottery in the late Archaic period, see Danile 2012: 84-88, with Beschi 1985: 57, 60-62; Beschi 2003: 310-313. 
114  For Corinthian imports on Lemnos, see Danile 2012: 84, 86, with Beschi 2005: 112, 137, nos. 23, 148; Beschi 2007: 140-142, nos. 3-11. 
115 Savelli 2008a: 97. 
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presented as a wedding gift or placed in graves of unmarried girls.116 Though technically 
unrelated to Athenian land allotment, the grave assemblage suggests two things about the 
settlers. First, it shows that in the generation after the Athenians conquered Lemnos, the settlers 
were probably not just a garrison of male hoplites, but more likely a full community including 
families and adolescent women. In fact, the settlers and their families seem to have replaced the 
native community, so there was really nothing for them to defend against.  
Second, and more importantly, the inclusion of Athenian imports shows how the settlers 
chose to import goods produced at Athens, and thus to reorient Lemnos’ links as an economic 
hub. Of course, Athenian goods produced during the fifth century have been found in every 
corner of the Mediterranean, so it is not particularly surprising that they would also show up on 
Lemnos. Still, it is a sign that Athenian human capital remained centralized at Athens despite 
the movement of settlers away from the metropole. For what little evidence there is for local 
production, it all seems to have been produced to imitate Athenian goods. Even though the 
Athenians compartmentalized their empire in a way that insulated their metropole from 
coalition members, Athenian settlers included, they still found ways to extend the reach of their 
markets. As we are already starting to see in the case of Lemnos, when the Athenians destroyed 
an existing community and confiscated their land, they replaced it with settlers who arrived on 
the island already plugged into Athenian markets.  
Outside of the urban center of Hephaistia, multi-generational tombs show the extension of 
the settler population out into the Lemnian countryside. By the middle of the fifth century, the 
settlers had begun to construct small peribolos funerary structures across the Hephaistian 
																																								 																				
116 Savelli 2008a: 99-100; 2008b: 361-363. Women wore epinetra on their thighs while weaving to prevent grease from getting on their clothes.  
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countryside. By dating the grave assemblages at two of these tombs, recent excavations have 
determined that the sites were in continuous use for several generations through the fourth 
century. In her study of the Hephaistian periboloi, Daniela Marchiandi explained that “L’analisi 
dell’evidenza funeraria assicura la continuità dell’occupazione degli abitati specifici di Katrakyles 
e di Paracheiri... tra il V e il IV secolo, ad opera di generazioni successive delle stesse famiglie” 
(the analysis of the funerary evidence assures the continuity of occupation specifically at 
Katrakyles and Paracheiri… between the fifth and fourth centuries, by successive generations of 
the same family).117 The multi-generational use of these sites may suggest that the families lived 
nearby and continued to hand down their allotments from father to son, thus ensuring that each 
generation would profit from the Athenian conquest of the island. 
 As we saw earlier for the lotholders at Mytilene and Chalkis, the settlers on Lemnos also 
seem to have reserved a portion of the land they confiscated as sacred property. Two boundary 
markers from the western side of Lemnos, found near Myrina, delimited sacred property 
owned by Artemis: 
ℎόρος 
τῶ τεµ- 
ένως τε ̑- 
ς Ἀρτέ- 
µιδος.118 
Boundary 
marker  
of a sacred 
property 
[owned by] 
Artemis. 
hόρος 
τεµένος 
Ἀρτέµι- 
δος τῆς 
ἐµ Μυρί- 
[νηι].  
Boundary 
marker  
of a sacred 
property 
[owned by] 
Artemis  
in Myrina. 
																																								 																				
117 Marchiandi 2008: 119. For a more thorough treatment of the peribolos funerary structures on Lemnos, see also Marchiandi 2003. 
During the fourth century, the Persians and Spartans recognized Athens’ legitimate claim to Lemnos in the King’s Peace, see Xen. 
Hell. 4.8.15, 5.1.31. A well-known inscription from the Athenian Acropolis dating from the early 380s records Athenian klērouchs on 
Lemnos, see IG II2 30; Stroud 1971: 160-165. For the history of Lemnos in the fourth century, see Cargill 1995: 12-15; Salomon 1997: 66-80. 
118 Left: IG I3 1500, from Myrina c. 500-480; Right: IG I3 1501, from Kastro c. 440-404. For Artemis worship on Lemnos, see Parker 1994: 345. 
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Though the worship of Artemis was common throughout the Greek world in the Classical 
period, and especially in Attica, Artemis must have had a special significance for the Athenian 
settlers on Lemnos.119 After all, Miltiades claimed to have conquered the island on behalf of her 
worshippers. The settlers at Myrina constructed a temple to Artemis on the acropolis 
overlooking the harbor, and its presence there probably reinforced the Athenian imperial 
narrative that justified the conquest of Lemnos.120 What exactly the settlers used the sacred 
properties for is unclear, but the term temenos found on the horoi refers to “a landed estate or 
precinct consecrated to a deity,” as Irene Polinskaya put it, and could be used for agriculture.121 
The settlers may have subsidized the rituals and festivals at the temple in Myrina with the 
money they earned farming and leasing Artemis’ sacred property on the island. 
Similar boundary markers from Aigina may help shed light on the agricultural land on 
Lemnos dedicated to Artemis. On Aigina, like on Lemnos, the Athenians forcibly removed the 
local population in 430, divided up the land, and then settled on the island.122 Also scattered 
across the island were some thirteen boundary markers reserving land for Apollo, Poseidon, 
and Athena. Not only were the boundary markers found at great distances from one another, 
making it impossible that they referred to a single precinct, but also they were found only in 
areas well suited for agricultural—as opposed to, say, the central and southern regions of the 
island were predominantly mountainous. This led Polinskaya to argue that “The Aiginetan 
																																								 																				
119 Artemis worship was also prominent in Attica. For Artemis worship in Athens, for example, see Plut. Them. 22.1; Paus. 1.1.4, 1.19.6, 
1.23.7, 1.26.4, 1.29.2. For the sanctuary of Artemis Brauronia on the Athenian acropolis, see Linders 1972; Rhodes and Dobbins 1979; 
Hurwitt 1999: 197-198. For Artemis worship in Brauron, see Hdt. 6.138; Paus. 1.33.1, 8.46.3. For Artemis worship in Eleusis, see Paus. 1.38.6. 
120 For the temple of Artemisia at Myrina, see Beschi 2001. 
121 Polinskaya 2009: 244, with Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 182. She distinguished the agricultural from the cultic functions of temene. 
122 For the Athenian conquest of Aigina in 430, see Thuc. 1.105.2; 1.108.4; 2.27.1; 7.57.2; 8.69.3; Diod. 12.44.2; Plut. Per. 34.1; Strabo 8.6.16. 
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temene marked by Athenian horoi were agricultural estates that would have been allotted as part 
of a general distribution of land to Athenian settlers following the expulsion of the indigenous 
residents and the occupation of Aigina by the Athenians in 431.”123 Just as the Athenians 
dedicated to Athena Polias a portion of the tribute they collected from coalition members, the 
settlers on Lemnos shared a portion of the island’s confiscated land with the gods who helped 
them confiscate the land. By fulfilling their religious obligations, the Athenians brought the 
gods into the imperial process and made them accomplices in the confiscation of land. The 
Athenian imperial practice of confiscating land and allotting a portion of it to the gods allowed 
the Athenians to assume a sort of imperial legitimacy from the gods. But, in doing so, they were 
also limiting the total number of allotments available to Athenian citizens.  
The Athenians may have been more willing to allot land to the gods because temples in 
the Greek world were known to provide essential economic services for communities. Because 
temples were often subsidized by income earned from agricultural land, they were able to 
accumulate a great deal of money. For those reasons, Raymond Bogaert argued that temples 
were often the premier institutions of credit in the Greek world—a function probably inherited 
from the Persian east.124 In the fifth century, there is plenty of evidence for temples as 
																																								 																				
123 Polinskaya 2009: 264, in reference to IG I3 1481-1490. She argued that co-ownership with the gods added legitimacy to the conquest. 
124 For temples as institutions of credit and banking, see Bogaert 1968, Davies 2001; 2007: 358; Von Reden 2010: 156-185. Bogaert (1968: 
279) shows that temple banks were common throughout the Greek mainland, the Aegean, and the Ionian coast, but not in the western 
Mediterranean. He hypothesizes that the Greeks inherited the practice of sacred banks from the Persian east, where the tradition can be 
traced back to Third Dynasty of Ur in the twenty-first century. The temple of Athena at Lindos and the Heraion at Samos had banking 
operations dating back to the sixth century. Bogeart (1968: 284) argued that temple banks were popular places for private citizens to 
deposit money because the temples were less susceptible to theft and fires. Because property rights were not always sufficient, 
merchants who travelled abroad wanted their money to be secure. Temples offered a surety that was both moral and material: moral 
because of the inviolability of sacred places; material because temples were made of durable materials and protected secure chambers. 
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institutions of credit from Attica at Athens, Eleusis, Rhamnous, Plotheia, and beyond Attica at 
Cos, Olympia, and Delphi. Temples made loans, guarded deposits, and issued currency, which 
facilitated the circulation of money and the movement of capital. In most cases, Bogaert 
showed, withdrawals paid for religious festivals. However, merchants and travelers could go to 
temples to exchange their money and get loans. At Cos, for example, the Asklepeion had a 
trapeza (or “banker”) for exactly that purpose.125 A deme decree from Plotheia in northeastern 
Attica c. 420 described how the temples within the deme made money by making loans to 
individuals with capital they accrued through rents: 
[ἔδ]οξεν Πλωθειεῦσι· Ἀριστότιµος [ε]-  
[ἶπ]ε· τὸς µὲν ἄρχοντας το ̑ ἀργυρίο ἀ[ξ]-  
[ιό]χρεως κυαµεύεν ὅσο κάστη ἡ ἀρ[χ]-  
[ὴ ἄ]ρχει, τούτος δὲ τὸ ἀργύριον σῶν [π]-  
[αρ]έχεν Πλωθεῦσι, περὶ µὲν ὅτο ἐστ[ὶ]  
[ψ]ήφισµα δανεισµο ̑ ἢ τόκος τεταγ[µέ]-  
ν̣ος κατὰ τὸ ψήφισµα δανείζοντα[ς κ]-  
[α]ὶ ἐσπράττοντας, ὅσον̣ δὲ κατ’ ἐν[ιαυ]-  
[τ]ὸν δανείζεται δανείζοντας ὅ[στι]-  
ς ἂν πλεῖστον τόκον διδῶι, ὃς ἂν [πεί]-  
[θ]ηι τὸς δανείζοντας ἄρχοντα[ς τιµ]-  
ήµατι ἢ ἐγγυητῆι. ἀπὸ δὲ το ͂ τόκο [τε κ]- 
αὶ τῶµ µισθώσεων ἀντὶ ὅτο ἂν τ[ῶν κε]- 
φαλαίων ὠνήµατα ἦι µί[σ]θωσιν φ[έρο]- 
ν̣τα, θύεν τὰ ἱερὰ τά τε ἐς Πλωθει[ᾶς κ]- 
οινὰ καὶ τὰ ἐς Ἀθηναίος ὑπὲρ Πλ[ωθέ]- 
[ω]ν το ͂ κοινο ͂ καὶ τὰ ἐς τὰς πεντετ[ηρί]- 
[δ]ας.126 
             The Plotheians decided. Aristotimos 
proposed: to allot the officials worthily of the 
money that each office controls; and these are 
to provide the money securely for the 
Plotheians. Concerning whatever loan there is a 
decree or setting of interest, they are to lend 
and exact interest according to the decree, 
lending as much as is lent annually to 
whoever offers the greatest interest, whoever 
persuades the lending officials by their 
wealth or guarantor, and from the interest, and 
the rents on whatever rent-bearing purchases 
may have been made from capital, they shall 
sacrifice the rites, that is, both the common rites 
for the Plotheians, and for the Athenians on 
behalf of the community of the Plotheians, and 
for the quadrennial festivals. 
 
The temples used whatever money they had on hand—and not already allocated for rituals, 
festivals, and taxes to Athens—to lend out to whoever would pay the greatest interest. In another 
inscription that records the annual finances of the temple of Nemesis nearby in Rhamnous from c. 
																																								 																				
125 For the Asklepieion at Kos, see Bogaert 1968: 298. 
126 IG I3 258, ll. 11-27, with Davies 2001: 124. 
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440, the single temple maintained between 48,000 and 56,000 drachmas on hand over five years.127 
Like the temples at Plotheia, the temple of Nemesis probably got most of its revenue from 
agricultural rents.  
 It is tempting to think that the temple of Artemis on Lemnos offered similar economic 
services to the settlers on the island. Since we do not have inscriptions from Lemnos to match 
those from Plotheia and Rhamnous in Attica, we cannot say definitively how the temple used the 
money it made from its agricultural land. But like the temples in Attica, the temple of Artemis 
likely was able to profit from its agricultural lands. Furthermore, the early settlers on Lemnos and 
any merchants from Attica doing business there would have had few other options on the island 
to get loans and deposit their money. A temple bank could have provided the necessary capital 
for new settlers to invest in their land and set up their new livelihoods: after all, most settlers 
would have arrived on Lemnos with only the resources that they could transport themselves. In 
the absence of a well-established market on the island, the new settler communities needed 
alternative ways of protecting their money and financing their investments, and a temple bank 
may have provided such a service. In that sense, the same temple that sanctified the conquest of 
Lemnos also facilitated the exploitation of the land by the settlers. With more available capital to 
invest in their land, the settlers would have been even better suited to profit from land allotment 
and use the money they earned to purchase goods from Attica.  
 What we saw on Lemnos was that Athenian land allotment, even when it involved 
Athenian settlers leaving Attica, had a way of expanding Athens’ markets. The Athenian conquest 
																																								 																				
127 IG I3 248, with Davies 2001: 117-118. He argued that the Athenians at Rhamnous had “come to see what would otherwise be 
‘dead’ resources locked up in the premises of a deme, or shrine, or temple, or phratry, or tribe, as resources which could be put to work.” 
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of the island removed the native community, severed existing commercial links with the 
northeastern Aegean and Corinth, and reoriented trade back to Athens. Though the Athenian 
settlers on Lemnos became citizens of a new political community, they remained plugged into the 
Athenian network of exchange. They may have been on their own to start a new political 
community, but their economic connection to Athens ensured that they individually were set up 
to make a profit from their land allotments. The Athenians back at Athens were still 
compartmentalizing their empire, insulating their metropole from the rest of their imperial 
territory, but metropolitanism to them meant that they allotted land in ways that expanded their 
markets. As we will see, the Athenians’ economic power continued to grow: by the second half of 
the fifth century, the Athenians were able to keep experimenting with land allotment by putting 
their economic power to the test on the island of Euboea.  
 
3.6. Euboea: Athenian Economic Power  
Rich in grain and strategically located to command Aegean commerce, the island of 
Euboea was the prize of the Athenian empire. Euboea sits just off the northern coast of Attica, 
separated from Athenian territory by a narrow channel. Only one and a half times larger than 
Attica, Euboea was home to thirteen poleis, none more than a day’s row from northern Attica. 
Chalkis, for one, sat at the channel’s narrowest point at the width of just a single trireme from ram 
to stern.128  In 506, the young Athenian democracy survived a two-front invasion from the 
Spartans, Boeotians, and Chalkidians, and wasted little time before turning to the offensive.129 
																																								 																				
128 Moreno 2007: 83. The Euripos strait is, on average, just 12 km wide. The strait is narrowest at Chalkis, where it is only 40 m wide.  
129 For the invasion of Attica by Sparta, Boeotia, and Chalkis, see Hdt. 5.72-76. For the attack on Chalkis in 506, see Hdt. 5.77.2; 6.100.2. 
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After defeating the Chalkidians in the field, the Athenians confiscated the land of the local elite 
and divided it up among four thousand lotholders. For the Athenians, Euboea was uniquely 
profitable—a fact soon noticed by the Persian emperor himself.130 So, as we saw with Lemnos, 
Chalkis seems to have fallen out of Athenian hands during the Greco-Persian Wars. But by the 
middle of the fifth century, the entire island of Euboea again became a laboratory of empire: 
between 452 and 446, the Athenians experimented by allotting land to both settlers and lotholders 
in different parts of the island. Afterwards, for nearly two generations surplus grain from Euboea 
fed the Athenian democracy and confiscated land enriched individual citizens.131 
If Athenian Lemnos was a story of Archaic imperialism in transition, then Euboea shows 
Athenian economic power at its height, when the Athenians chose freely between two forms of 
land allotment. Unlike Lemnos, Euboea at the time of the Athenian conquest had four highly 
developed economic centers at Histiaia, Chalkis, Eretria, and Karystos. Also, by then the 
Athenian navy had experimented with coercion from a distance for a generation after finding 
success at Naxos in 476 and Thasos in 465. The case of Euboea shows how the combination of 
economic competition on Euboea and Athenian military development created a new imperial 
geography on the island: though the Athenians at Histiaia followed a similar approach as the 
settlers on Lemnos, on the rest of the island the Athenians seem to have remained lotholders 
from back at Athens. Because Histiaia was the only forested and fertile region of the island, an 
insular colony there promised high returns; however, Athenian lotholders may have looked to 
the mountainous center and the barren south of the island and decided that extracting a stable 
																																								 																				
130 Hdt. 5.31. The Persian emperor Artaphrenes agreed to attack Naxos in 500 because he could use the island to stage a campaign to 
take Euboea, “a large and wealthy island” (νήσῳ µεγάλῃ τε καὶ εὐδαίµονι). Darius adopted the Euboean talent for gold, Hdt. 3.89.2. 
131 For Euboea’s role in the Athenian grain market, see Moreno 2007: 77-143. Euboea was Athens’s main source of grain from 446-411. 
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rent from back at Athens was safer and more reliable. The Athenians’ experience south of 
Histiaia was instructive: the Athenians showed how lotholders could defer direct control of 
confiscated land, leave the local community mostly undisturbed, and rely on the threat of their 
navy to collect a regular income from back in Attica. As we saw earlier, the Athenians would 
apply a similar approach to Lesbos in 427. Even though the Athenian state prioritized the 
interests of its private citizens by way of an insular colony at Histiaia and lotholders to the 
south, political insularity never meant economic insularity—the full strength of the Athenian 
economic power was on full display across Euboea. 
In many ways, Euboea was unique within the Athenian empire. Together, the 
communities on Euboea lost more land to Athenian land allotment than any other island in the 
Athenian empire. Euboea was also just off the coast of Attica: according to Thucydides, when the 
Athenians mobilized for the Peloponnesian War, they deployed one hundred triremes to patrol 
Attica, Salamis, and Euboea as a single theater of operation.132 A generation later, Isocrates still 
spoke of how uniquely important Euboea was to the Athenians in the fifth century: he knew well 
enough that Euboea had as much, if not more, resources than any other island in the Aegean.133 
But even though Euboea as a whole may have been unique, the Athenians dealt each community 
independently. We see this in the different ways the Athenians confiscated land, collected tribute, 
conducted diplomacy, and deployed their navy. Despite its unique role in the history of Athenian 
																																								 																				
132 Thuc. 3.17.1-2. Thucydides implied (3.17.3-4) that traditional hoplite warfare and land sieges were more costly than naval patrols. 
Even so, a scholiast to Aristophanes’ Clouds wrote that the Athenians, under Pericles’ leadership in the mid-fifth century, “besieged” the 
island, focusing their efforts primarily on Chalkis and Eretria: Aristoph. Clouds Σ 213a: ἐπολιόρκησαν δὲ αὐτὴν ̉Αθηναῖοι µετὰ 
Περικλέους, καὶ µάλιστα Χαλκιδέας καὶ  ̉Ερετριέας. πρὀς τὀ παρατέταται, ἐν ᾦ ἡ θέσις δηλοῦται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπήνεγκε τὸ 
παρετάθη. Moreno (2007: 102, 126-143) assumed that “this was in effect a permanent siege,” a physical occupation of the entire island. 
133 Isoc. 4.107. 
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imperialism, Euboea is still an instructive case study because of how much the Athenians 
experimented on the island. On Euboea, we get to see both what distinguished and what unified 
the various ways the Athenians allotted land. This is made possible owing to a fairly broad range 
of written evidence from historical texts and popular culture, as well as recent archaeological 
surveys of defense structures and excavations at Karystos and Eretria. 
The story goes that at about 452, the Athenian general Tolmides led an invasion of Euboea 
and Naxos and, after a successful campaign, allotted land to a thousand Athenians, split between 
the two islands.134 The Euboean campaign was part a broader Athenian effort to confiscate land 
elsewhere in the Aegean: at about the same time, Athenian citizens received land allotments on 
Andros, Naxos, the Chersonesos, and Thrace.135 Yet shortly thereafter, the Boeotians to the north 
of Euboea revolted in 447 and defeated the Athenians in the field at Koroneia. The Euboeans and 
Megarans took the opportunity to renew hostilities against the Athenians in 446. But after a 
speedy campaign across the island, Pericles put down the revolt.136  
The Euboean revolt invited the Athenians to revisit their approach to imperial property 
on the island. For Eretria and Chalkis, and possibly also Karystos, the Athenian settlement 
meant renewed oaths of loyalty and a homologia (or “agreement”) in the priority of Athenian 
interests. The Histiaians, however, who had executed a captured Athenian trireme crew, lost 
their land, which was thereafter merged with the coastal settlement of Oreos. For the Histiaians, 
																																								 																				
134 For Tolmides’ campaign, see Diod. 11.88.3; Paus. 1.27.5. Between Euboea and Naxos, Tolmides divided up land for one thousand 
klērouchoi. At the same time as Tolmides’ campaign, Pericles attacked the Chersonesos, allotted one thousand klēroi to Athenians citizens. 
135 Plut. Per. 11.5; 19.1; Andoc. 3.9; Aesch. 2.175. Both Andocides and Aeschines place the Euboea allotments alongside Naxos and the 
Chersonesos. For the Cyclades and the Athenian empire in the fifth century, see Rutihauser 2012: 81-139. For Thrace, see Pébarthe 1999.  
136 For the Periclean settlement of Chalkis after the revolt, see IG I3 40; Plut. Per. 11.5; Ael. 6.1.; IG I3 1502. For Eretria, see IG I3 39. For 
Histiaia, see Thuc. 1.114.1–3, 7.57.2, 8.95.7; Theopomp. fr. 387; Philoch. fr. 118; Diod. 12.7.1, 22.2; Plut. Per. 23.2; IG I³ 41; Strabo 10.1.3-
4. Thucydides may have been silent about the rest of Euboea because, by comparison, what happened at Histiaia was much worse. 
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this imperial synoikismos (or “gathering together”) meant that they not only lost ownership of 
their land to Athenian settlers, but they also had to physically relocate to Macedonia.  
Looking back on the period, Andocides remembered that the Athenians held land 
covering no less than two-thirds of the island.137 For him, Euboea was the crowning achievement 
of the Athenian empire, next to the confiscations on the Chersonesos and Naxos. Using more 
ambiguous terms, Aeschines also recalled how the Athenians “held” Euboea while also sending 
out settlers to colonies:  
καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἑπτακισχίλια τάλαντα ἀνηνέγκαµεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν 
διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ταύτην, τριήρεις δ᾽ ἐκτησάµεθα πλωίµους καὶ ἐντελεῖς οὐκ ἐλάττους 
ἢ τριακοσίας, φόρος δ᾽ ἡµῖν κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν προσῄει πλέον ἢ χίλια καὶ διακόσια 
τάλαντα, καὶ Χερρόνησον καὶ Νάξον καὶ Εὔβοιαν εἴχοµεν, πλείστας δ᾽ ἀποικίας ἐν 
τοῖς χρόνοις τούτοις ἀπεστείλαµεν. 
In the period that followed [the Peace of Nicias] we again deposited treasure in the 
Acropolis, seven thousand talents, thanks to this peace, and we acquired triremes, 
seaworthy and fully equipped, no fewer than three hundred in number; a yearly tribute of 
more than twelve hundred talents came in to us; we held the Chersonesos, Naxos, and 
Euboea, and in these years we sent out a host of colonies. 
It is hard to know what Aechines intended when he distinguished between the Athenians 
holding the Chersonesos, Naxos, and Euboea and the Athenians sending out colonies. He seems 
to have been implying that the land the Athenians held on Euboea was somehow different from 
the land settlers owned in colonies. We saw earlier in inscriptions dating from after the Euboean 
revolt that the Athenians owned land in Chalkis, Eretria, and Histiaia, both individually and as 
sacred property.138 What Aeschines and the inscriptions did not make clear, however, is what 
this kind of landholding actually looked like—they say nothing of how the Athenians actually 
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138 For example, IG I3 418; 422; Dem. 20.115. 
	 	
 
	
134 
held the island, be it through physical control, coercion from a distance, economic power, or a 
combination of strategies.  
Because there is no literary evidence for an official Athenian imperial presence on the 
island besides several itinerant magistrates, many archaeologists and historians have tried to 
link local developments in material culture to the initiative of Athenian lotholders.139 Most who 
study fifth-century Euboea assume that Athenian lotholders must have set up ad hoc defensive 
measures near their land to help them defend it from the people they dispossessed: with the 
traditional citizen-garrison model as their guide, archaeologists in particular have emphasized 
any change in material culture that might suggest a change in occupation. As such, they have 
assumed that Athenian lotholders are materially distinguishable from Euboean communities 
because they involved a large population movement, and thus a physical occupation of the 
confiscated land.  
To be sure, in the countryside of Karystos in southern Euboea, small fortifications 
started to show up alongside rural settlements during the Athenian imperial period. Recent 
surface surveys showing the increase of these small agricultural “towers” in the Paximadi 
peninsula have prompted members of the Southern Euboea Exploration Project to assume the 
presence of lotholders who developed a defensive network between their plots.140 Compared to 
the five towers in use during the Archaic period, and six during the Hellenistic period, a total of 
nineteen could be dated to the period of Athenian imperialism. Excavations of the towers have 
																																								 																				
139 Moreno (2007: 126-140) and Jensen (2011: 261-264) argued that the Athenians had controlled imperial land directly. Jensen (2011: 272) 
argued that Athens “preferred to assert control over Euboea directly through the implantation of cleruchies, colonies, and garrisons.” 
140 Seifried and Parkinson 2014: 284, 311; Gardner and Seifried 2016; contra Chidiroglou 2011; Chatzidimitriou & Chidiroglou 2014. The 
number of towers increases sharply during the Classical period (making up 76% of the towers from the Neolithic to Ottoman period). 
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found mostly millstones and storage vessels, and determined that they were built on terraces, 
often near threshing floors. Furthermore, even the biggest structures only measured six to eight 
meters in diameter, though most were far smaller. All this suggests an agricultural rather than 
defensive purpose. Though the towers were probably never big enough to serve as defensive 
strongholds for either Athenian lotholders or local Karystians, together they had a commanding 
view of the coastline and could just as easily have helped native Karystians stay alert to 
Athenian naval patrols, as Chelsea Gardner and Rebecca Seifried recently argued.141 Whether 
Karystians or Athenian lotholders, whoever built the towers seem to have wanted a clear view of 
the coast, not a command of the countryside. 
From the same period, a number of burials from nearby cemeteries in western Karystos 
have yielded local ceramic products mixed with a large amount of luxury ceramic imports from 
Athens—mostly black-figure choes and lekythoi, similar to those imported on Lemnos.142 In 
excavations of forty-seven graves of the Archaic to late Classical periods, Athenian ceramic 
imports outnumbered local Karystian potters and terracotta makers in the fifth century. But the 
increase of Attic wares in graves during this period, which nearly disappear during the second 
half of the fourth century, does not necessarily mean that Athenian lotholders were the ones 
importing Athenian goods. Rather, as Maria Chidiroglou concluded, the increase of Athenian 
imports at Karystos may be explained by the strength of the Athenian export economy and the 
proximity of Euboea to Athens. Karystos likely remained an economic hub during the fifth 
																																								 																				
141 Gardner and Seifried (2016) used geospatial and view-shed analysis to argue that the towers observed the coastline. Chatzidimitriou 
and Chidiroglou (2014: 324) also argued that “Athenian imperialism may have led some of the local population living in the 
Kokkaloi area to implement measures to protect their crops and resources by taking refuge in a well-built tower, when the need arose.” 
142 Chidiroglou 2011: 161-163. 
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century thanks to its command of the deep-sea port of Geraistos, so the presence of Athenian 
luxury imports is not at all unexpected. The Karystians may have remained a hub because they 
were plugged into the Athenian export market: after all, the Karystians, like the neighbors at 
Chalkis and Eretria, continued to pay tribute to Athens from the 450s up until they revolted in 
413, so they may have found it worthwhile to buy into the Athenian market to keep commercial 
traffic moving in and out of their harbor. But because no historical author ever mentioned any 
Athenians living in Karystos, and we have no archaeological evidence to suggest the same, all we 
can say is that Athenian naval and economic power came together to pressure Karystos.  
Likewise, excavations further to the west at the urban center of Eretria have dated 
changes in defense structures and ceramic imports to the middle of the fifth century. During the 
period of Athenian land allotment on the island, new fortifications were built to enclose the 
entire city, with a monumental west gate. As was the case for the towers in Karystos, however, 
it is unclear whether the Eretrians built the fortifications to defend against the Athenians, or 
perhaps the other way around. Excavated graves in and around the city of Eretria found more 
Athenian vases than at any other site in the Mediterranean outside of Attica: excavations found 
over a hundred Athenian lekythoi and another seventeen choes dating from the second half of the 
fifth century.143  The choes in particular have received a great deal of attention because they 
appear to depict the Athenian Anthesteria festival, in which young Athenian boys received the 
small wine decanter to celebrate their survival through the dangers of child mortality.144 J. R. 
Green and R. K. Sinclair, for example, argued that the presence of choes must mean that a large 
																																								 																				
143	Green and Sinclair 1970: 523.	
144 For the Anthesteria festival, see Aristoph. Thesm. 746, with Ham 1999. The festival drew attention to the boys’ prospective role as 
adult members of the community, rather than their present status as children, through the shared ritual context of a drinking banquet. 
	 	
 
	
137 
number of Athenian lotholders were living in Eretria.145 Even so, there seems to have been more 
continuity than change in fifth-century Eretrian material culture: the quantity of imported Attic 
pottery was most abundant in the second quarter of the fifth century, and actually decreased 
during the third quarter. Meanwhile, what little evidence there is for local production all comes 
in the way of Athenian imitation vases, whereby Eretrian potters hoped to compete with the 
Athenian export market.146 
Though the Anthesteria festival was popular in Athens, and choes was intimately tied up 
in the festival’s celebrations, the existence of Athenian choes is not at all sufficient evidence to 
identify a community of Athenians lotholders living in Eretria. In fact, Athenian choes depicting 
the Anthesteria festival have been found much further from Athens, as far away as Rhodes, 
Etruria, and Spain.147 The picture that emerges of Eretria during the period of Athenian land 
allotment is, again, not necessarily one of occupation: the changes in material culture at Eretria, 
like Karystos, can be explained by Athenian economic power. What set Eretria apart were its new 
fortifications—at once predictable owing to the general increase in fortifications in the generation 
before the Peloponnesian War, yet also noteworthy that the Athenians allowed it when they were 
not so lenient with Thasos in 465 and Samos in 440.148  
																																								 																				
145 From the Athenian vases alone, Green and Sinclair (1970: 525) argued that “the migration of Athenian individuals might lie 
behind the growing quantity of Attic pottery during the second quarter of the fifth century, the noticeable increase about the middle 
of the century would seem to indicate the arrival of a concentrated body of cleruchs rather than individual Athenians acting on their 
own initiative.” 
146 Sapouna-Sakellaraki 1995: 19; Ducrey 2004: 136. Still, Ducrey emphasized that the majority of the vases from Eretria were imported. 
147 Van Hoorn 1951: 49-51. Twelve Attic choes were found in children’s graves at Eretria (nos. 23, 112, 118, 123, 124, 158, 162, 518, 522, 
523, 895). Yet among the dozen choes excavated in the cemetery of Spina in Etruria, four were found in children’s graves (nos. 206-522, 
207-523, 376-513, 518). In Rhodes a chous was found in the grave of a newborn baby (no. 895) and at Taranto from an infant girl (no. 930). 
148 For the destruction of Thasos’ walls in 465, see Thuc. 1.100.2, 1.101; Plut. Cim. 8.2; Nepos Cim. 2.2. For Samos in 440, see Thuc. 1.115-117. 
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From what we have seen at Karystos and Eretria, there is nothing to suggest that Athenian 
lotholders actually “held” the island in any real, physical sense. Even so, the Chalkis Decree c. 
446, which settled the Athenians’ affairs in the community after the Chalkidians revolted, stated 
clearly that the Athenians entrusted the protection of Euboea to unidentified strategoi: 
περὶ δὲ φυ- 
λακε ̑ς Εὐβοίας τὸς στρατηγὸς ἐπιµέλεσ-
θαι ℎος ἂν δύνονται ἄριστα, ℎόπος ἂν 
ἔχε- ι ℎος βέλτιστα Ἀθεναίοις.149  
And as to  
the guarding of Euboea, the generals 
shall take care of that as best they can in 
the best interests of the Athenians. 
In a recent study of the Athenian grain trade during the period of Athenian land allotment, 
Alfonso Moreno assumed that the decree must have been referring to Athenian generals, 
presumably in charge of organizing Athenian garrisons on the island.150 He drew from a series 
of regional surface surveys of the Euboean countryside to suggest that there was a ring of 
Athenian naval garrisons scattered around the island near the coast, a strategy that would have 
anticipated the fortification of Attica in the early fourth century.151 For Moreno, the most 
compelling candidates were the forts at Vrachos near Phylla and Ano Potamia overlooking the 
bay of Kyme. 
However, neither case can be substantiated. In fact, excavations at Vrachos found no 
materials that could be dated to the Classical period, despite plenty of ceramic evidence from 
the late Archaic and Hellenistic periods; dated material from Ano Potamia show that the hilltop 
																																								 																				
149 IG I3 40, ll. 76-78. For the long debate about the meaning of the Chalkis decree, especially lines 52-57, see Gauthier 1971; Meiggs 1972: 
567; Vinogradove 1973; Whitehead 1976; Smart 1977; Fornara 1977; Balcer 1978; Henry 1979; Pébarthe 2000; Giovannini 2000; Ostwald 
2002; Pébarthe 2005; Sosin 2014. The consensus now is that the xenoi mentioned in the decree were not Athenian lotholders living in Chalkis. 
150 Moreno 2007: 119-140. He argued that there must have been a ring of garrisons in Euboea and across the channel in northern Attica. 
151 Theocares 1959; Sackett et al. 1966. Sackett et al. catalogue 92 settlement sites, covering all of Euboea. Though not complete, all 
major sites are covered. For the development of a system of Athenian defensive fortifications in the fourth century, see Ober 1985. 
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fortress did not take on its role as a prominent fortified position until the fourth century.152 
Furthermore, in a recent comprehensive survey of all known Eretrian defensive structures, 
Sylvian Fachard catalogued all 183 known sites between Chalkis and northern Karystia: he 
found that no site has any indication of Athenian occupation, and nearly every Classical site 
dates from the fourth century—with the one possible exception of late Archaic Vrachos.153 
Fachard concluded that a system of defensive fortifications did not develop until the fourth 
century, and therefore could not have been Athenian garrisons. In sum, there is no reason to 
assume that Athenian garrisons took an active role in policing Eretria when the evidence does 
not demand it. 
Instead, given what we have seen about how the Athenians used their navy in the fifth 
century, it is more likely that the Athenians used well-known sites like Rhamnous and Oropos 
in Attica across the Euboean gulf, as well as the garrison at Atalante on the northern coast of 
Boeotia, to allow their navy to patrol the island.154 After all, that is how Thucydides—an 
Athenian general who commanded the Athenian navy at Amphipolis—described the 
Athenians’ approach to the island.155 At Rhamnous, for example, Athenian triremes could 
quickly mobilize from the site’s two harbors. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had 
plenty of success with amphibious raids on coastal settlements in the Peloponnese, and Euboea 
was probably no different.156 Therefore, in the absence of any official Athenian garrisons on 
																																								 																				
152 For Vrachos, see Sakellaraki et al. 2002: 113-115; Fachard 2012: 300-301. For Ano Potamia, see Sampson 1981, contra Moreno 2007. 
153 Fachard 2012.  
154 For Rhamnous, see Pouilloux 1954; Ober 1985: 135. Petrakos 1999: 161-162. For Oropos, see Thuc. 8.60.1. For Atalante, see Thuc. 2.32. 
155 Thuc. 4.104.5-6. Athenian strategoi commanded both at sea and on land: hence the Chalkis Decree may have referred to the navy.   
156 For example, Demosthenes conducted raids on the Peloponnese during the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. 3.91.1, 3.105.3, 3.107.2-3. 
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confiscated lands, the Athenians probably relied on the unmatched power of their navy to 
remind allied poleis of the inevitability of retribution in the event of a revolt.  
If the Athenians held as much land on Euboea as the historical and epigraphic sources 
suggest, historians and archaeologists should take note that there is not more evidence that the 
Athenians disrupted the island. As we will see in the next two chapters, Syracusan and Roman 
land allotment left a very clear, and often very violent, mark on the landscape. If we did not have 
multiple historical sources telling us that the Athenians allotted land on Euboea, we probably 
would not be considering it as a case study in Athenian land allotment, much less as the prize of 
the Athenian empire. From the 450s on, the Karystians, Eretrians, and the Chalkidians continued 
to pay their contributions to the Delian League, though at reduced rates beginning in 451/50, 
around the same time that Tolmides confiscated land on the island. Karystos and Eretria seem to 
have remained viable economic hubs, though ceramic evidence from the two communities 
suggests that they imported most of their luxury goods from Athens. Though some Athenian 
lotholders may well have lived on or near their land allotments at Karystos, Eretria, and Chalkis, 
there is no evidence to suggest that they did so in large numbers: most of them, it seems, lived 
back in Athens. If that was the case, land allotment at Karystos, Eretria, and Chalkis would have 
anticipated the arrangement Thucydides described at Mytilene in 327. The tribute payments, the 
imports of Athenian goods, and the lotholders living at Athens all would have fit in nicely with 
how the Athenians compartmentalized their empire.   
Unlike the rest of the island, however, the northwestern community at Histiaia was the 
site of a new Athenian colony. There, Athenian settlers took an active role in re-shaping the 
region’s human geography. During the Euboean revolt in 447/6, the Athenians dispatched a 
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fleet to Histiaia. When the Histiaians managed to capture an Athenian trireme, they decided to 
execute the entire crew. After the revolt, the Athenians inflicted upon Histiaia a more severe 
punishment than the other Euboean poleis:  
Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀνακτησάµενοι καὶ τοὺς Ἑστιαιεῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐκβαλόντες 
ἰδίαν ἀποικίαν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξέπεµψαν Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος, χιλίους δὲ 
οἰκήτορας ἐκπέµψαντες τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν κατεκληρούχησαν.157 
The Athenians, regaining control of Euboea and driving the Histiaians from their city, 
dispatched, under Pericles as commander, a colony of their own citizens to it and 
sending forth a thousand colonists they portioned out both the city and countryside in 
allotments. 
Histiaia and the coastal community at Oreos lost ownership of their land to Athenian settlers, 
and had to physically relocate to Macedonia.158 In all likelihood, the Athenians used the 
execution as an excuse to settle Histiaia, which was the most fertile, and also the only forested, 
part of the island. Because the Histiaians refugees no longer constituted a political community, 
they did not have to pay taxes to the Delian League. Instead, the Athenian settlers, now 
technically the Histiaians, appear to have taken over the former residents’ position as coalition 
members of the Delian League.159  
Since Histiaia has not been excavated, we cannot yet say how the settlers’ experience 
there mirrored what we saw on Lemnos. Nevertheless, Thucydides, Theopompus, and 
Diodorus all insisted that Athenian settlers did indeed dispossess and replace the native 
Histiaians. Hence we can safely say that the Athenians experimented with land allotment on 
Euboea in two distinct ways. First, as we saw earlier, Athenian lotholders held land in Karystos, 
																																								 																				
157 Diod. 12.22.2, with Thuc. 1.114.3; Theopomp. fr. 387; Philoch. fr. 118. Theopompus said that two thousand Athenians got allotments. 
158 Theopomp. fr. 387. For how displacing the Histiaians reshaped the region, see Jensen 2010: 135-141; 2011. 
159	Histiaia paid 1,000 dr. in 447/6. Histiaia does not appear on the lists after that, though that may be because the lists are fragmentary. 
During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian settlers at Histiaia fought with the Athenians during the Sicilian campaign, see Thuc. 7.57.2. 
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Eretria, and Chalkis. Second, Athenian settlers moved to Histiaia, where they became coalition 
members and lived in their own insular colony. In neither case, however, was the Athenian 
state seeking to control the people its army dispossessed: rather, individual lotholders made 
money from their allotments, the Athenian state received tribute payments, and coalition 
members bought Athenian goods. Altogether, land allotment on Euboea benefited individual 
Athenians most, but it was also a vehicle for metropolitanism.   
We can see clearly enough how the Athenians compartmentalized their empire from the 
way they reacted to a second Euboean revolt a generation later. When news of the Athenian 
defeat in Sicily traveled eastward in 413, the Euboeans took the opportunity to revolt from the 
Delian League. They soon won the support of the Lesbians, who shared in their experience of 
land allotment. In the opening days of the revolt, the Eretrians first moved to neutralize the 
Athenians’ navy by taking the Athenian garrison at Oropos, recognizing it as a great threat to 
Euboea. With the Spartans now in command of northern Attica from Dekelea, the Athenians 
could not risk losing any more of their coalition. For that reason, the Athenians immediately 
mobilized another fleet from Athens to join up with the rest of the triremes already patrolling 
the island. When the Athenian forces joined together off the coast of Euboea, the Euboeans 
feared that the Athenians would blockade the island from the sea. But as the Athenian navy put 
in outside of Eretria to search for food, an Eretrian raised a signal for the Spartan fleet waiting 
across the channel at Oropos to attack. Unprepared, the Athenian fleet was routed in no time, 
and the sailors rushed ashore. Fleeing to the town of Eretria, the Athenians sought refuge from 
the Spartans, but were cut down by the residents as they entered the city. Afterwards the 
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Spartans helped the entire island defect from the Athenians.160 Only Histiaia did not revolt: but 
the Athenian settlers there could do little to stop the revolt, and were themselves driven out 
from Euboea at the end of the war. For a second time in so many years, news of catastrophic 
defeat reached Athens. 
The Athenians lost more on Euboea than just their land allotments. Going all the way 
back to 506, when the Athenians first confiscated land on Euboea, the island was a symbol of 
democratic imperialism. Aristophanes, for one, joked that Euboea looked the way it did—
stretched out along the northern border of Attica—because the Athenians made it that way. In 
the Clouds, an elderly farmer named Strepsiades was amazed by all the advanced fields of 
knowledge Socrates taught at his ‘Thinkery’—geometry, in particular, because the Athenians 
used it to measure out land allotments. One of Socrates’ students insisted that geometry could 
also be used to measure the whole earth. Clearly impressed, Strepsiades responded that such a 
skill must be dēmotikos kai chrēsmios (both “democratic and useful”).161 Strepsiades went on to 
identify Euboea on a map of the earth, recalling how the Athenians stretched out the island 
under Pericles’ leadership.  
Though Aristophanes offered nothing more than a caricature of Euboea, in just a few 
lines he captured the significance of land allotment in Athenian society: land allotment was 
“democratic and useful” because it allowed the Athenians to rework the physical landscape to 
their benefit. The Athenians could joke that they stretched out Euboea because they were able to 
make the single island profitable for so many individual citizens. Strepsiades was amazed that 
																																								 																				
160 For the Euboean revolt, see Thuc. 8.1.3, 8.5.1-2, 8.60, 8.95-6; Diod. 13.47.3-6. For the threat of blockade, see Diod. 13.47.3. 
161 Aristoph. Clouds 202-213.  
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knowledge could have such power. Of course, Aristophanes’ audience knew well enough that 
land allotment was rooted in violence and coercion. Then again, they were all sitting back in 
metropolitan Athens, in a public theater, imagining how they could use land allotment to carve 
up their imperial territory. 
 
3.7. Conclusions  
 The Athenian empire was an empire of contradictions. Within the Delian League, the 
Athenian state demanded loyalty of its coalition members but did very little.162 As we have seen, 
the Athenian state was never all that interested in controlling an imperial territory or governing 
the people within it. Rather, the Athenian state pursued the private interests of its citizens by 
allotting land to groups of individual settlers and lotholders. Therefore, in the Greek world where 
cooperative and interstate institutions were becoming the norm outside of Athens, Athenian land 
allotment was an outlier.163 Like the elite opportunism of Archaic period, Athenian land allotment 
lacked the appearance of the state, though it burst into a Classical world of interstate relations. On 
the one hand, the Athenians fashioned the Delian League as a relationship among states; and on 
the other hand, the Athenians allotted land to individual citizens.  
 Athenian land allotment owed its distinctive character to its origins in the Archaic 
period. The combination of Solon’s reforms and elite competition created a new form of 
opportunism that put a premium on private wealth. The development of a market economy at 
Athens presented an alternative to settler colonialism, but economic growth only further 
																																								 																				
162	In this regard, Athenian imperial governance in the fifth century was fairly typical of government in Greek poleis. Strauss (2013: 
23) argued that “for all its pretensions, Classical Greek government claimed everything and did little. That is the paradox at its heart.”	
163 For cooperative institutions, see Mackil 2013; Ober 2015; Blome 2015. For customs and expectations of interstate relations, see Low 2007. 
	 	
 
	
145 
embedded private inequality into Athenian society. At the end of the Archaic period, naval 
warfare and Kleisthenes’ democratic reforms made it so more Athenians shared in the rewards 
of empire. At the same time, land allotment also meant that the elites had found a way to 
institutionalize private wealth. As the Athenians confiscated more land during the fifth century, 
they drew lessons from their imperial neighbors: they created a new hybrid form of land 
allotment that united Spartan coercion from a distance with Persian entrepreneurialism. The 
Athenians soon learned from their navy that they could compartmentalize their empire in order 
to rebuild and invest in their metropole. Over time, the Athenians developed an approach to 
their imperial territory where taxes and trade flowed directly to their metropole rather than 
being shared or reinvested on the frontier.  
 Altogether, Athenian land allotment helped the Athenians create a monopoly on human 
capital in the Aegean. By transferring wealth back to Athens, the Athenians continued to invest in 
crafts and specialization, which in turn attracted more craftsmen, merchants, and bankers to 
Athens to do business. Because Athenian settlers arrived at their allotments already plugged into 
Athenian markets, and Athenian economic power ensured that Athenian goods were imported 
even in places the Athenians confiscated land, land allotment also helped the Athenians extend 
their markets. In that sense, the Delian League broke down economic networks in the Aegean, 
and then land allotment built a new one with Athens at its center. Outside of Athens, however, it 
was more destructive than constructive. At Hephaistia and Histiaia, we saw how Athenian land 
allotment unsettled whole native communities to make room for Athenian settlers. On the rest of 
Euboea, we also saw how Athenian land allotment could leave native communities largely intact, 
but still transfer its members’ wealth back to Athens while they simultaneously imported 
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Athenian goods. In the cases of both Lemnos and Euboea alike, the native communities learned 
firsthand what it meant to have Athenian leadership.    
So when the first summit of the Second Athenian League convened at Athens in 377, 
prospective members had every reason to be cynical. For nearly seventy years coalition members 
could look to the Athenians for defense against the Persians, but membership to the Delian 
League also came with the very real possibility of losing land. The Greeks remembered Athenian 
imperialism not just for how it was so disruptive or so coercive in everyday life, but because 
Athenian power was more economic than political. Unlike the Syracusans and Romans after 
them, the Athenians never extended citizenship to the people they dispossessed; in practice, the 
Athenians were limiting the amount of people who could receive a land allotment.164 
Consequently, coalition members increasingly saw themselves on the other side of empire—
always on the frontier, separate from the Athenian metropole, and never included in the imperial 
project. Perhaps, then, the imperial discourse at the time that marked Athens’ allies as “slaves” 
says much more about an ideology of land and citizenship than the actual life of empire.165 In a 
world where elite ideas about wealth united landownership with eleutheria (or “freedom”), those 
who had lost out to the Athenians had also lost control of their own labor.166 In this regard, for 
many coalition members the Athenians were no better than the Persians.  
																																								 																				
164 In fact, during the fifth century the Athenians placed restrictions on who could become citizens: under Pericles’ citizenship law of 
451/0, both parents had to be citizens for a child to become a citizen, see [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.4; Plut. Per. 37.3-4. The Athenians also 
kept lists of Athenian citizens, and regularly reviewed the records to expel anyone who did not have a proper claim to citizenship. 
165 For example, Thucydides (3.10.5) wrote that the Mytilenaeans liked to think that the Athenians had “enslaved” their allies. For 
the freedom-slavery dichotomy, see Strauss 2008: 223. For the discourse on dispossessed communities, see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004. 
166 Contra Moreno 2007: 320-321. For the elite ideal farmer, see Hdt. 2.165-167; Xen. Oec. 4-5; Dio. Hal. Rom. Ant. 2.28; Raaflaub 1983; 2004. 
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Even so, the Athenians were very Greek in their defense of polis life and closed citizenship. 
But that is not the whole story. The Athenians had also created an exceptionally integrated 
political community before they started allotting land. Even though private inequality was built 
into Athenian society, most citizens could still look to Athens as the source of their middling 
livelihood thanks to high real wages, its market economy, and metropolitan infrastructure. 
Essentially, the Athenians had created such an integrated metropole at the time of imperial 
expansion that they took for granted the frontiers beyond it. In the end, it is not surprising that the 
Athenians found a way to distance the state from other communities. Economic exchange may 
have been opening up the Greek world to increased interaction, but Athenian land allotment only 
reinforced the boundaries of the polis. If there was, after all, a logic to the way the Athenians 
allotted land, then the Peloponnesian War did not simply cut short the Athenians on their way to 
creating a Mediterranean empire in the Roman mold. This is not to say that the Athenian road to 
empire was doomed from the start, nor were the problems the Athenians had in securing their 
empire simply a failure of creativity. Had the Athenians defeated the Syracusans in 413, the 
ancient Mediterranean might never have gotten to know the Syracusans and Romans as we do 
today. Instead, Athenian land allotment is an example of how even the most promising conditions 
at the metropole cannot guarantee the life of an empire. 
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Chapter 4  
THE SYRACUSANS 
The Athenians took to the sea in 415 with the promise of empire awaiting them on Sicily. 
Brash and barefaced, the Athenians hoped to bring their empire of allotment to the western 
Mediterranean.1 An armistice with the Spartans, now in its seventh year, freed them to redirect 
their fleet across the Ionian Sea.2  Even so, the Syracusans expected the Athenians were 
overextending themselves so far from home. When the Syracusans came together on the slopes 
of the Epipolai heights above the city to discuss the Athenian threat, they assured themselves 
that the Athenian empire at war was no match for the western Greeks. For most Syracusans, the 
treaty of Gela a decade earlier in 424 meant that the Sicilians would join together to fight the 
Athenians, whose imperial pivot toward the island won them no favor.3 Thus, Hermokrates, the 
champion at Gela, came before the Syracusan assembly and insisted that they send envoys to 
their Greek and Punic neighbors without delay.4 He then invited his audience to behold the 
great distance separating them from Athens and to consider the fate of empires: the Athenians, 
like the Persians at Salamis, could not hope to extend their empire over so vast a distance, he 
argued, and their defeat would leave the Syracusans empowered to take on Sicily themselves.  
                                                        
1 For the Athenians’ preparations for the Sicilian campaign and the prospect of land allotment, see Thuc. 4.65, 6.18.3; Diod. 12.54.1, 13.2.2; 
13.30.1; Kagan 1981: 159-209. Officially the Athenians sailed to Sicily at the request of the Segestans, who were at war with Selinous and 
Syracuse. The Athenians struck an alliance with the Segestans in the middle of the fifth century, see IG I3 11; Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 80-82. 
2 Thuc. 6.31; 6.43. For the Peace of Nikias in 421, see Thuc. 5.13-24.  
3 In 424, the Greek states in eastern Sicily came together at Gela to sign a peace treaty, see Thuc. 4.58-65; Kagan 1974: 265-268. In effect, 
Athenian imperialism had prompted Sicilian unity: the Sicilians agreed to the Syracusans’ proposal to leave “Sicily for the Sicilians.” 
4 For Hermokrates’ speech and Athenagoras’ response, see Thuc. 6.34-41, with Bloedow 1996; Fauber 2001; Mader 1993; Hinrichs 1981. He 
hoped that fear would make the Carthaginians join them, see Thuc. 6.34.2; cf. 1.23.6. For his career, see Grosso 1966; Westlake 1969: 174-202. 
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But as the Athenians sailed to Sicily, they saw the Syracusans’ own imperial past 
weighing against them. Alkibiades had convinced the Athenians to undertake the campaign on 
the promise that the island was crippled with instability and stasis (or “civil strife”).5 He 
pictured its cities teeming with “mixed mobs,” known more for their frequent relocations than 
their sense of citizenship and duty. After all, only two years after the Sicilians came together at 
the Congress of Gela, the Syracusans forced the Leontine elite to relocate to Syracuse after 
destroying their city. Afterwards, the Leontines who moved to Syracuse became Syracusan 
citizens.6  The Leontines were just the most recent examples in a long history of forced 
relocations on Sicily dating back to the beginning of the fifth century.  
So when the Athenians sized up the Syracusans, they took pride in their own closed 
citizenship and autochthonous imperial society.7 The Athenians, for their part, were no strangers 
to forced relocations: the Lemnians and Histiaians knew this only too well. But the Athenians saw 
in Syracuse itself, with its the fluid borders and mixed population, the image of those places like 
Lemnos and Histiaia that had fallen victim to Athenian imperialism: they saw Sicily as a world 
destabilized by a history of relocations and land confiscations, composed of fragmented states 
that could be picked apart individually. Alkibiades was appealing to what the Athenians knew 
best: their own experience with conquest and land allotment taught them that the Syracusans’ 
imperial past would be their undoing. In other words, the Athenians mapped the Aegean world 
that they had created onto Sicily. As the two Greek states made preparations for war, they saw in 
each other a common history of conquest and land allotment.  
                                                        
5 For Alkibiades’ views on Sicilian instability, see Thuc. 6.17.2-4. Alkibiades was responding to Nikias’ concern of overreach, see Thuc. 6.11.  
6 For the relocation of the Leontine elite, see Thuc. 5.4.1-5; Diod. 12.54. Dionysios allotted their land to mercenaries in 396, Diod. 14.78. 
7 For Athenian ideas about autochthony, political society, and imperialism in the fifth century, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1996: 27-48. 
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The Athenians, however, misread the imperial geography of Sicily. For the Syracusans, 
land allotment was also a formative institution of their community, but not in a way the 
Athenians would have recognized. Beginning in 483, and just two years after Gelon took control 
of Syracuse, successive Deinomenid tyrants transformed the city into a metropolis by resettling 
elite populations from nearby Gela, Kamarina, Megara, and Leontinoi. At first, Gelon allotted 
land in and around Syracuse itself to new residents, and the land they left behind remained 
mostly unused. Later, in 476 Hieron was the first to allot land outside of Syracusan territory when 
he resettled the Naxians and Katanians to Leontinoi and had Syracusan and Peloponnesian 
settlers take their place.8 But the democratic takeover in 466 marked a caesura in the Syracusans’ 
transition to empire, as the mixed residents of the Deinomenid state returned home and scattered 
across eastern Sicily. It was not until the aftermath of Gela in 422 that the Syracusan democrats 
revisited the Deinomenid approach to forced relocation and land confiscation at Leontinoi. After 
the Athenians’ gamble on Sicily ended in total defeat in 413, and two Carthaginian campaigns on 
the island failed to reach Syracuse, the Syracusans picked up where the Deinomenids had left off: 
with Dionysios I now as their military leader, they set out on a period of rapid imperial state-
formation that unsettled much of Sicily and southern Italy for a single generation.9 In the century 
between Gelon’s tyranny and Dionysios’ death in 367, the Syracusans allotted land after forced 
relocations on at least twenty-one occasions (see Table 4.1, with Maps 4.1-2). After the Athenians’ 
failed Sicilian campaign, the Syracusans succeeded the Athenians to become the leading Greek 
state in the Mediterranean. Much to the Athenians’ dismay, Hermokrates was right.  
                                                        
8 Hieron’s new settlement was called Aitna, see Diod. 11.49.2. The new settler population of Aitna was a mixed community of both 
Syracusan and Peloponnesian recruits. Hieron is said to have transferred the dispossessed Naxians and Katanians to nearby Leontinoi.  
9 Dionysios is first attested in the sources as a supporter of Hermokrates in 408 in a failed military coup at Syracuse, see Diod. 13.75.  
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Table 4.1. Dates and locations of Syracusan land allotments in the historical sources 
Date Location  Origin of Lotholders Main Sources 
483 Syracuse 
Kamarina, Gela, Leontinoi, 
Megara Hyblaia 
Hdt. 7.154-156; Thuc. 6.4 
483 Syracuse  Mercenaries Diod. 11.72-3 
476 Leontinoi Naxos, Katane Diod. 11.49 
476 Aitna Syracuse Diod. 11.49 
422 Syracuse Leontinoi Thuc. 5.4.1-5; Diod. 12.54.7 
405 Syracuse, Leontinoi  Gela, Kamarina Diod. 13.111 
404 Syracuse  Mercenaries Diod. 14.7 
404 Entella Mercenaries Diod. 14.9 
403 Naxos  Sikels Diod. 14.15.1-3 
403 Katane  Mercenaries Diod. 14.15.1-3 
403 Syracuse  Leontinoi Diod. 14.15.4 
396 Leontinoi  Mercenaries Diod. 14.78.4 
395 Messene  Lokroi Diod. 14.78.5, 14.88.5 
389 Syracuse  Kaulonia, Hipponion Diod. 14.106.3, 14.107 
389 Kaulonia, Hipponion Lokroi Diod. 14.106.3, 14.107 
 
In many ways, the Syracusan empire mirrored its Athenian counterpart. Like their fellow 
Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean, the Syracusans divided up confiscated land into plots and 
then allotted them to individuals for their own private use. Greek authors, for their part, used the 
term klēros and its cognates to describe Syracusan allotment, just as they did for Athenian 
allotment. At the height of the Syracusan empire in the early fourth century, Dionysios 
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commanded the largest navy in the Mediterranean and the city of Syracuse was one of the most 
active urban centers in the world, its massive port teaming with merchant ships.10 And at each 
forced relocation and confiscation of land, the Syracusans, like the Athenians, were breaking 
down the political and economic networks that existed before their empire. In fact, in the 
generation after their Sicilian campaign, the Athenians themselves considered the Syracusans to 
be the predominant power in the western Greek world. In 394/3 and then again in 368/7, the 
Athenians recognized Dionysios as the “archon of Sicily,” and even granted him citizenship to seal 
a defensive alliance against the Spartans.11 The Athenians had finally come to recognize the 
Syracusans for the imperial power they had become after more than a century of land allotment.  
Still, Syracusan tyrants, not democrats, were responsible for nearly every occasion of 
land allotment. Furthermore, the tyrants routinely allotted land to mercenaries and allies rather 
than actual Syracusan citizens—citizens who often came from a dispossessed community and 
were forced to live on allotted land at Syracuse. Despite the similarities between Syracusan and 
Athenian land allotment, ancient historians have shied away from comparing the two imperial 
histories, assuming that tyrants and democrats necessarily created different kinds of empires—
that tyranny alone sufficiently explains Syracusan land allotment. To be sure, even in antiquity, 
Sicily was known for its frequent recourse to tyranny, and ancient authors saw tyrants going 
                                                        
10 For the development of the Syracusan navy, see Diod. 11.88, 12.30, 14.41-44, 15.13, with Murray 2012: 81-84. For urbanization at 
Syracuse, see Morris 2006: 43-46; Evans 2009. Plato (Letters 7.332c), in his criticism of Syracusan urban relocations wrote that 
Dionysios had “united all Sicily into a single city.” In the early fourth century, Syracuse may have become the first single Greek city 
to exceed 50,000 residents, see Morris 2006: 44. Still, Athens and Piraeus together had a larger population already in the fifth century 
before the Peloponnesian War. 
11 IG II2 18, l. 7; IG II2 103, l. 19-20; IG II2 105 + 523, l. 8, with Osborne 1982: 57-59; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 48-51,160-169. For 
Athenian diplomacy with Dionysios after the batlle of Leuktra in 371, see also [Dem.] 12.10; Lysias 19.19-20. Ps. Demosthenes and 
Lysias both linked Dionysios to Evagoras king of Salamis, a supporter of Athens and the Second Athenian League, see Sorg 2015: 63-64. 
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hand-in-hand with forced relocations and mercenary settlement.12 Thus the historical sources 
for land allotment focus on the motivations and personality of the tyrant himself, and take for 
granted what went on wherever he was not present. Drawing on those sources and Alkibiades’ 
famous assessment of Sicily, historians tend to treat Syracusan land allotment primarily as an 
instrument of the tyrant, a simple form of remuneration for services that protected and 
empowered his regime. In this traditional view, land allotment had no real bearing on 
Syracusan society and was in no way linked to popular politics, much less democracy, even 
though the Syracusan democrats relocated the Leontines to Syracuse in 422. By reconstructing 
the story of Syracusan land allotment as one just about tyrants, it is hard to explain why 
Syracusan tyrants and democrats both allotted land in conquered territories to people outside of 
Syracusan society and then resettled the people they dispossessed back in Syrakousai to become 
citizen landowners. 
In this chapter, I show how the Syracusans valued their imperial territory in a very 
different way than the Athenians, a way that cannot be explained simply by the difference 
between tyrants and democrats. Instead, I argue that the Syracusans saw imperial land as 
external to their state so that the people of their empire could become internal to their state. The 
Syracusans considered imperial land to be less a source of wealth than the people taken from it:  
hence they gave away imperial land and concentrated imperial labor. Therefore, the twin policy 
of land allotment and relocation was a political means to an economic end: the concentration of 
human capital at Syracuse. Unlike Attica, Syracusan territory had long been an underpopulated 
                                                        
12 See Section 4.3. For the frequency of tyrants in Sicily, see Thuc. 1.18.1, 6.38.3; Just. 4.2.3. For the idea that there was a strong connection 
between tyrants, mercenaries, and empire, see Aristotle Pol. 3.1286b; 5.1315b; Polybius 11.13; Diod. 14.65.2–3, with Lomas 2006: 106-107. 
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frontier economy, which meant that there was more available land than people to work it. 
Despite having one of the finest harbors in the Mediterranean, the Syracusans also were not the 
economic power that the Athenians were at the time they began confiscating land. Quite the 
opposite: the Syracusans could hardly compete with their Greek and Punic rivals on Sicily, 
mostly exporting grain in return for manufactured goods. Over time, the Syracusans became 
increasingly open to giving citizenship to the people they dispossessed, so long as it meant that 
they could secure an empire’s share of human capital back at Syracuse.  
Altogether, the Syracusans thought of land allotment as a way to reshape the human 
geography of Sicily and concentrate human capital back at Syracuse. The Syracusans, like the 
Athenians before them, saw imperial land as something external to their citizen community: 
they were committed to the idea of the insular polis and its citizen chōra, so they kept the land 
they conquered as distinct and separate from Syracuse itself. Unlike the Athenians, however, 
the Syracusans used land allotment to transfer people, not just wealth, from the land they 
conquered. For that reason, Syracusan land allotment concentrated human capital more than it 
centralized it within a broader network: it transferred whole communities to Syracuse rather 
than plugging them into a Syracusan network of exchange from where they were already living, 
outside of Syracusan territory. At each transfer, the Syracusans undercut the productive 
capacity of the their rivals, increased economic activity and production at Syracuse, and 
quickened the pace and scope of specialization in their labor force. Outside of Syracusan 
territory, the recipients of land allotments received the base conditions for a new agrarian life 
on Sicily, but that life also required them to start over in competition with Syracuse. 
 155 
  
Above: Map 4.1. Sicily. Below: Map 4.2. Southern Italy. 
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In what follows, I have divided the story of Syracusan land allotment into six sections. 
After deconstructing the sources and historiography in section one, section two surveys the 
Archaic prehistory to Syracusan land allotment to understand why the Syracusans were willing to 
trade imperial land for human capital in the fifth and fourth centuries. Based on the growth of 
Syracuse’s commercial and military rivals, section three shows how the Syracusans externalized 
their imperial territory as a way to force along the economic development within Syracusan 
territory. Section four then shows how tyrants and democrats both naturalized the people they 
moved to Syracuse as a way to concentrate human capital at the metropole. Two final sections 
draw from recent archaeological evidence from eastern Sicily and Kalabria in southern Italy to test 
how land allotment undermined economic communities outside of Syracuse.  
 
4.1. Sources & Historiography 
The figure of the tyrant was central to Sicilian political culture. Looking back on Sicilian 
history before the Roman conquest of the island, Diodorus described his native island as 
“particularly prone to one-man rule,” or monarchia.13 He had in mind a very particular kind of 
one-man rule, one that the Greeks called tyrannis, and the ruler himself they called a tyrannos, or 
“tyrant.” To the Greeks, tyrants were leaders who directed public affairs in their own self-
interest, not the interests of the broader political community.14 The label “tyrant” could also 
apply to anyone who governed through coercion and force alone. It was in this sense that 
                                                        
13 Diod. 19.1.5. Diodorus uses the word µοναρχία in this instance, but then switches to τυραννίς to describe each specific example. 
14 For Aristotle’s formulation of the Greek typology of tyrannis and tyrannoi, see Arist. Pol. 4.1295a1-24, with Luraghi 2013: 135-139. For 
classic treatments of Greek tyranny, see Andrewes 1956; Berve 1967; Mossé 1969. For more recent studies, see Austin 1990; Luraghi 
1994; Cawkwell 1995; Anderson 2005; Lewis 2006; 2009. For the legacy of tyranny and tyrant-killing in democracies, see Teegarden 2014. 
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Thucydides used the term to describe the Athenians and their position at the center of the 
Delian League. 15  But tyranny did not necessarily preclude the existence of republican 
institutions: the Syracusan popular assembly under Dionysios presided over the city’s finances, 
used sortition to fill public offices, and elected Dionysios I “stratēgos autokratōr,” the city’s head 
general and military leader.16 Still, because the Greeks tended to remember tyrants more for 
their vices than the institutions that supported them, they saw tyranny as a particularly volatile 
form of governance, and communities led by tyrants particularly prone to outbreaks of stasis. 
And for good reason: Syracuse seems to have experienced more staseis than any other Greek 
polis, with nineteen documented cases in the Classical period alone. 17  When Alkibiades 
described Sicily to his Athenian audience, he saw Syracusans’ frequent relocations and 
instability as part and parcel of tyranny and Sicilian political culture. 
The historical sources for Syracusan land allotment, for their part, also implicate 
Syracusan tyranny in Syracusan imperialism. Writing from back in Athens, Thucydides and 
Herodotus both emphasized what they saw to be fundamental differences between Syracusan 
imperialism in the west and Athenian imperialism in the east. Thucydides, whose history is one 
of the only extant contemporary sources for Syracusan imperialism, digressed at the beginning 
of Book 6 to explain the long history of Sicilian population movements to his Athenian 
audience. Unlike the Athenians in the eastern Greek world who were well-known for their 
autochthony, , he explained, Syracusan tyrants and their neighbors had a long history of 
moving people in and out of their states, from one part of Sicily to another. Thucydides 
                                                        
15 See Thuc. 1.122.3, 1.124.3, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, with Tuplin 1985. Aristophanes used tyrannos to describe the dēmos, see Knights, 1111-1114. 
16 Diod. 13.94.5–95.1, 15.20.6, 19.1.4. For discussion of republican institutions at Syracuse under Dionysios, see also Caven 1990: 159-161. 
17  Berger 1992: esp. 34-49. He studied the nineteen documented cases between the end of the Gamoroi regime in 491/0 and Timoleon.   
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included this digression before narrating the Athenians’ campaign to Sicily precisely because he 
wanted to show his Athenian audience just how different a world west Greece was from east 
Greece, and thus just how cavalier Alkibiades was in his assessment of Syracusan power. Still, 
he took a lot of details for granted: he never once mentioned Syracusan land allotment by name, 
only referring to the movement of people from one place to another.  
Herodotus was also more interested in comparing east to west Greece than describing 
imperial institutions. During a brief digression on the envoys the anti-Persian coalition sent to 
Sicily in 480, Herodotus described how Gelon made Syracuse a powerful state by relocating 
people from all over eastern Sicily to Syracuse with citizenship.18 Unlike Athenian power, which 
rested in its democratic institutions, Syracusan power according to Herodotus rested in its ability 
to marshal large armies from Syracuse. Thucydides and Herodotus are invaluable for modern 
historians because they give a brief but contemporary view of Syracusan imperialism—albeit one 
directed towards an Athenian audience. However, they both wrote their histories before the most 
active period of Syracusan land allotment, the period of Dionysios’ leadership, before it was ever 
clear that the Syracusans were on their way to creating an empire to succeed the Athenians. As a 
result, Thucydides and Herodotus leave modern historians with the impression that the only way 
to compare Syracusan an Athenian imperialism is to compare tyrants and democrats.  
We see a similar Athenocentric approach to Syracusan imperialism in the contemporary 
political theorists who were, again, writing in Athens. Aristotle pointed to Dionysios time and 
time again in his Politics as an exemplary tyrant and anti-democrat. After all, Aristotle studied 
                                                        
18 Herod. 7.154-156. Unlike Thucydides, Herodotus did not seem to think, or at least he made no mention, that this kind of 
demographic engineering was destabilizing.   
 159 
under Plato, who tried his hand for a time as Dionysios’ advisor only later to narrowly escape a 
death sentence.19 Consequently, whenever Aristotle used Dionysios’ example, or any other 
Syracusan tyrants for that matter, to illustrate the problems of tyranny, he did little to hide his 
disdain for Syracusan political culture. In each of his anecdotes about Dionysios, he focused on 
the tyrant himself, not any of popular political institutions at Syracuse that carried over from the 
fifth-century democratic regime. It would be easy to forget for anyone reading Aristotle’s Politics 
that Syracuse even under the tyrants had one of the largest citizen assemblies in the Greek 
world.20 Rather, for Aristotle, Dionysios was an exemplary tyrant because he did all the things the 
Athenians expected of a tyrant: he regularly hired mercenaries, he seemed to hand out citizenship 
freely, and he maintained diplomatic links to other states through political marriages. Land 
allotment, unsurprisingly, was nowhere on Aristotle’s register. Still, because Aristotle’s Politics 
weighs so heavily on how modern historians interpret Greek political culture, his portrait of 
Dionysios has made it difficult to see Syracusan imperialism, and indeed Syracusan land 
allotment, as anything but the tyrant’s personal instrument of power.   
Because the contemporary sources for Syracusan land allotment are nearly silent on the 
subject, and excavations at Syracuse so far have found nothing to rival the Athenians’ 
epigraphic habit, our main source is the Sicilian historian Diodorus. Unlike both Thucydides 
and Herodotus, Diodorus offers an unbroken narrative of Syracusan history down to 380, 
arranged annalistically. Without Diodorus’ history, we would know almost nothing about the 
sequence and distribution of Syracusan land allotments in the late fifth and early fourth 
                                                        
19 For Plato in Sicily, see his Seventh Letter, though it is uncertain whether he himself wrote it. See also Diogenes Laertius, Life of Plato.  
20 Caven 1990: 159-161; Robinson 2011: 67-92. We do not have anything like the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia for information about 
government institutions at Syracuse, so Aristotle’s anecdotes about tyranny remain the main sources for Syracusan political history.  
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centuries. Diodorus wrote his universal history to integrate Greek with Roman history, but in 
doing so his chronology sometimes suffered at the expense of his narrative.21 But whereas his 
chronology may be shaky, his interest in land allotment was at least consistent. With few 
exceptions, whenever he wrote that the Syracusans defeated another state, he also mentioned 
whether or not they confiscated any land and what they did with it. In fact, Diodorus used 
κληρουχέω and its cognates more than any other author writing about Greek history. In his 
effort to unite Greek with Roman history, Diodorus may have seen land allotment as a common 
thread—after all, he was a Sicilian author writing during the Roman civil wars of the late 
Republic, a time when land allotment was hyper-politicized, especially on his native island.22 
Furthermore, his two main sources for Syracusan imperialism, Philistus of Syracuse (c. 432-356) 
and Timaeus of Tauromenion (c. 345-250), experienced firsthand two successive waves of 
Syracusan imperialism.23  Philistus was a general and early friend to Dionysios; Timaeus 
supported Timoleon from Tauromenion, where he was hegemōn. Both were personally exiled by 
Syracusan tyrants later in life. From what we can tell from the few fragments we have of their 
histories, they were personally invested in the tyrants’ legacies and their failings as military 
leaders. Drawing on those authors, Diodorus connected all land allotments directly to the 
tyrants, not to Syracusan society as he did for Athenian and Roman society.  
Drawing on the close connection between tyrants and Syracusan political culture, 
modern historians have traditionally taken the tyrant himself as the central agent of Syracusan 
                                                        
21 Marincola 2011: 176-177. 
22 Diodorus would have been alive for the controversial agrarian laws debated in Cicero’s De re agraria. He also would have heard 
about Sulla, Caesar, and Pompey allotting land to their veterans. For Diodorus and his Roman context, see Sacks 1990; Muntz 2017.  
23 For Diodorus’ sources, see Sanders 1981; 2002; Sacks 1994. For the historical works of Philistus and Timaeus, see Vattuone 2011. 
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land allotment. This approach treats empire, relocations, and land allotment serving the 
personal interests of the tyrant. As such, the history of Syracusan land allotment has 
traditionally been the history of Syracusan tyrants. Renewed interest in the volatility of 
autocratic forms of government after the Second World War led historians to see Greek tyranny 
as an undesirable, but sometimes necessary phase in the evolution of a polis on its way to a more 
participatory form of government. In this view, tyrants allotted land to mercenaries and allies to 
win their support, and thus maintain a hold on power. For example, Antony Andrewes, in his 
influential study of Greek tyrants suggested that Syracusan tyrants relocated dispossessed 
people and allotted the land they left behind to bring those areas under their personal control. 
Helmut Berve and Claude Mossé built on Andrewes’ model by arguing that Syracusan tyrants 
created a personal monarchy that had no relation to the city of Syracuse and its citizens. For 
them, land allotment was a symptom of a tyrant’s coalition of power: it allowed him to appease 
his coalition of mercenaries and allies while simultaneously moving unruly populations back to 
Syracuse where he could suppress their dissent. This model of a “tyrant-coalition” became the 
standard explanation for Syracusan land allotment.24 
In the 1980s and 1990s, as many ancient Greek historians turned their focus to Athenian 
democratic society, the study of Syracusan society shifted away from the tyrants themselves to the 
                                                        
24 See Andrewes 1956: 128-142; Berve 1967; Mossé 1969. For the influence of the “tyrant-coalition” model on later studies, see, for 
example, Finley 1979; Caven 1990; Berger 1991; Luraghi 1994; Péré-Noguès 1999; Ober 2015: 180, 254. According to evolutionary 
approach to tyranny, tyrants and their elite coalitions monopolized power in a way that allowed the broader community to conceive 
of it in an abstract way. This view favors the replacement of tyranny by democracy at Athens. For an overview of the traditional 
approaches to Greek tyranny, see Lewis 2006: 6-9. For the Athenocentric approach, Greek constitutional history, and the figure of 
the tyrant, see Brock and Hodkinson: 2000: 4-9. For other Athenocentric studies of tyranny, see Kinzl 1979; Cawkwell 1995; Giorgini 
1993; Barcelo 1993. 
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fluidity of western Greek societies.25 At the center of this shift was the recognition that Syracusan 
tyrants, compared to their mainland counterparts, undermined the traditional political 
boundaries of their own polis community by moving dispossessed populations to Syracuse with 
citizenship. In four exhaustive studies, Jakob Seibert, Nancy Demand, Riccardo Vattuone, and 
Alessandro Giuliani catalogued each moment of urban relocation to show how Sicilian tyrants, 
moreso than any mainland tyrant, relied on “demographic engineering” and political synoikism 
(from synoikismos, literally “moving in together”) to secure their power at home and abroad.26 
Building on Andrewes’ tyrant-coalition model, they showed how the Syracusan state was 
fundamentally different from Athens: in their pursuit of personal power, Syracusan tyrants freed 
themselves of any meaningful connection to the state, brought together a composite political 
community at Syracuse, and maintained close relationships with those mercenaries they settled 
abroad. But for all of their interest in the demographic consequences of Syracusan imperialism, 
they only reinforced Andrewes’ regime-based focus. By taking for granted what Syracusan 
“control” actually looked like outside of Syracuse, they left imperial land allotment as a postscript 
to a story of tyrants consolidating their power at the metropole.  
Other historians have pointed to the particular ethnic and social fissures on Sicily to 
explain Syracusan imperialism. Sebastiana Consolo Langher and Franco De Angelis have recently 
argued that the conditions on Sicily drove the Syracusans and their neighbors to leave behind 
traditional ideas of the insular polis community in favor of a larger “territorial state”—an 
                                                        
25 Interest in Athenian democracy during this period roughly coincided with the 2,500 anniversary of Kleisthenes’ popular reforms 
at Athens. See, for example, Ober and Hedrick 1993, 1996; Ober 1996; Morris and Raaflaub 1998; Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998, with 
Lomas 2006: 2. 
26 Seibert 1982-1983; Demand 1990; Vattuone 1994; Giuliani 1995. See also Luraghi 1994: 288-304; Mafodda 1990: 53-69; 1996: 71-80. 
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expansionist, multi-polis state.27 They argued that, because the Syracusans strongly identified with 
other Sicilian Dorians, and because stasis was a recurrent problem in colonial cities, each 
Syracusan regime, whatever its political persuasion from Gelon to Agathocles, pursued some 
form of territorial state greater than the polis and its chōra. For them, the social tensions in Sicilian 
cities made the Syracusans prone to expand their state to bring in other Dorians and, in the 
process, reinforce the ethnic base of Syracusan society. A policy of relocations disrupted local 
alliances and shifted elite loyalties to the Syracusan regime; a policy of land allotment then 
expanded the Syracusan state to incorporate conquered land. In this view, when the Athenians 
declared Dionysios I “the archon of Sicily,” the title was not simply a show of honor but rather a 
recognition that he governed a single state that included much of Greek Sicily.  
In a similar approach, Schlomo Berger argued that tyrant and democratic regimes alike 
wanted to expand the Syracusan state.28 What united Syracusan tyrants and democrats was their 
common sense of ethnic identity, but lack of political “rootedness,” or sense of autochthony, as 
descendants of colonists. Sicilian colonists and their descendants did not have the same level of 
connection to their place of residence as their counterparts in mainland Greece. By emphasizing 
the structural continuities of the Syracusan state, Consolo Langher, De Angelis, and Berger moved 
away from the tyrant as the agent of empire. In fact, they saw the Syracusans not so much as 
imperialists, but rather as state builders. Still, this approach, like those before it, assumed strong 
connections between Syracuse and communities outside of Syracusan territory, but did not show 
                                                        
27 Consolo Langher 1996: 218-255; 1997; De Angelis 2016: 63, 126-129. Neither of them compared how this form of multi-polis state 
might have been similar to mainland experiments with federalism, even though koina in Thessaly and the northern Peloponnese 
shared many similar qualities.  
28 Berger 1991, with Amit 1973. Still, he argued that the Syracusan tyrants violated the standard institutional practices of Greek poleis. 
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those connections: it was never clear what the Syracusans thought of land beyond the Syracusan 
chōra or how other poleis were affected by state building.   
 In the last decade, historians have begun to take a more discursive approach, looking at 
how land allotment figured into ideas about ethnicity, citizenship, and “integration.” Kathryn 
Lomas, for example, has shown how Greek communities in Sicily and southern Italy allowed 
for a much greater level of mobility across boundaries of citizenship and even ethnicity. Because 
of their proximity to native Sicilians and Italiotes, western Greeks’ own self-definition 
developed in relation to non-Greek cultures.29 Consequently, when Syracusan tyrants allotted 
imperial land to “barbarian” mercenaries of Campanian or Sikel origin, they were not only 
subverting the very idea of the polis, they were also fashioning a distinctive Syracusan imperial 
identity distinct from Athenian autochthony. Similarly, Sandra Péré-Noguès argued that 
Dionysios I allotted land to his mercenaries as a way to integrate them into the Syracusan state, 
as Gelon had done with his mercenaries at Syracuse.30 Though there is no evidence for 
mercenaries settled outside of Syracuse receiving citizenship, she nevertheless assumed that 
they identified with the Syracusan state through their connection to imperial land. For Lomas 
and Péré-Noguès, land allotment was a symptom of western Greek political culture, but still a 
culture that played out according to the intentions of its tyrants.  
Recent interest in global and economic history has prompted some historians to study 
Syracusan land allotment as a process of state-formation. Ian Morris considered forced 
relocations and land allotment as a sign that the Syracusans, like the Athenians, were headed 
                                                        
29 Lomas 2000; 2006. She did not say whether Italiote ideas about citizenship may have influenced the Sicilians, per Dunbabin 1948: 
416. Dunbabin suggested in passing that synoikism and citizenship at Syracuse was more like Rome than anywhere in the Greek world. 
30 Péré-Noguès 2004; 2006. 
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down what Charles Tilly called a “capital-intensive” path to a commercial and urban state.31 
Because the Syracusans’ military power rested with their mercenaries, they were essentially 
converting capital, acquired through rents and conquest, into coercive power. For Morris, the 
Syracusans’ payments to mercenaries tied them to the state, and therefore the Syracusans did 
not have to “outsource” warfare to allies, which would have distanced the tyrant from his own 
source of power. The allotment of land to mercenaries then reinforced their integration into the 
Syracusan state, and the communities they formed were centers of imperial security. For all his 
important theoretical insights, Morris repackaged the tyrant-coalition model: relocations 
increased the tyrant’s wealth and land allotment helped control hostile frontiers.   
 Though the study of Syracusan land allotment has continued to inspire interest among 
ancient historians, recent work has done little to advance our understanding of Syracusan land 
allotment beyond whatever the intentions of the tyrant himself may have been. For all their 
variety, the studies of Syracusan imperialism in recent decades have all adhered in one way or 
another to the tyrant-coalition model. Because ancient historians have focused exclusively on the 
historical evidence from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Diodorus, and those historians were 
themselves more interested in the tyrants than land allotment, it is not surprising that the history 
of Syracusan land allotment has traditionally been the history of Syracusan tyrants. But it remains 
unclear how land allotment figured into Syracusan society more broadly and to what extent the 
Syracusan community of citizens, not just Syracusan tyrants, played a role. 
                                                        
31 Morris 2009: 101, 161, with Tilly 1992. Morris argued that the Syracusans were quite different from the Athenians because they 
never created a centralized tax base and bureaucracy to govern the state beyond Syracuse itself. Still, he suggested that Gelon and 
Hieron may have pioneered the Greek model of what Tilly called a “capital-intensive” state, which the Athenians later adopted 
under the Delian League. 
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This chapter moves beyond traditional regime-based approaches by de-centering the tyrant 
as the primary agent of empire. Tyrants may have been in power for much of Syracusan imperial 
history, but land allotment affected all of Syracusan society—land allotment was a Syracusan story, 
not just a tyrant story. Far from subverting the territoriality of the polis community, land allotment 
allowed the Syracusans to “externalize” their imperial territory by consolidating the people they 
dispossessed within Syracusan territory and allotting the land the left behind to people outside of 
Syracusan society. Like the Athenians, the Syracusans were committed to the strong connection 
between citizenship and the chōra. But unlike their Aegean counterparts, the Syracusans allotted 
land in their own territory (or “Syrakousai”) as well as outside of it: on the one hand, they allotted 
land in Syrakousai to dispossessed imperial communities with Syracusan citizenship; on the other 
hand, they allotted the land confiscated from those communities to mercenaries and allies, who then 
formed new political communities separate from Syracuse. Because human capital, I argue, not 
land, was the most valuable commodity within their imperial territory, the Syracusans let the land 
they confiscated remain separate from, and external to, their own territory. The Syracusans were 
internalizing new citizens in a way unheard of among the eastern Greeks, but they were 
nevertheless committed to the idea of the insular polis community, where the reach of the state and 
its citizens mapped onto the territory of the citizen chōra.  
 Outside of Syracusan territory, the Syracusans unsettled much of the Greek west, but then 
forced many of those dispossessed communities to relocate to Syrakousai to make room for new 
settlers. The mercenaries and allies who settled on the confiscated land were on their own to build 
a new life, often a slow transition that, as we will see, undercut local economic activity to the 
benefit of Syracuse. Furthermore, Syracusan citizens themselves had no part in land allotment 
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outside of Syracusan territory: they may have become citizens after receiving allotments of land in 
the Syracusan countryside, but they could not expect to share directly in the benefits of imperial 
land. But because land allotment did not require any drain on the Syracusans’ productive power, 
and it brought together an empire’s share of human capital at Syracuse, it placed Syracusan 
citizens at the helm of the fastest growing urban center in the Mediterranean. In all, this chapter 
argues that Syracusan land allotment resulted in a massive transfer of imperial peoples that did 
more to increase production and specialization at Syracuse than build political support for the 
tyrant outside of Syracusan territory.  
 Such an approach moves beyond the regime-based approaches by asking why Syracusan 
land allotment took the forms it did, not treating it as a simple consequence, or symptom, of 
tyrants’ personal struggle for power. By emphasizing the economic life of imperial communities, 
it can be tested against archaeological evidence from eastern Sicily and southern Italy. Syracusan 
land allotment put a premium on internalizing the people of empire because it emerged out of a 
long colonial history, a prehistory that emphasized the shortcomings of Sicilian agrarianism in the 
absence of the labor and markets it counted on. What we see is that the Syracusan empire was 
distinct from its Athenian counterpart not necessarily because it emerged alongside tyrants, but 
because those tyrants were more interested in the people of empire than their land.  
 
4.2. The Archaic Origins of Syracusan Land Allotment 
 Unlike Athens, Syracuse was itself a colony, a Corinthian initiative in a push of 
commercial expansion in the second half of the seventh century. One of a dozen major Greek 
colonial sites on the island, Syracuse also grew up alongside two dozen or so native Sikel, 
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Sikan, and Elymian communities in the central highlands, and yet another three Punic 
settlements on the northwestern coast. Though Syracusan territory was well under half the 
size of Attica, at roughly 1,000 km2 near the end of the Archaic period, and the Syracusans 
themselves founded at least one independent settler colony at Kamarina, the Syracusans 
seem to have mostly focused on agricultural intensification within Syracusan territory.32 But 
as they began to confiscate land outside of Syrakousai at the beginning of the fifth century, 
they had learned that there was plenty of land already within Syracusan territory for 
allotment, and thus the land they confiscated was expendable and could be given to 
mercenaries and allies. What they lacked, however, was the labor and specialization needed 
to compete economically, and ultimately militarily, with their rivals in eastern Sicily. As we 
will see, by the end of the Archaic period, they saw imperial land as external to their state so 
that they could bring imperial peoples back to Syrakousai to become members of it.  
 In Syrakousai, a citizen community was slow to develop, which made it easier for new 
people to become members of the Syracusan community. For much of the Archaic period, a 
narrow coalition of elite Syracusans (the gamoroi, literally “they who divide the land”) ruled 
over a mixed community of Greek immigrants and native Sikels held in serf-like conditions.33 
Though the earliest Corinthian colonists may have been united in a sense of political 
                                                        
32 For the size of the Syracusan territory in the Archaic period, see De Angelis 2000a: 122-124; 2000b, with Dunbabin 1948: 95-112; Di Vita 
1956; Cancio 1980; De Miro 1986: 571-572; Gates 1997; Muggia 1997: 58-59. For Kamarina, see Thuc. 6.5.3, with Dunbabin 1948: 104-107; 
Lentini 1983; Manni 1987. They founded settlements within Syracusan territory at Heloros in c. 700, Akrai in 664, and Kasmenai in 643.  
33 For the identification of the gamoroi and kyllyrioi, see Hdt. 7.155.2; Arist. fr. 603; Marmor Parium 36, with Dunbabin 1948: 55-64, 111; 
Loicq-Berger 1967: 35-37; Lepore 1970: 142-147. Herodotus wrote that the Syracusans held the kyllyrioi as douloi, or slaves. The first group 
of Corinthian colonists likely drove out most of the native Sikels from the area, and those who remained were held in a form of slavery, 
the details of which remain unclear. It is tempting to draw parallels between Syracusan kyllyrioi and the Spartan helots, see Section 3.2.  
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community and Dorian ethnicity, later generations of immigrants did not fully share in that 
community and only hardened the existing oligarchy. 34  The Syracusan state, like the 
Athenian state before Solon, was really just a narrow coalition of landowning elites. But 
unlike Athens, Syracuse did not have an early watershed moment like Solon’s reforms that 
pushed Syracusan society to develop a cohesive citizen community. In the absence of a strong 
sense of citizenship, and because only the elite really constituted the state, Syracusan society 
allowed for a level of cultural heterogeneity unseen in Attica. For example, unlike their 
Aegean contemporaries, the Syracusans do not seem to have adopted any communal forms 
of mortuary practice; instead, excavations of both urban and rural burials during the Archaic 
period show high levels of local variation and a range of symbolic systems.35 Even before the 
first Syracusan tyrants, a narrow conception of the state and a fluid sense of what it meant to 
be “Syracusan” made Syracusan society more open to new members. 
 Meanwhile, elite Syracusans were becoming immensely wealthy putting local labor to 
work on Syrakousai’s grain-rich countryside, a trend that checked any desire they may have 
had to look beyond the Syrakousai for more land and new sources of wealth. Though Syracuse 
itself began as a small coastal settlement, and after a generation its territory extended only 35 
km south to a small outpost at Heloros, the territory continued to grow over the course of the 
seventh and sixth centuries into sparsely populated, non-Greek borderlands. By 500, Syrakousai 
covered the entire southeast corner of Sicily south of the Anapos river and east of the Hyrminos 
                                                        
34 The Syracusans came from Corinth, a Dorian community, see Thuc. 6.3.2, with Braccesi and Millino 2000: 23-27; De Angelis 2016: 71-73. 
35 Jackman 2005: 21-62. She drew similar conclusions for Selinous and Metaponto as well. By way of comparison, I. Morris (2009a: 
159-160, with Morris 1989) argued that, “Starting around 700 B.C.E., Aegean Greeks [namely Athens] tended to represent their cities 
in their death rituals as single, homogeneous communities, each sharing a unified symbolic system to which all buriers adhered.”  
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river, an area of some 1000 km2.36 Within those borders, the land was particularly well suited for 
agriculture, and received nearly twice as much rainfall as Attica. Franco De Angelis has 
estimated that up to 80-90% of Syrakousai was cultivable, more than twice as cultivable as 
Attica, giving it a carrying capacity of up to 144,000 people: though under half the size of Attica, 
it could actually sustain more people.37 For that reason, Syracuse was well known in antiquity 
for its agricultural surpluses.38 With its massive Great Harbor, much larger than the Kantharos 
Harbor at Piraeus (see Figures 4.1-2), Syracuse was naturally poised to command grain 
shipments between northern Africa, southern Italy, and mainland Greece. The Syracusan elite 
took advantage of Syracusan agriculture by exporting grain in exchange for manufactured and 
ceramic goods.39 Therefore, because elite Syracusans could rely on the kyllyroi for cheap labor, 
and they also controlled the division of land and agricultural rents within Syrakousai, they did 
not look outside of Syrakousai for new sources of wealth, as Miltiades had in Attica. Instead, the 
elite continued to give land to non-elite Syracusans and new immigrants at small rural 
settlements within Syrakousai, such as Akrai and Kasmenai.40 In doing so, they showed how 
Syrakousai was already large enough to accommodate new landholders.   
                                                        
36 Gates 1996: 8-12, 23-36.  
37 De Angelis 2000a; 2000b. By comparison, Attica was roughly 35-40% cultivable, with much less reliable rainfall, hence the growth 
of the Athenians’ import market and their dependence on foreign grain, see Garnsey 1988: 91-93, with Osborne 1987: 33-34; 1996b: 59.  
38 Thucydides (3.86.4; 6.20.4; 6.90.4) mentioned on three occasions that Syracuse was known as a grain-producer. On the second occasion, 
Nikias warned the Athenians the Syracusans could count on homegrown grain, as opposed to imported grain, to sustain them. In 486, 
Gelon sent a shipment of grain to the Romans, free of charge, see Dion. Hal. 8.70.5. Then in 481, Gelon offered to supply the entire anti-
Persian coalition with grain during the war, see Hdt. 7.158. For a note of caution on the historical sources, however, see De Angelis 2006.  
39 Lanza and Westcoat 1989: 76. It is worth noting that exchange with Corinth continued at comparatively high levels, relative to 
other Sicilian poleis, through the beginning of the fifth century, even after the Athenian ceramic industry largely took over the market. 
40 For Akrai in 664, see Fischer-Hansen et al. 2004: 189-190. For the hilltop site of Kasmenai in 643, see Fischer-Hansen et al. 2004: 205-206. 
Kamarina seems to have been an independent polis, and fell out of favor with Syracuse shortly after its foundation, see Cordano 1987.  
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 Together, a fluid citizen community and elite agriculturalism led wealthy Syracusans to 
find new ways of increasing the labor force in Syrakousai. By the sixth century, high agricultural 
rents and intra-elite competition allowed the gamoroi to marshal labor and materials to such an 
extent that temple building at Syracuse, like at Selinous, Akragas, and Gela, began to outpace 
mainland Greece.41 At Syracuse, for example, the gamoroi ordered the construction of two 
colossal Doric temples for Apollo and Olympian Zeus. The vast wealth that allowed for 
Syracusan temple building came from an abundance of fertile land in Syrakousai. But unlike 
Attica, Syrakousai in the Archaic period was an underpopulated “frontier economy,” which 
                                                        
41 For intra-elite competition and temple building in Sicily, see Mertens 2006: 90-256. For labor and temple building, see De Angelis 
2003a: 140-143, 163-169. For the Apollonion and Olympieion, see Boardman 1980: 172-173; Fischer-Hansen et al. 2004: 229. By 
comparison, in Athens the Peisistratids ordered the construction of the Old Temple of Athena and started the Olympieion, see 
Hurwit 1999: 99-136.  
Left: Figure 4.1. The Syracusans harbors. Right: Figure 4.2. The Athenians’ harbors.  
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meant that there was more available land than people to work it.42 The Syracusan population 
was, after all, originally a small colonial population, and therefore demographic growth and 
subsequent immigration was slow to populate Syrakousai.43 By the end of the Archaic period, 
the urban population of Syracuse numbered roughly 2,400-6,500, and the total population of 
Syrakousai reached roughly 7,500-20,000—the upper limit still nearly eight times smaller than 
Attica.44 So even though the gamoroi were able to accumulate high agricultural revenues, the 
control of labor, not land, was the real source of their wealth. Consequently, when they went to 
war with their colony Kamarina in c. 552, and in defeat the Kamarinaians vacated the city, the 
Syracusans did not resettle it, which would have only reduced their own labor force.45 The 
Kamarinaian campaign set an important precedent: when a Syracusan military campaign broke 
apart a political community, they would not necessarily resettle the land.  
 As most Sicilian states transitioned from oligarchies to tyrannies in the sixth century, and 
the neighboring states of Akragas and Gela became imperial states, the Syracusans inherited a 
model of indirect empire that allowed them to continue investing in their own territory. 
Beginning with Phalaris’ takeover of Akragas in 570, one Greek state after another adopted 
tyranny in a rush of peer-polity interaction.46 Afterwards, many of those states also tried to 
                                                        
42 De Angelis 2010: 37; 2016: 55-57, with Powelson 1988: 308-310; Allen 1997: 145-146. De Angelis explained that, “for the early Greek poleis 
in Sicily to thrive, it was vital to concentrate populations and to minimize their movements, so that economic exploitation could take root.” 
43 For demographic growth, see De Angelis 2000a: 139, with Muggia 1997: 56-115; Scheidel 2003: 131-135, with Beloch 1886: 261-305. 
44 De Angelis 2016: 143. By comparison, in 500 Athens had a population of roughly 20,000 and Attica roughly 150,000, see Morris 2006: 39. 
45 The evidence for Kamarinaian history in the second half of the sixth century is very sparse. According to Thucydides (6.5.3, with 
Philistos FGrH 556 F5), the Syracusans expelled the Kamarinaians from the city after some sort of apostasis. In c. 491, Hippokrates of 
Gela resettled Kamarina after defeating the Syracusans at Heloros. However, excavations suggest that some residents may have 
remained on site: the habitation zone and Archaic burials show no signs of rupture in the sixth century, see Lentini 1983: 5-6; Pelagatti 
1976–77: 523–526; 1978. 
46 De Angelis (2003a: 39) suggested that native forms of authoritarian government may have influenced the growth of island’s Greek states.  
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expand across Sicily. For example, under Phalaris’ (r. 570-554) leadership, the Akragantines 
conquered much of central Sicily, extending Akragas’ reach as far north as Himera on the 
northern coast of Sicily.47 To the east, Kleandros (r. 505-498) and Hippokrates (r. 498-491) of Gela 
followed a similar path on the eastern seaboard of Sicily. Hippokrates conquered Leontinoi, 
Naxos, Zankle, and Kallipolis, took their inhabitants as slaves, and carried away whatever 
moveable property they left behind.48 After conquering each city, he often installed a new 
figurehead as tyrant, such as Skythes at Zankle and Ainesidemos at Leontinoi, and allowed them 
to govern it as an independent polis.49 In his rapid conquest of eastern Sicily, Hippokrates readily 
employed Sikel mercenaries.50 When he went to repopulate those cities that he had conquered, he 
allotted imperial land to people outside of Geloan society—to his mercenaries and immigrants 
from mainland Greece, such as the Samians at Zankle and the Arkadians at Kamarina.51  
 Hippokrates was creating a kind of indirect empire: he refounded cities with new 
landholders drawn from outside Gela and their tyrants were only connected to Gela through 
military commitment. He was more interested in the labor and moveable property he could take 
from other communities than the actual control of their land. This approach to imperial coercion 
was distinct from its Athenian counterpart because it was premised on personal contacts rather 
than naval mobility. Since Gelon, Syracuse’s first tyrant, was himself a cavalry commander 
under Hippokrates, he got to witness firsthand just how this particular approach to imperial 
                                                        
47 For Phalaris, see Arist. Pol. 1310b28; Rhet. 1393b11; Polyaen. 5.1; Diod. 19.108.1-2, with Luraghi 1994: 21-49; Adornato 2006; 2012. 
48 For Kleandros and Hippokrates, see Hdt 7.154-155; Polyaen. 5.6, with Dunbabin 1948: 376-406; De Miro 1962; Luraghi 1994: 119-186. 
49 For Skythes, a tyrant from Kos, at Zankle, see Hdt. 6.23-24, 7.164.1. For Ainesidemos at Leontinoi, see Hdt. 7.154.1; Paus. 5.22.7. 
50 Dunbabin 1948: 416; Griffin 2005: 115-116. Polyaenus (5.6) mentioned Sikel mercenaries from Ergetion in Hippokrates’ employment. 
51 For Samians at Zankle, see Hdt. 6.23; 7.164.1. For Arkadians at Kamarina, see Anth. Pal. Appendix, Epig. 43, with Griffin 2005: 116-117.  
 174 
territory could work.52 He also witnessed how a community needed more than agricultural 
labor to transform a city into a metropole.  
 The arrival of Gelon at Syracuse set in motion a series of economic and demographic 
changes that rapidly transformed Syracuse into a metropole ready to compete with its 
commercial rivals. With the rise of Athenian and Punic trade networks in the sixth century, 
Syracuse found itself at the crossroads of Mediterranean trade.53 Despite having one of the 
Mediterranean’s finest harbors, Syracuse was nevertheless a secondary power on Sicily, 
importing most all manufactured goods, primarily from Corinth, Rhodes, and Etruria, in 
exchange for agricultural surpluses.54 This was a time when nearly every other major Greek 
community on Sicily was developing some sort of ergastēria (or “production workshops”) to fuel 
exchange: Syracuse is the only major site on the island for which there is no archaeological 
evidence of industry and manufacturing dating from the Archaic period. 55  Though the 
Syracusan elite may have had cheap agricultural labor, they did not have the kind of human 
capital that could outfit imperial centers like Gela, Akragas, and Selinous—much less Athens—
with the tools of war. But in 485 Gelon, having succeeded Hippokrates as tyrant of Gela, took 
advantage of a short-lived democratic coup at Syracuse to set himself up as the first tyrant of 
Syracuse.56 He had inherited a Sicilian empire from Hippokrates at Gela, which had more fertile 
land than Syracuse, but he chose to leave Gela to his brother Hieron so that he could claim 
                                                        
52 Hippokrates served under Gelon as hipparchos, see Hdt. 7.154-155.  
53 For Phoenician and Punic trade, see Pilkington 2013: 77-129. For Mediterranean interconnectivity, see Broodbank 2013: 506-592. 
54 For imports from Corinth and Rhodes, see Dunbabin 1948: 61-62, 227-245. For Etruria, see Hencken 1958; Loicq-Berger 1967: 176-177. 
55 For evidence of industry and manufacturing at Selinous, Akragas, Gela, Megara Hyblaia, Naxos, Zankle, see Fischer-Hansen 2000. 
Because the modern city of Syracuse sits on top of the ancient site, it is possible that excavations have not yet found the Archaic 
workshops. The early Archaic craters found at the Fusco cemetery at Syracuse may have been local productions, see Pelagatti 1982: 148.  
56 For the democratic coup and the disorder that followed, see Hdt. 7.155; Arist. Pol. 1302b25-33; Diod. 10.26, with Dunbabin 1948: 415-416.  
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Syracuse for its harbor.57 Gelon brought with him half the urban population of Gela and all the 
Kamarinaians, who he gave Syracusan citizenship. With the transition at Syracuse to Gelon’s 
tyranny also came a transfer of imperial energy: in 483, the Syracusans conquered the 
Megarians and Leontinoi and relocated their elites to Syrakousai, leading to the first land 
allotments in Syrakousai to people dispossessed by Syracusan militarism.58 In the process, 
Syracuse built up a navy of at least two hundred triremes, one that would have rivaled Athens’ 
fleet, and equally capable of coercion.59  
 In what followed, Syracusan land allotment unsettled much of eastern Sicily and southern 
Italy for over a century. Sicilian political culture and agriculturalism had taught the elite at the top 
of Syracusan society that forced relocations and land allotment in Syrakousai could bring them 
high agricultural rents at home. They also learned from their imperial neighbors at Gela that they 
did not have to follow up imperial conquest with state colonialism: they used land allotment to 
form new dependent communities drawn from people outside of Syracusan society. The growth 
of neighboring states in eastern Sicily, and other Mediterranean powers like Athens and Carthage, 
also revealed to them what the city of Syracuse was lacking: the skilled labor and specialization 
needed to scale up economically and militarily. Consequently, the Syracusans would allot land in 
two different ways: within Syracusan territory to people who became Syracusan citizens and 
outside of Syracusan territory to people from outside of Syracusan society.  
                                                        
57 For the size and boundaries of the Geloan chōra, see De Angelis 2000a: 136-138. Though no ancient source said explicitly why 
Gelon moved from Gela to Syracuse, the main differences that distinguished Syracuse from Gela were its harbor and its position on 
the eastern seaboard of Sicily. For the development of the Syracusan harbors, see Evans 2009: 16-20. 
58 Hdt. 7.156.2. Gelon forced them to move to Syracuse, but he gave them citizenship and land in return, likely to increase the city’s wealth. 
59 Hdt. 7.158.4. Herodotus wrote that in 480 Gelon offered to supply the anti-Persian coalition in Greece with two hundred triremes. 
For the development of the Syracusan navy in the fifth century, especially the expansions under Gelon and Hieron, see Corretti 2006.  
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The transition to tyranny at Syracuse was a transformative moment for Syracusan 
imperialism: Tyranny brought with it from Gela the coercive capacity to create an empire. By 
limiting land allotment to mercenaries and allies in nearly every case, it also ensured that most 
Syracusans would not directly profit from land outside of Syracusan territory. Even so, we will 
see that the tyrants’ approach to imperial territory became so engrained in Syracusan society that 
Syracusan citizens under the democracy and later under Dionysius I continued to move people 
within Syracusan territory to become citizens.  
 
4.3. Externalizing Imperial Territory 
 As the Syracusans adjusted to life under Gelon after 485, they could do little but watch as 
Syracusan territory filled with new people from around eastern and central Sicily. Alongside the 
new residents from Gela, Kamarina, Megara, and Leontinoi, Gelon also gave citizenship to ten 
thousand of his mercenaries—likely those who helped him conquer Megara and Leontinoi in the 
first place.60 Among the mercenaries were immigrants from the Peloponnese, three of whom are 
known from their dedications at Olympia and Delphi.61 One man by the name of Phormis wrote 
on a statue at Olympia that he was “an Arkadian of Mainalos, now of Syracuse.” Presumably he 
fought for the Syracusans, and afterwards moved to Syracuse and became a citizen.62 Under 
                                                        
60 For Gelon’s career at Syracuse, see Mafodda 1990; 1996. For the ten thousand mercenaries settled in Syrakousai, see Diod. 11.72.3.  
61 Demand 1990: 48-49. An Arkadian from Mainalos named Phormis dedicated a statue of himself dressed as a warrior at Delphi, see 
Paus. 5.27.2. Another Arkadian from Mantinea named Praxitiles dedicated two statues at Olympia, see Dittenberger and Purgold 1896: 
no. 266. A final Arkadian named Agesias commissioned Pindar to celebrate his victory at Olympia, see Pind. Olym. 6.6. At Selinous, an 
Arkadian living at Gela named Alexias made a dedication to the goddess Hekate during Gelon’s early rule, see Guarducci 1953: 209-
211. It is possible that Gelon employed mercenaries such as Alexias and then settled them at Syracuse after he moved from Gela.  
62 Gelon married the daughter of Theron, tyrant of Akragas, to secure a political alliance with central Sicily’s strongest state, see Diod. 
14.63.3, with Luraghi 1994: 260-262. For the Battle of Himera in north-central Sicily, see Hdt. 7.166-167; Diod. 11.20-26; Pind. Pyth. 1.71-80. 
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Gelon, the urban population of Syracuse increased to roughly 15,000-24,000, and the total 
population of Syrakousai may have reached as much as 100,000, still far below Attica.63 In 480, just 
five years after Gelon moved to Syracuse, the Syracusans and their Akragantine allies defeated 
the Carthaginians at the Battle of Himera—according to Herodotus, on the same day the 
Athenians defeated the Persians at the Battle of Salamis. Just as Salamis was proof to the 
Athenians that their navy was the key to coercing their allies, Himera showed the Syracusans that 
imperial territory was less important than the people they took from it.  
 Between Gelon’s conquest of Megara and Leontinoi in 483 and Dionysios’ death in 367, 
Syracusan tyrants continued to allot land outside of Syracusan territory to people from outside 
of Syracusan society. They gave it either to mercenaries from the Peloponnese and Campania or 
to their Lokrian allies from southern Italy after Dionysios secured a marriage alliance with on of 
their leading families.64 The only time Syracusan citizens ever received land allotments outside 
of Syracusan territory was at Aitna, a new colony founded by Hieron in 476 on land taken from 
the Katanians. There, Diodorus wrote that Hieron “allotted the land not only of Katane, but also 
much of the neighboring lands which he added to it, to a sum of ten thousand settlers”—one 
half from Syracuse, the other from the Peloponnesus.65 In all likelihood, the rapid demographic 
growth at Syracuse under Gelon allowed Hieron to experiment with colonialism, like the 
Athenians did at Lemnos around the same time. Still, Aitna was an outlier: the next century of 
                                                        
63 De Angelis 2016: 184. It is difficult to give population estimates for Athens at the same time. Still, by the mid-fifth century, 
Athens had a population of roughly 60,000-65,000 and Attica roughly 300,000-350,000, see Morris 2006: 42, with Hansen 1986; 2004: 636.  
64 Peloponnesians at Aitna in 476, Tyndaris in 396, and Messene in 395 and again in 369; Campanians at Entella in 404, Katane in 403, 
Aitna in 396; Sikels at Naxos in 403 and Tauromenion in 396; unnamed mercenaries at Leontinoi in 396 and at Tauromenion in 392. 
Lokrians at Messene in 395, Kaulonia in 389, Hipponian in 389, and Skylletion. Dionysios’ first wife, Hermokrates’ daughter, died in 
405, see Diod. 13.112.4. In 398, Dionysios married twice: Doris of Lokroi, see Diod. 14.44.6-7; Andromache of Syracuse, see Diod. 14.44.8. 
65 Diod. 11.49.2; Pind. Pyth. 1.30-31. According to Pindar, Hieron chose Aitna’s site for its “fruitful land” near the slopes of Mt. Aitna.  
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tyrants and democrats never again allotted land to Syracusan citizens outside of Syracusan 
territory. Instead, they kept giving it away. This was because, I argue, the Syracusans had a 
different view of imperial territory than the Athenians.  
 Unlike the Athenians, who compartmentalized their empire to direct taxes and trade from 
imperial land back to Athens, the Syracusans needed imperial people more than imperial land. 
After Kleisthenes’ reforms, the Athenians naturalized the resident foreigners living Attica all at 
once and, by the time they began confiscating land, they already had a robust market economy: 
what they wanted was land and the money they could make from it.66 The Syracusans, however, 
had plenty of available land in Syrakousai, but not enough people and skilled labor to take full 
advantage of it. In a way, we can think of what the Syracusans were doing as forcing along in 
stages what had already happened at Athens: they were naturalizing new citizens, investing in 
human capital, and transforming their city into a metropole. From what we can tell, the people 
they moved within Syracusan territory all became citizens and, as citizens, they could also expect 
to receive land in and around Syracuse. Like Athenian citizens, Syracusan citizens participated in 
land allotment, just only within Syracusan territory. As we will see, the Syracusans still restricted 
their citizenship to those living within Syracusan territory, despite the Syracusan political 
community being more fluid than what we saw in Attica. In that sense, the Syracusans were not 
all that different from the Athenians because they were also upholding the territoriality of the 
Greek polis. What distinguished them, however, was how they externalized their imperial 
territory: by moving dispossessed people within Syracusan territory, and then allotting land to 
them as citizens, the Syracusans were trading imperial land for imperial people.    
                                                        
66 For naturalization of foreigners at Athens after Kleisthenes’ reforms, see Arist. Pol. 1275b36–37; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21.4. with Kagan 1963. 
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 Gelon first moved the communities from Gela, Kamarina, Megara, and Leontinoi to 
Syracuse as a way to compete with his Greek and Punic rivals on Sicily, but also with Athens. 
Already in Herodotus’ Histories we see Athens and Syracuse set up as rivals and competitors: 
the story goes that the Athenians defended the eastern Greeks from Persian invaders at Salamis 
on the same day that the Syracusans defended the western Greeks from Carthaginian invaders 
at Himera. Both commanded navies of two hundred triremes, if we take Herodotus at his word. 
In the years after Himera, Hieron styled Syracuse as a cultural center to rival Athens, inviting 
Aeschylus from Athens to perform The Persians and then The Women of Aitna, which 
commemorated the conquest of east-central Sicily. He also invited the likes of Simonides and 
Pindar, both lyric poets from the eastern Mediterranean. Syracuse, he hoped to show, was on its 
way to becoming a city that could compete on the Mediterranean stage.67  
 But after the democratic coup in 467, it seems that many of the Syracusans who became 
citizens under Gelon and Hieron either left or were forced to leave Syracuse by the archaioi politai 
(or “original citizens”).68 Excavations at Kamarina, which Gelon destroyed after moving its 
residents to Syracuse, have found that both the city and countryside were totally redesigned 
along a new grid pattern around the middle of century, likely by the Kamarinaians who returned 
home.69 Back at Syracuse, the remaining citizens divided up their territory among themselves: 
αἱ δὲ πόλεις σχεδὸν ἅπασαι πρὸς τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν πολέµων ὁρµήσασαι, καὶ 
κοινὸν δόγµα ποιησάµεναι, πρὸς τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ξένους διελύθησαν, καὶ τοὺς 
φυγάδας καταδεξάµεναι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολίταις τὰς πόλεις ἀπέδοσαν, τοῖς δὲ ξένοις 
τοῖς διὰ τὰς δυναστείας ἀλλοτρίας τὰς πόλεις ἔχουσι συνεχώρησαν τὰ ἑαυτῶν 
ἀποκοµίζειν καὶ κατοικεῖν ἅπαντας ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ. αἱ µὲν οὖν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἐν 
                                                        
67 De Angelis 2016: 188-190. 
68 Diod. 11.72.3. In this passage, Diodorus referred to the Syracusan citizens naturalized under Gelon and Hieron as xenoi (or “foreigners”). 
69 Di Stefano 2006: 168; Mertens 2006: 352-353; Pelagatti 2006: 48. See also the reconstructed plan of Kamarina in De Angelis 2016: 113. 
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ταῖς πόλεσι στάσεις καὶ ταραχαὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατελύθησαν, αἱ δὲ πόλεις τὰς 
ἀπαλλοτρίους πολιτείας ἀποβαλοῦσαι σχεδὸν ἅπασαι τὰς ἰδίας χώρας 
κατεκληρούχησαν τοῖς πολίταις πᾶσιν. 70 
Virtually all the cities, in their eagerness to put an end to these wars, with one accord 
agreed to come to terms with the foreigners living in their midst. They then took back the 
exiles and returned the cities to [the descendants of] their original settlers. All those 
foreigners who, at the behest of their former rulers, had been left in possession of cities not 
their own, they gave permission to take with them their own goods and to settle in 
Messenia [in the Peloponnese]. Thus the civil strife and disorder that had prevailed 
throughout the Sicilian cities was brought to a close; and the cities themselves, after 
driving out the forms of government which foreigners introduced, with almost no 
exceptions divided up their territories into allotments among all their citizens. 
With a tyrant no longer in charge at Syracuse, the Syracusan citizens first moved to get larger 
shares of land within Syracusan territory. 71 They were able to do so, Diodorus implied, because 
Gelon and Hieron had given land to the people they moved to Syracuse—land which was now 
available again for allotment. But even though Syracusan citizens now controlled the allotment 
process, they also triggered a period of demographic, and probably also economic, decline: as 
hundreds, if not thousands, of naturalized citizens left Syracusan territory, much of the activity 
that made Syracuse a rival to Athens in the first quarter of the fifth century also dissipated. We 
saw in the last chapter that it was around this time that Lysias’ father moved his business from 
Syracuse to Athens, which was fast becoming the economic center of the Mediterranean. 
According to Diodorus, in 439 the Syracusans invested what they could from their wars against 
the Sikels to build a new navy of one hundred triremes.72  
                                                        
70 Diod. 11.76.5-6. Green (2010: 78 n. 98) pointed out that, at the time, “Messenia was still in revolt against Sparta; thus the deportees, 
almost all experienced mercenaries, must have been welcomed by Sparta as a useful instrument in helping to put down the insurrection.”  
71 According to tradition, so much property was changing hands, resulting in so many court cases, that a Syracusan named Corax tried 
to formalize Greek rhetoric for the first time, see Cic. Brut. 46. 
72 Diod. 12.30.1. Diodorus was referring to the war against Douketios, who died in 440, see Diod. 12.29; Jackman 2006. Still, Thucydides 
wrote that the Syracusans in 426/5 were still making preparations “to avoid being any longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels.” 
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 But in the generation after the democratic coup, the Syracusan citizens watched as 
Athenian economic power began to overtake Sicily. A shipwreck off the coast Gela, for example, 
dating from the third quarter of the fifth century was carrying a cargo full of almost nothing but 
Attic fine wares and transport amphorae.73 By 433, the Athenians had secured a political alliance 
with the Leontines—the Syracusans’ closest neighbors to the north—no doubt to further their 
interests on the island.74 Just a few years later, in 427 the Syracusans went to war with the 
Leontines, and the Athenians sent a fleet of twenty triremes to test the Syracusans’ battle 
readiness.75 As the war dragged on, the Leontine masses began to call for the re-allotment of their 
territory, as the Syracusans had done after 467. In turn, the Leontine elite in 422 “came to an 
agreement with the Syracusans,” according to Thucydides, “abandoned and laid waste their city, 
and went and lived at Syracuse, where they were made citizens.”76 Neither Thucydides nor 
Diodorus said whether or not the new citizens received land allotments within Syracusan 
territory, or any kind of property for that matter, but it is hard to think that the Leontine elite 
would have moved to Syracuse without the promise of land in some form. Under growing 
pressure from the Athenians, the Syracusan democrats did what just a generation earlier was 
unthinkable: they transferred people from outside of Syracusan territory back to Syracuse to 
become citizens.  
 The Syracusans in 422 were, in effect, reaffirming the approach to imperial territory that 
first developed under the Syracusan tyrants. Athenian economic and military power may have 
                                                        
73 De Angelis 2016: 292-294, with references in n. 388. 
74 IG I3 54. The Athenians may have already been planning an expedition to Sicily, and were hoping to count on logistical aid from 
Leontinoi.  The Athenians also may have hoped such a treaty might convince the Syracusans to stop supporting their Spartan enemies. 
75 Thuc. 3.86. According to Thucydides, the Athenians sent the fleet also to prevent the Syracusans from sending grain to the Spartans.  
76 Thuc. 5.4.3. See also Diod. 12.54.7. Diodorus wrote that the Leontine elite agreed because they saw no end to the war with Syracuse. 
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prompted the Syracusan democrats to reconsider why they deported naturalized citizens after the 
democratic coup: back in 467, they wanted to establish a new political identity, which meant they 
had to mark a clean break from the tyrant regime.77 A generation later, however, they began to see 
imperial land as the Deinomenids had before them: they hoped to get from their imperial territory 
the human capital to compete with their commercial and military rivals. Judging by how the 
Syracusan democrats expelled the naturalized citizens after 467, they seem for the time to have 
been doing what the Athenians were doing—closing off their citizen community from other 
imperial communities. But the Syracusan democrats became more willing to allow new people to 
move to Syracuse to become citizens probably because they came to see again that it was an 
efficient way to transform their city into a metropole. Yet in return, they had to share the land 
within Syracusan territory. 
 The Athenian expedition to Syracuse probably only reinforced for the Syracusans how 
precarious their power was on Sicily. After all, it was the Spartans, not the Syracusans, who 
turned the tide of the war against the Athenians in 414. In victory, a Syracusan populist named 
Diokles managed to convince the Syracusan elite to let public offices be filled by sortition—
bringing Syracusan democracy more in line with Athenian democracy. 78  The Syracusan 
democrats could have used their new power to pursue a different approach to imperial territory. 
But when the Carthaginians marched on Syracuse in 405, the Syracusans came together in their 
assembly and elected Dionysius stratēgos autokratōr.79 Within the first year, the entire communities 
                                                        
77 Thatcher (2012: 89) emphasized a clean break in Syracusan political identity at the beginning of the new democratic regime in 466. 
78 Diod. 13.34.4. See also Arist. Pol. 1304a 27. Aristotle said that Diokles was the one who changed Syracuse from a politeia to a dēmokratia.  
79 Diod. 13.94.5–95.1. According to Diodorus, the Carthaginians were marching on Syracuse, so the Syracusan democrats were willing to 
take a risk and hand over military leadership to Dionysios. Diodorus did not say, however, that they gave up the institution of sortition. 
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at Gela and Kamarina relocated to Syracuse.80 Then, after making peace with the Carthaginians, 
Dionysios divided up Syracusan territory among Syracusan citizens, including the foreigners 
and slaves he naturalized: 
τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν µὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόµενος ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ᾽ 
ἡγεµονίας τεταγµένοις, τὴν δ᾽ ἄλλην ἐµέρισεν ἐπ᾽ ἴσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ, 
συµπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόµατι τοὺς ἠλευθερωµένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει 
νεοπολίτας.81 
As for [Syracusan] territory, he picked the best of it and distributed it as gifts to his friends 
and to higher officers, and divided the rest of it equally to both foreigners and citizens, 
including under the name of citizens the manumitted slaves whom he designated as new 
citizens.  
After being elected by Syracusan citizens, Dionysios was doing what both tyrants and 
democrats had done at Syracuse by allotting land within Syracusan territory to citizens and 
foreigners, who also became citizens. In 403, Dionysios brought what was left of the Leontines 
back to Syracuse to become citizens; he did the same for the Kaulonians and Hipponians in 389, 
and the Rhegians in 387.82 Under Dionysios, Syracuse had an urban population of roughly 
50,000, and Syrakousai probably reached, or even exceeded, its carrying capacity of 144,000.83 
Since Diodorus attributed all foreign policy decisions to Dionysios, it is hard to say whether or 
not he had the support of the Syracusan citizens in each case.84 What we can say, however, is 
that land allotment under Dionysios continued to reinforce the territoriality of the Syracusan 
                                                        
80 Diod. 13.111. They relocated because their cities were destroyed. Some of them seem to have returned home, see Diod. 13.113-114. 
81 Diod. 14.7.4.  
82 For the Leontines, see Diod. 14.15.4; Xen. Hell. 2.3.5; Kaulonians and Hipponians, see Diod. 14.106-7; Rhegians, see Diod. 14.111.  
83 For demographic estimates of Classical Syracuse, see Morris 2006: 44. Beloch (1968 [1886]: 281) put Dionysios’ Syracuse at 100,000. 
84 It is difficult to say what the Dionysios’ relationship was with the Syracusan citizens who elected him. Diodorus, for one, had a 
certain Theodoros speak out against Dionysios, saying that he “enslaved” the Syracusans, see Diod. 14.66. However, Stroheker 
(1958: 16-18), Sanders (1981: 401-408), and Caven (1990:160-172) have argued convincingly that Dionysios was probably not as bad 
as Diodorus makes him out to be. It would not be surprising that Diodorus had a negative view of Dionysios if he was drawing 
information from Timaeus, who wrote in Athens with an anti-Syracusan bias. 
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citizen community: the foreigners who received land within Syracusan territory also became 
citizens. And as we will see shortly, land allotment was also what transformed Syracuse into a 
metropole that could compete commercially and militarily with Athens and Carthage. 
 Outside of Syracusan territory, Dionysios gave away the land he confiscated to 
mercenaries and foreign allies, both from outside of Syracusan society. Those who received land 
allotments seem to have become citizens of a new community where they were living, alongside 
the other recipients. In 395, for example, Dionysios allotted the Messenian countryside, which 
had been depopulated during a Carthaginian campaign a year, which left it open for Dionysios 
to confiscate. Dionysios refounded Messene as a heterogeneous community of Lokrians, 
Medmaians, and exiles from mainland Messenia, who may have fought as mercenaries for 
Dionysios.85 Afterwards, the Rhegians went to war against Dionysios, claiming that he getting 
ready to could cross over to Italy.86 Though Dionysios may well have been using Messene as a 
staging area for an Italian campaign, the residents of Messene thereafter fought as “Messenians” 
alongside Dionysios’ mercenaries. 87  Later, when the mainland Messenians relocated to 
Tyndaris, Diodorus wrote that they “enrolled many to [Tyndarite] citizenship, and they 
speedily came to number more than five thousand citizens.”88 In the two cases of Messene and 
Tyndaris, at least, the recipients of land allotments became citizens of a new community, which 
probably made them institutionally separate from Syracusan citizens. In effect, Dionysios was 
preserving the cultural link between citizenship and property ownership, what Lisa Eberle has 
                                                        
85 For the Carthaginian campaign, see Diod. 14.57. For Dionysios’ refoundation of Messene in 395, see Diod. 14.78.5, with Raccuia 1981. 
86 Diod. 14.87.1. The Rhegians offered asylum to whomever Dionysios had exiled or dispossessed during his prior Sicilian campaigns.  
87 Diod. 14.87.2. Diodorus described a short battle when the Messenians and Dionysios’ mercenaries successfully fought off the Rhegians. 
88 Diod. 14.78.6. 
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called “communities of place.”89 For Dionysios, this link held for both Syracusan territory as 
well as the communities outside of it where he allotted land to mercenaries and allies. 
Unlike Athenian cleruchies and colonies, Syracusan land allotments outside of 
Syracusan territory do not seem to have had much of an institutional connection to the imperial 
center. Of course, it is possible that there seems to be less of a connection because there are 
fewer historical and epigraphic sources for Syracusan land allotment: the historical sources, for 
their part, do little to clarify the relationship between the recipients of those land allotments and 
the Syracusan state. As we will see in the next section, the sources for Syracusan imperialism in 
the Classical period make no mention of imperial taxes on allotted land or contributions from 
people settled on allotted land. Authors from the Roman period were actually under the 
impression that there was no large-scale imperial taxation on Sicily until Hieron II’s agricultural 
tax, commonly known as the lex Hieronica of the mid-third century, a century after Dionysios I’s 
death.90 In the place of a centralized system of imperial taxation that connected center to 
periphery, the Syracusans must have counted on plunder to finance future campaigns—much 
like the Romans were doing at that time in central Italy.91 Neither is there any evidence for 
imperial officials, like the archontes and episkopoi of the Athenian empire. Though the absence of 
imperial officials is noteworthy, their absence may say more about the imperfect sources than 
about Syracusan imperialism itself. 	
                                                        
89 Eberle 2014: 13. In a recent study of Greco-Roman “exclusionary property-regimes,” Eberle argued that empires “circumscribed the 
economic possibilities of their own citizens” by converting “political and military power into the acquisition of land for their own citizens.”  
90 For the lex Hieronica and Syracusan standardized imperial taxation, see Cic. Verr. esp. 2.2.147; 2.3.14-15, with Walthall 2011; 
2013. Diodorus only once mentioned a phoros in relation to the Syracusans: in 439, the Syracusan democrats imposed a tax on the Sikels.  
91 For the importance of plunder to the Syracusans, see Morris 2013: 291-292; De Angelis 2016: 316-317. For the Romans, see Section 5.2. 
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	 Like the Athenians, the Syracusans seem to have done little to garrison their imperial 
territory. From what little we can tell from Diodorus’ narrative about garrisons, the Syracusans 
used them as mostly temporary measures, and typically only during wartime. For example, 
during his first campaigns in 403, Dionysios gave Katane a garrison, only later to withdraw it 
before allotting the surrounding land to his Campanian mercenaries. During his first war against 
the Carthaginians, Dionysios fortified Syracusan territory and the Leontine acropolis with 
garrisons before marching north to war.92 In the same war, Dionysios placed a temporary garrison 
at Motya after defeating the Carthaginians, only to remove it shortly thereafter. But because the 
sources for Syracusan imperialism focus very little on imperial communities after the moment of 
allotment, it is impossible to say to what extent the relative absence of garrisons is, once again, 
simply a problem with the sources.  
Because most modern historians tend to assume that Dionysios must have found a way to 
control his imperial territory, we are left with the impression that he kept close relationships with 
the mercenaries and allies who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory. Sandra 
Péré-Noguès, for one, argued that when Dionysios allotted land to his mercenaries, he was 
creating “un maillage serré de structures défensives qui selon les cas pouvaient être des colonies 
militaires ou des phrouria” (a tight network of defensive structures which, depending on the case, 
could be military colonies or garrisons).93 In this view, land allotment integrated the mercenaries 
into an expanding, multi-polis Syracusan state. Yet this model requires us to assume that all 
mercenaries—even those who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory—received 
                                                        
92 For the garrison at Katane, see Diod. 14.15.1; for Leontinoi, see Diod. 14.58.1; for Motya, see Diod. 14.53.5, with Pilkington 2013: 283.  
93 Péré-Noguès 2006: 486, with Péré-Noguès 1999; 2004. She suggested in passing that mercenary settlement must have integrated 
and assimilated the mercenaries into the Syracusan tyrant state, though she never develops how exactly this would have worked.  
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Syracusan citizen, based only on the fact that foreigners who settled within Syracusan territory 
received Syracusan citizenship.94 But based on what we have already seen, we have no reason to 
conflate land allotment to mercenaries outside of Syracuse with the grant of citizenship to 
foreigners at Syracuse: there is no evidence to suggest that anyone living outside of Syracusan 
territory received Syracusan citizenship.95 Nor is there any reason to think that there were 
different forms, or levels, of citizenship, as there were in mid-Republican Rome. Even at nearby 
Leontinoi, Diodorus wrote that in 396 Dionysios’ mercenaries became “most hostile to him,” so he 
divided up the Leontine territory among them in lieu of their pay.96 Afterwards, the mercenaries 
became residents at Leontinoi and Dionysios hired new mercenaries to replace them.  
 From what we can tell, there was not much of a difference between the land allotments 
that went to mercenaries and the land allotments that went to citizens of an allied state. After 
398, when Dionysios reaffirmed an old political alliance between Syracuse and Lokroi by 
marrying Doris, the daughter of a prominent Lokrian, all land allotments in southern Italy went 
to Lokrian citizens rather than Syracusan mercenaries.97 Though Dionysios’ marriage to Doris 
may have facilitated the transfer of land allotments to the Lokrians, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the new communities they formed had any more of an institutional link to 
Syracuse than the mercenary communities. In this sense, the Lokrians were similar to the 
                                                        
94 Péré-Noguès 2004. She assumed a connection between the mercenaries Dionysios settled at Syracuse and those allotted land abroad. 
95 This is not to deny, however, that mercenaries and foreigners were a crucial part of Syracusan militarism. Under Dionysios the 
Syracusan army never took the field without a sizeable mercenary force, accounting for up to a third of the total army, see Parke 1981: 
67-68. In the fourth century, there was no shortage of mercenaries, especially as demobilized soldiers from the Peloponnese turned 
westwards for employment after the Peloponnesian War, see Trundle 2004: 6, 35-37; 45.  
96 Diodorus 14.78.1-3. For the imperial history of Leontinoi after Dionysios settled his mercenaries there in 396, see Section 4.5 below. 
97 During the first Athenian campaign to Sicily, Lokroi allied with Syracuse against Athens and Rhegion, see Thuc. 3.86.2, 4.2.1. During 
the second campaign, Lokroi refused the Athenian fleet safe harbor, granting it instead to the Syracusans, see Thuc. 6.44.2, 7.1.1, 7.25.3. 
 188 
mercenaries from Sparta and elsewhere in the Peloponnese, who were serving because of the 
diplomatic relationship between Syracuse and Sparta. Through land allotment, mercenaries and 
allies played a similar role in Syracusan imperial history: on the one hand, both fought for 
Syracuse because of state-level political relationships; but on the other hand, neither expanded 
the Syracusans’ citizen territory.  
Overall, the Syracusans seem to have been committed to externalizing their imperial 
territory by giving away confiscated land to people from outside of Syracusan society. The only 
way the mercenary and Lokrian landowners were really bound to the Syracusans was that they 
occasionally had to fight alongside the Syracusan army. According to Diodorus, when Dionysios 
went to war against the Carthaginians in 398, “he levied from the Syracusans those who were fit 
for military service, and summoned from the cities under his command their able men”—and it is 
reasonably to assume that the new imperial communities numbered among them.98 In a sense, 
then, Syracusan imperial communities were paying tribute in the form of military levies. They 
were not all that different from the coalition members of Delian League, except that they could 
not get out of military service by paying a tax. But this last point is crucial: Athenian and 
Syracusan land allotment were both highly extractive, though in different ways. Whereas the 
Athenians compartmentalized their imperial territory so they could extract taxes and trade from 
their imperial land, the Syracusans externalized their imperial territory to focus on extracting 
people from their empire. For that reason, the Syracusans did not have anything that we could 
call “Syracusan cleruchies” outside of Syracusan territory: rather, Syracusan territory was itself a 
cleruchy, where citizens received allotments of land.   
                                                        
98 Diod. 14.44.2. 
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Under both tyrant and democratic regimes, the Syracusans prioritized their own territory 
at the expense of the land they conquered, a process that allowed them to concentrate the people 
of their empire within their own territory. The Syracusans may not have demanded that 
Syracusan society remain a closed citizen community, or developed an ideology of imperial 
autochthony, but their approach to territory was just as stereotypically Greek as what we saw 
with the Athenians in the eastern Mediterranean: the Syracusan citizen community still mapped 
directly onto Syracusan territory. Even though Syracusan citizens never achieved the same level 
of political enfranchisement as their Athenian counterparts (except perhaps during the brief 
period between Diokles’ reforms and the election of Dionysios as stratēgos autokratōr), what 
distinguished Syracusan land allotment from Athenian land allotment was not necessarily 
regime-type. Rather, what set the Syracusans apart was that citizens received land allotments only 
within Syracusan territory. By sharing those allotments with people relocated from all over their 
imperial territory, the Syracusans were driving a very particular kind of economic change: they 
were concentrating an empire’s share of human capital within Syracusan territory. By transferring 
human capital to Syracuse, the Syracusans had found a way to transform their city into a 
metropole that could compete economically and militarily with Athens and Carthage. 
 
4.4. Concentrating Human Capital 
 Syracusan territory was famous in antiquity for its fertile landscape.99 When the Athenians 
came together in 415 to debate whether or not they should try to conquer Syracuse, Nikias argued 
that one of the Syracusans’ greatest strengths was that “they grow their own grain rather than 
                                                        
99 For Sicilian agriculturalism, see De Angelis 2006; Walthall 2013: esp. 1-4, with Diod. 23.1.1; Pindar Nem. 1.13-16; Cicero Verr. 2.2.2. 
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importing it [like we do].”100 Under Dionysios, the Syracusans are said to have kept one million 
medimnoi of grain in storage, which was enough grain to feed upwards of 40,000 Syracusan 
families for an entire year.101 The Athenians recognized just how different Syracusan territory was 
from Athenian territory: as we saw last chapter, they decided that a war against the Syracusans 
was worth it because the rewards from the land they could confiscate from them were so great. 
For the Syracusans, grain production was the main source of the their wealth beginning as far 
back as the Archaic period. By the Classical period, having so much fertile land within their 
territory allowed the Syracusans to share it with new citizens. More than that, the Syracusans 
were able to settle the full populations of large cities within their territory.    
 When the Syracusans imagined their imperial territory, they were mindful of their 
agricultural wealth as well as their commercial and military rivalries. As a result, the 
Syracusans’ approach to imperial territory made it so the Syracusans’ did not directly benefit 
from the land they confiscated. The Syracusans externalized their empire the way they did, 
rather, because they needed skilled labor and specialization more than they needed more land. 
As we will see, the Syracusans do not even seem to have taxed the land they confiscated, 
choosing instead only to require military service from the people who received land allotments 
outside of Syracusan territory. Instead, I argue below that the Syracusans benefitted from land 
allotment indirectly through non-agricultural production: emblematic of Syracuse’s fertile 
landscape, land allotment also created an influx of human capital and economic activity to 
Syracuse. By transferring entire merchant, craftsman, and entrepreneurial populations to 
                                                        
100 Thuc. 6.20.4. As we saw earlier in Section 3.2, the Athenians relied heavily on grain imports even during in the Archaic period.  
101 Aelian Var. Hist. 6.12. I assume here that an average family of two adults and three children would have needed to consume roughly 
25 medimnoi of grain per year. 
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Syracusan territory, and then replacing them with mercenaries or foreign allies, the Syracusans 
were feeding their own markets while leaving the people who received land allotments outside 
of Syracusan territory to start over. Overall, the way the Syracusans used land allotment as a 
way to reshape the island’s human geography shows the significance of land allotment in the 
absence of a centralized imperial tax structure. 
 Because Syracusan territory was so well known for its agricultural output, historians 
have long assumed that the Syracusans must have extracted some kind of agricultural taxes or 
rents from the land they confiscated. We saw in the last chapter that this was precisely what the 
Athenians and the Persians did; it would not be unthinkable, therefore, that the Syracusans did 
the same. In this view, land allotment would have served a very specific purpose for the 
Syracusans: it increased the taxable surface area of their empire. In a recent study of Sicilian 
economic history, Franco De Angelis suggested that “Dionysios appeared to have taxed all 
agricultural holdings and income [in his empire]; therefore, having more people and land under 
his control was another way to generate tax revenue for the large expenditures he incurred.”102 
Still, from the little historical evidence that we have for Syracusan taxes during the Classical 
period, it is far less certain that the Syracusans were taxing the land they confiscated and 
allotted to mercenaries and foreign allies. To return to the assembly debate before the Athenians 
sailed to Sicily in 415, according to Thucydides Nikias warned the Athenians that the Sicilian 
states were stronger than Alkibiades was leading them to believe, in part because they also had 
an imperial income:  
                                                        
102 De Angelis 2016: 129, with 316. He argued that imperial taxes on agricultural land helped pay for mercenaries. See also Scerra 2003. 
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 πολλοὶ µὲν γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἔνεισι καὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί, πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ 
ὄχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτάς. χρήµατά τ᾽ ἔχουσι τὰ µὲν ἴδια, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς 
ἐστὶ Σελινουντίοις, Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπαρχὴ ἐσφέρεται. 103 
Not only are there many hoplites, archers, and javelin-throwers, but also triremes with 
the population to man them; they have funds, privately and also what is in the 
Selinountine sanctuaries; in addition, the Syracusans are offered first fruits (aparchē) by 
certain barbarians. 
The “barbarians” Nikias referred to were probably the Sikels living in the mountains northwest 
of Syracuse: Diodorus also recorded the Sikels paying a phoros to the Syracusans as early as 
339.104 As we saw earlier, the Syracusan democrats fought the Sikels in the 440s, and then 
invested in a new navy with the money they got after defeating them. It is tempting to draw 
parallels to the Delian League: after all, the Athenian tribute lists also used the term aparchē for 
the imperial tax paid in coin to Athena and stored at the Acropolis.105 But even in the case of the 
Delian League, tribute was not a tax on confiscated land. The Sikels may have sold agricultural 
surpluses to help pay the tax, but we have no reason to believe that the tax was linked to land 
allotments outside of Syracusan territory.  
 In fact, later authors were under the impression that it was not until the Hellenistic 
tyrant Hieron II (r. 269-215) that the Syracusans systematically collected taxes from the people 
living in their imperial territory. Cicero, who knew Sicily well from his service there as 
quaestor, argued in his third speech Against Verres that agricultural taxes on the island dated 
back to Hieron II. 106  Furthermore, in a recent study of standardized grain measures, 
                                                        
103 Thuc. 6.20.4. This passage appears during the debate between Nikias and Alkibiades during the initial buildup to the campaign. 
104 Diod. 12.30.1. 
105 ATL 33.7; 34.7. In his commentary on Thucydides, Gomme suggested that “ἀπαρχή in the Classical period is usually… used of a 
tithe or production of produce, or its equivalent in money, paid to a god, i.e. to a fund kept in a temple and regarded as a god’s.” 
106 Cic. Verr. 2.3.14-15. Livy (24.21.11-2) also referred to monumental, public granaries on the island of Ortygia during Hieron’s time. 
Pritchard (1970: 365-368) argued that Hieron’s tax system may have been influenced by the Carthaginians or, more likely, the Ptolemies. 
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monumental granaries, and coinage from southeastern Sicily, Alex Walthall has shown how 
Hieron II developed a new administrative system designed to collect an annual grain-tax from 
the landowners living within in his Sicilian empire.107 Under Hieron II the Syracusans actually 
seem to have developed a level of imperial centralization that rivaled the fifth-century Athenian 
empire: Walthall has shown, for example, that Sicilian dry measures dating from the third century 
shared formal qualities with their Athenian precedents.108 During the Classical period, however, 
there is no historical or archaeological evidence for the kind of regional standardization or large-
scale agricultural taxation associated with Hieron II in the Hellenistic period or the fifth-century 
Athenians—or any imperial taxation on land allotments, for that matter. Though it is certainly 
possible that the absence of any positive evidence for such a tax may be a failure of the sources, 
such a significant omission would be surprising.109 As we have seen, the Syracusans’ agricultural 
wealth within Syracusan territory may have prompted them to focus less on managing a 
centralized tax system than concentrating human capital. 
 Within Syracusan territory, however, the Syracusans had some kind of tax on economic 
activity. According to Diodorus, when Dionysios relocated the Kaulonians to Syracuse in 389, he 
exempted them from taxes because they had given up their land without a fight: 
ταύτης δὲ τοὺς µὲν ἐνοικοῦντας εἰς Συρακούσας µετῴκισε καὶ πολιτείαν δοὺς πέντε 
ἔτη συνεχώρησεν ἀτελεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν κατασκάψας τοῖς Λοκροῖς τὴν χώραν 
τῶν Καυλωνιατῶν ἐδωρήσατο. 110	
                                                        
107 Walthall 2013. For the standardized grain measures, see also Walthall 2011. For the monumental granaries, see also Walhall 2015.  
108  Walthall 2013: 12, with Lang and Crosby 1964: 39–55. There is very little evidence for standardization in the Classical period: at 
Gela, excavations had yielded two bronze weights from the early-fifth century, Dubois 1989: 174 nos. 152-153; Arena 1992: 25 no. 16, 
26 no. 26. 
109 Morris (2009a: 161) suggested that ps.-Aristotle’s Oeconomica would have mentioned such a tax should it have actually existed. 
110 Diod. 14.106.3. There is no evidence for any other dispossessed peoples receiving a tax emption at any point in Syracusan history.  
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The inhabitants of [Kaulonia] he relocated to Syracuse, gave them citizenship, and gave 
them an exemption from taxes (ateleia) for five years; he then destroyed the city and gave 
the territory of the Kaulonians to the Lokrians. 
Like all the other people the Syracusans relocated back to Syracuse, the Kaulonians received 
Syracusan citizenship. But for whatever reason, Dionysios was willing to give them an exception 
from some sort of direct eisphora tax on citizens’ property or indirect tax on imports, as found in 
most Greek states at the time.111 As Syracusan militarism began to scale up under Dionysios, the 
Syracusans seem to have been still developing an economic infrastructure to outfit their army 
with the tools of war. It is reasonable to assume that the people relocated to Syracuse would have 
indirectly contributed to the state’s capacity to wage war through indirect, if not direct, taxes. 
After all, any increase in agricultural production and distribution would have led to more harbor 
dues from merchant shipping—what Nicholas Purcell has called “taxing mobility.”112 It is unclear 
why Dionysios would have exempted the Kaulonians from their taxes for five years, especially in 
389 when the Syracusans were still fighting a costly war in southern Italy. Perhaps Dionysios and 
the Syracusan assembly decided that it was more important that the Kaulonians live and work 
within Syracusan territory than they pay taxes.  
 Because the Syracusans seem to have prioritized imperial relocations over imperial taxes, 
it is easy to conclude that they had less in common with the Athenians than other authoritarian 
states in the Near East that moved people around to control them more effectively. In an 
influential study of Greek state formation, Ian Morris argued that Syracuse “had more in common 
                                                        
111 Unfortunately, As with other financial institutions in the Classical Greek world, most of our evidence for ateleia comes from 
Athens. For the eisphora tax for military finance at Athens, see Thomson 1964; Rhodes 1982; Möller 2007: 375-380; Pritchard 2015: 93, 96, 
103. For indirect taxes on imports, ateleia, and exemptions from taxation in the Mediterranean more broadly, see Bresson 2016: 293-299. 
112 Purcell 2005b: 230.  
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with the practices of Near Eastern kings than with those of Aegean Greek cities.”113 Josiah Ober 
went further to suggest that “Gelon may have borrowed the idea of transportation of populations 
from the Persians [who followed] a well-established west Asian imperial tradition.”114 To be sure, 
forced relocations were more common among the top-heavy states of the Near East than the 
Greek world, though Near Eastern historians tend to call them “deportations.” Beginning as far 
back as Old Kingdom Egypt, the Hittites, Assyrians, and Persians also forcefully relocated people. 
In Mesopotamia, for example, the Assyrians relocated people far from their native homes to 
elsewhere in their empire, like the fertile Cizre Plain in the Upper Tigris River Valley over a 
hundred kilometers north of Aššur. In the Assyrian empire, the relocations restructured the 
agricultural economy by focusing labor at fertile areas. They also broke apart unruly communities 
and local identities by mixing them with other dispossessed populations. Yet, from what we can 
tell from the Mesopotamian empires, the relocations did not necessarily concentrate the 
dispossessed peoples at the imperial center—as was the case for the Syracusans. Quite the 
opposite: the relocations moved them all over each empire.115   
Only the Hittites seem to have relocated the people they dispossessed to the imperial 
center at Hatti. Under Mursili II (r. 1321-1295), for example, the Hittites relocated thousands of 
defeated peoples to the Hittite countryside in and around Hattusa in central Anatolia. In most 
documented cases, the Hittites only relocated a portion of a defeated community; afterwards, the 
people who were relocated either worked the land of an elite estate or garrisoned a military 
outpost. In both cases, however, they held a semi-servile status. The Syracusans, it is worth 
                                                        
113 Morris 2009a: 112. For him, the distinctive qualities of Syracusan state formation were population relocations and political marriages. 
114 Ober 2015: 179. He argued that Gelon’s motives were constructive, not punitive: unlike the Persians, Gelon was creating a super-polis.  
115 For Egyptian relocations, see Redford 1992: 207-209. For Assyrian, see Oded 1979: 19-22; Parker 2013. For Persian, see Briant 2002.  
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recalling, made the people they relocated back to Syracuse full members of Syracusan society, with 
citizenship as well as their own land.116  
 Rather, the way the Syracusans dispossessed people of their land, allotted it to new 
people, and then relocated the dispossessed back to Syracuse with citizenship was without 
precedent. It is certainly possible that the Syracusans were inspired by events in the Near East, 
but they drew from a Greek political culture of allotment and citizenship to reimagine the 
phenomenon. Despite what we have come to expect from Athenian society, Greek political 
culture was actually primed to facilitate the relocation of people from one community to 
another, thanks to formal institutions built around naturalization and property rights. From 
what we have seen, the Syracusans under both tyrant and democratic regimes were open to 
using these institutions to internalize the people of their empire. They were open to relocations 
not only because new people would have brought them more indirect taxes from market 
activity, but also because those would have helped them expand their military: after each 
relocation the Syracusans could draw from a broader pool of skilled craftsmen, merchants, 
wage laborers, and so on to help build the tools of war. 117 By concentrating much of eastern 
Sicily and Kalabria’s supply of human capital at Syracuse, the Syracusans could also take 
advantage of whatever businesses and networks of exchange the new residents brought with 
them. Land allotment, in that sense, was a means to an end, a way for the Syracusans to force 
along the growth of their metropole.  
                                                        
116 For Hittite relocations, see Bryce 2005: 217-219. 
117 In this sense, Syracusan state formation, taxation, and imperialism in the late Archaic and early Classical periods anticipate C. 
Tilly’s thesis for early modern Europe, in which he argues that “war makes the state and the state makes war,” see Tilly 1992: 20-21.  
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 We can see this clearly enough when the Syracusans were preparing to go to war once 
again against Carthage. According to Diodorus, in 398, just over five years since the Geloans, 
Kamarinaians, and Leontines relocated to Syracuse, Dionysios direct the Syracusans to organize 
a massive workforce to build the tools of war: 
εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς τεχνίτας ἤθροιζεν ἐκ µὲν τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν ταττοµένων πόλεων κατὰ 
πρόσταγµα, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατείας, 
µεγάλοις µισθοῖς προτρεπόµενος. διενοεῖτο γὰρ ὅπλα µὲν παµπληθῆ καὶ βέλη 
παντοῖα κατασκευάσαι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ναῦς τετρήρεις καὶ πεντήρεις, οὐδέπω κατ᾽ 
ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους σκάφους πεντηρικοῦ νεναυπηγηµένου. συναχθέντων δὲ 
πολλῶν τεχνιτῶν, διελὼν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἐργασίας κατέστησε τῶν πολιτῶν 
τοὺς ἐπισηµοτάτους, προθεὶς δωρεὰς µεγάλας τοῖς κατασκευάσασιν ὅπλα. 118 
At once, [Dionysios] gathered skilled craftsmen, commandeering them from the cities 
under his command and attracting them by high wages from Italy and Greece as well as 
Carthaginian territory. For his purpose was to make weapons in great numbers and 
every kind of missile, and also quadriremes and quinqueremes, no ship of the latter size 
having yet been built at that time. After collecting many skilled workmen, he divided 
them into groups in accordance with their skills, and appointed over them the most 
conspicuous citizens, offering great bounties to anyone who created a supply of arms.  
Though it is unclear which exact cities were under Dionysios’ prostagma (or “command”) at the 
time, a direct result of relocating the Geloans, Kamarinaians, and Leontines to Syracuse several 
years earlier was that some of them would have numbered among those put to work building 
the tools of war. Even with their added labor, apparently Syracuse was still developing as an 
imperial center, so Dionysios also had to recruit skilled craftsmen from across the 
Mediterranean. Diodorus went on to explain that, in less than a year, the Syracusans and their 
growing workforce built or retrofitted a total of 310 warships, constructed 160 new shipsheds, 
repaired another 150, then manufactured 140,000 sets of shields, swords, and helmets, as well as 
                                                        
118 Diod. 14.41.3-4. 
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14,000 breastplates.119 Besides transforming the Syracusans’ Great Harbor into one of the best-
outfitted military harbors in the Mediterranean, the operation also went a long way in 
transforming Syracuse into a major economic center.  
In a recent study of what it took to build and operate a navy in the Classical Greek world, 
Vincent Gabrielsen explored how navies of this size required a significant infrastructure of 
financial, human, material, and economic resources: from transporting timber to building storage 
facilities; from organizing specialized labor to training for quality control. Altogether, building a 
navy, he argued, would have “fuelled the economy and gave market-mechanisms an intensity 
and fields of action that they never had before.”120 The new shipsheds alone, with their massive 
stone structures and wood slipways, probably would have taken over half a million work-days of 
specialized labor to construct, by Jari Pakkanen’s estimates.121 The warships also would have 
required all sorts of specialized industries, like woodworking for the hull and masts, textile 
manufacturing for the sails and ropes, metalworking for the rams and anchors, and 
leatherworking for the oar fittings. To put this in perspective, Peter Acton estimated that it could 
have taken up to three thousand work-days to build just one trireme hull and fit its components, 
to say nothing of what it would have taken to source and transport all the materials.122 Each ship 
also needed to be provisioned with grain and oil, both stored in transport amphorae—which 
                                                        
119 Diod. 14.42-43. Excavations to the north of Ortygia in the Small Harbor have found eight parallel, rock-cut shipsheds, possibly dating 
from the early fourth century, see Basile 2002; Gerding 2013. For the Syracusans’ war preparations in 398, see also Caven 1990: 88-97.  
120 Gabrielsen 2017: 429. He was speaking generally about building and operating navies, but he drew mostly from Athenian examples.  
121 Pakkanen 2013. He estimated that it would have taken the Athenians about 1.2 million work-days to construct three hundred 
shipsheds in the fifth century. He based his calculations on estimates of how long it probably would have taken the workers to dig 
the soil and bedrock, cut the bedrock, quarry the stone for the foundations and superstructure, construct the foundations and 
superstructure, fill the spaces between foundation blocks, construct scaffolding, set the slipway timbers, produce tiles, and tile the roofs. 
122 For triremes, see Acton 2014: 191-200. For what it would have taken to manufacture armor and weapons, see Acton 2014: 131-144. 
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would have numbered in the thousands if we take into account the entire fleet. The Syracusans 
were able to accomplish all this, according to Diodorus, because “the ablest skilled craftsmen 
were gathered from everywhere into one place”—Syracuse.123 
 It was probably during this period that the Potter’s Quarter developed in the lower 
Akradina near the harbor. Excavations there have found evidence for kilns dating from the 
middle of the fourth century, though it is reasonable to think, given what we have seen, that 
manufacturing began at least a generation earlier.124 Unlike what we saw for earlier periods, 
Athenian ceramic imports on Sicily were “practically nonexistent,” to quote De Angelis, during 
the first quarter of the fourth century.125 Though this is not surprising given the rapid decline of 
Athenian commerce at the end of the fifth century, it may also say something about the growth of 
Syracusan manufacturing. Even though the Syracusans had to hire craftsmen from around the 
Mediterranean to fill out their workforce, the largest influx of human capital came, I have argued, 
from the people who were relocated to Syracuse. Even for those who may not have lived in the 
actual city of Syracuse, we know from excavations at a later fourth-century farmstead at Manfria 
near Gela that rural sites could also double as workshops producing pottery—their “part-time 
occupation,” as Horden and Purcell might call it.126  
Whereas land allotment within Syracusan territory was what facilitated an influx of 
human capital, land allotment outside of Syracusan territory probably left the areas largely 
under-developed. Even though there is no archaeological evidence for actual Syracusan land 
                                                        
123 Diod. 14.42.1. 
124 For the fourth-century workshops at Syracuse, see Fischer-Hansen 2000: 108-109, with Fallico 1971: 581-583, 590-594; Lagona 1972-73.  
125 De Angelis 2016: 306. It is also worth noting that this was a period when Corinthian coins began circulating in large quantities.  
126 Adamesteanu 1958: 300-333. For discussion of land allotment, farmers, and their “part-time occupations,” see above Section 2.3, p. 33. 
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divisions outside of Syracusan territory, land allotment may well have worked like the original 
division of land at the time of a colony’s original foundation—the dasmos (or “primary 
division”). A massive survey project of Metapontum further up into Italy on the Gulf of 
Tarentum, for example, found division lines of agricultural properties. In Metapontine territory, 
division lines dating from end of the Archaic period show a re-allotment of land, perhaps like 
what the Syracusans did after 467. During the Classical period the allotments were, on average, 
about sixteen hectares—though two-thirds of them were smaller than the average.127 Allotments 
of this size were still more than large enough to keep a family at a sustenance level, and they 
probably could count on a small surplus. In his analysis of the settlement history of the land, 
Joseph Carter noted that the divided territory “developed constantly over the whole life of the 
colony, with properties changing hands and families being extinguished or leaving the land.”128 
Hence the allotments may initially have been smaller: at Kamarina, grid lines dating from after 
the refoundation in 461 suggest more moderate allotments of about five and half hectares, 
which is more in line with the majority of the Metapontine properties (see Figure 4.3).129 For the 
Kamarinaians and about two-thirds of Metapontines, the land allotments were suited more for 
sustenance than surpluses that could be sold at market. 130 
                                                        
127 For the survey, settlement history, and aerial photography of the Metapontine chōra, see Carter et al. 2004: 141; Carter 2006a: 91-127. 
128 Carter et al. 2004: 142. 
129 Di Stefano 1993–94: 1378–1381; Cordano and Di Stefano 1997: 297–299. The plots of land measure about 210m by 265m. Four 
farmhouses have been excavated, and each had an adjoining cemetery. For the redistribution of land at Kamarina, see Diod. 11.76.4-5; 
Thuc. 6.5.3. A system of roads connected the urban center to the farms, see Pelagatti 1980–81: 723–729; Di Stefano 1984–85: 762–764. 
130 Carter 2006a: 134-150. The evidence for land division and farmhouses at Metaponto is not unique: the Chersonesos in the late Classical 
period showed similar features, see Carter 2006a: 121-127; 2006b. In the Chersonesos, unlike at Metaponto, there were no family cemeteries. 
Still, the farmhouses have evidence for living quarters and domestic cults, which suggest that they could have been occupied year-round. 
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Likewise, Syracusan land allotments outside Syracusan territory probably had to be large 
enough to sustain the new landowners, who were on their own to start a new life. Together, the 
new community of landowners could not fall back on an existing market: after all, the landowners 
received their land precisely because the former community’s economic infrastructure had 
already been transferred to Syracuse. Also, as we will see shortly, the Syracusans tended to 
destroy the city before allotting land around it. Consequently, the new imperial communities 
created through land allotment were more likely to focus on sustenance agriculture than 
economic specialization and manufacturing, especially during the first years after they settled at 
the site. At Syracuse, however, both new and old citizens were plugged into a growing imperial 
economy, where human capital was concentrated to the benefit of merchants, craftsmen, and 
entrepreneurs. By allotting land within Syracusan territory to new citizens and then abroad to 
mercenaries and foreigners, the Syracusans were increasing economic activity at Syracuse at the 
expense of their imperial territory.  
Fig. 4.3. Kamarina’s city plan (left) and land allotments (right), Di Stefano 1993-94: 1380. 
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4.5 Eastern Sicily: Undercutting Rival Markets  
 The communities of eastern Sicily probably suffered more from land confiscations than 
any other region in the Classical Greek world.131 For over a century, every single community in 
the region of around 4,500 km2 was unsettled and resettled at one point or another, a process that 
began with Hippokrates in the 490s, continued with the Syracusans under Gelon, Hieron, and the 
democrats, then finally took off again under Dionysios. As we saw already, after a pair of 
Carthaginian invasions unsettled southern Sicily in the final decade of the fifth century, the 
Geloans and Kamarinaians resettled at Syracuse. But soon thereafter, according to Diodorus, 
some of them left Syracuse for Leontinoi, and then returned home after the Syracusans made 
peace with the Carthaginians. In what followed, the Syracusans set out to conquer the entire 
eastern seaboard of Sicily.132   
The cases of Naxos, Katane, and Leontinoi, in particular, show how Syracusan military 
campaigns could break apart a political community to redirect its economic infrastructure to 
Syracuse. Afterwards, the Syracusans left the communities outside of Syracusan territory to 
develop on their own: new settlers replaced the dispossessed peoples, divided up the land for 
private use, and then formed a new political community separate from the Syracusans. Katane, 
Naxos, and Leontinoi make for good case studies for Syracusan land allotment because 
excavations at the three sites have yielded evidence for local production and imports spanning 
the Classical period, which allows us to track how land allotment and population transfers may 
have affected economic activity, and ultimately human capital, at each site. As we will see, the 
                                                        
131 The communities of eastern Sicily include Messene, Naxos, Katane, Leontinoi, Megara Hyblaia, Syracuse, and Kamarina. Those 
communities constituted an area of around 5,500 km2, or 4,500 km2 without Syracuse. By comparison, Euboea was just over 3,500 km2. 
132 For the move to Leontinoi, see Diod. 13.113.4. Those who returned to their homes became Carthaginian tributaries, see Diod. 13.114.1. 
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archaeological data from urban and rural excavations show how the three communities were 
under-developed, sustenance economies: the new communities formed through land allotment 
were slow to recreate the levels of local production and market activity from before the 
Syracusan conquest.  
 The Naxians were victims to three separate conquests over the course of a century. After 
Hippokrates first conquered the Naxians in the 490s, Hieron later dispossessed them in 476 and 
allotted their land to new landowners.133 After the collapse of Thrasyboulos’ tyranny in 466, the 
Naxian refugees returned home and refounded Naxos.134 Over the next two generations, the 
Naxians supported the Athenians in an anti-Syracusan coalition during their two campaigns on 
the island in 427 and 415.135 However, when Dionysios first turned to the offensive in 403, 
Naxos and Katane were betrayed to him by elite members of the cities, after which he destroyed 
the two cities and sold everyone into slavery.136 Dionysios did so, in all likelihood, to made an 
example of the Naxians and Katanians: anyone who resisted a Syracusan campaign could be 
sold into slavery; otherwise, Dionysios would offer citizenship and land at Syracuse, as was the 
case for the Leontines later that very year. After clearing the Naxian countryside, he gave the 
land to the neighboring Sikels, showing little interest at the time in settling the area with new 
landowners who would be loyal to Syracuse. In 392, Dionysios went to war with those same 
Sikels, some of whom had founded a nearby city at Tauromenion. In defeat, the Sikels gave up 
                                                        
133 For Hippokrates’ campaign against Naxos in the 490s, see Hdt. 7.154. For Hieron’s relocation of the Naxians in 476, see Diod. 11.49. 
134 For the return in 461 of the refugees who Hippokrates, Gelon, and Hieron had dispossessed from eastern Sicily, see Diod. 11.76.3-6.  
135 Thuc. 3.86.2; 6.98.1; 7.14.2. 
136 For Dionysios’ initial interest in conquering Naxos, see Diod. 14.14.1-2. For Dionysios’ conquest of Naxos in 403, see Diod. 
14.15.2-3. Some Naxians managed to escape from slavery and were settled by Rhegion at Mylai in 394, see Diod. 14.87.3. However, 
the Naxian refugees at Mylai were forced to scatter across the island when Mylai fell to Dionysios later in 394, see Diod. 14.87.3. 
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Tauromenion, and Dionysios used the occasion to allot land to some of his mercenaries.137 
Though Naxos had once been an active economic center in Sicily, Dionysios’ land allotments 
did little to revitalize the city. 
 Though Hippokrates’ initial conquest of Naxos left no clear mark on the city’s physical 
landscape, excavations have found that Hieron gave the city a new plan before resettling it. In 
the second quarter of the fifth century, the city was laid out with a new orientation along an 
orthogonal system of narrow insulae.138 The Naxian refugees who returned after 461 resettled 
the Hieronian city, where they developed the city into one of Sicily’s premier economic centers. 
Excavations of the urban center have found a common destruction layer dating from the end of 
the fifth century, likely associated with Dionysios’ conquest of the city.139 Afterwards, there is 
evidence for small renovations to urban houses near the bay in the fourth century, but there 
were no major developments until the third century, when commercial activity returned to the 
city. Even though Dionysios resettled the city with new landowners, land allotment alone, it 
seems, was not enough to reverse the decline in market activity, as we can see from the 
kerameikos and the harbor.  
 Just to the north of the main urban center of Naxos was the kerameikos (or “Potter’s 
Quarter”) covering an area of more than 1,000 m2 rich in clay deposits. 140 Here, local production of 
                                                        
137 For the founding of Tauromenion in 396, see Diod. 14.59. For the conquest of Tauromenion in 392, see Diod. 14.87.4-14.88.4; 14.96.4. 
138 Pelagatti 1976–77: 537–543; Belvedere 1987; Lentini 1998: 72–86. The Classical city was crisscrossed by three main roads (plataeia) 
running east-west, and then smaller roads (stenopoi) intersecting them at right angles. In between, most insulae contained four houses.  
139 Lentini 2002: 224. He explained that the destruction layer had a homogenous material profile: ““I segni della distruzione sono 
evidenti sull'intera area urbana, e soprattutto omogeneo e della fine del V a.C. è il materiale che si rinviene negli strati di crollo. 
Nessuna trasformazione databile al secolo successivo si registra nel tessuto urbano, ora controllato su di una superficie più estesa.” 
In the destruction layer excavations have found a hoard of 22 silver tetradrachms dating from the late fifth century, see Lentini 1990. 
140 For the Naxian kerameikos, see Pelagatti 1965: 88-89; 1968-69: 350-352; 1972: 213-215; 1980-81: 696-697, with Fischer-Hansen 2000: 103-104. 
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Euboean-type pottery and terracottas thrived from the early sixth century through to the end of 
the fifth century—however, there are no ceramics from the first quarter of the fifth century, which 
may suggest a break in local production concurrent with Hippokrates’ and Hieron’s campaigns. 
Excavations at the kerameikos have found three large kilns and adjacent workshops for working 
the clay. Those workshops seem to have gone out of use sometime around the end of the fifth 
century, as evidence for local ceramic production disappears. Meanwhile, Naxian mints, which 
had been producing a steady supply of coins since c. 460, stopped issuing new coins around the 
end of the fifth century.141 Overall, the archaeological evidence from the Naxian kerameikos gives 
the impression that local production of ceramic wares dropped off after Dionysios dispossessed 
the Naxians in 403, but remained undeveloped even with the new residents. This picture is 
reinforced by changes in activity at the nearby harbor, located just to the southeast.  
  Excavations at the Naxian harbor have uncovered four monumental trireme shipsheds, 
and their assemblages preserve the only direct evidence on Sicily for shipping in the Classical 
period.142 Prior to their destruction at the end of the fifth century, the shipsheds housed the 
Naxian navy, a small fleet that sailed with the Athenians in 415. Pottery from below the 
foundation blocks show that the ship sheds were installed sometime in the mid-fifth century by 
the restored Naxian democracy.143 The slipways of the dockyard have yielded a large quantity of 
black glaze pottery and transport amphorae: most of the black glaze pottery date from 430-400, 
with only several earlier pieces from 470-460; of the 158 wine amphorae, a first group of mostly 
                                                        
141 For Naxian coins, see SNG Cop. Sicily 485-496, with Kraay 1966; De Angelis 2016: 296-298. 
142 For the recent excavations of the Naxian harbor and ship sheds, see Blackman and Lentini 2003; Lentini et al. 2008; Lentini et al. 2009. 
Lentini et al. (2008: 354) noted that the whole complex of four slipways would have been more than ten times the size of a local temple. 
143 Blackman and Lentini (2003: 435) emphasized the Naxians’ alliance with the Athenians: “It is tempting but perhaps adventurous to 
see Athenian inspiration, encouragement and advice in the development of a small fleet and naval installation by their Sicilian ally.” 
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Sybarite and Massalian wares date from the first half of the fifth century whereas a second group 
of mostly Campanian and Lokrian wares date from the second half of the fifth century.144 The 
amphorae alone show that Naxians in the fifth century were importing goods from all around the 
western Mediterranean. However, like local production at the kerameikos, there is no evidence at 
the harbor for a Naxian import economy in the first generation of the fourth century. In fact, the 
shipsheds appear to have been destroyed at the end of the fifth century: fallen tiles from the 
collapsed roof, an ash layer, and scatter of some fifty bronze arrowheads all date from the end of 
the period, likely associated with Dionysios’ attack on the city in 403.145  
 Indirectly, the archaeological evidence from Naxos shows the economic effects of 
Syracusan imperial land allotment. Even though the Naxians were replaced in 403 by new 
landowners, the new residents did not restore the city’s economic activity. After 403, the new 
residents left the kerameikos unused, they were passed over by merchants from across the western 
Mediterranean, and their harbor did not have a navy to protect it. In all likelihood, the decline in 
activity at Naxos can be explained by a transition to subsistence farming: for the time being, the 
new landowners may have worked more on their land allotments. The new Naxians could look to 
Syracusan land allotment as the source of the livelihoods, but land allotment also seems to have 
undercut Naxos as a center of local production and trade.  
 In many ways, the history of Katane ran parallel to Naxos. In 476, Hieron displaced the 
Katanians at the same time as the Naxians to make room for his new city, Aitna. Pindar, in his 
first Pythian ode, praised the surrounding countryside as “fruitful land,” which was divided 
                                                        
144 For the black glaze pottery, see Blackman and Lentini 2003, with catalogue. For the transport amphorae, see Lentini et al. 2009. 
145 For archaeological evidence of the destruction of the Naxian ship sheds at the end of the fifth century, see Lentini et al. 2008: 314-317. 
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among ten thousand new landowners.146 But a decade and a half later in 461 the original 
Katanian refugees, like the Naxian refugees, returned home and refounded their city as Katane. 
After just two generations of independence, in 403 Dionysios conquered Katane, sold everyone 
into slavery, and settled his Campanian mercenaries at the site.147 The Campanians only lived 
there for seven years before Dionysios resettled them again at Inessa further inland where, 
according to Diodorus, they could better protect themselves against the Carthaginians.148  
 Because the modern city of Catania sits atop the ancient city, the archaeological evidence 
for Classical Katane and its territory is more limited that what we have for Naxos.149 Even so, 
excavations at the Piazza San Francesco yielded a large votive deposit from the temple of 
Demeter, with around eight thousand terracotta figurines dating from the end of the seventh 
century through the end of the fifth century.150 In his analysis of the terracotta votives, Giovanni 
Rizza argued that there was an artistic rupture in the second quarter of the fifth century, with 
similar typological features and representations of Demeter and Kore continuing through to the 
end of the fifth century. It is tempting to attribute the transition to either Hieron or the returning 
Katanian refugees, but the chronology for the votives is not precise enough to make any 
conclusions. Still, alongside the votives were also several thousand imported ceramics from 
Athens, Corinth, and the Ionian coast, mostly dating from the sixth and fifth centuries.151 It is 
                                                        
146 Pind. Pyth. 1.30, with Donzelli 1996; Morgan 2015: 300-346. 
147 For the refounding of Katane, see Diod. 11.76.3, with Vinci 2010a; Strabo 6.2.3. For the Campanian mercenaries, see Diod. 14.15.1-3. 
148 Diod. 14.58.2. Dionysios resettled the Campanians as an emergency measure in anticipation of the imminent Carthaginian invasion. 
Inessa also went by the name Aitna because the Hieronian refugees from the original Aitna fled there in 461, see Diod. 14.14.2; Strabo 6.2.3. 
149 For the Katanian chōra, see Manganoro 1996a. Because there has not been a surface survey, his analysis relies on written sources. 
150 For the votive deposit, see Rizza 1960; 1996. The excavations of the votive deposit at the Piazza San Francesco filled 1,200 cassettes. 
151 For the Archaic and Classical ceramics from the sanctuary of Demeter, see Pautasso 2009; Kerschner and Mommsen 2009. The 
Neutron Activation Analysis method helped identify centers of production for ceramics imported from the eastern Mediterranean.  
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significant that, of the nearly 700 known Athenian imports excavated from Sicily dating to the 
Archaic period, 284 came from Katane.152 The majority of the Athenian imports found at Katane 
date from the second quarter of the sixth century (105 total) and the first quarter of the fifth 
century (110 total). Though the number of imports found at Katane is certainly not directly 
representative of the city’s actual import economy, in all likelihood Katane played a central role in 
the distribution of Athenian wares in Sicily.  
The absence of ceramic and terracotta wares from the first half of the fourth century 
suggests that Katane, like Naxos, had lost its position as a central Sicilian economic center. After 
all, the Campanians only lived at Katane for seven years after Dionysios dispossessed the 
Katanians, and afterwards the urban center fell out of use until the middle of the fourth century.153 
So even though Katane had a nice harbor and was naturally suited to command trade across the 
Ionian Sea, the new Campanian landowners had little time to take advantage of the area before 
Dionysios resettled them further inland. And though it is impossible to say how and to what 
extent they used their land allotments at either Katane or Inessa, the new landowners were likely 
no more productive than their neighbors at Naxos. 
 Further to the south, the urban center of Leontinoi sits just 45 km to the northwest of 
Syracuse, and 10 km inland from the eastern seaboard of Sicily. The story goes that around 483, 
Gelon overtook the area, removed the city’s elites to Syracuse, and enslaved everyone else.154 A 
few years later in 476, Hieron conquered the nearby Naxians and Katanians, and relocated them 
                                                        
152 Giudice 1996. In the study, Giudice analyzed by quarter-century the painters represented and their parallels elsewhere on Sicily. 
153 In 353, Kallippos, Dion’s murderer, took the city, see Plut. Dio 58.4. There is no literary evidence for Katane between 396 and 353. 
154 Hdt. 7.156.3. Herodotus wrote that Gelon dispossessed the “Euboeans in Sicily,” which refers to the Chalkidian colonists at 
Leontinoi. Prior to his conquest of Leontinoi, Gelon had conquered Megara Hyblaia, which physically separated Leontinoi from 
Syracuse, see Thuc. 6.4.1-2; Hdt. 7.156.2. For excavations at Megara Hyblaia and evidence of its destruction, see Vallet et al. 1976; 1983.  
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to Leontinoi, making it a community of refugees.155 After Thrasyboulos’ fall from power, the 
Leontines returned to Leontinoi for a short-lived period of independence, emboldened for a 
time by an alliance with the Athenians.156 But, as we saw earlier, shortly after the conference of 
Gela in 424, which brought together the Sicilian Greeks in common cause against the Athenians, 
the Leontine elite came to an agreement with the Syracusans, destroyed their city, and moved to 
Syracuse to become citizens.157 For the next few decades, Leontinoi again became a community 
of people dispossessed by war: Diodorus called it a city “full of refugees and foreigners: even 
before it was again resettled in 405, this time by refugees from Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina 
fleeing the Carthaginians.158 Then in 403, after Dionysios enslaved the Naxians and Katanians, 
the mixed residents at Leontinoi hoped to avoid a similar fate so they agreed to resettle at 
Syracuse.159 Seven years later in 396, Dionysios divided up the Leontine countryside and 
allotted it to his mercenaries: 
τοῖς δὲ µισθοφόροις ὡς µυρίοις οὖσι τὸν ἀριθµὸν ἔδωκεν ἐν τοῖς µισθοῖς τὴν τῶν 
Λεοντίνων πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν. ἀσµένως δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπακουσάντων διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς 
χώρας, οὗτοι µὲν κατακληρουχήσαντες ᾤκουν ἐν Λεοντίνοις. 
He offered to his mercenaries, who numbered about ten thousand, in lieu of their pay the 
city and territory of the Leontines. To this they gladly agreed because the territory was 
good land, and after portioning it out in allotments they made their home in Leontinoi.160 
                                                        
155 Berger 1991: 135; Vanotti 1995; Frasca 2009: 99. 
156 For the Leontines’ alliance with the Athenians in 433, see IG I3 54, with Wick 1976. See also Thuc. 3.86, 4.24.9; Diod. 12.53, 12.83. 
157 Thuc. 5.4.2-3. For the conference of Gela in 424 and the resulting political breakdown at Leontinoi, see Thuc. 4.58-65, with Dreher 
1986. See also Diod. 12.54.7, 13.95.3, 14.58.1. The Athenians used the relocation of the Leontine elite as one of their main motives for the 
second Sicilian campaign in 415, see Thuc. 6.33.2, 6.48.1. Diodorus says that Leontinoi had become a sort of ad hoc Syracusan garrison 
(phrourion): for example, Dionysios used Leontinoi as a staging ground from which he became tyrant at Syracuse, see Diod. 13.95.3. 
158 Diod. 13.95.3. The Akrgantines, Geloans, and Kamarinaians decided to settle at Leontinoi instead of Syracuse, see Diod. 13.113.4. 
159 Diod. 14.15.4. Diodorus explained that in 403 the mixed residents at Leontinoi, “expecting that they would receive no help and 
reflecting on the fate of the Naxians and Katanians, were struck with terror in fear that they would suffer the same misfortunes.” 
160 Diod. 14.78.2-3, with Rizza 2002. Because Dionysios was cash poor, he worried that his mercenaries were preparing to depose him. 
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In antiquity, Leontinoi was known for its fertile landscape at the foot of Mt. Etna: according to 
legend, Herakles himself is said to have “marveled at the beauty of the plain.”161 So even though 
Dionysios was cash-poor and unable to pay his mercenaries in 396, the promise of land and a 
new life at Leontinoi was a good bargain. For much of its history, however, Leontinoi was also 
known as a center of non-agricultural production.  
At Leontinoi, the late Archaic period before the first Syracusan conquest, marked an 
efflorescence in Leontine local production.162 From the sanctuary of Alaimo just outside of the 
urban center, excavations have yielded over 200 complete ceramic vessels, produced locally, as 
well as nearly 250 Corinthian imports, and others from Etruria—all from just the one site.163 
From the same site, there is also ample evidence for local terracotta and metal production, all in 
late Archaic contexts.164 However, evidence for local production falls off completely in the fifth 
century in both urban and rural settings. In his synthesis of Leontine material culture, Massimo 
Frasca recently concluded that the Syracusan conquests disrupted local production, a 
disruption that lasted until the fourth century when distribution of Leontine wares picked up 
again.165 Despite having a larger population after Hieron’s relocations, the new labor force does 
not seem to have helped with non-agricultural production. Furthermore, there is little evidence 
for new building during the fifth century. Rather, reuse of the Archaic walls, sanctuaries, and 
cemeteries was much more the norm.166  
                                                        
161 Diod. 4.24.1. 
162 For an overview of Leontine history, see Gula 1995. For recent syntheses of the excavations at Leontinoi, see Frasca 2003; 2009. 
163 For the excavations at the sanctuary of Alaimo at Leontinoi, the catalogue of finds, and analysis, see Grasso 2008; Frasca 2009: 75-77.  
164 For terracotta production, see Frasca 2009: 91-96. For metallurgy and weaponry, with a catalogue of finds, see Grasso 2008: 133-140.  
165 Frasca 2008: 113. 
166 For the walls, sanctuaries, and cemeteries, see Frasca 2008: 108-112, contra Rizza 1955. For the sanctuaries, see also Rizza 2003.   
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During the fifth century, the bulk of Leontine material culture comes in the form of 
ceramic imports from Athens. Still, all the Attic imports date from the second and third quarters 
of the century, and cease altogether at the beginning of the last quarter of the fifth century—
concurrent with the short-lived period of Leontine independence, and ending at about the same 
time as when the Syracusan democrats relocated the Leontines to Syracuse.167 Among the Attic 
ceramic wares, there were four well-preserved red-figure kraters, and many other lekythoi. 
However, there is a two-generation gap beginning in the final quarter of the fifth century for 
which there is absolutely no evidence for local production or imports. This was at a time when 
neighboring states like Gela and Kamarina were still importing ceramics from Attica, at least up 
until they were relocated to Syracuse. Ceramic production only picked up again in the second 
quarter of the fourth century, with the Lentini-Manfria group beginning sometime in the 360s, 
and taking off during the 340s.168 Meanwhile, the Leontines began to build new monumental 
epitymbia tombs, suggesting an increase in material wealth a half century or so after Dionysios 
allotted the land to his mercenaries.169 
Like Naxos and Katane, Leontinoi had a tumultuous history in the Classical period as 
Syracuse’s neighbor. At Leontinoi, the frequent relocations resulted in breaks in local production 
and the import economy—breaks that even continued for the generation after Dionysios allotted 
land to his mercenaries. As elsewhere in eastern Sicily, the new landowners were on their own to 
start a new community outside of Syracusan territory. If there were, in fact, ten thousand 
                                                        
167 For Athenian ceramic imports, see Orsi 1930; Frasca 2008: 113-114. Because of the low overall number of Athenian imports, it is 
impossible to say, as Frasca (2008: 119) did, that the Leontines’ treaty with the Athenians had any effect on the ceramic import market.  
168 For the Lentini painter and the Lentini-Manfria group, see Trendall 1967: 583-614. In his analysis of the Lentini painter, Trendall 
concluded that “He probably began his career before the time of Timoleon and was active during the third quarter of the fourth century.” 
169 For the fourth-century dating of the epitymbia tombs in the southern necropolis, see Rizza 1955: 291-292; Frasca 2008: 137-139. 
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Campanian mercenaries who received land allotments at Leontinoi, then each new landowner 
could only have received about six and half hectares of land: De Angelis has recently estimated 
that Leontine territory was about 830 km2, though only about 664 km2, (or 66,400 hectares) was 
cultivable.170 Allotments of this size would have been comparable in output to the fifth-century 
farms found at Kamarina. Therefore, most of the new landowners at Leontinoi after 396 were 
probably small-scale farmers, producing little to no surpluses. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that there is little archaeological evidence for non-agricultural production at Leontinoi in first half 
of the fifth century. 
What we have seen is that Syracusan land allotment was the shared history of Naxos, 
Katane, and Leontinoi. But unlike Athenian imperialism, Syracusan imperialism does not have 
a clear story for who benefitted from imperial land allotment. In the opening years of Dionysios’ 
tyranny, the Naxian countryside went to Sikels, the Katanian countryside to Campanians, and 
the Leontine countryside to mercenaries. In all three cases, the new landowners received the 
base conditions for a new agrarian life in Sicily, but that life also required them to start over in 
an under-developed economic community. For Dionysios, imperial land allotment allowed him 
to satisfy his debts—both financial and political—to his mercenaries and foreign allies. It also 
reshaped the human geography of Syracuse itself as economic activity moved south to the 
growing urban center: in the early fourth century Syracuse reached a population of nearly 
50,000 through forced relocations, and was fast becoming one of the Mediterranean’s leading 
economic centers, rivaling Athens and Carthage. 
                                                        
170 De Angelis 2000a: 128-129, with De Angelis 2016: 226-234. Most of Leontinoi’s territory is volcanic and sits below an elevation of 300 m. 
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Though the territories of the eastern Sicilian communities were confiscated and divided 
up time and time again, the recipients did not command the best agricultural land on the island: 
in fact, the Syracusans seem to have had their eyes on Sicily’s low-hanging fruit and none of the 
big prizes. For example, the territory of Naxos and Katane were less than 60% cultivable—
compared to Gela and Akragas, at 86 and 87%, respectively—and all six eastern communities 
(Messene, Naxos, Katane, Leontinoi, Megara Hyblaia, and Kamarina) together had less 
cultivable than Gela and Akragas on the southern coast of Sicily.171 Still, the smaller eastern 
Sicilian communities, though not agricultural titans, were big importers from the east. 
Consequently, competition with Carthage in southern Sicily, combined with the relative 
strength of the eastern communities’ markets, probably put the north more in line with the 
Syracusans’ interests. 172 When the eastern Sicilians, like the southern Italians after them, 
relocated to Syracuse, the land they left behind remained external to Syracusan territory. 
 
4.6. Kalabria: Exchanging Land for Trade 
As the Syracusans marched north in 396 after taking Naxos, the Messenian countryside 
before them was deserted, its fields unplowed since the Carthaginian invasion a year before. Like 
the other eastern Sicilian communities, Messene received new landowners, all beneficiaries of 
Syracusan land allotment. At Messene, the new landowners arrived from Lokroi and its colony 
Medma, both Greek communities on the Italian side of the Strait of Messina.173 At just 3 km wide 
                                                        
171  De Angelis 2000a. The six poleis have about 308,940 hectares of cultivable land; Gela and Akragas have about 333,600 hectares. 
172 For economic competition between Carthage and Syracuse in the Classical period, see Pilkington 2013. For Carthaginian markets and 
monetization in the western Mediterranean, see Frey-Kupper 2014; Prag 2010, with Brenot 1992; Dietler 1997; Cutroni Tusa 2000a; 2000b.  
173  For the new landowners at Messene, see note 86 above. 
 214 
at its narrowest point, the channel separating Sicily from mainland Italy was one of the busiest 
waterways in the Mediterranean: through it travelled the lion’s share of commercial shipping 
between the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas, and also mainland Greeks on their way to the western 
Mediterranean.174 The Porticello shipwreck, which sank c. 415-385 just north of Rhegion, opposite 
Messene, shows just how crucial the channel was for shipping at the time of Dionysios’ 
campaigns: in a single cargo were amphorae from the Chalkidiki and Bosporos in eastern Greece, 
others from Punic Sicily and southern Italy, three life-size bronze sculptures, and lead ingots from 
the Laurion mines in Attica.175 It was probably because Messene commanded the western 
seaboard of the channel that Dionysios moved quickly to repopulate the site before the 
Carthaginians or Rhegians could do the same. From then on, all Syracusan land allotments north 
of Naxos up through Kalabria in southern Italy went to the Lokrians.   
The Syracusans were no strangers to Italian political and commercial life. Already in the 
Archaic period the Syracusans were trading with the Lokrians on the Ionian coast of Kalabria: a 
merchant ship sailing just outside of the Syracusan harbor in the late Archaic period sunk with 
a cargo of Lokrian amphorae.176 Under the Deinomenids, the Syracusans reaffirmed their 
commercial interests by joining the Lokrians in a war against the Rhegians.177 Even after the 
Lokrians offered asylum to Thrasyboulos after the collapse of the Deinomenid tyranny, the 
Syracusan democrats upheld the alliance with the Lokrians through both Athenian campaigns 
                                                        
174 In 433, the Athenians went to war with the Corcyraeans against the Corinthians, in part, to protect their trade in western Greece. 
175 For the Porticello shipwreck, see Eiseman and Ridgway 1987; Parker 1992: 333-332, with De Angelis 2016: 292-293. The small ship 
had a hull of roughly thirty tons. Eiseman and Ridgway (1987: 33) argued that the ship wrecked c. 415-385, whereas Parker (1992: 333-
332) argued that it may have been wrecked sometime closer to the mid-fifth century judging by the artistic style of the sculptures. 
176 Parker 1992: 293; Albanese Procelli 1996: 99. For the distribution of amphorae in Archaic Sicily, see Albanese Procelli 1997: 4-5. 
177  Pind. Pyth. Σ 1.99a, 2.36c. In 477, the Rhegians under the tyrant Anaxilas attacked Lokroi and Hieron came to the Lokrians’ aid. 
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to Sicily. 178 Dionysios carried the alliance into the fourth century by taking a Lokrian wife in 
398. Afterwards, when the Syracusans crossed over into Italy, they continued to internalize the 
peoples of their empire by giving away the land they confiscated in southern Italy to the 
Lokrians. The region makes for a useful case study because we can pull from urban excavations 
at Kaulonia and Rhegion, rural intensive survey of Kaulonian territory, and Diodorus’ 
unbroken narrative of the Syracusans’ campaigns. Altogether, the material shows how the 
economic effects of Syracusan land allotment in eastern Sicily also held true for land allotment 
in southern Italy. More than that, it allowed the Syracusans to maintain their oldest trading 
partner in western Greece while also transferring the region’s human capital to Syracuse.  
Through Syracusan land allotment, Lokrian citizens received land all over Kalabria at 
Kaulonia, Hipponion, and Skylletion. In effect, Dionysios left Kalabria to the Lokrians. In doing 
so, Lokroi became one of the wealthiest Greek communities in southern Italy at the expense of 
nearby Rhegion, Kaulonia, and Kroton.179 For the Syracusans, the alliance with Lokroi may have 
helped them scale up their navy. As we saw earlier, when Dionysios was preparing to go to war 
against Carthage in 398, he retrofitted Syracuse’s double harbor with new ship sheds and build a 
new navy of three hundred warships. To do so, he called on his Italian allies for timber:  
ἀκούων γὰρ ὁ Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ ναυπηγηθῆναι τριήρη πρώτως, ἔσπευδε κατὰ 
τὴν ἀποικισθεῖσαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων πόλιν αὐξῆσαι τὸ µέγεθος τῆς τῶν νεῶν κατασκευῆς. 
λαβὼν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐξαγωγὴν ὕλης, τοὺς µὲν ἡµίσεις τῶν ὑλοτόµων εἰς τὸ κατὰ 
τὴν Αἴτνην ὄρος ἀπέστειλε, γέµον κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους πολυτελοῦς ἐλάτης τε 
καὶ πεύκης, τοὺς δ᾽ ἡµίσεις εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀποστείλας παρεσκευάσατο ζεύγη µὲν τὰ 
πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κατακοµιοῦντα, πλοῖα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρέτας πρὸς τὸ τὰς σχεδίας 
ἀπάγεσθαι κατὰ τάχος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. 180 
                                                        
178 For the Lokrians during the first Athenian campaign, see Thuc. 3.86.2. For the second Athenian campaign, see Thuc. 6.44.2; 7.1.1; 7.25.3.  
179 For Lokroi, see Costamagna and Sabbione 1990; Costabile 1992; Del Monaco 2013. For the Kalabria region, see De Sensi Sestito 1989.  
180  Diod. 14.42.3-4. Dionysios recently conquered Naxos and Leontinoi on either side of Mt. Aitna, so he had direct access to its timber. 
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For, hearing that triremes had first been built in Corinth, he was intent, in his city that had 
been settled by a colony from there, on increasing the scale of naval construction. After 
obtaining leave to transport timber from Italy he dispatched half of his woodmen to 
Mount Aitna, on which there were heavy stands at that time of both excellent fir and pine, 
while the other half he dispatched to Italy, where he got ready teams to convey the timber 
to the sea, as well as boats and crews to bring the worked wood speedily to Syracuse. 
The southern-most tip of Kalabria is famous, even to this day, for its dense coniferous forests. 
Within just 10 km of Lokroi, the Lokrian countryside is split by four rivers that flow down from 
the coniferous interior, which could have served as exit points for timber exports. Dionysios 
may have looked to the Lokrians, his closest allies in Italy, and their natural supply of timber 
when he was building his new navy. In a sense, the Syracusans may have seen Lokroi much as 
the Athenians did Macedonia for much of the fifth century: as a source of timber. But unlike the 
Athenians, Dionysios did not seem to have used the Syracusan navy to protect citizens’ land 
allotments or any other private sources of wealth outside of Syracusan territory. 
 Soon after the Syracusans made peace with the Carthaginians in 396, a peace that would 
hold until 383, Dionysios took his empire of allotment to southern Italy.181 Before sailing to Italy in 
389, Dionysios entered into an alliance with the Oscan-speaking Lucanians in the southern 
Apennines, who had recently conquered Poseidonia and Laos in Campania, just 300 km south of 
Rome.182 After wintering in Sicily, a Syracusan navy sailed north to support the Lucanians in their 
conquest of Thurii, an Athenian colony bordering Lucanian territory to the south.183 But the 
Thurians had recently entered into an alliance themselves, a defensive coalition of Italian Greeks, 
the second “Italiote league,” formed in 393 to protect Kalabria from the Lucanians to the north 
                                                        
181 Diod 14.100.1. Diodorus wrote that Dionysios was already planning “to take hold of” (προσλαµβάνω) the Italian Greeks at this time.  
182 Diod. 14.100.5. The Lucanians had recently conquered Poseidonia and Laos, see Strabo 6.1.3; Diod. 14.101.3. See also Section 5.5. 
183 Diod. 14.101-102.  
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and the Syracusans to the south.184 In 389, Kroton, Kaulonia, and Rhegion joined Thurii in a 
growing regional fight against the Lucanians and the Syracusans, who were also supported by 
Lokroi. As elsewhere in the Greek world, the Italian interstate system tended towards the 
balance of power among smaller states: when faced with a growing Syracusan power, the 
smaller states banded together.185 
 The Syracusans entered into an alliance with the Lucanians precisely because a 
coordinated Italiote league might further threaten commercial activity moving through the Strait 
of Messina. In his first attempt to control the channel in 390, Dionysios was defeated at Rhegion 
by a formidable Italian navy, numbering among it sixty warships from Kroton.186 Even though the 
Syracusans could count on the Lokrians for regional support in southern Kalabria, the formation 
of the Italiote league pooled the members’ collective resources and expanded the theater of 
operations northward up the Tarentine gulf coast. But after 390, and with Lucanian support in the 
north, the Syracusans were able to divide the Italian Greeks’ forces, allowing them to pick off 
Kaulonia and Rhegion in the south.187 Though the Lucanians benefitted in the north just as the 
Syracusans did in the south from a divided Italiote league, the Syracusans sustained their alliance 
with the Lokrians with the promise of land allotments.  
                                                        
184 Diod. 14.91.1, with Wonder 2012: 130; Fronda 2015. The Italian Greeks formed the alliance after Dionysios’ failed attack on 
Rhegion and the Lucanians moved into Campania. Not to be confused with the coalition of 393, the Italian Greeks created a similar 
defensive alliance nearly two generations earlier after the Athenians founded Thurii in 444/3, see Polybius 2.38-39, with Wonder 
2012: 137-138.  
185  For the balance of power in the Greek world, see Strauss 1991. For the Mediterranean interstate system, see Eckstein 2006: 37-78. 
186 Diod. 14.100.1-4. Kroton appears to have been the hegemon of the Italiote league after Thurii’s defeat, see Wonder 2012: 144-145. 
187 Diod. 14.102.3. Diodorus wrote that “Dionysios hoped that, if the Italian Greeks were embroiled in war with the Lucanians, he might 
appear and easily make himself master of affairs in Italy, but if they were rid of such a dangerous war, his success would be difficult.” 
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 In 389, the Syracusan army crossed over to Italy and first moved against the Kaulonians. 
Though the Italiote league managed to send an army to draw Dionysios away from his siege of 
Kaulonia, the Syracusans defeated the Italians in the field at the Eleporos river.188 But before 
returning to Kaulonia, the Syracusans marched on Rhegion. Having just been defeated in the 
field, the Rhegians came to an agreement with Dionysios in return for their lives: they paid three 
hundred talents of silver and handed over their entire navy of seventy warships.189 At Rhegion, 
the Syracusans were following in the Athenians’ footsteps of monopolizing naval power. 
Afterwards, the Syracusans returned to Kaulonia and, in defeat, the Kaulonians agreed to relocate 
to Syracuse with citizenship.190 Dionysios ordered the city be destroyed before he gave the land to 
the Lokrians. Like its predecessors in eastern Sicily, Kaulonia received new landowners from 
outside Syracusan society, who were on their own to found a new community.  
 Afterwards, the new landowners at Kaulonia set out to rebuild the city and work the 
countryside. As at Naxos, the urban center of Kaulonia was refounded with a new orientation 
along an orthogonal plan. But excavations of the city’s fortifications have shown that the new 
landowners were slow to rebuild the city: though excavations have found that the sixth-and fifth-
century circuit walls were destroyed at the beginning of the fourth century, the new walls 
surrounding the city date to the mid-fourth century, at least two generations after city was 
refounded.191 Unfortunately, there is little else in the way of archaeological evidence from the city 
dating from the Archaic and Classical periods that can help shed light on the new landowners. 
                                                        
188 Diod. 14.104.4. The Italians sent an army from Kroton, though the Rhegians appear to have supplied soldiers to the army as well. 
189 Diod. 14.106.3. In defeat, the Rhegians feared what the Syracusans might do to them, perhaps with the Naxians and Katanians in mind. 
190 Diod. 14.106.4. 
191 Tréziny 1988: 209-210; 1989: 155-157. Dionysios II may have refounded the city again in 357, see Diod. 16.10.2, 16.11.3; Plut. Dion. 26.7. 
 219 
A recent intensive survey of the Kaulonian countryside suggests that the new 
landowners may have been small-scale farmers like their contemporaries in eastern Sicily. The 
survey found that, though fourteen of the total seventeen sites in the survey areas were new to 
the Classical period, the number of total sites only increased by three.192 The sites from the 
Classical period were mostly small, located near the coast, and on sites not previously 
occupied.193 Though the surveyors did not see much of a decrease in the total number of sites 
between the fifth and fourth centuries, by the Hellenistic period, the number of sites had 
decreased to thirteen and, again, were mostly new sites.194 In his analysis of the sites, Antonio 
Facella argued that the discontinuity between the fourth and third centuries was very different 
from what intensive surveys found at nearby Kroton and Metaponto, where settlement patterns 
only increased in the fourth century—more in line with the kind of agricultural intensification 
that might be expected of a Greek colony during the Classical period.195 It is possible that the 
changes to Kaulonia’s rural settlement may actually have been caused by a move towards 
urbanism rather than a demographic or agricultural decline. Still, the kind of decline and 
discontinuity in the fourth century suggests that the new landowners at Kaulonia, compared to 
their neighbors to the north, may have struggled to take advantage of the countryside.   
After Kaulonia, the Syracusans turned to the remaining Italian Greek states in southern 
Kalabria. In 389, Hipponion and Skylletion to the west and east of Kaulonia received the same 
treatment as Kaulonia. At Hipponion, Diodorus says that the Syracusan army “marched on 
                                                        
192 Facella 2011: 312, with Parra 2001; 2004; Parra and Facella 2011; Facella 2012. Parra and Facella (2011: 538) list eight “uncertain” sites. 
193 Facella 2011: 315, with table 4. Facella suggested that the sites were probably small farms, but unfortunately none were excavated. 
194 Facella 2011: 312-313.  
195 Facella 2011: 315-316. For Kroton, see Ruga et al. 2005: 153. For Metaponto, see Carter 2001: 786, 790-791; 2006: 225-227, 229-232. 
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Hipponion, removed its inhabitants to Syracuse, destroyed the city, and divided up its territory 
among the Lokrians.”196 Afterwards, according to Strabo, Skylletion became a part of Lokrian 
territory.197 The Syracusans then turned south to Rhegion. Because the Rhegians had recently 
lost their navy, the Syracusans blockaded their harbor, driving up the price of grain sixty fold, 
and let starvation set in.198 After holding out for two years, in 387 the Rhegians finally gave in: 
Dionysios ordered the six thousand survivors be relocated to Syracuse and ransomed for a mina 
each—those who could not pay their personal indemnity became slaves as further punishment 
for the long siege.199 Like the other Kaulonia and Hipponion, the city of Rhegion was destroyed, 
but it seems to have remained deserted for another generation: excavations have dated all 
public architecture to the mid-fifth century.200 By not allotting the Rhegian countryside to the 
Lokrians, Dionysios may have been limiting any possible disruptions to movement through the 
Strait of Messina. Furthermore, the destruction of Rhegion marked the death of the second 
Italiote league.201 With the combined populations of Kaulonia, Hipponion, Skylletion, and 
Rhegion relocated to Syracuse, and the Lokrians in possession of their land, the Syracusans had 
little use for their alliance with the Lucanians. So Dionysios broke the alliance, and ordered a 
wall be built across southern Kalabria, stretching from Skylletion on the Ionian coast to just 
                                                        
196 Diod. 14.107.2. See also Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.7. The Lokrians had fought against the Hipponians back in 422, see Thuc. 5.5.3. 
197 Strabo 6.1.10. Strabo used the verb προσορίζω, which means “to include within the boundaries”—in this case, of the Lokrian chōra. 
198 Diod. 14.111.1. According to Diodorus, a medimnos cost three mina (or roughly 300 drachms) at the peak of the blockade. On 
average, a family of five would have consumed about 25 medimnoi of grain per year, with an income of roughly 300-400 
drachms. The market price for grain varied in the fifth century from 5-6 drachms per medimnos, see Ober 2015: 95. Therefore, the 
Rhegians in 389 were spending a year’s wages for the equivalent of about two weeks of grain, at sixty times the usual market price. 
199 Diod. 14.111.2-4. 
200 Strabo 6.1.6. Dionysios II refounded the city c. 360. See also Costabile 1978; Martorano 1985; Hansen and Fischer-Hansen 1994: 72-74. 
201 It is unclear what happened to Kroton at this time. Dionysios may have “captured” Kroton as well, see Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 20.7. 
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north of Hipponion on the Tyrrhenian coast.202 What lay south of the wall was Lokrian territory; 
the former inhabitants, Syracusan.   
In 387, the Syracusans had a foothold for what might have become an Italian empire. But 
that Italian empire, for the time, was in Italian hands—that is, the Syracusans continued to 
relocate the Italian Greeks to Syracusan territory but give away their land to the Lokrians. The 
Syracusans were supporting their oldest political and economic allies in Italy by removing all 
competition in southern Kalabria and increasing the agricultural surface area at their disposal. In 
return, the Syracusans repossessed Kalabria’s share of human capital. Even though Dionysios 
remained tyrant of Syracuse for another twenty years, Hipponion and Skylletion were the last of 
Syracuse’s imperial land allotments in the Classical period, at least as far as we can tell from the 
historical sources. The Syracusans continued to pursue their commercial interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean, first by founding a series of naval stations and emporia (or “trading settlements”) 
along the Adriatic such as Issa and Lissos, and possibly Adria and Ankon as well.203 And to good 
effect: Syracusan currency from the early fourth century has been found at nearly thirty sites 
along the Ionian and Adriatic coasts, as far north as Oderzo in northeastern Italy.204 The 
Syracusans also went on a raiding expedition along the Etruscan and Corsican coasts in 383.205 On 
their way to Corsica, the Syracusans raided Pyrgi, the coastal emporion of Caere just 55 km 
northwest of Rome, and took off with 1,500 talents of silver. The Syracusans’ fundraising in the 
                                                        
202 Strabo 6.1.10. Strabo wrote that the wall was never finished because some unnamed Greeks from the north stopped the construction. 
203 Diod. 15.13-14; 16.5. For Dionysios, the Syracusan colonies in the Adriatic, and the possibility of an “Adriatic empire,” see Beaumont 
1936: 203; Woodhead 1970; Braccesi 1977; Amat-Sabattini 1991; Cambi 2002; Ceka 2002; D’Andria 2002; Gorini 2002; Lombardo 
2002; Cabanes 2008. For Ankon, see Strabo 5.4.2. For Adria, see Theopomp. fr. 128; Tzetzes ad Lycophr. 631; Etym. Magn. 18.54–57. 
204 Gorini 2002: 204; SNGCop. 720-722. 
205 Diod. 15.14.3-4; Strabo 5.2.8. At Pyrgi, the Syracusans plundered the temple, defeated the Pyrgians, and took with them prisoners 
for ransom and any other movable property they could find. Unfortunately, neither Diodorus nor Strabo said what happened on Corsica. 
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Tyrrhenian financed a new war in western Sicily against the Carthaginians, which they carried on 
in fits and starts until Dionysios’ death in 367. For the time, trading and raiding, not land 
allotment, was lucrative enough to fund Syracusan militarism. Perhaps all the relocations back to 
Syracusan territory had accomplished what the Syracusans considered the goal of land allotment: 
transferring human capital back to Syracuse. 
 In the end, the Syracusans handed over their Italian empire to the Lokrians. Though 
many historians of Syracusan imperialism have imagined that the Syracusans achieved a kind 
of direct control over southern Italy, when Diodorus wrote that Dionysios wanted “to take hold 
of the Italian Greeks,” he may have been referring to how the Syracusans relocated them back at 
Syracuse, not the actual effects of imperial control or land allotment. The verb προσλαµβάνω 
could also quite literally mean “to take in”: 
κατὰ δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν ὁ τῶν Συρακοσίων τύραννος Διονύσιος σπεύδων τῇ κατὰ τὴν 
νῆσον δυναστείᾳ καὶ τοὺς κατ᾽ Ἰταλίαν Ἕλληνας προσλαβέσθαι, τὴν µὲν ἐπ᾽ 
ἐκείνους κοινὴν στρατείαν εἰς ἕτερον καιρὸν ἀνεβάλετο. 
In Sicily Dionysios, the tyrant of the Syracusans, hoping to take hold of the Italian 
Greeks along with the power that he [already] held on the island, postponed the general 
war against them to another time.206 
For the Syracusans, land allotment and human capital were the twin foundations of their 
empire. But land allotment also meant that the regions that lost out to Syracusan militarism 
could only be controlled indirectly through the threat of violence: in Italy, the Syracusans took 
what they wanted—the people of empire—and left the Lokrians to look after the rest. Though 
land allotment only indirectly benefitted the Syracusan economy, the Syracusans owed much of 
their continued success to their imperial partnership with the Lokrians. At Kaulonia, 
                                                        
206 Diod. 14.100.1. In Oldfather’s Loeb translation, he translated προσλαµβάνω as “annex,” giving the impression of some kind of control. 
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Hipponion, and Skylletion, the Syracusans exchanged land for trade with the Lokrians. Because 
the Syracusans could stand to give away surplus land, they externalized the imperial land in 
return for timber and military support.  
 
4.7. Conclusions 
 The Syracusan empire was not much to look at. Unlike the empires of Hellenistic and 
Roman Sicily, the Syracusan empire in the Classical period did not produce the kinds of 
physical monuments to imperial control that historians have come to expect of ancient empires. 
In fact, for much of the Classical period, Syracusan imperialism was much more destructive 
than it was constructive outside of Syracusan territory in the areas where the Syracusans 
confiscated land.207 As we have seen, it did not come with the usual trappings of imperial 
control, like taxation, imperial officials, or garrisons because, I have argued, the Syracusans 
externalized their imperial territory. Even so, the Syracusans used land allotment to create an 
imbalance of power in eastern Sicily and southern Italy, where new landowners committed to 
fight for Syracuse, but were on their own to build a new political community. Land allotment 
was the shared history that connected the Syracusans’ imperial territory to all the relocated 
people living and working at Syracuse.  
The story of Syracusan land allotment began in the Archaic period: a long pre-history of 
political synoikism, combined with an economy geared more towards agrarianism than industrial 
production, made Syracusan society open to the kinds of demographic relocations that came at 
                                                        
207 Diod. 16.83.1; Plut. Tim. 22.4-6. Talbert (1974: 146) argued that “Archaeology has now confirmed the view of the ancient sources 
that from 405 to c. 340 much of southern Italy was ruined, undeveloped and under-populated.” For recent critiques of this view, see 
Bonacasa et al. 2002; De Angelis 2016: 129-133, 218-219. 
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the business end of so many military campaigns. At the beginning of the fifth century, the 
Syracusans inherited a model of indirect empire, which made it so few Syracusans received land 
allotments outside of Syracusan territory. At the same time, as Syracusan militarism scaled up, so 
too did the Syracusans’ need for non-agricultural production and a broader labor force. Further 
into the fifth century, the Syracusan democrats continued to see imperial land as external to the 
state so that imperial peoples could become internal to the state—a trend that continued through 
to Dionysios. The Syracusans had learned that they could build up Syracuse with an influx of 
labor, skilled craftsmen, and market activity. The Archaic origins of Syracusan imperialism 
presented two forms of land allotment: one that infused Syracusan society with dispossessed 
imperial peoples; another that created an indirect empire that was separate from Syracuse. For the 
Syracusans, land allotment was always about the people of empire.  
 In the Classical period, few Syracusan citizens ever received land allotments outside of 
Syracusan territory, a source of wealth reserved instead for mercenaries and citizens of allied 
state. In eastern Sicily, the Syracusans broke apart political communities by relocating the 
defeated populations back to Syracuse and then allotting their confiscated land to mercenaries 
at Aitna, Entella, Katane, Naxos, Leontinoi, Tyndaris, Tauromenion, and Messene. After 396, the 
Syracusans treated the defeated communities in a similar way before giving away their land to 
the Lokrians at Messene, Kaulonia, Hipponion, and Skylletion. Only at Megara Hyblaia in Sicily 
and Rhegion in Italy did the Syracusans leave the urban center unsettled. In every case of 
Syracusan land allotment, the Syracusans directed the heavy hand of their army to break up a 
political community and relocated the dispossessed peoples back to Syracuse, as either citizens 
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or slaves. Even though new communities made up of new landowners often sprang up in their 
place, those communities were still separate from Syracuse.   
 What we have seen, then, is that Syracusan land allotment remade the western Greek 
world at Syracuse. By giving land and citizenship to dispossessed people within Syracusan 
territory, and then allotting their land to mercenaries and foreign allies, the Syracusans were 
taking hostage the economic infrastructure of eastern Sicily and southern Italy. At Syracuse, the 
effects of demographic growth and specialization helped the Syracusans get to work building 
the tools of war. Outside of Syracusan territory, at places like Naxos, Katane, Leontinoi, and 
Kaulonia, land allotment offered the new landowners a new life, but they could not fall back on 
an existing market. Likewise, archaeological evidence from those imperial communities 
suggests that land allotment was a drain on Syracusan imperial territory. 
 When the Athenians recognized Dionysios as the archon of Sicily in 394/3, they had every 
reason to assume that, as the Syracusans’ military leader, he commanded the Greeks on the 
island. Just a year after another successful Syracusan campaign to Messene, the Athenians were 
not about to make the same mistake they did in 415 when they misjudged Sicily’s imperial 
history. After a decade of warfare, the Syracusans had internalized the collective populations of 
eastern Sicily, and they were preparing to turn northward to southern Italy. The Athenians 
recognized Dionysios’ position of power not because he directly controlled every city he defeated, 
but because the Sicilian Greeks were quite literally his to command from Syracuse. The Athenians 
could only look on as the Syracusans internalized an empire’s share of human capital. They also 
learned how Syracusan land allotment ensured that there were no other Greek community in 
eastern Sicily that could compete, either militarily or economically. In the end, the imperial 
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discourse that elevated Dionysios’ power probably says more about his ability to marshal 
resources at Syracuse than the actual reach of his tyrant state through the western Greek world. 
Despite all of the fighting and suffering, the Syracusans did little to physically expand the 
Syracusan citizen community or its territory. In this regard, the Syracusans were not all that 
different from the Athenians.  
 But whereas the Athenians confiscated land to create private forms of wealth, the 
Syracusans saw confiscated land more as a political means to an economic end: to build up 
Syracuse and Syracusan society. To be sure, political synoikism was nothing new in the 
Mediterranean world: it was a fairly common way for states to stay economically or militarily 
competitive. The well-known examples of Rhodes in 408/7, Megalopolis in 368, and Kos in 
366/5, to name a few, were part of a much wider phenomenon.208 Consider also the legendary 
rape of the Sabine women in Rome or the creation of Attica under Theseus.209 And after the 
expulsion of the tyrants in Athens, Kleisthenes naturalized foreigners and slaves in one blow by 
enrolling them in his tribes.210 Athens and Syracuse were, therefore, variations on a theme. What 
sets Syracuse apart was how naturalization was an on-going process, at least until 387, and how 
it always came at after a military conquest. The Syracusan history of land allotment and human 
capital also helps reinforce our understanding of why the Athenians went to great lengths to 
keep their citizens at Athens: the Syracusans may have been accumulating and concentrating 
the kinds of human capital and market presence that the Athenians could count on, and did not 
                                                        
208 For voluntary and involuntary relocations in the Greek world, see Moggi 1976; Demand 1990; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 115-119. 
209 For the rape of the Sabine women, see Livy 1.9; Plut. Rom. 15. In a recent narrative synthesis of Roman history, Beard (2015: 67) 
argued unconvincingly that the rape of the Sabine women “reflected Roman political culture’s extraordinary openness and willingness 
to incorporate outsiders… No ancient Greek city was remotely as incorporating as this.” For Attica under Theseus, see Thuc. 2.16.1. 
210 Arist. Pol. 1275b36–37; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 21.4. 
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want to lose, already in the middle of the fifth century. The Athenians and Syracusans were 
both privileging the metropolis at the expense of their imperial territoriality, and using imperial 
land as a mechanism for state building.  
Because the Syracusans focused on their war against the Carthaginians after 383, and the 
political breakdown after Dionysios’ death made way for an imperial breakdown, there is no 
way to tell whether the Syracusans were finished with their empire of allotment at the time of 
its death. On the one hand, Syracuse and its markets may have grown enough by the time of 
Dionysios’ Kalabrian campaign that there was no more need for land allotments, at least within 
Syracusan territory. On the other hand, Syracusan militarism had always relied on confiscated 
land as a form of remuneration, and the Syracusans showed no signs of retiring from 
Mediterranean battlefields. After Kalabria, the Syracusans showed interest in Adriatic markets 
and they continued to push ever-further north up the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy, past Campania 
all the way up to Etruria. When the Syracusans raided Pyrgi on the southern coast of Etruria in 
383, just 55 km away the Romans were just setting out on their own transition from regional 
city-state to territorial empire. From then on, the Mediterranean’s three empires of allotment 
shared a common history.  
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Chapter 5  
THE ROMANS 
The Syracusans sailed up the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy to Etruria in 384, emboldened by 
their recent gains in eastern Sicily and Kalabria. Just three years after handing over the land 
they confiscated in Italy to the Lokrians, the Syracusans set their sights on Pyrgi, the wealthy 
emporion of Etruscan Caere, known for its trade with the Carthaginians from Sardinia.1 Less 
than 50 km to the east were the ruins of Veii, Rome’s Etruscan neighbor. A decade had passed 
since the Romans destroyed the city: since then, the Romans gave citizenship to the surviving 
Veientines, divided up their territory, and finished allotting the land to Roman citizens by 387.2 
Later that same year, the Romans survived what would be the worst attack to their metropole 
until the final years of the Republic when an army of Gallic mercenaries ransacked the city of 
Rome.3 When the Syracusans raided Pyrgi and took off with 1,500 talents of silver, those same 
Gauls are said to have fought alongside them as mercenaries.4 By 384, the paths of Syracusan 
and Roman militarism took both states to war against the Etruscans, a course that might have 
ended with a clash between the two empires—the Syracusans, arriving in central Italy at the 
                                                        
1 For the Syracusan campaign to Pyrgi, see Diod. 15.14.3; Strabo 5.2.8. For trade at Pyrgi with the Carthaginians, see the Pyrgi Tablets, 
with Pilkington 2013: 197-201; Michetti 2016. On the west coast of Sardinia, Tharros was likely the closest Carthaginian colony to Etruria. 
2 For the conquest of Veii, see Livy, 5.30.7; Diod. 14.102.4. For the grant of citizenship to the surviving Veientines, see Livy 6.4.4. For 
the allotment of the ager Veientanus to Roman citizens and the creation of four new Roman citizen tribes, see Livy 6.5.8; Diod. 14.16.  
3 The “Varronian” tradition dates the sack of Rome to 390, but Polybius dated it to 387, the same year as the Peace of Antalkidas in 
the eastern Mediterranean and the siege of Rhegion by Dionysios, see Polybius 1.6.1, with Beloch 1926: 140; Walbank 1957: 46-47, 
185-186. For fourth-century Greek authors writing about the sack of Rome, see Theopompus FGrHist 115 F.317; Plut. Cam. 22.2-3, 
citing Heraclides Ponticus and Aristotle.  
4 For the Gallic mercenaries and the Syracusans, see Justin 20.5.1-6; Strabo 5.2.3; Diod. 14.117.7, with Sordi 1960: 62-72; Cornell 1995: 
316. However, it is impossible to tell from the sources whether or not the Syracusans had a hand in the sack of Rome, as Sordi suggests.  
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heels of a century of violence and relocations; the Romans, a fledgling state still experimenting 
with imperial land allotment at Veii. But with Rome already stripped of its moveable property, 
the Syracusans chose to leave Italy behind for bigger prizes on Corsica.  
 Their city pillaged, the Romans quickly turned to the offensive to secure their territory, 
with campaigns against the neighboring Etruscans, Aequi, and Volsci. Afterwards, the Romans 
founded colonies on allotted land at Satricum and Setia in Volscian territory and then Sutrium 
and Nepet in southern Etruria, all before the end of 383.5 The Romans also extended a form of 
dual citizenship, an hospitium publicum (or “public hospitality”), to the citizens of Caere—an 
agreement between two states still reeling from the raids of the prior decade.6 The agreement with 
Caere anticipated the grants of civitas sine suffragio (or “citizenship without the vote”) to defeated 
communities in the later fourth century: on the one hand, citizens of Rome and Caere enjoyed all 
the private and commercial rights of the other state; on the other hand, they were free of its 
obligations, military participation in particular, for the time being. Together, land allotment, 
colonization, and an increasing citizen community became the telltales of Roman imperialism in 
the mid-Republic. Looking back on the period, Cicero celebrated Roman colonization: “it is 
worthwhile to recollect the diligence exhibited by our ancestors, who established colonies in such 
suitable places to guard against all suspicion of danger, that they appeared to be not so much 
towns of Italy as propugnacula imperii”—projections of imperial power.7 Like the Athenians in 478 
and the Syracusans in 413, the Romans recovered from the shock of 387 and went on to confiscate 
                                                        
5 Harris 1971: 43-44. For Satricum, see Liv. 6.16.7. For Setia, see Vell. 1.14. For Sutrium, see Diod. 14.98.5. For Nepet, see Liv. 6.21.4. 
6 Livy 5.50.3; Gellius 16.13.7; Strabo 5.2.3. It is possible, as some historians have argued, that the agreement between Rome and 
Caere was an early, if not the first, instance of civitas sine suffragio, see Sordi 1960: 36-49; Harris 1971: 45-47; Eckstein 2006: 251-252. 
However, the two states probably just agreed to extend some of the rights of citizenship, see Humbert 1978: 29-32; Cornell 1995: 320-321. 
7 Cic. De Agr. 2.73. See also Appian B. Civ. 1.1.7. 
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their neighbors’ land. But unlike their Greek predecessors, the Romans achieved a form of 
durable imperial stability that lasted, in one way or another, for a thousand years. To Cicero and 
his contemporaries, the peculiar Roman mixture of land allotment, colonialism, and citizenship 
was part and parcel of the Romans’ “success.”8  
 And for good reason. From the beginning of the Republic, the three institutions formed 
the engine of Roman imperialism. Within a decade of the republican coup of 509, the Romans 
began to transform the Italian countryside as new landowners from Rome settled near or among 
defeated communities. At first, the Romans of the early Republic allotted land near the borders of 
Roman territory, often in collaboration with their Latin neighbors, in an effort to reinforce their 
place in the porous flatlands of western Latium.9 Later, between the 390s and the outbreak of the 
First Punic War in 264, the Romans allotted land to form new colonies on at least twenty-seven 
occasions, though mostly after the defeat of the Latin League in 338 (see Table 5.1, with Maps 5.1-
5). What emerged was a multi-layered system of citizenship and imperial territory: there were 
four small “Roman” colonies that were little more than garrisons where the residents had full 
Roman citizenship; the remaining twenty-three had varying levels of partial, or “Latin,” 
citizenship, which also required military participation.10 In other cases, the Romans extended 
Roman territory by allotting land (the so-called “viritane allotments”) without forming a new 
colony, as at Veii: in these places, the rural communities were still politically administered by the 
                                                        
8 Harris recently argued that the same three conditions were the basis of Roman power in the mid-Republic, see Harris 2016: 23-33. 
9 For the early Roman colonies, see Cornell 1995: 301-304. For the Pontine region to the south of Rome, for example, see De Haas 
2011. This may have been a similar process to what we saw with the Peisistratid consolidation of Attica and Syracusan 
intensification under the gamoroi. 
10 The Romans did not, in fact, make a strong distinction between the two forms of colonies. Rather, the distinction is a product of 
modern scholarship, see Pelgrom and Stek 2014b: 15. For the distinction between “Roman” and “Latin colonies,” see Broadhead 2007. 
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urban center of Rome. Wherever the Romans did not establish a colony, or the land did not 
become privatized through viritane allotment, the land was open for public use—the ager 
Publicus. During the period between the conquest of Veii and the First Punic War, Roman land 
allotment transformed central Italy as tens of thousands of Romans moved away from Rome. 
Table 5.1. Dates and locations of Roman land allotments in the historical sources 
Date Location  Type Main Sources 
495 Velitrae, Signia Colony Livy 2.31.4; Dion. Hal. 7.13-14 
492 Norba Colony Livy 2.34.6; Dion. Hal. 7.13.5 
467 Antium Colony Livy 3.1; Dion. Hal. 9.59.1-2 
442 Ardea Colony Livy 4.9-11 
418 Labici Colony Livy 4.47 
393-
387 
Ager Veientanus Viritane Livy 5.30, 6.4; Diod. 14.102.4 
395 Vitellia Colony Livy 5.29.3 
393 Circeii Colony Diod. 14.102.4 
385 Satricum Colony Livy 6.15.12-13 
380s Sutrium, Setia, Nepet Colony Livy 6.21.5; Vell. 1.14.2 
383 Ager Pomptinus Viritane Livy 6.21.4 
338 Ager Latina, Ager Falernus Viritane Livy 8.11.13-15 
334 Cales Latin Colony Livy 8.16.13-14 
329 Tarracina Roman Colony Livy 8.21.10-11 
328 Fregellae Latin Colony Livy 8.22.2 
314 Luceria Latin Colony Livy 9.26.1–5; Diod. 19.72.8 
313 
Saticula, Suessa Aurunca, 
Pontiae Latin Colony Livy 9.28.7-8 
312 Interamna Lirenas Latin Colony Livy 9.28.8; Diod. 19.105.5 
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303 Sora, Alba Fucens Latin Colony Livy 10.1.1-2 
299 Narnia Latin Colony Livy 10.10.1–5 
298 Carseoli Latin Colony Vell. 1.14 
295 Minturnae, Sinuessa Roman Colony Livy. 10.21.7-10; Diod. 19.101.3 
291 Venusia Latin Colony Vell. 1.14.6 
289 Hadria Latin Colony Liv. Per. 11.7 
289 Sena Gallica Roman Colony Poly. 2.19.12, 2.21.7-8 
273 Cosa, Paestum Latin Colony Livy Per. 14.8; Vell. 1.14.7 
268 Ariminum, Beneventum Latin Colony Livy Per. 15.5; Vell. 1.14.7 
264 Firmum Latin Colony Vell. 1.14.8 
263 Aesernia Latin Colony Vell. 1.14.9 
 
 Even as far back as the fifth century, allotment was central to Roman political culture: 
besides dividing up land, allotment also set voting procedures, assigned magistrates’ 
responsibilities, and decided military commands. But since the Romans used popular election 
instead of sortition to fill public offices, far more Romans received land allotments than ever held 
public office in the mid-Republic. It was in the allotment of land, then, that the Romans most 
resembled the Athenians and Syracusans. Though even there, land allotment drew far more 
Romans away from their metropole than the total number of Athenians and Syracusans who 
moved away from Athens and Syracuse combined. Because the Romans went on to form an 
empire that spanned the Mediterranean, historians tend to focus less on how land allotment 
emerged as an institution during a period of political and economic crisis than how, by Cicero’s 
time, the movement of Roman settlers had become the hallmark of Roman state power. In doing 
so, they take imperial success as their object of inquiry, explaining how the Romans used land 
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allotment to become so powerful.11 The lure of success is itself ancient: Polybius, for one, began 
his history with the simple question of how did “the Romans subjugate the whole inhabited 
world to one rule, a thing never done before, in less than fifty years?”12 Historians have long given 
credit to land allotment for Rome’s ultimate success in Italy: what we find in nearly every history 
of the mid-Republic is that it lifted the poor from poverty to fight in the legions, it carried Romans 
out into their empire to project the unruly frontier, and it created communities to integrate the 
defeated. In other words, land allotment was an instrument of imperial control.  
 To be fair, the orderly division of the Italian countryside was one of the most iconic 
symbols of Roman imperialism when Cicero and Polybius were writing. Besides, the checker-
board landscapes and elaborate foundation rituals described by surveyors centuries after the mid-
Republic give the impression that a centralized strategy land allotment “remained basically 
unchanged for centuries,” as Edward Togo Salmon imagined.13 For that reason, historians have 
been tempted to use evidence for land allotment from the later Imperial period to fill out earlier 
periods—evidence that only reinforces the idea that the Romans were uniquely prepared to create 
a Mediterranean empire. In recent years, however, archaeologists have begun to chip away at the 
traditional view: we are beginning to see all sorts of local variations to colonial landscapes and 
continuity with defeated communities, both of which only seem to challenge the idea that there 
was ever a single model of Roman colonization in the mid-Republic.14 But those advances have 
                                                        
11 For the most influential studies in this vein, see Salmon 1969; Sherwin White 1973; Hopkins 1978; Humbert 1978; Harris 1979; 
Mouritsen 1998; Scheidel 2004; Eckstein 2009, with Section 5.2. For recent textbook examples, see Potter 2014: 60-82; Beard 2015: 131-168.  
Recent interest in processes of social integration only reinforces a triumphalist reading, see Jehne and Pfeilschifter 2006; Roselaar 2012. 
12 Polybius 1.1.5, with Walbank 1957: 40. For a recent iteration of this same framework, see Lomas 2018: vii. 
13 Salmon 1969: 10. For land divisions, see Dilke 1971; Chouquer et al. 1987; Gargola 1995; Campbell 2000; Chouquer and Favory 2001.  
14 For example, see Terrenato 2001; Bispham 2006; Pelgrom 2008; De Haas 2011; Robinson 2013; Pelgrom and Stek 2014; Bellini et al. 2014. 
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left Roman historians with a new historical problem: it is hard to explain why citizens were 
moving out into their imperial territory at a rate unseen among the Athenians and Syracusans and 
yet why they may also have been fairly independent of the Roman state. 
In this chapter, I show how Roman land allotment in the mid-Republic can be understood 
only if we stop trying to explain how it contributed to imperial success in the long run. This is 
because, I argue, the Romans who hoped to receive land allotments saw imperial territory as an 
escape from the elite economy at Rome, so their movement away from Rome decentralized 
Roman power in the short term. Whereas the Roman warlords who led Rome’s armies hoped that 
confiscating land might add to their political prestige and project Roman power, most Romans 
moved away from Rome to their allotments to take advantage of the economic opportunity, not 
necessarily for the good of the empire. By the mid-Republic, Rome’s competitive political elite of 
old patrician families and upwardly-mobile plebeians distinguished themselves above all by their 
achievements in war and, by extension, the land they confiscated. For them, land allotment won 
them nobilitas (or “heroic renown”) among their peers back at Rome, and thus the prestige to win 
higher office. But the Roman citizens who actually received land allotments were mostly 
craftsmen, merchants, and laborers, and when they moved out across Italy they took their skilled 
labor to existing communities outside of Roman territory. As more Romans took advantage of 
existing networks of exchange and economic structures, land allotment actually became a vehicle 
for economic diffusion and regionalism.  
Therefore, what really set Roman land allotment apart from the Athenian and Syracusan 
approaches was that it transferred so much of Rome’s human capital away from the center. As we 
will see, land allotment did more to decentralize Roman territory than concentrate human capital 
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back at the metropole, as we might expect from the Athenian and Syracusan cases. Rather, the 
dispersal of human capital into rural areas reoriented existing regional networks of exchange 
around Roman business centers spread around central Italy. Though Rome certainly grew as an 
imperial center, it was not the only center of Roman exchange. Because Roman settlers shared a 
kind of commercial citizenship with other communities, they could took advantage of existing 
economic networks to specialize and produce for regional markets as well as the Roman market. 
Gradually, as Rome’s elite competed to confiscate more land, land allotment created a new form 
of intensive imperialism because Roman human capital became entrenched all across Italy.  
 
Map 5.1. Central Italy, with the four case studies discussed in Sections 5.5-6 
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Above: Map 5.2. Latium. Below: Map 5.3. The Tyrrhenian coast of central Italy. 
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Above: Map 5.4. Campania and Northern Lucania. Below: Map 5.5. Southern Etruria. 
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In what follows, I have divided the story of Roman land allotment into six sections. After 
deconstructing the sources and historiography of Roman land allotment in section one, section 
two surveys the prehistory to Roman land allotment to understand why so many among the 
Roman elite were willing to give away land away from Rome. Based on the slow pace of agrarian 
reform and social enfranchisement at Rome, section three then shows how the recipients of land 
allotments came to see imperial territory as an escape from the elite economy at Rome. To explain 
the movement of Roman citizens away from Rome, section four shows how Roman human 
capital reoriented existing networks of exchange as landowners worked to take advantage of 
already developing central Italian economy. Two final sections look to recent archaeological 
evidence from the Liri Valley and then Cosa and Paestum to test how land allotment created 
regional economic centers. 
 
5.1. Sources & Historiography 
 To the Romans, sortition was as old as republicanism. From the beginning of the 
Republic, the Roman brand of republicanism was highly aristocratic, but the elite offices of the 
consuls, praetors, and military tribunes held authority because sortition decided all matters of 
voting procedure and military command.15 Even in the fifth century, the sortes was a religious 
auspice, an ideological guide that subordinated the personal ambitions of patrician families to 
the broader political community.16 It tempered elite competition and relaxed political coalitions: 
as a non-personal procedure after election, it put magistrates on an equal footing and settled 
                                                        
15 For sortition and public office in the early republic, see Stewart 1998. For the mid-Republic, see also Taylor 1966; Rosenstein 1995. 
16 Stewart 1998: 1. She argued that the Romans saw the lot as the consent, or permission, from Iuppiter Optimus Maximus for public action. 
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contests through procedure, not politics.17 But outside the governing elite, sortition was also at 
the center of social conflict in the early Republic, what historians often call the “Struggle of the 
Orders.” Because much of Roman territory in the fifth century was public land, and tradition 
holds that Rome’s patrician landowners held much of it, the plebeians regularly pushed the 
state to the brink of collapse to get shares of public land for private use. The literary sources 
record twenty-five occasions between 486 and 367 when the plebeians wagered their military 
service and political consensus for allotments of land.18 As we will see, time and time again 
sortition made and unmade the Roman state during the mid-Republic: one the one hand, far 
more Romans received land allotments than ever held public office at Rome; on the other hand, 
the Romans who put their names in to get a land allotment hoped to move away from the 
Roman community and escape the elite economy at Rome.   
 But because the Roman state ultimately survived its republican growing pains, the ancient 
historical sources construct a continuous narrative of successful transitions: aristocratic 
republicanism to broad political enfranchisement; Italian crisis to imperial power. Reading them 
we get the sense that, once the Romans managed to get their political affairs in order at Rome in 
the mid-fourth century, they burst outward into central Italy as a robust imperial power, using 
land allotment to great effect along the way. The two main historical sources for Roman land 
allotment in the early and mid-Republic are Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, both Augustan 
historians writing at the end of the first century BCE, some three centuries removed from the 
subject. Livy (c. 64 BCE–9 CE) wrote a continuous narrative history of Rome from Romulus to 
                                                        
17 Rosenstein 1995: 45-48. For elite competition and political coalitions in the early and mid-Republic, see Terrenato 2014. 
18 Cornell 1995: 270-271, with refs. to Flach 1994. He argued that some details in the literary tradition may have been unhistorical, but it 
is unlikely that the entire tradition was an invention, as some historians have argued, see Niese 1888; Beloch 1926: 344; Olgivie 1965: 340. 
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Augustus, telling a highly glorified story of Rome’s rise to empire from humble beginnings. Only 
a fourth of the entire work survives, but the first ten books are extant and take the narrative down 
to 293. Though Livy often relied on moralizing anecdotes and speeches to advance his narrative, 
and his purpose was more didactic than reconstructive, he gives us a chronological structure for 
the study of individual cases of land allotment. Livy’s main source for land allotments in the mid-
Republic was the Annales Maximi, the state archives recorded each year by the Pontifex Maximus 
since the fifth century.19 Drawing on the annalistic records, Livy often made note of the location, 
context, and number of Romans who received land. For example, Livy wrote that “a senatorial 
decree was passed [in 396] that seven iugera of Veientine land be apportioned to every plebeian.”20 
From statements like this, Livy’s history helps modern historians know where to look for land 
allotments and who received them.  
Dionysius of Halicarnassus (60-c. 7 BCE) also wrote a narrative account of Rome’s early 
history, though an unbroken narrative is only extant up to 443. Livy and Dionysius agreed on 
most details, in large part because they relied on the same sources. As a prequel to Polybius’ 
history, Dionysius’ narrative focused on the virtuous behavior that, over time, allowed the 
Romans to conquer an empire.21 In speech after fictional speech, Dionysius emphasized how the 
Romans resolved social conflict through public deliberation, not civil war as the Greeks so often 
did. Because, in his view, the Roman character and the problems it overcame were timeless, he 
often narrated past events with anachronistic details. For example, his account of the Struggle of 
                                                        
19 The Annales maximi were the official state archives of magistrates, military campaigns, notable events, and colonies, recorded annually 
by the Pontifex Maximus, see Cic. De. Orat. 2.52. For the Annales and their reliability as a source for Livy, see Cornell 1995: 13-18. 
20 Livy 5.30.8. 
21 Dion. Hal. 1.5.2-3. In this sense, he also echoes the proem to Polybius’ history in which the historian tries to explain Roman success. 
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the Orders clearly mimicked the accounts of the Gracchi, as in the description of Sp. Cassius’ 
attempts to redistribute the ager publicus in 496: the anachronism emerges when we are told that 
the plebeians and “Latin allies” were the ones who received allotments, at a time when the 
Romans had no allies but Latins.22 Like Livy, Dionysius helps us fill out the chronological 
structure of, but not the intentions behind, land allotments.   
Where Livy and Dionysius both saw a continuous history of political enfranchisement 
through land allotment, other authors like Cicero, Appian, and Gellius saw a success story of 
citizen-garrisons. Like Livy and Dionysius, Cicero (106-43 BCE) constructed a romanticized past 
to serve the present: he argued in his De lege agraria that the Romans of the mid-Republic allotted 
land to create propugnacula imperii—and he could claim that it was a successful program precisely 
because Roman dominance in Italy was unquestioned in 63 BCE.23 In what amounted to a thinly 
veiled critique of Caesar’s populism, Cicero’s critique of the agrarian law required a very 
particular imperial logic: if land allotment back in the good old days was meant to create colonies 
in service of the empire, but the recipients of the land nowadays could very well be more loyal to 
men like Caesar than the Republic, then the privatization of public lands would actually endanger 
Rome—land allotment would hand over strategic positions to military commanders, who could 
then march on Rome. In effect, Cicero reinforced the idea that land allotment in the mid-Republic 
was deliberate and served a very specific purpose in service of the state.  
 Two centuries further removed from the subject, Appian and Gellius gave similar 
accounts of Roman centralization. In his account of the Roman civil wars, Appian (95-165 CE) 
                                                        
22 Dion. Hal. 8.71-76, with Gabba 1954; 1991: 152-189; Capanelli 1981; Pelling 2007: 252-257; Roselaar 2010: 27. Cornell (1995: 271, n. 
112) argued that “Latin allies” was used in the Gracchan period, but anachronistic for 486 when the Romans had no allies but Latins.  
23 See above, n. 7, with Jonkers 1963; Vasaly 1988. 
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showed the benefits of monarchy by stressing the risks of divided power. To get to the root of the 
problem, he pointed to the decline of the citizen-farmer in the late Republic, a trend he saw to be 
the unintended consequence of an otherwise noble program of land allotment. Early on, he 
argued, “The Romans, as they subdued the Italians successively in war, seized a part of their 
lands and built towns there, or enrolled klērouchoi of their own to occupy those already existing, 
and used them as garrisons.”24 Unlike the latifundia of the late Republic, mid-Republican land 
allotment created stability. For an author writing about Rome’s civil wars, stability was all-
important. A rough contemporary of Appian, Gellius (125-180 CE) included in his antiquarian 
work a passing note on the relationship of colonies to the Roman people: in his view, colonies 
were quasi effigies parvae et simulacra (or “small copies and likenesses”) of the Roman people.25 
Though the short passage did not carry much weight for Gellius, it gave rise to the idea among 
modern historians that the physical landscape of Republican colonies emulated the city Rome. In 
doing so, Gellius added to the romanticized views of Livy and Dionysius that the recipients of 
land allotments moved out into Italy primarily to project Roman power. 
A final source for Roman land allotment is the colorful, but highly technical writings of 
the agromensores (or “land-surveyors”).26 A collection of practical, mathematical, religious, and 
legal texts, compiled in the fifth century CE as the Corpus agrimensorum, preserves an 
unparalleled look into the world of land allotment: for example, the nuts and bolts of surveying; 
setting the field boundaries; the procession of the new landowners in military formation under 
                                                        
24 App. B. Civ. 1.1.7, with Hopkins 1978: 1-8. Appian wrote in the first sentence of the work that there were frequent disputes about land 
allotments in the early Republic, but conflict always ended in restraint and mutual concessions, unlike the breakdown in the late Republic. 
25 Gell. NA 16.13.9, with Bispham 2000: 157-58; 2006: 78-85; Sewell 2014. For the interpretation of archaeological evidence with 
Gellius’ formula as a model for centralization and diffusion, see esp. Salmon 1969: 18; Brown 1980: 12; Coarelli 1998: 75; 2005: 24-38. 
26 Dilke 1971; Gargola 1995; Campbell 2000; Chouquer and Favory 2001. For the surveyors, see Moatti 1993; Chouquer 2010.   
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a banner; marking out the town walls; the division of the land by lot. All this gives the 
impression that the Roman countryside was a checkerboard of orderly allotments—that once 
the Romans conquered the locals, they also conquered the landscape. Though some of the 
authors, like Frontinus (40-103 CE), were writing at the time of the Flavians, many of the texts 
date from much later. Because there are no historical sources to check whether or not the details 
of the Corpus agromensorum hold for Cicero’s lifetime, much less the early or mid-Republic, the 
collection is a tantalizing, but nevertheless highly problematic source for earlier periods: it 
remains unclear from the historical sources to what extent the Romans had a centralized, 
orderly system of land allotment in the mid-Republic. 
Altogether, the ancient literary sources for Roman land allotment in the mid-Republic 
share a common theme: the Romans expanded into Italy with a deliberate plan that put the 
recipients of land allotment to work in service of a centralized Roman state. But the authors of 
those sources lived in a very different world, a time far removed from the debates of the mid-
Republic. This is not to say that they were necessarily misinformed or they knowingly 
misrepresented the past. Rather, the role of land allotment had changed dramatically by the late 
Republic and the Imperial period, and the authors may have given meaning—and, indeed, 
coherence—to the imperial past so they could think with it alongside their present 
circumstances. Whereas the Livy and Dionysius’ narratives help us reconstruct the chronology 
and geographic distribution of mid-Republican land allotments, the passing analyses of Cicero, 
Appian, and Gellius are less helpful: they are reductive caricatures that tell us more about the 
author’s time than the mid-Republic. But because Livy and Dionysius left their readers without 
much analysis of what land allotment meant in Roman society beyond, perhaps, the intentions 
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of the Roman elite, it is understandable that modern historians have turned to Cicero, Appian, 
Gellius, and the agromensores to fill in the gaps. Consequently, historians have tended to ask the 
same questions about land allotment that were popular among the ancient sources. For that 
reason, as we will see, the study of Roman land allotment remains tethered to an ancient tradition 
of Roman success. 
Drawing on the close connection between republican sortition and the success of the 
Roman empire, modern historians have traditionally taken a top-down, statist perspective to the 
study of Roman land allotment. With three distinct historiographical approaches, this perspective 
sees land allotment, and the colonies on allotted land, as deliberate instruments of the imperial 
center. First, in the most influential study of Roman colonization of the twentieth century, Edward 
Togo Salmon argued that the Romans allotted land at strategic points in Italy so that people loyal 
to Rome would occupy the site, and then defend the area on behalf of Rome—much like Cicero’s 
view.27 Drawing on the Allied advance up western Italy during the Second World War, he argued 
that the Romans surely would have recognized strategic sites for their defensive positions, as the 
Allies had. Excavations at Cosa and Alba Fucens and aerial photography of centuriation after the 
war in the 1940s and 1950s reinforced Salmon’s view that Rome had a heavy hand in all colonial 
affairs: the apparent regularity of colonial city planning and the evenly divided rural landscapes 
fit nicely with the ancient traditions of Gellius and the agromensores. Consequently, he assumed 
that evidence from the high Imperial period could be exported back in time to explain mid-
                                                        
27 Salmon 1969. For a recent discussion of Salmon’s study, its historiographical tradition, and its impact, see Pelgrom and Stek: 
2014b. Pelgrom and Stek showed the how the historiographical tradition of Roman defensive colonization went as far back to 
Machiavelli’s Discorsi (1531). For Salmon, strategic points included enemy frontiers, points of advance, roads, river crossings, 
mountain passes, and sea ports, see Salmon 1967: 212; 1969: 57. For the influence of the Second World War on his interpretation, see 
Salmon 1956: 99 n. 2. 
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Republican land allotment.28 In his excavation reports from Cosa, Frank Brown only added to 
Salmon’s centralized view of land allotment by emphasizing the physical similarities between 
Cosa and Rome: their public spaces, temples, and so on.29 In effect, Salmon argued that the Roman 
elite used land allotment to defend their empire. This model of a “garrison-replica” remains the 
standard explanation for Roman land allotment. 
Whereas Salmon tried to minimize socio-economic and cultural causes in favor of military 
strategy, a second group of historians has tried to tie land allotment to the Struggle of the Orders. 
Writing in the aftermath of Italian national unification, Italian scholars like Ettore De Ruggiero, 
Ettore Pais, and Plinio Fraccaro admired how land allotment allowed the Romans to maintain a 
very delicate socio-economic and demographic equilibrium.30 These historians were building off 
of a centuries-old tradition dating back to Machiavelli and Sigonius which held that land 
allotment relieved Rome from demographic overload, thereby limiting the risks of civil strife; the 
land allotments then lifted the urban poor from poverty, making them financially eligible to fight 
in Rome’s wars; in doing so, land allotment promoted the virtues of an idealized citizen-farmer-
soldier and a sense of unity and commitment to the Roman state.31  
More recently, Tim Cornell in a meticulous study of early Rome retold the story that 
land allotments were the Romans’ solution for social conflict.32 Though the socio-economic 
perspective usefully fuses what the historical sources say about land allotment to the well-
                                                        
28 Salmon 1969: 20. 
29 Brown 1951; 1980: esp. 1-18; Brown et al. 1960; 1993. For Cosa and its countryside as a “typical Latin colony,” see Salmon 1969: 29-39. 
For colonies’ “mimetic” relationship to Rome, see Libsius, Admiranda, sive, de magnitude Romana (1598); Beloch 1880: 154; Mommsen (1912). 
30 De Ruggiero 1896; Pais 1923; 1924; 1928; Fraccaro 1939; 1940; 1956, with historiographical comments in Pelgrom and Stek 2014b: 26-30. 
31 For the socio-economic perspective, see Macchiavelli, Discorsi (1531); Sigonius, De antique jure Italiae (1560). For land allotment creating 
peasant-soldier communities with civic virtues, see also Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de leur decadence (1734). 
32 Cornell 1995: 268-270; 301-304. For the importance of socio-economic and demographic causes, see also Crawford 1971 and Oakley 2002. 
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trodden tradition of patrician-plebeian conflict in early Rome, it focuses only on how the Roman 
elite intended to deal with their internal problems through imperialism—an imperial logic that, 
in turn, relied on more land allotments to produce even more soldiers. In effect, Cornell and his 
predecessors began to question how the recipients of land allotments may have benefited from 
moving away from Rome, but relied on the same narrative of elite agency that animated 
Salmon’s model.  
 Meanwhile, a third group has emphasized the cultural impact of Roman land allotment. 
In this approach, land allotment carried Romans out into their empire to integrate their new 
subjects. The cultural approach shares a lot in common with what we saw with the first 
approach: while Salmon stressed defense through militarism, the cultural approach draws from 
ideas about “Romanization” and shows how the Romans placated their enemies, little by little, 
by creating new communities on allotted land with the people they defeated. Whereas earlier 
historians like James Reid and Frank Abbott emphasized the civilizing effects of land allotment 
on non-Roman communities, more recently Mario Torelli argued that the Romans sent new 
landowners to live alongside the local elites at Paestum, thus “Romanizing” them.33 Like the 
socio-economic approach, the cultural approach foregrounds the strategic effects of 
acculturation: together with the Roman recipients of land allotments, the defeated people 
would also be more willing to fight for Rome. Though land allotment certainly played a role in 
the creation of a Roman Italy, the cultural approach still assumes, or at least implies, that the 
Romans moving away from Rome intended to unify Italy even in the early years of the 
                                                        
33 Reid 1913; Abbott 1915; Torelli 1999: esp. 3. For the link between land allotments and military service, see Rosenstein 2004: esp. 61; 
2006; 2012; Eich and Eich 2005; Scheidel 2006; Jehne 2006. 
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Republic. In other words, it takes the end product—a culturally unified Italy—and explains 
how it got that way, with all the benefits of hindsight.  
As helpful as the three approaches to Roman land allotment are for historians, each 
cannot answer why, for example, the Romans did not compartmentalize their imperial territory 
like the Athenians or externalize it like the Syracusans. In the end, the top-down approaches 
assume that the Romans did what they did because they were just better imperialists. But it 
remains unclear whether or not there was anything uniquely Roman about Roman land 
allotment. More than that, all three approaches tend to start from the assumption that Roman 
imperialism was a net positive: after all, Salmon likened the Romans to the Allies in the Second 
World War. Before him, Roman historiography in Western Europe from Montesquieu to 
Mommsen was steeped in the idea that empire is fundamentally a civilizing mission: it was all 
too common for historians to focus on success because their own societies were so deeply 
embedded in Roman political culture.  
 To begin deconstructing the traditional approaches to land allotment, in the last decade or 
so historians have returned to the basic question of what it meant in the mid-Republic for Romans 
to own land. Dominic Rathbone deconstructed the continuum between private ownership of 
allotments and the ager publicus in Italy to argue that private property was the first legal category 
of land tenure at Rome, probably beginning as early as the sixth century BCE. 34 Unlike the more 
communal, state-owned public land, land allotments transferred all ownership of the land to the 
landowner himself. In his view, Roman imperialism tended towards “privatization” because most 
public lands ended up being allotted at some point. Since Rathbone, Saskia Roselaar has shown 
                                                        
34 Rathbone 2003. For the early Republic, Rathbone emphasizes the Twelve Tables for evidence of individual property, see Section 5.2. 
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that public land was not just a temporary legal category between conquest and allotment: rather, 
conquered people often continued to use their own land, though it was technically Roman public 
land—a reminder of their economic dependence on Rome.35 Still, Rathbone’s line of inquiry leads 
to another set of questions: why were the Roman elite, unlike the Athenians, willing to transfer 
full ownership of allotted land from the state to the individual and then not demand a tax; and 
why did the Roman elite, unlike the Syracusans, allow those individuals to move away from 
Rome? For historians who assume a story of success, the answer is clear enough: the Roman elite 
made a calculated decision to give away land to individuals so that they could then defend Rome, 
in one way or another.  
 In recent years, archaeologists have begun to question the role of the Roman state during 
the mid-Republic. Drawing on postcolonial theories of resistance, appropriation, hybridization, 
and identity, Nic Terrenato, Guy Bradley, and Edward Bispham, have chipped away at the 
statist model of Roman colonization by showing, on the one hand, high levels of local variation 
among Roman colonial landscapes and, on the other hand, high levels of local continuity from 
pre-to post-conquest.36 Jeremia Pelgrom, Tymon De Haas, and the Cambridge Roman Colonial 
Landscapes project, among others, have continued to “go local” as a way to show the great 
variety of urban and rural imperial landscapes in the mid-Republic.37 What has emerged is a 
sense that Roman land allotment and colonization was far from a one-sided, top-down imperial 
project. Instead, in their view, Roman landowners had to collectively “negotiate” new 
                                                        
35 Roselaar 2010: 37. 
36 Terrenato 2001b; 2005; 2014; Bradley 2006; Bispham 2000; 2006. See also, more broadly, Bradley and Wilson 2006; Patterson 2006a; 
Termeer 2010. For a recent example of a local-level study of a single colonial landscape to the same effect, see Robinson 2012; 2013. For 
the importance of postcolonial theory to recent deconstructions of the instrumentalist approaches, see Pelgrom and Stek 2014b: 11. 
37 Pelgrom 2008; 2014; Pelgrom and Stek 2014; De Haas 2011; Bellini et al. 2012; 2013; 2014. See also Stek 2009; Stek G.-J. Burgers 2015. 
 249 
relationships with local communities, resulting in something altogether distinct from Rome 
itself. Though this approach certainly does not mean to deny the violence and asymmetries of 
power inherent to Roman imperialism, its revisionist perspective tends minimize the very real 
exploitative intentions behind land allotment and the arrival of settlers in favor of the 
continuities with defeated communities. 
Even though the recent push to decenter Roman imperialism has carefully 
deconstructed the dirigiste model of Roman colonization, there has been little interest in 
building a new understanding of land allotment. By decentering the agency of the Roman state 
to good effect, we have nearly lost Roman agency altogether. Consequently, there is no 
alternative to the instrumentalist explanations of success. Instead, historians are left with a set of 
contradictions: the Roman elite had a plan even in the mid-Republic for how to defend its 
empire, but that plan seems to have had little continuity from one place to another; the Romans 
strategically conquered the Italian countryside, but rural settlements had more in common with 
what was there before the Roman conquest than Rome itself; the Romans sent out thousands of 
new landowners to defend their empire at new colonies in the fourth century, but at a time 
when the Roman state was in political and economic crisis; Roman land allotment in the early 
Republic followed the same rules and rituals as the Augustan period, but there is no evidence 
for centuriation before the First Punic War. The list goes on. Historians are left without a clear 
understanding of how land allotment fits into Roman imperialism.   
 This chapter moves beyond explanations of success and reconsiders why so many 
Romans wanted to move away from Rome to their land allotments before there was ever an 
abstraction like “The Roman Empire.” In the mid-Republic, Rome’s political elite won prestige 
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at home for projecting Roman power outside of Rome, but that does not mean that the Romans 
who actually moved out to their land allotments had the same thing in mind. Rather, I argue 
that land allotment began as compromise between Rome’s generals, who had a lot to gain in 
political prestige at Rome from the act of confiscating land, and the plebeians, who hoped to 
make more money by moving away from Rome’s elite economy. Those who received a land 
allotment saw it more as an economic opportunity because they could take advantage of 
existing economic structures outside of the narrow elite economy at Rome. Unlike the 
Athenians and Syracusans, the Romans who moved away from the metropole still had a form 
of commercial citizenship, which, I argue, put them at an advantage over existing communities 
by reducing transaction costs. Roman landowners could also rely on the agricultural staples 
already being produced by existing communities so they did not have to start over and create 
new networks of production and exchange. Altogether, Roman land allotment was different 
from Athenian and Syracusan land allotment because it was profitable for most landowners to 
move away from Rome and, perhaps more importantly, the Roman generals who were 
confiscating the land thought it was in their interest as well.    
 What we will see, therefore, is that in the century before the First Punic War, the Romans 
conquered much of central Italy, then allowed many of their own citizens to move out across it. 
With the movement of Romans away from Rome also came a massive transfer of human capital—
quite the opposite of what we saw in the last chapter with the Syracusans. Unlike the Athenians 
and the Syracusans, the Romans almost always allotted land in places where members of the 
defeated communities continued to live, if not live nearby. Over time, this led to Roman human 
capital becoming entrenched all across Italy, as communities of Roman landowners reoriented 
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regional networks of exchange around themselves. As we will see, this was made possible 
because the Roman state had developed in such a way before the first land allotments that many 
Romans could, and wanted to, move away from Rome.   
 
5.2. The Archaic Origins of Roman Land Allotment 
 Like Athens, Rome was an inland settlement: 24 km from the coast, the earliest 
settlement overlooked movement across the Tiber river at Tiber island, a natural crossroads for 
trade moving up and down the west coast of Italy. Like Syracuse, Rome grew up in a melting 
pot of sorts: one of the thirty or so Latin communities, Rome also came in contact with 
Etruscans to the north, Osco-Umbrians to the east, and Campanian Greeks further to the south. 
In the highly-competitive world of central Italy, Roman territory was probably no more than 
800 km2 at the end of the Archaic period—still smaller than Syrakousai and little more than a 
third the size of Attica at the time of each state’s imperial transition.38 For the Romans, this 
meant that access to land and economic opportunity within Roman territory remained limited 
to a narrow elite of patricians, who were likely Rome’s early landowning families. Meanwhile, 
during the sixth and fifth centuries the patricians became increasingly wealthy from raiding 
Rome’s neighbors, which relied on their ability to marshal soldiers not land. Over time, I argue, 
the patricians learned that land and labor outside of Roman territory were expendable but 
Roman soldiers were not. Plebeians, therefore, could move away from Rome to their land 
allotments so long as they would still mobilize to fight in the Roman army from time to time. As 
                                                        
38 For the size of Roman territory, see Cornell 1995: 204-209, 320, with Beloch 1926: 314-320; Fulminante 2014: 105-170. Rome was 
fairly large by regional standards in Latium. Rome’s neighbors at Tibur and Praeneste were roughly 350 and 250 km2, respectively. 
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the Romans faced one crisis after another in the fifth century, Roman citizens became 
increasingly willing to move away from Rome across central Italy if it meant they could do 
better than they were doing within the elite economy at Rome. 
 The Romans, like the Syracusans, were slow to develop a strong sense of political 
community, which made it easier for them to bring in members of other communities without 
disrupting the idea of the state. The top of Roman society in the Archaic period was a loose 
coalition of landowning families (the gentes, or “clans”), who collectively granted military 
authority to a single king.39 Because of Rome’s precarious standing in central Italy, that coalition 
was famously open to political synoikism to fill out their ranks. In fact, the legendary rape of the 
Sabine women is likely a vestige of a much longer tradition: inscriptions from southern Etruria 
from the seventh and sixth centuries show how individuals and whole groups moved in and 
out of Roman society in a kind of elite horizontal mobility. For example, Demaratus of Corinth 
moved to Etruscan Tarquinia and his son later became the fifth king of Rome; consider also the 
Claudii, a powerful family numbering in the hundreds that migrated into Latium sometime 
around the end of the sixth century.40 The practice set an important precedent for Roman 
relations with other states: by the fifth century, the Romans extended certain commercial rights 
to their Latin neighbors under the foedus Cassianum to facilitate mobility among the Latin elite.41 
Like the Delian League, the “Latin League,” as it came to be known, began as a defensive 
alliance. But unlike the Athenians, the Romans extended reciprocal commercial rights to their 
allies: anyone could draw up legal contracts, own property, or exchange citizenship in allied 
                                                        
39 Smith 2006; Terrenato 2007a; 2011; Armstrong 2016a: 50-72. For gentes and land, see Capogrossi Colognesi 1980; Hermon 2001: 53-56. 
40 Ampolo 1976-77: 341; Cornell 1995: 124-125, 157-158, 174-175; Smith 1996: 210, 237-238; 2006: 161; Bradley 2006: 165-166; Terrenato 2011. 
41 Cornell 2000; Smith 1995: 212-213. For the foedus Cassianum and the Latin League, see Cornell 1995: 293-301. See also Section 5.3. 
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states. Consequently, a tradition of Roman “open society” helped pave the way for political 
synoikism, but also the movement of people and their labor in and out Rome.42  
 Meanwhile, Roman warlords fought wars to increase the agricultural surface area 
available to their gentes. This affected Roman territory in two ways: it expanded Roman territory 
but also limited access to it. Later Roman kings like Servius Tullius (r. 575–535), took the Romans 
to war against neighboring Caere, Tarquinia, and Veii and confiscated some of their land for 
public use; the patrician Fabii then seem to have continued the war against the Veientines into the 
fifth century with the support of “all the members of their clan,” staking their claim to some of the 
public land.43 Wealth from agricultural rents, however, remained concentrated in the hands of the 
patrician landowners: the historical sources mention time and time again the use of nexum (or 
“debt-bondage,” similar to what was saw in Athens’ before Solon’s reforms) for agricultural labor, 
a practice that continued well into the fifth century.44 Because the gentes controlled access to public 
land, and the landowners at the top of those gentes were becoming rich from agricultural 
surpluses, patrician warlords continued to wage wars to gain access to more land rather than 
invest in non-agricultural production at Rome.45 So what began as a small settlement of little more 
than 150 km2 in the early Archaic period increased to 800 km2 by the end of the sixth century.46 
                                                        
42 For the term Roman “open society,” and mobility among the elites of central Italy in the Archaic period, see Ampolo 1970-71; 1976-77. 
43 For Servius Tullius, see Livy 1.42.2; Dion. Hal. 4.27. For the Fabii and Veii, see Dion. Hal. 9.15; Livy 2.49, with Armstrong 2016a: 145-146. 
44 Though elite displays of wealth in the sixth century changed from “princely” tombs to public temples, the economic structure 
creating that wealth did not, see Smith 1996: 186-189. For debt-bondage, see Livy 2.23.8; 2.24.7; 2.25.3; 2.27.1; 2.31.8; 7.19.5; 8.28.2; Dion. 
Hal. 3.1.5; 4.9.8. Nexum featured prominently in the Twelve Tables, see e.g. Table 6.1. For intensification, see Armstrong 2016a: 148-157. 
45 For the gentes and Roman wars, see Capogrossi Colognesi 1994; Franciosi 1999; Motta and Terrenato 2006: 229-230; Terrenato 2011; 
Drogula 2015: 18-33; Armstrong 2016a: 86-93.  
46 Confiscating land from neighboring states was fairly common, see Livy 1.11; 1.15.5; 1.33.9; 1.38.1; 1.53.2; Dion. Hal. 3.6.1; 3.28.6; 4.27.6. 
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Still, of the roughly 25,000-35,000 Romans, few of them actually owned land and the patrician 
landowners were in no hurry to do anything about it.47  
 Together, Roman “open society” and patrician agriculturalism greatly limited access to 
land within Roman territory, but the transition to republicanism in the fifth century created some 
of the legal institutions that individual Romans later would use to own land outside of Rome. 
Though the republican coup of 509 formally transferred sovereignty to the Roman people, it did 
little to disrupt the patricians’ monopoly on public land.48 In fact, political and economic change 
came very slowly at Rome. The republican coup was in no way a watershed moment like 
Kleisthenes’ reforms in Athens: only after a “proto-republican” period, to borrow Harriet 
Flower’s periodization, in which the plebeians marched out of Rome in 494 (the first such popular 
walkout, or “secession”), won political representation through democratically elected tribunes, 
and then pressured the Roman elite for half a century, did they get written laws on land use and 
debt.49 What emerged in c. 451/0 was the Twelve Tables, which mostly seems to have been an 
attempt to normalize individual property rights.50 Under the new republic, political participation 
depended on a person’s individual property (their “census”), and because land was the 
predominant form of property at the time, the Twelve Tables focused heavily on agricultural 
life—field boundaries, damage to property, exchange of produce, capital loans, and so on. 
Whereas roughly a third of the laws concerned land and individual property, there is no mention 
                                                        
47 For urban and rural population estimates of Rome at the end of the Archaic period, see Ampolo 1980: 15-31; Cornell 1995: 206-207. 
48 For the elite monopoly of public land, and the long battle for access to the land, see for example Livy 2.61.1–4, 3.1.1–2, 3.30.1, 4.36.1–2, 
4.48.2–4, 4.51.5–6, 4.58.12, 6.5.4–5; Dion Hal. 5.68.1, 6.95.3–4, 7.4.5, 8.69–8.75, 10.36.2, with Roselaar 2010: 26-28. 
49 Flower 2010: 48-49. For the transition, see Armstrong 2016a: 129-146. For debt, see Vanderpuy 2017. For secessions, see Bradley 2017. 
50 For the economic implications of the Twelve Tables and the emphasis on individual property, see Kaser 1956: 234; Kauffmann 1964: 
51; Diósdi 1970; Capogrossi Colognesi 1980; 1988; Cornell 1995: 272-292; Smith 1996: 191-192; Rathbone 2003: 138-139; Roselaar 2010: 22. 
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of commercial transactions, non-agricultural production, or land belonging to the state or gens. 
The impression we get is that the Romans, perhaps moreso than the Athenians or Syracusans, 
privileged individual ownership over state and collective ownership.51 The republican reforms 
did a great deal to secure individual property, but the patrician landowners did nothing to 
systematically divide up or share the land within Roman territory. Consequently, individual land 
ownership became an institution that the Romans would export to conquered land.  
 The push to secure individual property came at a time when what appear to have been a 
series of internal and external crises in the fifth century made many non-landowning plebeians 
more willing to leave Rome for land outside of Roman territory. Though it is hard to say 
anything about fifth-century Rome with any certainty, the patchwork of historical sources and 
material culture all seem to point to a period of crisis and experimentation.52  For much of the 
fifth century, the magistrate lists (the “Fasti”) show little regularity in political offices: one year 
the Romans might elect consuls and the next consular tribunes. The irregularity of public office 
holding may have resulted from elite competition in an aristocratic republic, or perhaps a 
reaction to a long sequence of military setbacks. Beginning shortly after the Romans allotted 
land at Velitrae, Signia, and Norba in the 490s, the Volsci, Aequi, and Sabines all regularly 
invaded Roman territory for much of the fifth century; the Romans even had land confiscated 
from them on a number of occasions.53 What began as a military crisis soon became an economic 
                                                        
51 Rathbone 2003. Cicero later argued that the main purpose of the Roman state was to defend property rights, see Cic. Off. 2.73, 2.78. 
52 For a recent reconstruction of fifth-century Roman history in broad terms, see Smith 2017.  
53 For the Volscians under Coriolanus confiscating land from the Romans, see Dion. Hal. 8.10.2. See also Dion Hal. 5.65.3; Livy 2.15.6. 
For Osco-Umbrian movements and other migrations throughout the Italian peninsula in the fifth century, see Pallottino 1991: 97-110. 
Some of the most famous characters in Livy’s account of the early Republic were involved in the wars defending Rome from invading 
armies. For example, under Cinncinatus, the Romans fought off the Aequi. Consider also Coriolanus, who invaded Rome with the Volsci.  
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crisis: all historical and archaeological evidence for public building and temple dedications at 
Rome cease after the first quarter of the fifth century; agricultural output declined so much, it 
seems, that the Romans repeatedly sent out embassies to buy grain from Etruria and even 
Syracuse.54 As the young republic navigated these crises, the plebeians walked out of Rome 
twice again in the fifth century, in 449 and 445. On each occasion the plebeians were showing 
the patrician landowners that they were willing to break from the Roman state.  
Finally, as the Roman state struggled through the fifth century, Roman warlords and their 
gentes continued to raid neighboring communities but not confiscate much land for allotment. 
Since the beginning of the fifth century at least, Roman militarism was mostly just predatory raids 
on movable property, with little continuity from one year to the next.55 It was probably in this 
sense that Livy said there was “neither stable peace nor open war” in the region.56 In fact, certain 
families could dominate the military magistracies in any given year, and their gens stood in for 
what might be called the “Roman army.”57 This may have given the Romans room to experiment 
with what to do on the rare occasions they confiscated land during the fifth century. After Titus 
Quintius Capitolinus and his army confiscated land from the Volscians at Antium in 466, 
Dionysius said that the Antiates worked the land themselves and paid Roman lotholders a fixed 
sum from their produce.58 Titus Quintius’ experiment soon failed: a year later, another Roman 
general raided the town a second time after the lotholders allegedly joined the Antiates and the 
                                                        
54 For the decline in public building, see Cornell 1995: 266. For poor agrarianism, see Garnsey 1988: 168-181; Morel 2007: 495-496. For 
grain imports from Syracuse, see Livy 2.34-35; Dion. Hal. 7.1-2, 7.12-15, 7.20, 8.70.5; Plut. Cor. 16. For grain from Etruria, see Livy 2.34. 
55 For warfare as “brigandage,” see Cornell 1995: 309. For gentes and raiding, see Rawlings 1998; Armstrong 2016a: 98-102, 214-215, 218. 
56 Livy 2.21.1; 2.26.1.  
57 For the public office and the gens, see Stewart 1998: 72-73; Armstrong 2016a: 174-175. For military tribunes, see Pinsent 1975: 45-50.  
58 Dion Hal. 9.50.2; 9.60.1-3. Dionysius called the Roman landowners at Antium “klērouchoi.” Apparently this arrangement did not work: 
Antium fought against the Romans for most of the fourth century until they were defeated in 338, see for example Livy 6.6-7; 8.12-14. 
 257 
Volsci against Rome.59 Afterwards, the Roman elite seem to have been more interested in raiding 
movable property than confiscating land for themselves further from Rome: it was not until 442 at 
Ardea and then 418 at Labici that the Roman elite in the Senate allotted land again. Even though 
the Romans seem to have been fighting all the time during the fifth century, they do not seem to 
have confiscated very much land. By the fourth century, as we will see, many Roman citizens 
were eager to get a land allotment and move away from Rome. 
Unlike the Athenians and Syracusans, the Romans began their transition to empire in 
fits and starts over the course of the fifth century, only accelerating after the conquest of Veii. 
What we have seen from the Archaic origins of Roman land allotment is that Roman territory 
was dominated by an elite economy which left little room for the plebeians to own land, much 
less to compete with the patrician landowners. A political culture of horizontal mobility, 
commercial citizenship, and individual property rights gave the Roman plebeians every reason 
to want land allotments, even if it meant they would have to move away from Rome and fight 
in the elite’s wars. Land allotment in early Roman history was thus a recognition that most 
Romans could not, in fact, share equally in Roman economic life, at least as the patricians at 
Rome knew it. As we will see, land allotment seems to have home increasingly common as the 
plebeians won more and more political concessions after the middle of fifth century and into the 
fourth and, by direct consequence, as political prestige became increasingly measured by 
military achievement than inherited patrician status.  
But even with popular institutions on the rise at Rome, land allotment had a very 
different relationship with republicanism in Roman society than what we saw at Athens and 
                                                        
59 Dion. Hal. 10.20-21. 
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Syracuse: land allotment did more to decentralize the Roman community than insulate it within 
a single territory. Roman citizens were wagering their participation for land allotments, though 
at the same time those allotments took them far away from Rome. In that sense, land allotment 
made and unmade the Roman state.  
 
5.3. Decentralizing Imperial Territory  
 The generation of Romans who saw their city ransacked in 387 rebounded from the 
disaster with a series of land confiscations and political reforms. In less than a decade, the 
Romans founded at least four colonies, divided up the ager Pomptinus into viritane allotments, 
added four new rural tribes, and granted full citizenship to the community living at 
Tusculum—the first municipium (or “self-governing community of Roman citizens”).60 In 367, 
after another two decades at war, the Roman plebeians also won a political victory: the Licinio-
Sextian Laws, as they are commonly referred to, eased debt payments, put limits on how much 
public land any one Roman could use, and required at least one consul, and thus one military 
commander, be plebeian.61 The Roman plebeians hoped the laws would allow more of them to 
benefit from the territory they fought and died for; with a plebeian consul in office, they also 
hoped to have more say in when and where they fought. For almost four decades afterwards, 
we hear almost nothing of land allotment: it seems that the reforms may have satisfied some of 
the demand for confiscated land, at least for the time being.  
                                                        
60 The four new rural tribes were Arnensis, Sabatina, Stellatina, and Tromentina. For citizenship at Tusculum, see Livy 6.26.8.  
61 For the Licinio-Sextian Laws, see Livy 6.35-42, with Cornell 1995: 332-340. The laws made it so any interest paid on a loan would 
be deducted from the principal, thereby relieving some of the debt. Over the next two decades, the Romans continued to pass more 
laws putting legal caps on interest rates, normalizing debt repayment procedures, and creating enforceable penalties for usurers.  
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Then, after the Romans defeated the Latin League in 338, and granted citizenship to 
various communities across central Italy, the Romans set out to confiscate land like never 
before: between 338 and the First Punic War, as many as one hundred thousand Romans 
received land allotments in what amounted to one of the most dramatic transformations of 
human geography in Greco-Roman history.62 It was during this period, when the patricians and 
plebeians first began to share the republic, that a new elite political class of nobiles emerged, 
with patricians and wealthy plebeians numbering among them. Consequently, “the values of 
the new elite,” as Harriet Flower explained, “were defined in terms of achievements in war and 
personal merit, rather than by inherited status.” 63  As Roman political culture became 
increasingly centered on the nobiles competing for military prestige, the generals among them 
took the Romans to war nearly every single year during this period. Each confiscation helped 
the commanding general distinguish himself from his peers.  
Yet beyond the elite world of nobiles, most plebeians seem to have chosen to move away 
from Rome instead of using their improved political standing to make Roman territory work 
more to their benefit. Even though the plebeians were now able to hold higher offices, most 
Romans still had little to do with the political process at Rome. Unlike the Athenians or the 
Syracusans after Diocles’ democratic reforms, the Romans used popular election rather than 
sortition to fill public offices—hence the importance of prestige. For that reason, most plebeians 
who actually made it to high office were already well known and, by necessity, quite wealthy. 
The Romans used sortition only to determine things like the order in which voting groups cast 
                                                        
62 For 338, see Livy 8.11-14, with Cornell 1995: 350, Map 7. For population estimates, see Afzelius 1942: 153-192, with Section 5.4 below. 
63 Flower 2010: 51-52. For the values of the nobiles, see also Harris 1979: 28-31. 
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their vote in the popular assemblies.64 Taking lots also helped officials who held the same rank 
(or “collegial magistrates,” like consuls and military tribunes) divide the responsibilities set out 
for them by the Senate.65 For Roman officials, the politics of the lot was simple enough: it made 
sure that the elites at the top of republican society cooperated within the state’s institutions 
when competition would otherwise have pitted them against one another. 66 It put limits on 
rivalries and settled political contests. But whereas political sortition mediated action within the 
Roman community, the Romans who put their name in for land allotment were choosing, in 
most cases, to actually move away from it.67   
So unlike the Athenians and Syracusans who thought of their imperial territory as a way 
to concentrate economic activity at their metropole, the Roman elite allowed their fellow citizens 
to move out into their imperial territory at an unprecedented rate in Greco-Roman history. 
Because Rome’s elite won prestige from confiscating land wherever they campaigned across 
central Italy, and their political careers were fixed to life at the Roman metropole, they seem to 
have been more than willing to give confiscated land far from Rome to plebeians. The nobiles, 
Rome’s new warlords, had good reason to give away the land: they could count on the settlers to 
protect their new home and, by proxy, secure the general’s victory for generations to come. For 
                                                        
64 For political sortition in early Republican Rome, see Taylor 1966: 70-72; Staveley 1972: 154-156; 230-232; Nicolet 1980: 257-258; 
Rosenstein 1995; Stewart 1998: 22-38. For the logistics of magistrates drawing lots, see Plaut. Cas. 345-346, 388-390; Tabula Hebana 23.  
65 The magistrates placed small wooden tokens in a water pitcher; someone then tipped the pitcher and whoever’s token poured out 
first got the responsibility. The Romans still used sortition to determine military commands in the mid-Republic, see Livy 7.25.12, 8.1.2.  
66 Because political sortition played such an important social roll among the Roman elite, historians have written Roman history as if 
that land allotment also sorted out the social conflict between the patricians and plebeians. The traditional story goes that the patricians 
allotted land to avoid social collapse and the plebeians were more than happy to take them up on their offer. However, there is no 
reason to assume a priori that the same logic held for both political sortition and imperial land allotment. 
67 In the mid-Republic, a period when political sortition was an elite institution, most Romans’ first experience with sortition would 
have been land allotment. For many of those Romans, land allotment would also have been their last experience with sortition at Rome. 
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the settlers, they moved out into an expanding network of existing communities with commercial 
citizenship, which made it easier for the Romans who settled in Roman colonies to do business 
and exchange among them. Each community of settlers was able to become its own hub 
connected to the existing communities around them.  
We can think of this in terms of what network theorists call a “decentralized” network, in 
which there is no single hub through which most activity moves, but rather any number of hubs 
with their own “hub-and-spoke” arrangement (see Figures 5.1-2).68 This is not to say that Rome 
was just another hub among many: a decentralized network only means that not all nodes (or, in 
this case, communities in central Italy) run directly to a single hub—Rome, which was already the 
largest city on the peninsula, despite its frequent brushes with crisis. Compared to the way the 
Athenians and Syracusans constructed their imperial territories, the Romans were creating one 
that was fairly decentralized. What distinguished the Romans, therefore, was that they allowed so 
many citizens to create new communities out among existing ones across central Italy. Over time, 
those communities became new regional hubs of exchange outside of the Roman center.   
                                                        
68 Figures 5.1-2 adapted from Baran 1964: 2. 
Left: Fig. 5.1. An idealized model of a “centralized” network, which approximates what we saw in 
the Athenian and Syracusan cases. Right: Fig. 5.2. An idealized model of a “decentralized” network. 
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As we saw earlier, our historical sources for Roman land allotment were mostly interested 
in how the Roman elite thought about land allotment: with the benefit of hindsight, it was clear to 
them that land allotment was a very centralized strategy of imperial expansion dating back to the 
earliest days of Rome. In one instance, Dionysius wrote that Romulus, the legendary founder of 
Rome, included land allotment in a larger plan to expand and strengthen the Roman state: 
τρίτον ἦν ἔτι Ῥωµύλου πολίτευµα, ὃ πάντων µάλιστα τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀσκεῖν ἔδει, 
κράτιστον ἁπάντων πολιτευµάτων ὑπάρχον, ὡς ἐµὴ δόξα φέρει, ὃ καὶ τῆς βεβαίου 
Ῥωµαίοις ἐλευθερίας ἦρχε καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεµονίαν ἀγόντων οὐκ ἐλαχίστην 
µοῖραν παρέσχε, τὸ µήτε κατασφάττειν ἡβηδὸν τὰς ἁλούσας πολέµῳ πόλεις µήτε 
ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι µηδὲ γῆν αὐτῶν ἀνιέναι µηλόβοτον, ἀλλὰ κληρούχους εἰς αὐτὰς 
ἀποστέλλειν ἐπὶ µέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ ποιεῖν ἀποικίας τῆς Ῥώµης τὰς 
κρατηθείσας, ἐνίαις δὲ καὶ πολιτείας µεταδιδόναι.69 
There was yet a third policy of Romulus, which the Greeks ought to have practiced 
above all others, it being, in my opinion, the best of all political measures, as it laid the 
most solid foundation for the freedom of the Romans and was no slight factor in raising 
them to their position of hegemony. It was this: not to slay all the men of military age or 
to enslave the rest of the population of the cities captured in war or to allow their land to 
go back to pasturage for sheep, but rather to send out lotholders to possess some part of 
the countryside and to make the conquered cities Roman colonies, and even to grant 
citizenship to some of them. 
Here, Dionysius referred to the Roman recipients of the land as klērouchoi, their colonies as 
apoikiai. Dionysius seemed to think that two main features of Roman imperialism distinguished it 
from its Greek counterparts. First, the Romans allowed most of the people they defeated to keep 
living where they were, sometimes even with a form of citizenship. Second, the Romans only 
confiscated part of the defeated people’s land, which meant that Roman settlers would have 
moved in among them. Together, he thought, the policy allowed them to increase the size of their 
army and then go on to conquer an empire. Though it is highly unlikely that any such strategy 
                                                        
69 Dion Hal. 2.16.1. 
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existed at the time of Romulus, or that there was any way for Dionysius even to have known 
about it in the first place, the passage is remarkable for what he took for granted. He rightly 
concluded that the movement of Roman settlers out among defeated communities was quite 
different than what the Greeks were used to doing, but what exactly Roman hegemonia looked like 
across Roman territory he did not say.  
 From what we can tell from the passing accounts of land allotment in Livy’s history, the 
Romans often plundered the countryside and confiscated only part of the land. The Romans 
took one-third to two-thirds of the defeated peoples’ land, but almost never the entire 
countryside.70 By the fourth century, at least, the Roman state took ownership of all confiscated 
land because the Roman army won it—it was ager publicus populi Romani.71 The land could stay 
this way for a long time: it could be years before the Senate actually allotted the land. Until then, 
the defeated community could continue to use the land, though it was technically no longer 
their legal property. Public land was also available to the Romans, as had always been the case 
for public land, though only elite Romans probably had the capacity to make use of it.72 Only 
when the Senate decided to part with the land was it divided up into allotments. In some cases, 
the land became Roman territory, and thus the ager Romanus grew in size: this happened when 
the Senate allotted the land as viritane allotments and the recipients were enrolled in a new 
citizen tribus (or “tribe”).73 Far more often before the First Punic War, the land remained 
separate from the ager Romanus, and therefore administratively separate from Rome: this 
                                                        
70 Rosealaar 2010: 31. For example, in 340 the Romans took two-thirds of Privernum, see Livy 8.1.3; in 303 the Romans took one-third 
of Frusino, see Livy 10.1.3. Aside from these relative terms, Livy seldom mentioned how much actual land the sum amounted to. 
71 Roselaar 2010: 25, 31-32. 
72 There may have been a small agricultural tax, paid in kind, for use of public land, see Appian B. Civ. 1.1.7, with Roselaar 2010: 90-95. 
73 For Roman citizenship and the creation of new tribes in the mid-Republic, see Taylor 2013; Cels-Saint-Hilaire 1995; Humm 2006. 
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happened when the Romans recolonized an existing city or founded a new one. In yet other 
cases, the Romans founded small coastal settlements and the settlers remained Roman citizen: 
this was very rare before the First Punic War, and altogether only amounted to 1,500 or so 
people by the middle of the third century.  
Though the historical sources never said how the Senate decided among the three 
different forms of land allotment, the hodgepodge geography of the Romans’ imperial territory 
had no clear, centralized logic to it: an existing community’s territory could be surrounded on 
all sides by Roman territory, a new colony founded at some distance from Roman territory, or a 
colony founded within an existing community’s territory but still politically separate from it.74 
In each case, the recipients of the land could be Roman, a member of an allied community, or 
even a member of the defeated community. What emerged, in nearly every case, were mixed 
communities of some sort, with commercial and political connections predating the Roman 
conquest to other nearby communities besides Rome. Politically, Roman citizens could become 
citizens of a new community, foreigners could become Roman citizens, and after 338, both 
Romans and non-Romans could find themselves somewhere in between with what has become 
known as “Latin status,” where they were part of a new colony but had the same commercial 
rights as members of the former Latin League.  
 Even though it was the Senate that decided when to allot land, Roman citizens could 
choose to put in their names for land allotment. In 334, the Roman Senate decided to found a 
colony at Cales in northern Campania. According to Livy’s account:  
                                                        
74 For a helpful map that attempts to make sense of the citizen geography of Rome’s imperial territory, see Cornell 1995: 382, Map 9.  
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Factoque senatus consulto ut duo milia quingenti homines eo scriberentur, tres uiros 
coloniae deducendae agroque diuidundo creauerunt K. Duillium T. Quinctium M. 
Fabium.75 
 
The Senate passed a resolution authorizing two thousand five hundred men to be 
enrolled for the colony, and the senators then appointed K. Duillius, T. Quinctius, and 
M. Fabius as a board of three to lead the colonies to their land. 
In this episode, as with others in the mid-Republic before and after it, the Senate delegated the 
task of allotting the land to a commission of three Roman officers.76 The commissioners were 
likely selected from members of the Roman elite who may have also commanded the military 
campaign that confiscated the land in the first place. Further back in Livy’s history, in 467 a 
distant relative of Titus Quinctius bearing the same name confiscated land from the Volsci after 
defeating them in the field. He was then in charge of the commission responsible for dividing up 
the land. After deciding how many allotments there would be, “those who wished to receive 
land,” Livy wrote, “were ordered to hand in their names.” 77 Both Livy and Dionysius agreed that, 
in 467, not enough Roman citizens put in their names because they preferred land near Roman 
rather than far away from it. Because Antium would have been further south than any other 
Roman settlement in 467, and the crises of the fifth century had only begun to disrupt Roman 
society, it is possible that some Romans were waiting for a better opportunity. But by 334, there is 
                                                        
75 Livy 8.16.14 
76 Livy also mentioned commissioners for the ager Pomptinus, see Livy 6.21.4; also Suessa, Pontiae, and Interamna Sucasina, see Livy 9.28. 
77 Livy 3.1.4-7, with Dion. Hal. 9.59.2. From Romans choosing to put their name forward for an allotment, see also Cic. Pro Caecina 
98. Only once did an historical source record land allotment as mandatory. In 494 the Senators apparently forced every Roman to put in 
their name for land at Velitrae, itself a former Roman colony just southeast of Rome, see Livy 2.31.4; 2.34.6; Dion Hal. 7.13.4-5; Plut. 
Cor. 12.2-13.2. The story goes that Velitrae was nearly wiped out by the plague right when Rome’s grain supply was running low. But 
because many Romans feared the plague, and few actually put in their name for land, the Senators decided to force the issue. When the 
Romans first decided to sort out the land at Velitrae, land allotment was voluntary, like at Antium; when not enough people actually 
put in their name, the Senators made it mandatory.  
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no indication that the Roman plebeians still held out for land within Roman territory. By then, 
most plebeians were choosing to leave Rome.  
 For the Roman citizens who chose to leave Rome, land allotment was both political and 
economic. When Livy actually specified who among the Romans received land allotments in the 
early and mid-Republic, he always singled out the plebeians; as for Dionysius, he twice referred 
to the dēmos (or “the people”) and, in another case, the polloi kai penētes (or “the masses and the 
poor”).78 Even though Dionysius was writing in Greek, and he does not seem to have had a 
single stand-in term for “plebeian,” his extant books mostly only covered the period before the 
plebeians really existed as a formal political group—which really only happened once the 
Licinio-Sextian Laws formalized the two groups by requiring one consul be plebeian. The 
plebeians were, for the most part, synonymous with the poor and disadvantaged in the early 
Republic, but by the middle of the fifth century they had formed their own positive identity 
relative to the patricians and their clients. By forming their own assembly (the concilium plebis), 
making collective resolutions (plebiscita), and electing their own officials, the plebeians were a 
state within a state.79   
The plebeians may have come together at a time of crisis to wager their military 
participation for political reform, but they also formed the most expansive socio-economic 
coalition in Rome. Since a few patrician gentes held a monopoly on political offices by the middle 
of the fifth century (a process often referred to by ancient historians as the “closing of the 
                                                        
78 For example, see Livy 4.11; 4.48; 5.30; 6.21.4; 8.11; 8.16.13-14; Dion Hal. 7.27-8; 8.73.3; 8.75.4. According to the literary tradition, the 
plebeians first came together as a social group within the complex Roman social hierarchy in c. 494 at the First Secession from Rome.  
79 Cornell 1995: 256-265. For the description of the plebeians as a state within a state, see Mommsen 1887: 3.145, with Livy 2.44.9; 3.19.9. 
For the plebeians in the fifth century, see Richard 1978; Raaflaub 1993; 2005a. 
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Patriciate”), all new citizens were plebeian, regardless of their wealth.80 Even after the rise of the 
nobiles, most plebeians who chose to put in their names for a land allotment were still making two 
kinds of statements. First, a political one: the plebeian “state” was less connected to Rome than it 
was to its constituent members, who had already proven at the First Secession that they were 
willing to walk out of Rome. Second, an economic one: by actually moving away from Rome, as 
we will see, they hoped to take advantage of existing networks of exchange and commercial 
citizenship to become an elite where no elite yet existed.  
 Among the plebeians, however, it is unclear who actually received land in the mid-
Republic. Modern historians tend to assume that the recipients of land allotments were more 
often than not members of the proletarii, the Romans who had little or no property and could not 
afford the arms and armor to fight in the army. The logic holds that, since the three main political 
concessions of the fourth century after the Licinio-Sextian Laws focused on debt, the proletarii 
were the ones most affected by debt, and the debt laws came just before an increase in the number 
of land allotments, then land allotments were also probably concessions to the proletarii.81 Arnaldo 
Momigliano offered a slightly different interpretation, arguing that the plebeians who received 
land in the late fifth and fourth centuries were mostly “artisans, laborers, merchants, and 
smallholders too poor to qualify for [regular] legionary service”—precisely because they were the 
ones who did not own much or any land.82 In yet another view, Peter Brunt, among others, 
                                                        
80 For the “closing of the patriciate” in the fifth century, see De Sanctis 1907: 234-235; Cornell 1995: 252-256; Armstrong 2016: 160-161. 
The wealthy Plautii from southern Latium moved to Rome, where they held the consulship five times between 358 and 329. To the 
patricians, the Plautii were plebeians, but they were nevertheless wealthy. For the Plautii in the fourth century, see Terrenato 2014: 47-53.  
81 The Romans passed laws in 367, 357, 347, and 326 on the subject of debt. The first, the famous Licinian-Sextian Laws, was the most 
transformative and indeed most remembered by later Romans. For the proletarii receiving land allotments, see Salmon 1969: 15, 120-121. 
82 Momigliano 2005: 176. For this reason, he suggested that the plebeians probably did not fight in the legions in the early fifth century. 
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argued that the recipients of land allotments were more likely military veterans who received 
land as payment for their service, and were already equipped to defend the land.83 His argument 
works well with the fact that land commissioners in the mid-Republic often included, from what 
we can tell, the same general who confiscated the land in the first place.  
But if the recipients could be veterans, and the assidui, not the proletarii, made up the core 
of the Roman infantry, then it follows that the assidui would have received land as well.84 It is also 
possible that the Romans made a distinction between who could receive land outside the ager 
Romanus: perhaps proletarii received land in the relatively stable regions still governed by the 
Roman state whereas the better-outfitted assidui received colonial land allotments. But since no 
historical source ever specified which plebeians actually received land, it is reasonable to 
conclude that anyone—save, perhaps, elite members of the patrician gentes—could put in their 
name for land allotments.85 What united them all was their movement away from Rome.  
Outside of Rome, the recipients of land allotments remained connected to Rome in two 
main ways. The first was through military service. Like the communities formed through 
Syracusan land allotment, Roman settlers were still liable for military service, so they had their 
own levies and fought as socii (or “allies”). Like the Romans’ Latin allies since the beginning of 
the fifth century, settlers could be called on to fight in the legions.86 Unlike the Athenians, but 
                                                        
83 For the recipients of land allotments as military veterans, see Brunt 1971: 392. See also Rosenstein 2004: 82-88; Erdkamp 2011: 111-114. 
84 For census qualifications of the assidui, see Rathbone 1993.  
85 Gabba 1988: 20; Pelgrom 2012: 30. Of the assidui who received allotments, Gabba argued that most would have been younger men. 
86 The Romans fought alongside their Latin allies since the Foedus Cassianum at the beginning of the fifth century. For Latin military 
levies in the fourth century, see e.g. Livy 6.10.6, 7.25.5-7. For military participation, see Scheidel 2006a; Jehne 2006. Many historians have 
seen the connection between military participation and land allotment as the key to Rome’s success: the Roman army confiscated land, 
the Senate divided it up, and the recipients continued to fight for Rome alongside defeated peoples, so Roman manpower kept on 
growing. For recent treatments of military integration, see Jehne and Pfeilschifter 2006; Rosenstein 2006; 2012; Roselaar 2011; Erdkamp 2011. 
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like the Syracusans, the Romans never accepted payment from their allies and settlers in the 
place of military service—probably because much of Italy was not yet using coinage.87 Military 
service, rather, was their tribute. For that reason, Rome’s military levies grew rapidly in the 
fourth century, thanks in part to land allotments which may have helped some settlers afford 
arms and armor to fight in the infantry. For the settlers who managed to become local elites in 
their new community, and in doing so commanded their levy in Rome’s wars, they also became 
responsible for distributing the spoils of war among their community. Fighting in Rome’s wars 
could be remarkably profitable, especially for the new elite.88 The ability to levy armies from 
each community undoubtedly made Rome a centralized power. 
The second way in which the recipients remained connected to Rome was through 
citizenship, which had the opposite effect. Because most Roman citizens could not afford to 
travel all the way to Rome to participate regularly in popular assemblies, and those who, after 
338, had civitas sine suffragio could not participate anyway, their citizenship mostly granted 
them commercial rights. These included the right to make legal contracts and own property, 
relocate and move freely from one city to another, and marry someone from another city with 
similar citizen status.89 These rights may have connected everyone they covered back to Rome 
because the rights were technically Roman rights, but they also made it easier from Roman 
settlers to connect to other communities around them. To start with, contracts that were 
                                                        
87 Coarelli 2013; Harris 2016: 32. Instead, the Romans’ revenue came from indirect taxes on economic activity, rents and fees from 
public lands, and wartime levies (tributum) on, or rather loans from, soldiers who were not conscripted, see Tan 2015; Rosenstein 2016.  
88 Even so, there is evidence that some settlers turned against the Roman state. The settlers at Velitrae attacked Roman territory on 
and off throughout the 380s and 370s, and they even joined forces with the Volsci against the Romans, see Livy 6.12.6, 6.17.7, 6.36.1. 
89 We know that these commercial rights were especially important at the time because after the Romans defeated the Latin League in 
338, they deprived the communities they saw to be the worst offenders from marrying and trading among each other, see Livy 8.14.10. 
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enforceable from one city to another could have helped drive down the transaction costs of 
doing business with people from other cities: with the certainty of legal recourse, merchants 
may not have had to increase their prices artificially to offset risks.90 The ability to move freely 
from one city to the next also would have facilitated exchange with neighboring communities. 
By taking steps to facilitate exchange broadly across the Romans’ imperial territory, commercial 
citizenship may even have given settlers the ability to specialize what they were growing on 
their land, and make more money in the process. Taken together, these commercial rights likely 
put settlers at an economic advantage compared to those who received land allotments within 
Athenian and Syracusan imperial territory. Those advantages, however, only existed because 
the Romans decentralized their imperial territory, making it easier for settlers to do business 
with the communities around them.  
This is not to deny that Rome was the fastest growing market in central Italy. The 
Romans started building roads across central Italy near the end of the fourth century to expedite 
the movement of armies but also the transport of goods by land.91 A small, fortified settlement 
at Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber river began protecting the flow of goods to Rome from the sea 
beginning earlier in the century, though excavations have not found any port facilities for 
transshipment dating from the mid-Republic.92 Excavations at Rome’s river harbor, Portus 
Tiberinus, and the Forum Boarium have found that the area best known for commerce saw a 
new phase of construction during this period: for example, construction began on the Temple of 
Portunus, dedicated to the god of harbors, overlooking goods moving in and out of the Portus 
                                                        
90 For transaction cost theory, see North 1990: 27-35; Eggertson 1990: 3-32. For recent studies in ancient history, see Kehoe et al. 2015.  
91 For Roman roads, see Wiseman 1970; Coarelli 1988b; Laurence 1999. For the individual initiatives to build roads, see Bradley 2014. 
92 Meiggs 1973: 19-23; Cornell 1995: 385. 
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Tiberinus.93 Yet all this was happening, it is worth remembering, despite what we have seen to 
be the decentralizing effects of land allotment.   
 During the period between the destruction of Veii and the First Punic War, the Romans 
continued to expand their own territory as tens of thousands of them also moved out into their 
imperial territory across central Italy. Unlike the Athenians, the Romans only compartmentalized 
their imperial territory by creating layers of citizenship. But even there, whether a community 
was a Roman municipium, a Roman colony, or any other community with civitas sine suffragio 
could change from one valley to the next. In that sense, it was not nearly as insular as either the 
Athenian or Syracusan citizen communities. Even the Syracusans, who brought defeated people 
back to Syracuse to become citizens, still kept their own territory separate from their imperial 
territory. In a way, the Romans were doing what the Syracusans were doing at Syracuse—
bringing together different groups of people into one citizen community—only on a much 
smaller scale and at various places all across their imperial territory. For Rome’s elite, 
confiscating land at the end of a successful military campaign was a way for them to distinguish 
themselves from their peers and advance their political careers. Yet for the Romans who 
received the land allotment, they chose to leave Rome probably because it meant they could 
escape the elite economy at Rome. Over time, as Rome’s elite compromised with the plebeians 
to decentralize their imperial territory, the movement of Roman settlers meant that Roman 
human capital dispersed out across central Italy and became entrenched within existing 
networks of exchange.  
 
                                                        
93 Coarelli 1988a: 113-127. Portunus was originally associated with keys, and later the storage of grain and other goods from the harbor. 
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5.4. Dispersing Human Capital 
 In the two generations after 338, the Romans continued to march across central Italy to 
fight more distant battles in Samnium, Etruria, Umbria, Campania, and Magna Graecia. As they 
defeated more people, and then signed them up for military service, the Roman army kept 
getting bigger and bigger. From the census numbers Livy cites in his history, the Romans had 
some 250,000 citizen-soldiers ready to fight during the Samnite Wars.94 After each battle they 
won, the generals returned to Rome rich with the spoils of war, slaves, and, perhaps most 
importantly, nobilitas.95 Meanwhile, the plebeian’s “desire for land,” as Livy described it, seems 
to have only increased despite the political reforms of the mid-fourth century.96 Aside from the 
wealthy plebeians who were joining a new political class of nobiles at Rome after 367, thousands 
of Romans were using their new political enfranchisement to leave Rome for land allotments.  
 What we see, then, is that the Romans conceived of their imperial territory in a way that 
generated both centripetal and centrifugal forces. Roman land allotment, in particular, was a story 
about the latter, especially when compared to the Athenian and Syracusan approaches. The 
Romans decentralized their imperial territory the way the did, I argue, because the settlers 
moving away from Rome hoped to take advantage of existing economic structures and networks 
of exchange. No matter how many Roman citizens moved away from Rome to project Roman 
power, as the elite hoped they would, Roman land allotment was doing more to disperse human 
capital out around new business hubs than concentrate it back at Rome. As we will see, Roman 
setters did not receive much more land than their Athenian or Syracusan counterparts, but they 
                                                        
94 250,000 in 323, see Livy 9.19; 262,321 in 293, see Livy 10.47. Roman manpower increased considerably, at least twofold, after 338. 
95 Livy used praeda and spolium over 350 times in Books 6-10. For nobilitas, see Harris 1990: 504; Hölkeskamp 1993; Armstrong 2016: 278-279. 
96 Livy 6.6.1. 
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could take advantage of existing communities to “intensify specialization”: with agricultural 
staples already being produced when they arrived, they could choose to specialize their 
agricultural production for sale on regional markets or produce manufactured goods with less 
competition than they were used to at Rome. Roman land allotment was able to extend Roman 
power across central Italy partly because it was dispersing Roman human capital across existing 
networks of exchange.97 
The period after the Latin War was remarkable for its demographic movement away of 
Rome. Years ago, Adam Afzelius tried to estimate how many Romans received land allotments 
during the Republic by taking the numbers Livy recorded and then extrapolating from those, and 
the amount of cultivable land within each territory, to get estimates for the occasions Livy did not 
provide an exact number of allotments.98 The estimates are only rough approximations, but they 
give us a rough idea of what was going on. By Afzelius’ estimates, between 338 and the beginning 
of the First Punic War in 264, around 70,000 Romans and their families received land allotments at 
nineteen new Latin colonies, which accounted for around 7,000 km2 of land.99 This began at a time 
when the Roman “core”—the urban center at Rome and its hinterland—had around 125,000 adult 
men.100 In the same period, Roman territory was also expanding: the ager Romanus grew from 
                                                        
97 The image historians often depict of Roman land allotment is a highly idealized one of orderly centuriation—a sense that once the 
Romans conquered the locals, they also conquered the landscape. In this view, the recipients of land allotments lived in town and 
travelled out to their farms each day; in doing so, they could defend the kind of civic life the Romans were so well known for. 
Likewise, Roman city-state culture replaced whatever indigenous village life existed before, see Toynbe 1965: 105-115. See also 
Hayes and Martini 1994: 36; Attolini et al. 1991: 144; Arthur 1991: 100. For critiques of the “agro-town” model, see Garnsey 1979, 
with Pelgrom 2008: 342-344. For Garnsey, the urban centers of colonies were too small to support the number of actual landowners. 
98 Afzelius 1942, with territory sizes based on figures in Polyb. 2.24. See further Cornell 1995: 381; Scheidel 2006a; Pelgrom 2012: 33-41. 
99 Afzelius 1942: 153-192, with Cornell 1995: 351, 380-385, esp. Table 9. Livy only gives an exact number of recipients for Cales, 
Luceria, Interamna Lirenas, Sora, Alba Fucens, and Carseoli; the numbers for the other thirteen Latin colonies can only be estimated.  
100 Scheidel 2006: 6, with Afzelius 1942. He estimated that around a fourth to a third of the total population lived in the city of Rome. 
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roughly 5,500 km2 to 27,000 km2—about twenty percent of the Italian peninsula, though much of 
the land was “Roman” only in name.101 Within the ager Romanus, somewhere between 20,000 and 
30,000 Romans and their families probably received viritane allotments; by extending citizenship 
to many of the existing communities in what became Roman territory, Roman territory went from 
supporting a total population of roughly 347,300 to 900,000. This would have put the entire 
Roman military coalition of Roman citizens, Latins, and allies somewhere around two million, 
still less than the two-and-a-half million of the Athenian empire in the mid-fifth century.102 
Altogether, up to three times as many Romans may have received land allotments outside of 
Roman territory as they did within Roman territory. Even for those who received viritane 
allotments, the location was often further away than some of the colonies: the recipients who 
made up part of the new tribe Falerna in 318 moved all the way to the bay of Naples.  
Tim Cornell has suggested that many of the recipients must have been non-Roman 
allies, even though the sources for the mid-Republic say nothing of the sort: he argued that “It is 
unlikely that the Roman population on its own could have withstood such a drain on its citizen 
manpower.“103 Such a “drain” certainly would have been disruptive to any pre-modern state, 
but perhaps that means that Rome’s elite and the plebeians each had good reason to pursue this 
type and degree of land allotment. Even if a third of the recipients were in fact non-Roman—
though there is no reason to think this—and a total of around one hundred thousand people 
received land allotments away from Rome during the period, then as much as half of the 
original core male population still moved away from Rome. To be clear, the mid-Republican 
                                                        
101 Ibid. The ager Romanus increased to 1,582 km2 after the conquest of Veii in 396. Until 338, the main addition was the ager Pomptinus. 
102 For the number of viritane allotments, see Cornell 1995: 380; Oakley 2005: 663-665. For total population estimates, see Afzelius 1942: 153. 
103 Cornell 1995: 367. See also Scheidel 2004: 10; 2006. 
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diaspora took place over the course of two generations. But each year, migration still would 
have outpaced natural demographic growth at Rome: the rate of movement to land allotments 
was, until then, unique to the Mediterranean.104  
Also unique, at least when compared to the Athenians and Syracusans, was how the 
Roman settlers moved into valleys and plains where there were plenty of people were already 
living and communities already established. It is worth recalling how Athenian settlers only 
founded colonies after destroying the existing community and the Syracusans moved everyone 
back within Syracusan territory before allotting land. The Romans, however, do not even seem to 
have confiscated all the land from a community. Some members of the existing community surely 
died fighting the Romans. Others may have been enslaved. Yet most people probably had to 
make due with less land, or none at all. As we will see below, Roman settlers at Fregellae and 
Interamna shared the Liri Valley with several Volscian communities, like Arpinum and Casinum; 
the settlers at Paestum shared the plain with Lucianians in and around the city and more down 
the coast at Elea and Roccaglorisa; the settlers at Cosa shared the valley with Etruscans at Vulci 
and Orbetello. Of course, the Romans did not share the land as equal partners: we should not lose 
sight of the fact that the Romans confiscated land only after a military defeat and with the threat 
of more violence hanging over the settlement. Roman settlers arrived at their allotments as 
conquerors. Afterwards, they took advantage of existing networks.  
Once they arrived at their new homes, Roman settlers received land allotments of 
varying sizes. Many historians have assumed that the actual size of land allotments at colonies 
was bigger than viritane allotments: in return for more land, the logic holds, the Roman poor 
                                                        
104 Pelgrom 2012: 35, with Scheidel 2003; Osborne 2004: 164. Migration at a rate of 0.4-0.8%, with natural growth at a rate of 0.2-0.3%. 
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agreed to garrison the unruly frontier in new colonies. According to Livy, the size of viritane 
allotments was incredibly small, ranging from two to seven iugera (equal to about one half to 
just under two hectares). At Veii in 393 the allotments were seven iugera; in the ager Falernus in 
339 the allotments were only three.105 Because a family could not subsist on so little land, these 
landowners may have used public land as well: as people got further from the Roman core, 
public land may not have been nearly so competitive, especially after 367.  
As for the size of allotments at colonies, the historical sources give no details for any Latin 
colony before the Second Punic War. Later, in the second century, the size of colonial land 
allotments was conditional on military rank, but still much larger than any viritane allotment of 
the fourth century: at Copia in 193 infantry got twenty iugera and cavalrymen got forty iugera 
(about five and ten hectares).106 There is no reason to assume that the size of allotments after the 
Second Punic War was representative of allotments in the fourth century: not only was there less 
aggregate demand for land after the Second Punic War because so many soldiers had died, but 
also the Roman victory increased the supply of confiscated land. Livy was probably using 
different sources for the fourth and second centuries anyway, so he may not have had access to 
the same details for both periods. But because Livy did, on occasion, record how many settlers 
signed up for a certain colony in the fourth century, and we can estimate about how much land 
was available for those colonists, we do not need to rely solely on comparative data from the 
second-century for fourth-century colonial land allotments.  
                                                        
105 For Veii, see Livy 5.30. For the ager Falernus, see Livy 8.11. For a synthesis of all known allotment sizes, see Pelgrom 2008: Fig. 1.  
106 By this time, there was little to no property qualifications for military service. For Copia, see Livy 35.9. The size of allotments 
seems to have increased with time: at Bononia in 189, infantry received fifty iugera and cavalrymen got seventy iugera, see Livy 37.57.  
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 Land allotments around colonies may have been bigger, but probably not by too much. In 
the Latin colonies founded before the First Punic War, anywhere from 2,500 to 6,000 settlers 
received land allotments. At Cales in 334 and Luceria in 314, there were 2,500 recipients; at 
Interamna Lirenas in 312, Sora in 303, and Carseoli in 298, there were 4,000 recipients; at Alba 
Fucens in 303, there were 6,000 recipients (see Table 5.2).107 Since Cales commanded around 100 
km2, each recipient could not have had more than four hectares. For the 265 km2 at Interamna, 
there was only enough for about six-and-a-half hectares for each recipient and his family. For the 
420 km2 at Alba Fucens, only seven hectares. But this does not account for public land, 
uncultivable areas, and whatever land was left for any existing communities, so the amount 
would have been even smaller. Unfortunately, physical evidence for centuriation lines cannot 
help us determine the size of land allotments: Pelgrom has meticulously re-evaluated the 
evidence for Roman centuriation and shown that there is no evidence for it, or any plot divisions 
for that matter, before the First Punic War.108 Still, with the data available to us, it seems as though 
the recipients of Roman colonial allotments were receiving about the same amount of land as the 
Syracusan mercenaries at Leontinoi. If they had been working under the same conditions as their 
Syracusan counterparts, the recipients of Roman colonial allotments may have had only enough 
land for subsistence farming.109 But unlike those who received land allotments in Syracusan 
territory, the Roman settlers entered existing economic networks.    
                                                        
107 Livy only gives numbers for six of the nineteen colonies before the Second Punic War. For Cales, see Livy 8.16.14. For Luceria, see 
Livy 9.26.5. For Interamna Lirenas, see Livy 9.28.8. For Sora, see Livy 10.1.2. For Carseoli, see Livy 10.3.2. For Alba Fucens, see Livy 10.1.2.  
108 Pelgrom 2008: 365-367; 2012: esp. 96-128, contra Castagnoli 1956; Hinrichs 1974; Chouquer et al. 1987; Carandini 2002: 121-123. This 
does not mean that they were not dividing up land into orderly plots yet, just that we should be cautious about using later evidence. 
109 A family of five would probably have needed about five and a half hectares for subsistence, see Rosenstein 2004: 66-68. See also 
Salmon 1969: 72, n. 110; Galsterer 1976: 47. This amount assumes that the farmers used crop rotation, leaving part of the land fallow. 
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Table 5.2. Number of land allotments recorded in Livy and estimates of maximum size 110 
Date Latin Colony 
Number of 
allotments 
Estimated Size of 
Territory  
Estimated Maximum Size 
of Land Allotment 
334 Cales 2,500 100 km2 4 ha 
314 Luceria 2,500 790 km2 31 ha 111 
312 Interamna Lirenas 4,000 265 km2 6.5 ha 
303 Sora 4,000 230 km2 5.75 ha 
303 Alba Fucens 6,000 420 km2 7 ha 
298 Carseoli 4,000 285 km2 7 ha 
 
Roman settlers often arrived in rural landscapes already worked by small farmers. In 
recent years, archaeologists have begun to find that Roman land allotment could not have been 
responsible for agricultural intensification in central Italy: Terrenato argued that, beginning in the 
fifth century and continuing through the third century, rural Italy experienced a major transition 
from nucleated urban centers to dispersed small farms, what he called “Hellenistic farms.”112 
Years ago archaeologists first observed this trend in central Italy, so it seemed reasonable enough 
to assume that Roman land allotment was the catalyst. Surveys in the Cecina valley in western 
Tuscany and the Biferno valley in eastern Samnium, however, have shown that agricultural 
intensification actually predated the Roman conquest, and the first several generations of Roman 
landowners had little, if any, material impact on rural settlement organization.113 In one survey 
after another, a wider trend has emerged: according to Terrenato, “What was a local phenomenon 
                                                        
110 Territory sizes from Cornell 1995: 381, Table 9, slightly modified from Afzelius 1942. 
111 This estimate is probably highly inflated given that Lucerian territory, in Afzelius’ estimates, also included the steep mountains to the 
west all the way until Apulia meets Samnium, see Roselaar 2010: 303, n. 36. The allotments were probably only in the fertile valley. 
112 Terrenato 2001a; 2012. He called them “Hellenistic farms” to emphasize how broad phenomenon was in the central Mediterranean.  
113 For regional survey of the Biferno valley, see Barker 1995; Robinson 2012; 2013. For the Cecina valley, see Terrenato and Saggin 1994. 
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of limited proportions became a global trend affecting the entire central Mediterranean.”114 
Though the full scale of this transformation is still coming into focus, the picture is clear enough: 
agricultural intensification in central Italy may have prepared rural landscapes for the arrival of 
new Roman landowners more than those landowners physically reshaped it. In other words, 
Roman land allotment was a process of reconfiguration: as we will see, Roman settlers could take 
advantage of existing networks instead of trying to create brand new ones.  
Ongoing research on colonial landscapes by Pelgrom and Stek has gone further to show 
that the majority—up to eighty percent—of new landowners probably lived outside the actual 
urban centers in small agricultural villages, in part because the urban centers were far too small 
to accommodate the number of Roman settlers. In his synthesis of survey evidence for fourth-
and early-third century Roman colonies, Pelgrom found that “Third-century sites are not 
scattered evenly over the territory, as is often expected, but are predominantly clustered 
together and separated from each other by large tracts of unoccupied land.”115 Survey around 
Interamna Lirenas (f. 312), for example, found sites with consistent, heavy scatters covering six 
hectares about 5 km away from the urban center; 7.5 km outside Venusia (f. 291) was a similar 
settlement scatter at Masseria Allamprese which covered around three hectares; 2.5 km outside 
of Suessa (f. 313), excavations have revealed an ashlar wall similar to the urban center’s 
perimeter wall dating from the first generation of landowners, and it may well have enclosed a 
                                                        
114 Terrenato 2012: 147. 
115 Pelgrom 2008: 348, with 2012: 129-152. See also Pelgrom and Stek 2013; 2014a; Stek 2014c; 2015; Pelgrom et al. 2015; Stek et al. 2015. 
This model of agricultural villages works well with the growing evidence for rural economic life in later Roman periods: the Roman 
Peasant Project, for example, has excavated a number of small surface scatters in southern Etruria and found that in every case they 
were not, in fact, small houses associated with individual farms, but rather agro-processing or ceramic production sites, see Ghisleni 
et al. 2011; Vaccaro et al. 2013; Bowes et al. 2011; 2013. They argued that these rural work sites were accessed from agricultural villages. 
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small settlement.116 The list goes on.117 According to Pelgrom and Stek, the landowners living in 
the scattered agricultural communities likely saw the urban centers more as economic and cult 
“service centers”—in effect, a central place where the new landowners visited from time to 
time, but did not live. As we will see, evidence that part of the existing communities continued 
to live in the conquered territory is unmistakable, which may have meant that the “service 
centers” became hubs for them as well.118  
If Roman settlers moved into areas where people were already farming, and they were 
able to centralize exchange in the area at their colonial hub, they may also have been to 
specialize what they were growing on their land allotments. Take, for example, seven iugera of 
farmland, which was still probably less than Roman settlers were getting at colonies. Imagine a 
farmer dedicating those seven iugera (or about 1.75 hectares) to grapes: if each hectare yielded 
25 hL in a growing season, which is reasonable for pre-modern viticulture, he could produce 
around 44 hL per year. Now, the plebiscitum Claudianum of 218 restricted Rome’s elite from 
owning ships that could transport more than 300 amphorae of wine: André Tchernia calculated 
that it would have taken about ten to twenty iugera of vines to produce that much wine.119 In a 
good year, then, the farmer could produce maybe 200 amphorae per vintage from his seven 
iugera. If he could sell these on the market wholesale, he and his family would be well above 
subsistence, probably earning well more than the two minae the Athenian lotholders collected 
                                                        
116 For Interamna, see Hayes and Martini 1994: 230, site 526. For Vinuesia, see Pelgrom et al. 2015. For Suessa, see Arthur 1991: 40.  
117 For a survey of “clustered” sites, or village settlements, outside of colonial urban centers, see Pelgrom 2012: 131-141, with 200-214. 
118 For discussion of the indigenous communities in colonial territories, see Bradley 2006: 171-177; Pelgrom 2008: 354-357; 2012: 153-187. 
119 For the plebiscitum Claudianum, see Livy 21.63.3. For grape-yield estimates, see Tchernia 2016: 150-173, with Cato Agr. 11.1. I am 
grateful to Nathan Pilkington for bringing to my attention what it would have meant for Roman settlers to “intensify specialization.”  
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from their allotments at Mytilene after 428.120 This is, of course, only speculative, but the lesson 
is important: the Roman settlers may not have intensified agriculture in the regions they moved 
to, but they may have intensified specialization. By taking advantage of Rome’s commercial 
citizenship, they could, potentially, grow what their land was best suited for—grain, grapes, 
olives, and so on—instead of only growing crops to sustain their family.  
By the end of the third century, in fact, Greco-Italic amphorae from Etruria, Latium, and 
Campania—areas all worked heavily by Roman settlers—were starting to break into 
Mediterranean markets in vast quantities carrying wine and oil.121 This was still a far way off 
from our period, where markets were still fairly regional, as we will see. Even so, it is 
reasonable to think that the arrival of Romans settlers and their human capital out in the rural 
areas of central Italy helped intensify specialization within those areas. If Momigliano was right 
that the Roman settlers were mostly artisans, laborers, merchants, and small-scale farmers, a 
view generally shared among historians, then specialization probably had something to do with 
the Roman human capital being transferred away from Rome to the communities the Romans 
defeated in war.122 What Philip Kay has called “Rome’s economic revolution” emerged out of a 
Roman trade network structured, in part, by the movement of Roman settlers away from Rome 
                                                        
120 If we assume, for the sake of argument, that later prices from Pompeii held true generally (when a half liter of wine went for 1 
aes) and wholesale value was about three-fourths the price of table wine, then each hectoliter was worth 140 asses, see De Simone 
2017: 39. 44 hL would then go for 6600 asses, which could buy 235 modii, or over 2000 liters of wheat, which would have put the 
farmer well above subsistence. 6600 asses, or 660 denarii, would have been considerably more valuable at Rome than 2 minae, or 200 
drachmae at Athens. 
121 For trade, see Morel 1989: 479-480; Loughton 2003: 179. For the distribution of Greco-Italic amphorae, see Will 1982; Tchernia 1986.  
122 For example, this view of plebeians is accepted throughout Raaflaub 2005a. Some plebeians probably would have had enough 
property to qualify for military service in some capacity because, as Raaflaub (2005b: 197) recognized, “Had the plebeians consisted 
only of poor farmers, herdsmen, day laborers, craftsmen, and traders, their movement would have been crushed at the first opportunity.” 
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to their land allotments.123 By transferring much of Rome’s human capital out into rural areas, 
where some existing communities continued to exist, Roman land allotment was disruptive in a 
much different way than Athenian and Syracusan land allotment: over time, it created regional 
economic hubs instead of concentrating economic activity at the metropole.   
Back at Rome, Rome’s elite do not seem to have made much of an effort to reverse the 
effects of migration away from Rome, likely because colonization played into their view of 
imperial territory. On a few specific occasions, the Romans moved part of a defeated community 
back to Rome, in a move that seemed to resemble the Syracusan population transfers. In 338, after 
the defeating the Latin League, the Romans forced the senators at Velitrae to move to Rome: 
In Veliternos, ueteres ciues Romanos, quod totiens rebellassent, grauiter saeuitum: et muri 
deiecti et senatus inde abductus iussique trans Tiberim habitare... in agrum senatorum 
coloni missi, quibus adscriptis speciem antiquae frequentiae Velitrae receperunt .124 
The people of Velitrae, Roman citizens of old, were severely treated for having revolted so 
often. Their walls were demolished, and their senate removed from the town and its 
members ordered to live on the other side of the Tiber… Colonists were dispatched to the 
farmlands of the senators, and when these were enrolled Velitrae appeared again to have 
the dense population of its early days.  
The Romans did the same for the senators at Privernum a decade later in 329.125 In the fourth 
century, the west bank of the Tiber was not technically a part of Rome because it lay outside the 
pomerium, the city’s formal boundary separating urbs from ager. But because of its easy access to 
trade up and down the Tiber, Transtiberim was home to many of the city’s merchants and 
craftsmen.126 So when the Romans transferred the senators from Velitrae and Privernum to 
                                                        
123 For “economic revolution,” see Kay 2014. For the economic integration of rural communities over time, see De Haas and Tol 2017. 
124 Livy 8.14.5-7, with Urso 1998. See also Livy 1.29.1, 1.33.1, 3.29.6; Dion. Hal. 2.55.6, 3.38.2, 3.50.3, 5.36.4, 6.20.5, 6.32.1, 6.55.1, 6.91.4. 
125 For Privernum, see Livy 8.21.9. 
126 Coarelli 2008: 335-336. Transtiberim maintained its “working-class character,” as Coarelli called it, through the high Imperial period. 
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Transtiberim, they were putting them among the same kind of people who would soon be taking 
ownership of their land. Unlike the Syracusans, the Romans only moved senators, elites who 
could not replace the plebeians’ labor but could, in time, become members of Rome’s elite.  
Instead, much of Rome’s population growth in the fourth and early third centuries 
probably came from a massive influx of slaves, the result of annual campaigning in Italy. Livy, 
in his tenth book, recorded the Romans enslaving around 70,000 people during the first decade 
of the third century.127 As the Roman empire grew in the mid-Republic, the slave population 
increasingly became the source of human capital at Rome as Roman citizens moved across 
central Italy. Unlike the Athenians and Syracusans, the Romans reconfigured rural landscapes, 
but did not always completely transform them. With the help of commercial citizenship, Roman 
settlers became entrenched within existing networks of exchange by taking advantage of the 
connections to nearby communities—in a way unseen among the Athenians and Syracusans.  
 
5.5. The Liri Valley: Roman Business Centers 
In the generation after 338, the Romans allotted land almost exclusively in the inland 
valleys connecting southeastern Latium to western Samnium and northern Campania 128 
Beginning with Cales in 334, the Romans allotted land at one colony after another, scattered in 
between defeated communities and new Roman tribes. During this period of transition, no region 
                                                        
127 For the influx of slaves to Rome in the late fourth and early third centuries, see Cornell 2000a: 46; Scheidel 2005a. For slave totals in 
Livy’s tenth book, see Oakley 1993: 24. The growing importance of slavery was implicit in 357, when the manumission of slaves became 
taxed, see Livy 7.16.7. According to Cornell, by the end of the century, freedmen constituted a major part of the plebeian population at 
Rome, see Cornell 2000a: 46. For general population growth at Rome in the fourth and third centuries, see Starr 1980: 15-26; Cornell 
1995: 385-394; 2000a: 46-47. The Romans built the Aqua Appia in 312 and the Aqua Anio Vetus in 272 to accommodate population growth.  
128 New Latin colonies southeast of Rome after the Latin settlement: Cales in 334, Fregellae in 328, Luceria in 314, Saticula in 313, Suessa 
Aurunca in 313, Pontiae in 313, Interamna Lirenas in 312, and Sora in 303. New tribes southeast of Rome: Oufentina and Falerna in 318.  
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saw more Roman settlers arrive than the river valley between the Aurunci and Meta mountains, 
known as the Liri Valley. About 100 km southeast of Rome, the Liri Valley was at the center of the 
main inland corridor between central and southern Italy. Though the valley was originally home 
to various Osco-Umbrian communities—Volsci to the northwest and Aurunci to the southeast—
the land quickly became one of the main sources of conflict between the Romans and Samnites. 
The story goes that, shortly after making a treaty with Alexander of Epirus, who had crossed over 
to Italy and was at war with the Samnites, the Romans allotted land in 328 to form the colony 
Fregellae, taking its name from the community of Volsci living there.129 The Samnites had recently 
destroyed a Volscian settlement in the valley, so the arrival of new Roman landowners provoked 
a war (the “Second Samnite War”) between the Romans and Samnites that ground along for 
another twenty-four years. After the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks in 321, the urban 
residents at Fregellae had to evacuate when the Samnites stormed the city, only to return again in 
313.130 A year after they returned, they were joined by another 4,000 landowners who received 
land allotments at the new colony Interamna Lirenas 25 km down the valley.131 Not long before, 
the Roman Senate approved the creation of the new tribe Oufentina on the other side of the 
coastal range, consisting of viritane landowners and enfranchised locals from Privernum.132 
Altogether, the region was the first major outlet for Roman settlers outside of Latium. 
                                                        
129 For the Romans’ treaty with Alexander of Epirus, see Livy 8.17. For the founding and naming of Fregellae, see Livy 8.22.1, 8.23.  
130 For the battle at the Caudine Forks, see Livy 9.2-6. For the evacuation of Fregellae, see Livy 9.12. For the return, see Livy 9.28.1-3. 
131 For the founding of Interamna Lirenas, see Livy 9.28.7-8; Vell. 1.14.4. 
132 Livy 9.20.6, with Taylor 2013: 55-56. The tribe Oufentina extended down to small coastal “Roman colony” at Tarracina, founded in 
329, see Livy 8.20.9. The Romans had confiscated from Privernum two-thirds of their land in 341, divided up the land as viritane 
allotments the following year, then enfranchised the Privernates after moving their elite to Rome in 329, see Livy 8.1.3, 8.11.13, 
8.20.9. At some point after 329, Privernum was designated a praefectura, a formal venue where Roman citizens, who were not members 
of a Latin colony and thus administered by Rome, could take care of legal business and do business, see Festus 262 L, with Knapp 1980. 
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The cases of Fregellae and Interamna, in particular, help us see how Roman land 
allotment dispersed Roman human capital across the rural areas of central Italy. The two 
colonies make for good case studies of Roman land allotment because, aside from Livy’s 
history, we have both excavated material from the urban centers and rural survey data from 
several decades of fieldwork. From that data we can get a better idea of where the Roman 
landowners settled into the valley, what they were producing, and perhaps also what they were 
trading for. Understanding the archaeological sources is complicated, however, by the fact that 
the Romans did not force the Volscians to move out of the valley. As we will see, the Romans 
and Volscians do not seem to have formed distinct and separate communities. Rather, survey 
data, ceramic analysis, and the historical sources all seem to point in the same direction: the 
Roman settlers were building off of indigenous settlement patterns, creating a network of small 
agricultural villages dispersed throughout the Liri valley among the Volsci who inhabited the 
area before them. Altogether, what we see is that the urban centers of Fregellae and Interamna 
became economic business centers where Roman settlers and Volscians occasionally came 
together to trade and do business.  
At Fregellae, the urban center was neither large enough to accommodate the landowners 
nor was it built to defend them. Because the Samnites had destroyed the prior Volscian 
settlement, the Roman settlement had to be built from scratch; in fact, excavations at Fregellae 
have found no trace of an earlier Volscian settlement below it. The actual urban center of 
Fregellae sat on a plateau of some 80 hectares, though the British excavators have shown that 
the earliest settlement probably only covered a small fraction of the plateau along the newly 
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built via Latina.133 The British team also determined that the city’s circuit wall was not built until 
the late third century, likely during the Second Punic War.134 Beforehand, the settlement may 
have had a partial wooden palisade: in Livy’s account of the Samnite takeover of the city in 320, 
the Samnites were able to sneak into the city at night without being detected, and some of the 
residents managed to escape through a gate of some sort.135 But because the early defenses left 
no material trace, there is no way to determine the actual size of the original settlement. By way 
of comparison, Interamna never exceeded 25 hectares, and Livy wrote that 4,000 settlers and 
their families received land: if the urban center was intended to house them all, there would 
have been over 600 people per hectare—an impossible amount by pre-modern standards.136  
Even if Fregellae occupied the entire plateau, and 4,000 settlers and their families lived 
on site (though Livy does not mention the exact amount), there would have been around 200 
people per hectare—again, an impossible amount. 137  Rather, only a fraction of settler 
community and a small elite probably lived in town: though excavations have found no trace of 
any small or densely-packed houses, the Italian team excavated a large elite house dating from 
the beginning of the third century.138 At first glance, it seems as though the town of Fregellae 
                                                        
133 Crawford et al. 1985: 85. See also Wightman and Hayes 1994: 35, who assume that the earliest arrivals occupied the entire plateau. 
134 Crawford and Keppie 1984: 33-35. They suggested that the colonists must have built the circuit wall quickly because “the southern 
end rested directly on natural clay, the northern end on a dense fill of clay with pebbles, fragments of pottery and fragments of tile.” 
135 Livy 9.12. 
136 A density of 640 people per hectare assumes each family had four members, which is still probably lower than average, see Rosenstein 
2004: 66-68. By way of comparison, the New York City borough of Manhattan in 2015 had an average of about 278 people per hectare.  
137 Because Livy does not specify the number of settlers at Fregellae, historians typically assume that it received the same amount as 
Interamna because the two colonies occupied territories of about the same size, at roughly 305 and 265 km2, respectively, see Cornell 
1995: 381, with Afzelius 1942. Sora in 303 and Carseoli in 298 also received 4,000 settlers, and they occupied 230 and 285 km2, respectively. 
138 Monti 1998: 63. This one elite house happens to be the only residence of any size found in any Latin colony dating from this period. 
In all likelihood, building and urban expansion during the second century probably destroyed any trace of the first houses built on site. 
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was probably less of a densely inhabited garrison than a central point outside of which the 
majority of the landowners lived.   
But even if Fregellae was a central point, the first landowners may have used a nearby 
Volscian fortress for defense in times of war, at least during the Samnite Wars. In his account of 
two Samnite campaigns in the Liri valley, Livy mentioned an arx Fregellana (or “citadel of 
Fregellae”) distinct from the town of Fregellae, which was less of a target for the Samnites: the 
British and Italian teams both identified the fortified hilltop position at the modern town of Rocca 
d’Arce about 8 km to the north as the most likely candidate.139 The site also sat about midway 
between Fregellae and Arpinum, a Volscian community that received civitas sine suffragio in 303.140 
Because Rocca d’Arce has a commanding view of the valley, and looks down from steep cliffs in 
all directions, it is a natural defensive position. This probably explains why material from the site 
show continuous use since the Bronze Age. Nearby, the Canadian team that surveyed 6.5 km2 of 
mountainous territory below Rocca d’Arce found seven Republican sites from the early colonial 
period.141 Still, for most of the year, the Roman settlers probably had little reason to go to the arx 
Fregellana, even less so than town of Fregellae itself. 
In fact, three separate surface survey projects have found that most of the landowners in 
the ager Fregellanus were probably living in the countryside in what appear to be small 
agricultural villages. Between 1978 and 1998, a Canadian project surveyed roughly 13 km2 east of 
Fregellae and 6.5 km2 to the northeast, a British project surveyed 9 km2 to the west of the 
                                                        
139 Livy 9.28.2; 9.31.13. For Rocca d’Arce as the arx Fregellana, see Crawford and Keppie: 23; Rocca d’Arce, see Monti 1990; Monti 1998: 48. 
140 For Arpinum, see Livy 9.44.16, 10.1.3, 38.36.7. Also in 303, Roman settlers received allotments to the north at Sora, see Livy 10.1.1-2. 
141 Zone 2 in Hayes and Martini 1994, fig. 27. 
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settlement, and an extensive Italian project surveyed another 100 km2.142 In all three projects, the 
teams found that the early Republican sites tended to be clustered together, in what were in all 
likelihood small villages or clusters of worksites. For example, in the Canadian survey, sites 86-87 
and 90-92 in Zone 2, all sites with ceramics from the early colonial period, were clustered together 
some 10 km east of Fregellae; in the British survey, sites 51, 52, and 54 were clustered some 5 km 
in the opposite direction; and in the Italian survey, the same goes for sites 33-38 about 1 km to the 
northwest.143 Unlike the urban center, the new landowners did not start from scratch at these sites: 
the British team, for example, found extensive ceramics dating from the pre-Roman, Late Iron 
Age period at the clusters in Zone 2. Though it is impossible to tell whether or not the Romans 
shared these sites with any Volscians, either a favorable topography or the existing settlements 
made the new landowners want to settle there. Some of the new landowners, at least, were living 
outside the urban center, joined together in clusters across a very old landscape.   
Furthermore, some of these rural sites may have been centers of non-agricultural 
production. Though excavations at Fregellae have found no traces of kilns, ceramic production, 
or manufacturing of any kind, rural areas are not quite so ambiguous. The Canadian survey 
found a high concentration of black slip ceramics (distinct from Campanian black gloss) at sites 
21 and 22 clustered about 5 km east of Fregellae: during the early colonial period, the scatter at 
site 22 covered about half a hectare whereas site 21 was just a minor site; by the end of the 
                                                        
142 For the Canadian project, see Hayes and Martini 1994. For the British project, see Crawford et al. 1986. For the Italian project, see 
Monti 1998. For a recent synthesis of the three surveys, with a focus on settlement patterns and density, see also Pelgrom 2012: 202-203. 
143  Hayes and Martini 1994: 181-182, with fig. 27. Crawford et al. 1986: 44-50, with fig. 2. Monti 1998: 97, with fig. 85. See also Pelgrom 
2008: 349-350. The Canadian team (Hayes and Martini 1994: 70) observed that a trend of “nucleated settlement” continued from the 
Early Iron Age through the end of the third century. In a similar statement, the British team (Crawford et al. 1986: 50) observed that “the 
pattern of settlement in the territory of Fregellae was not so much one of single farms, but one of something very close to villages.”  
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Republic, site 22 had gone out of use whereas site 21 ballooned in size and was producing large 
quantities of amphorae from several kilns (recently unearthed, coincidentally, by the 
construction of a railway).144 Though site 21 has not been excavated, and there is no evidence for 
an on-site kiln to match the later one from site 22, it is possible that both were production sites, 
and production consolidated at site 22 over time to supply the increased amount of agricultural 
produce from nearby farms. Petrological analysis of the black slip ceramics from the area found 
that the full range of inclusions could be found locally, which led the team to conclude that 
“most, perhaps all of the pottery may very well therefore be local.”145 The same goes for coarse 
wares, like at site 80 in the foothills below Rocca d’Arce. Aside from the evidence for local 
production, the survey teams found no trace of transport amphorae from Campania or Latium 
dating from the fourth or third centuries.  
The combination of these two conditions—the local inclusions and no evidence for 
imports—led the Canadian team to conclude that “The overall impression given by this 
material is one of rural self-sufficiency, not much influenced by ceramic trends elsewhere…The 
fine-quality black-gloss wares of the northern Campanian sites have not been recognized 
among the survey finds; this reinforces the general picture of minimal outside contacts in 
Republican times.”146 But this critical assessment needs to be qualified. We should not expect to 
find a lot of evidence in the Liri Valley for imports from this period because it was not an area 
for elite consumption but probably more one of production for elites. Roman settlers were 
probably trading transport amphorae full of oil and wine with their neighbors in and around 
                                                        
144 Hayes and Martini 1994: 152-153, 175-176, with fig. 22. Though site 22 has not been excavated, the kilns are “present in [a] rail-side ditch.” 
145 Williams 1994: 161. Though a similar range of inclusions have been found elsewhere in central Italy, local production is more likely. 
146 Hayes 1994: 127.  
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the valley, with some ending up down river, even all the way to the coast by way of the lower 
Liri River (modern Garigliano River).147 It was there, at the mouth of the Liri River, that the via 
Appia led through Minturnae after 295. What we are missing, rather, is the bullion, probably 
bronze bars (either aes rude or aes signatum), that the Roman settlers probably received in 
exchange for the goods they were producing on their land allotments. 
 Though the Roman settlers seem to have mostly lived outside of the urban center, the 
landowners dispersed throughout the rural villages probably came together at the urban market 
at Fregellae. The urban center was fairly small in the early colonial period, and its public 
monuments like the Curia and Comitium had not yet been built. Even so, Fregellae had an 
enormous forum: at 145 by 55 m, Fregellae’s public marketplace covered some 8,000 m2. 148 The 
forum has gained a certain level of notoriety among archaeologists because Filippo Coarelli, 
whose team most recently excavated the site, found two parallel lines of post-holes: these, he 
concluded, held poles that joined together by rope to turn the forum into a urban polling place—a 
colonial equivalent of the Roman saepta in the Campus Martius.149 But Coarelli’s focus on urban 
political life took for granted the forum’s importance as a market, and just how big the forum 
actually was compared to colonial marketplaces in the Classical Greek world. In fact, Roman fora 
in the mid-Republic were more often used as spaces for people to conduct business, especially in 
colonies and prefectures where there were no specialty “niche” markets like there were at the 
                                                        
147 Van der Mersch (2001: 187-193, with Olcese 2017) argued for a similar process in Campania after the arrival of Roman settlers in 
the ager Falernus in 338. He suggested that more Greco-Italic amphorae were produced to keep up with specialized wine production. 
148 Excavations at the Curia and Comitia have found that the monumental phases date from after the Second Punic War, see Coarelli 
1998: 57. However, the same excavations found that Fregellae’s forum dates from the first generation of the colony, see Coarelli 1998: 56. 
149 Coarelli 1998: 56. For the debate on the function of these post-holes in colonies, see Mouritsen 2004; Coarelli 2005. In his critique of 
Coarelli’s interpretation, Mouritsen argued that “There was no urban parallel to the political use of the forum envisaged in the Latin 
colonies. This interpretation in effect applies the structure of the Saepta to the forum, while giving it the functions of the Comitium.” 
 291 
growing metropolitan center of Rome.150 For the Sicilian cities where a marketplace has been 
identified and measured, none comes close to Fregellae: in the Classical period, centuries after 
they were founded, Kamarina had a marketplace measuring about 4,500 m2 and Megara Hyblaia 
and Selinous about 5,000 m2 each.151 All three cities were major trading centers with the eastern 
Mediterranean and had significantly larger urban populations than any Roman colony in the late 
fourth century. The new landowners at Fregellae built the forum, it seems, to accommodate more 
market activity perhaps than some of Sicily’s major trading centers.  
Even though Fregellae’s forum may have doubled as a polling place several times each 
year, the urban market would have been active far more often. Because the forum straddled the 
via Latina, all traffic up and down the valley, and indeed between Rome and Campania, passed 
directly through the market.152 Traffic from long-distance trade through the forum may have been 
fairly low in the colony’s early years, judging by the lack of Campania wares, but Fregellae was 
probably geared more for bringing together regional economic activity than it was for military 
garrisoning. If most of the landowners were dispersed throughout the ager Fregellanus in small 
agricultural villages, then the urban marketplace was probably the main link that united them. 
Consequently, most days of the year they may have had more to do with Volsci living in the 
valley and at Arpinum than they did with any formal political community at Fregellae. 
 In many ways, Interamna developed parallel to Fregellae. Just 25 km southeast of 
Fregellae, the urban center of Interamna also sat in the middle of the valley astride the via 
                                                        
150 For the forum as a marketplace and the importance of economic activity to fora more generally, see Akaiturri 2008: 26-27, 31-32.  
For “niche” markets, see the forum piscatorium, Livy 26.27.2-3; the forum holitorium, Livy 21.62.2-4; more generally, Varr, Ling. 5.146. 
151 For the agora at Kamarina, see Di Stefano 1993-4: 1370. For Megara Hyblaia and Selinous, see De Angelis 2003: 20, 36; 2015: 83-84. 
152 For the route the via Latina took through the Liri Valley and a topographic survey of Fregellae and its environs, see Ferraby et al. 2008. 
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Latina. When the landowners from Fregellae returned in 313, they were joined a year later by 
another 4,000 who received land allotments further down the valley. Like Fregellae, Interamna 
was never home to all the landowners: at 25 hectares at its greatest extent, Interamna could only 
conceivably hold about a sixth of the landowners and their families.153 At Interamna, the forum 
occupied a space of roughly 4,500 m2, about half the size of the one at Fregellae, though still 
comparable to its Greek counterparts in Sicily.154 If the two colonies had roughly the same 
number of landowners, and the colonial fora were designed first and foremost as polling places, 
as Coarelli argued, it is difficult to explain why the two fora were such different sizes. But if the 
urban centers were more suited to be business centers, the discrepancy may shed light on the 
relationship between Fregellae and Interamna: since Interamna was the second colony in the 
area, and the urban center was not replacing an indigenous site, whereas Fregellae shared the 
space with a Volscian community, it would make sense that Interamna would have a smaller 
marketplace. In this sense, the two urban centers may have had marketplaces to match their 
particular economic circumstances. 
 Like at Fregellae, Interamna seems to have been surrounded by agricultural villages. 
Two separate surface survey projects have found that major sites outnumber minor sites, and 
most of those minor sites were found in clusters.155 East of Interamna, the Canadian survey 
found no sites for about 5 km, at which point there are several clusters: for example, site 296 
                                                        
153 For urban Interamna, see Bellini et al. 2012. This carrying capacity assumes 120 people per hectare, following Pelgrom 2008: 343. 
154 For the forum at Interamna, see Bellini et al. 2014b. 
155 In Zones 5-7 of the Canadian survey, there were 11 minor sites compared to 15 major sites dating from the early colonial period, 
see Hayes and Martini 1994: 173-236, with fig. 43. By the Late Republic, the relationship between minor and major sites had 
inverted: the same survey found 31 minor sites and 12 minor sites dating from after the 200. Preliminary results from the recent 
Cambridge survey seem to support the Canadian survey’s findings, though the full report is unpublished, see Bellini et al. 2012: 359.  
 293 
covered about 2 hectares with black slip and coarse wares dating from the early colonial period, 
and was surrounded by another half-dozen smaller sites.156 The same survey found almost no 
trace of continuity with pre-Roman settlements: there were hardly any ceramics dating from the 
Late Iron Age before the Roman landowners arrived in the valley. But this is not surprising: 
whereas Livy regularly identified who owned the land in a particular region before the Romans 
confiscated it, he said nothing for Interamna. In fact, in the passage where Livy wrote that 
communities of Aurunci and Volsci had owned the land at Suessa and Pontiae, respectively, he 
said nothing for Interamna when he mentioned it a sentence later.157 From what we can tell, 
Even though the Roman landowners at Interamna did not move into an area with an existing 
settlement pattern, they may have followed the lead of their neighbors at Fregellae and formed 
agricultural villages outside of Interamna.  
 Like elsewhere in central Italy, land allotment at Interamna would have created the 
conditions for a sustenance economy had the settlers not been situated within a network of 
existing communities. According to Afzelius’ estimate, the ager Interamnas covered about 265 
km2, and Livy recorded a total 4,000 landowners, so each landowner could not have received 
more than 6.5 hectares. Parts of the Liri Valley were also uncultivable: though the highlands on 
either side of the valley and the terraces along the Liri and Gari rivers were fertile, between 
them were swamplands unsuitable for agriculture.158 Those landowners may have had even less 
land to work with, about the same amount as the Syracusan mercenaries at Leontinoi. There, 
                                                        
156 Hayes and Martini 1994: 205, with fig. 43. During the survey, the owners of the field claimed that there was a cemetery on the site. 
157 Livy 9.28.7-8. In 313, the Roman Senate decided to allot land at Suessa, Pontiae, and Interamna, but for some reason that Livy did 
not mention, the Senate decided to delay the land allotments at Interamna for a year. Suessa was just another 25 km down the valley. 
158 Martini 1994: 6-8. 
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the land was much better than what the Roman landowners had in the Liri Valley, and it still 
remained an underdeveloped sustenance economy for at least a generation after the Syracusan 
mercenaries arrived.  
 But even though the size of land allotment at Interamna may not have been any better 
than at Leontinoi, the main difference between the landowners at Interamna and their 
counterparts at Leontinoi was their relationship with the Volsci already living in the valley. 
Unlike Syracusan land allotment, Roman land allotment did not require the existing 
communities be moved elsewhere. Though there is no evidence for Volsci living at the same 
sites as the new landowners, there were Volsci living further up the valley around Fregellae and 
others living just 10 km away to the northeast at Casinum. When the Samnites took Casinum 
during one of their many campaigns in the valley during the late fourth century, the Volsci who 
fled the city and later returned may have received partial Roman citizenship, as was the case for 
the Volsci at Fundi and Formiae just on the other side of the Aurunci mountains in 330.159 
Compared to what we saw with the Athenian and Syracusan approaches, Roman land 
allotment likely created very different economic relationships with the new communities that 
came in contact with Roman settlers. 
Indirectly, Fregellae and Interamna show the effects of Roman colonial land allotment. 
Unlike Syracusan land allotment at Kaulonia, for example, Roman land allotment at Fregellae 
and Interamna created a network of small agricultural villages dispersed across the Liri Valley, 
often among the Volsci who inhabited the area before them. In the two generations after the 
                                                        
159 For the Samnite conquest of Casinum, see Varro Ling. 7.29, with Salmon 1967: 26, 49. For Fundi and Formiae, see Vell. 11.14.3. In 
his account of Hannibal’s march through the valley, Livy included Casinum in a list of other communities like Suessa and Allifae 
that had citizenship, see Livy 26.9.2-3. 
 295 
new landowners arrived at their land allotments, the rural communities of landowners 
remained fairly self-sufficient from Rome, judging from local ceramic production and the 
absence of any material evidence for long-distance imports. In fact, the landowners living in the 
rural villages may have had more contact with local Volsci than they did with the formal 
political communities of Fregellae and Interamna. More often than not, those urban centers 
probably functioned as business centers where the landowners and the indigenous 
communities could come together to trade and do business. Altogether, the Romans who chose 
in 328 and 312 to put their names in for a land allotment in the Liri Valley chose to leave Rome 
behind—an act that did more to create economic links and regular points of contact with the 
Volsci living in the valley than it did to extend the Roman state. So in the case of the Liri Valley, 
Roman land allotment took a share of Rome’s artisans, laborers, merchants, and small-scale 
farmers, and plugged them into a Volscian landscape. What emerged were the beginnings of 
regional economic networks far away from Rome.  
 
5.6. Paestum and Cosa: Reorienting Regional Markets 
During the first generation of the third century, the pace of allotment seems to have 
slowed as the Romans fought one war after another across central Italy in Samnium, Etruria, 
and Umbria.160 Then in 280, a Greek army led by Pyrrhus of Epirus marched up the Liri Valley 
from Campania, ravaging the Fregellaeans’ land along the way.161 In that same year, the 
                                                        
160 For the third-century wars in Samnium, see Salmon 1967: 255-292; Cornell 2004; Scopacasa 2015: 146-153. For Etruria and Umbria, see 
Harris 1971. In the first quarter of the third century, the Romans founded Latin colonies at Narnia in 299, Carseoli in 298, Venusia in 291, 
and Hadria in 289. There is no evidence for viritane allotments during this period, and no new tribes were formed between 299 and 241. 
161 For the Pyrrhus’ invasion of Italy, see Franke 1989; Lomas 1993: 48-53. For Pyrrhus’ campaign at Fregellae, see Florus Epit. 1.13.24. 
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Romans went to war with the Etruscans from Volsinii and Vulci just north and northwest of the 
Roman landowners at Sutrium.162 In both cases, the Roman settlers learned just how dangerous 
life outside of Rome could be. Still, more Romans continued to put their name in for land 
allotments: after Pyrrhus withdrew from Italy in 275, the Romans picked up where they left off 
and allotted land for the first time since the end of Third Samnite War (298-290). In 273, Roman 
settlers formed two new colonies on the Tyrrhenian coast: one at the centuries-old city of 
Paestum in southern Campania, the other at a brand new site named Cosa in central Etruria.163 
At the time, the land at Paestum and Cosa were the furthest south and north on the Tyrrhenian 
coast the Romans had allotted land. As the Roman army extended its reach to ever more distant 
battlefields, so too did land allotment take Roman citizens ever further from Rome. 
Though twin colonies by birth, Paestum and Cosa had little in common. On the one 
hand, the actual urban center of Paestum was originally a seventh-century Greek colony, later 
conquered by the Lucanians, and then shared with the Romans: settlement at Paestum was 
mixed, considerably large, and culturally heterogeneous. On the other hand, Cosa was a brand 
new settlement built on land confiscated from Vulci, though 30 km west of the Etruscan center: 
settlement at Cosa was isolated, small to start, and culturally Roman. For most historians and 
archaeologists, then, the story of Paestum and Cosa is one of opposites: “The two colonies 
evidently served different purposes,” as John Pedley explained it, “Cosa served as a deterrent to 
hostile Etruscans, while Paestum was perhaps the outward manifestation of a peaceful alliance 
                                                        
162 The only evidence for the Roman campaign against Vulcientes is the Fasti Triumphales, see CIL 1.2.2. 
163 For Paestum and Cosa, see Livy Per. 14.8; Vell. 1.14.7. According to the Periochae to Livy, the lost books 12-14 all contained accounts 
of Roman wars against the Etruscans and Lucanians, which presumably led to the land confiscations for Paestum and Cosa in 273.  
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between Lucanian aristocrats and Rome.”164 To be sure, Paestum and Cosa show just how 
varied and contingent Roman colonization could be, and how the elite at Rome had no single 
way of organizing landowners nor any single precondition for land allotment.165 In fact, there 
was probably as much variation between Paestum and Cosa as there was between any two 
places where the Athenians or Syracusans allotted land.  
 Even so, the cases of Paestum and Cosa show how Roman land allotment, despite all the 
variation from one colony to the next, had one common theme: Roman land allotment 
centralized existing regional economies around Roman business centers. Put another way, the 
Roman landowners reconfigured regional networks of exchange in a way that put themselves at 
the center. During the early third century, the city of Rome continued to grow as a metropolitan 
center, but Roman land allotment disrupted economic networks outside of Roman territory in a 
way that privileged regional exchange—that is, the bulk of trade did not flow directly through 
Rome, as was the case at Athens and Syracuse. The cases of Paestum and Cosa are particularly 
insightful because over a half-century of urban excavations and rural survey at the colonies 
themselves and the existing settlements around them can help us track how production and 
networks of exchange changed over time. The data from these projects suggest that the growth 
of these Roman business centers was true for non-agricultural production as well as agricultural 
production; the conditions for both, I argue, resulted from the dispersal of Roman human 
capital into the region. As we will see, land allotment took new landowners out into the 
countryside around Paestum and Cosa, where they focused regional economic activity back to a 
                                                        
164 Pedley 1990: 115. For a similar sentiment, see also Curti et al. 1996: 173; Torelli 1999: 43. 
165 In this regard Bispham, Pelgrom, Stek and others (see notes 36-37) were right to critique the “statist” model of Roman colonization.  
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Roman economic hub. Whereas the cases of Fregellae and Interamna showed us how land 
allotment could create agricultural villages that put settlers in contact with existing 
communities, Paestum and Cosa then show how, over time, those settlers could reconfigure the 
region’s economy around themselves. What we see, therefore, is that Roman land allotment was 
particularly Roman because it reconfigured rural Italian life around Romans, not the 
metropolitan center of Rome.  
 The Roman settlers who arrived at Paestum in 273 entered a very old and already 
flourishing landscape. The site was originally a Greek colony from Sybaris, founded in the 
seventh century as Poseidonia. For two centuries the city thrived, judging by its three massive 
temples and public architecture.166 Sometime around the turn of the fifth century, the Lucanians 
from southern Samnium took the city and renamed it Paistos. Despite the Lucanian takeover, 
the city seems to have retained at least part of its Greek community, judging from how red-
figure vase painting, votive offerings at Greek sanctuaries, and use of the Bouleuterion all 
continued as before. 167  In the century between the Lucanian and Roman conquests, the 
countryside saw a drastic increase in rural sanctuaries and cemeteries, which some 
archaeologists have interpreted as an increase in wealth, rural habitation, and perhaps also 
agricultural intensification.168 It is impossible to say how well these mapped onto actual 
settlement patterns since there have been no diachronic field survey projects in the area, and the 
                                                        
166 For the pre-Roman history of Poseidonia-Paistos, see Pedley 1990: 21-112. 
167 For Greek continuity into the Lucanian period and excavations of the Greek site, see Greco and Theodorescu 1980; 1983; Pedley 1990: 
97-112; Cipriani and Longo 1996; Wonder 2002; Crawford 2006; Isayev 2007: 110-117. In her study of Lucanian material culture, Isayev 
(2007: 114) argued that the Lucanian conquest “reflects not a separate isolated group of Italians who have taken over a Greek territory 
but rather a community which has incorporated itself into the life of the Greek city, and brought with it new socio-cultural trends.” 
168 For sanctuaries and cemeteries as proxies for settlement and land tenure, see Pedley 1990: 99; Crawford 2006: 62; Gualtieri 2013: 377.  
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sanctuaries and cemeteries are all chance finds.169 Still, Paestum and its place in northern 
Lucania make for a valuable case in Roman land allotment: because there have been extensive 
excavations at the urban center at Paestum as well as at a nearby Lucanian settlement at 
Roccagloriosa, it is possible to track changes in trade and non-agricultural production, and also 
how an influx of new Roman landowners may have affected exchange in northern Lucania. 
 Before the Roman landowners arrived, Lucanian Paistos was one of the leading economic 
centers on the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy, with trade connections all over the western 
Mediterranean. In the generation after Dionysios’ death at Syracuse, a number of Sicilian potters, 
vase painters, and craftsmen moved to Paistos, and transformed the city into a leading production 
center: more than a thousand red-figure vases have been found in southern Italy and Sicily from 
the single workshop of Asteas and Python (c. 360-330) at Paistos.170 Excavations at the Porta 
Marina on the western edge of the city have revealed an industrial area for the production of 
pottery in use during the second half of the fourth and early third centuries; kilns and molds for 
terracotta production from the same period have been found in the city center, along with 
hundreds of terracotta figurines made with local clay.171 Excavations at the Bouleuterion, still in 
use through the Lucanian period, found it filled in with industrial waste dating mostly from the 
early third century, such as ceramic fragments, misfired terracottas, and broken bellows—all signs 
of industrial production.172 Furthermore, many of the fourth century tombs found scattered 
throughout the countryside included all kinds of luxury goods and displays of wealth, like 
                                                        
169 There has been only one field survey in the territory of Paestum, and it focused entirely on the Greek Archaic period, see Skele 2002. 
170 Asteas and Python signed many of their vases. For vase painting at Paistos, see Trendall 1952; 1987: 54-174; Pedley 1990: 109-112. 
171 For Porta Marina, see Greco 1988: 85. For production, see Greco and Theodorescu 1980: 20-21; 1987: 156-157; Ammerman 1993: 15-22. 
172 For the fill of the Bouleuterion, see Greco and Theodorescu 1983; Pedley 1990: 80. The Bouleuterion was apparently still in use 
through the end of the fourth century: excavations found an Oscan inscription, though written in Greek, of a magistrate dedication. 
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Tanagra figurines imported from mainland Greece, amber jewelry, and elaborate wall frescos.173 
Altogether, the material evidence from Paistos before the Romans’ arrival gives the impression 
that the city was a major center of production and Mediterranean trade.    
 The same can be said for the Lucanian settlement at Roccagloriosa, an inland settlement 
60 km southeast of Paistos on the Cilento peninsula. The Lucanian city, which covered some 15 
hectares, developed around the same time as production ramped up at Paistos, judging from 
the fortification walls and habitation area, which all date to the second quarter of the fourth 
century.174 Excavations at Roccagloriosa, like at Paistos, show that it too was a center of 
Mediterranean trade, albeit on a smaller scale. Excavations have found extensive evidence for 
craft production and metallurgy, including kilns, pottery wheels, terracotta molds, and pieces of 
slag; ceramic workshops, for their part, were producing Tarentine imitation wares.175 Amphorae 
found at Roccagloriosa dating from the fourth and early third centuries seem to suggest that its 
inhabitants were importing goods from all around the Mediterranean, from as far away as 
mainland Greece and North Africa.176 Though the ceramic evidence shows that Roccagloriosa 
regularly traded with Magna Graecia and Sicily to the south, there is no evidence for trade with 
Paistos or Campania to the north.177 Like the cities of eastern Sicily before Dionysios’ conquest, 
Paistos and Roccagloriosa were plugged into Mediterranean markets. 
                                                        
173 For cemeteries and tombs around Lucanian Paistos, see Pedley 1990: 99-108; Pontrandolfo 1987; Pontrandolfo and Rouveret 1992. 
174 For the fortifications and habitation area at Roccagloriosa, see Gualtieri and Fracchia 1990; Gualtieri 1993b; Isayev 2007: 119-120. 
175 For ceramic evidence from Roccagloriosa, see Fracchia 1993; Gualtieri and Fracchia 1990: 161-164. For metallurgy, see Wayman 1993. 
176 For trade and amphorae at Roccagloriosa, see Arthur 1990; Fracchi 1990; Gualtieri 1993c: 338-341, with Tables I-II. Of the 117 
amphorae found during excavations at Roccagloriosa, 11 came from mainland Greece, 67 from western Greece, 29 from Punic 
workshops (mostly with Tunisian fabrics), and 10 with unknown origins.  
177 Despite extensive excavations, there is no positive evidence at Roccagloriosa for trade with Campania or the Lucanians to the 
north before the mid-third century, only a few examples of shared formal qualities, see Fracchia 1990: 219-278; Arthur 1990: 278-286. 
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 But unlike the uprooted communities of eastern Sicily, the Lucanians of Paistos did not 
move away before the Roman landowners moved in. At least not all of them. Inscriptions found 
during excavations suggest that some of the Lucanians were enrolled as colonists of Paestum. 
Three inscriptions dating from the middle of the third century list the quaestors at Paestum, and 
the names are a mix of Oscan-Lucanian and plebeian names.178 On the one hand, there were 
quaestors with names like Vibius, Megonius, and Bracius, all names of Oscan origin. On the other 
hand, there were also Latin names like S. Sextius, L. Claudius, and L. Statius.179 Apparently the 
citizens of Roman Paestum included both plebeians, who received land allotments, as well as 
Lucanians. Because the fourteenth book of Livy is not extant, there is no way to know just how 
many Romans received land at Paestum. By Afzelius’ estimate, the territory of Paestum was 
enormous: at 540 km2, it was about the same size as Fregellae and Interamna put together.180 
Paestum may have been so big because there was already a large Greco-Lucanian community. 
Alternatively, the Roman army may have confiscated more land, so there were more allotments. 
Either way, land allotment at Paestum did not displace the whole community living there. 
 Like the urban centers of the Liri Valley, Paestum too was a business center for the new 
landowners. Even though the Romans settlers entered an already-thriving city, they refocused 
the regional economy around themselves. When they arrived, the Roman colonists replaced the 
existing agora with a new forum measuring about 8,000 m2, almost identical in size to the one at 
                                                        
178 ILP 139-141, with Arcuri 1986. See also Torelli 1999: 76. 
179 The first came from the same gens as L. Sextius Sextinus Lateranus, plebeian consul in 366. The gens Sextius is also attested in 
inscriptions from the Esquiline hill in Rome, where the Plebeians often held their assembly during the Republic and disposed of 
their dead, see Arcuri 1986: 7. The second was a member of the Claudii, who immigrated to Rome in Archaic period, and had plebeian 
families who used the name Lucius, see Cic. ad Fam 3.4-6. The third was related to T. Statius, plebeian tribune in 475, see Livy 2.52.  
180 Afzelius 1942: 191. In 273, Paestan territory would have been the second largest colonial territory, behind Venusia at ca. 800 km2. 
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Fregellae. But unlike at Fregellae or Interamna, the Paestan forum was surrounded by a ring of 
shops dating back to the first generation of the colony (see Figure 5.3). Yet excavations at the 
forum show a stark drop-off in ceramic material dating from the third century: dating from the 
fifth and fourth centuries were several hundred examples of fine wares and amphorae that 
could be sold on the Mediterranean market, whereas the early Roman period had only four 
examples of fine wares and no amphorae.181 Jean-Paul Morel has suggested that Paestum had its 
own workshop producing bowls with petites estampilles (or “small stamps”), a new form of 
stamped black gloss pottery originally produced around Rome, and spread through Italy by the 
Roman diaspora.182 In all likelihood, the Roman landowners brought this craft with them from 
Rome and set up a modest workshop at Paestum. However, the vast majority of ceramics dating 
from the third century are utilitarian wares, 22 in total, likely made at Paestum.  
                                                        
181 For ceramics from the fifth and fourth centuries, see Greco and Theodorescu 1987: 119-147. For ceramics from the Roman period, 
see Greco and Theodorescu 1987: 147-154. In fact, there are only four pieces of fine ware that can be firmly dated to the third century.  
182 Morel 1969: 100, with Fracchia 1990: 233-234; 1993: 268. 
Fig. 5.3. The forum and shops at Roman Paestum, Greco and Theodorescu 1987: 17-18, fig. 1. 
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The drop-off in ceramic materials from the third century may well be more a problem of 
preservation than economic change. After all, it is unclear why the settlers would have invested in 
a massive new marketplace if they were not producing much for trade. Yet based on what we 
have seen, another possible explanation is that they were no longer producing for the same 
Mediterranean markets, choosing instead to specialize agricultural production for regional and 
Roman markets. This still does not explain the total absence of transport amphorae, which would 
have been used to sell wine, oil, and also grain. But if the settlers were focusing on specialized 
agricultural production, and amphorae were now being produced outside the urban center as we 
saw at Fregellae, there may not have been much ceramic production in the city for urban 
excavations to find anyway.   
To the south, the Lucanians at Roccagloriosa were becoming increasingly caught up in 
the changes at Paestum. Two decades before the Romans confiscated land at Paistos, the Roman 
army went to war with Elea, a Greek colony on the coast about halfway between Paistos and 
Roccagloriosa.183 After defeating the Eleates, the Romans made a defensive agreement with 
them, as they had with dozens of other states in central Italy by the third century.184 Though the 
Romans did not confiscate any land from Elea, perhaps because the region is so mountainous, 
the entire Cilento peninsula was affected in one way or another by the arrival of Roman 
landowners at Paistos in 273: Elea was bound to Rome by treaty, but the rest of the peninsula, 
Roccagloriosa included, seems to have been pulled away from its Mediterranean network 
                                                        
183 Livy 10.44.8-10.45.11. According to Livy, the Romans went to war because the Eleates had supported the Samnites in the Third 
Samnite War. According to Strabo, Elea was originally a Phokaian colony, and managed to survive the Lucanian conquest of the 
region, see Strabo 6.1.2. 
184 The Eleates contributed ships to the Roman war effort during the First Punic War, see Polybius 1.20.14, with Walbank 1957: 74–75. 
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towards the new Roman center to the north. By the middle of the third century, evidence for 
overseas trade from Roccagloriosa all but disappeared. Excavations have shown that ceramic 
production continued at Roccagloriosa, but mostly of a new series of thin-walled grooved 
bowls, similar in form and composition to several found during excavations at Paestum from 
the same period.185 Excavations also found examples of bowls with petites estampilles, produced 
with stamps imitating the one from Paestum.186 Finally, field survey of the countryside around 
Roccagloriosa found that there were far fewer sites in the third and second centuries, though a 
dozen or so larger sites further away from the urban center remained in use.187 Altogether, 
economic activity in and around Roccagloriosa in the generation after the Romans arrived at 
Paestum transitioned away from Mediterranean markets to more regional exchange with the 
Romans to the north.   
 Land allotment at Paestum did much more than transfer ownership of land from 
Lucanians to Romans. Because many of the Roman settlers were probably artisans, laborers, 
merchants, and farmers before allotment, land allotment also affected the production and 
movement of goods in the region around Paestum. When the Romans arrived, at least part of the 
Lucanian community at Paestum and Roccagloriosa remained on site, though their economic lives 
were reoriented towards the Roman colonial center. Because Roman settlers probably owned 
much of the agricultural surface area in the region, and thus probably also much of the region’s 
wealth, the Lucanian communities seem to have stopped producing the specialized items they 
had been before the Roman conquest. Instead, they may have worked as laborers in Roman fields 
                                                        
185 For the thin walled grooved bowls, see Fracchia 1990: 233, 261 no. 218; 1993b: 267-268; Greco and Theodorescu 1980: fig. 42, no. 37. 
186 Fracchi 1990: 233, 257-259 nos. 200, 206, 207. 
187 For settlement patterns at Roccagloriosa, see Fracchi and Ortolani 1993: 235; Gualtieri and Fracchia 2001: 127-159; Isayev 2007: 122. 
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or used whatever land they still had to grow agricultural staples to sell at the Paestan market. 
Over time, they probably became more and more dependent on a new economic network 
centered at Paestum. Though these last points must remain speculative for now, Paestum seems 
to have gone from being a major center of Mediterranean trade and non-agricultural production 
to a center of regional agricultural exchange so the settlers could specialize what they were 
growing. In other words, they replaced a broader Mediterranean network with a more regional—
and, for them, more profitable—one with themselves at the center.  
 Meanwhile, 450 km to the north another group of Roman settlers were starting a new life 
from their land allotments at Cosa. Like Paestum, Cosa was a coastal settlement set within a very 
old landscape. But unlike Paestum, Cosa was a brand new settlement: though the Romans 
confiscated the land for Cosa from the Etruscan city of Vulci, the settlers chose to build a new city 
some 30 km to the west instead of moving to the existing settlement, as their contemporaries at 
Paestum had done, even though Vulci was also highly urbanized and the region’s most active 
economic center. Beginning as far back as the eighth century, trade with Sardinia, southern 
France, and further afield made Vulci one of Etruria’s wealthiest cities.188 By the sixth century, 
Vulci commanded a half-dozen or so cities, including the nearby cities of Orbetello, Doganella, 
and Saturnia to the west. Despite its importance, Vulci is almost entirely absent in historical texts. 
Still, generations of archaeologists have helped fill out the region’s history, with extensive 
fieldwork at Vulci and Doganella, as well as an ambitious intensive survey project of some 160 
km2 of the Albegna valley. Because Cosa has been excavated more than any other Latin colony, 
the region is an ideal case study alongside Paestum.    
                                                        
188 Steingräber 1981: 183-203; Sgubini Moretti 1993. 
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 The Roman settlers at Cosa, as with those at Paestum, stepped into a region with a 
thriving export economy. At Vulci there was a pottery industry dating from as far back as the late 
seventh century, with the prolific Orientalizing workshops of the Painter of the Swallows, 
originally from as far away as the eastern Mediterranean, and the Bearded Sphinx Painter from 
Corinth.189 Bucchero and black-figure pottery in the sixth century and red-figure in the fifth from 
Vulci was making its way to southern France all the way down the Iberian peninsula. At Vulci, 
viticulturists and craftsmen coordinated their production to produce one of the Mediterranean’s 
leading wine export industries, with local wine shipped in large shipping amphorae as far away 
as the Atlantic coast of Spain.190 Even as Syracusan and Carthaginian militarism in the fifth and 
fourth centuries was isolating Vulci from its southern trade routes, judging by the general 
decrease of Etruscan wares in the Mediterranean, luxury goods from Vulci still made their way 
across the Mediterranean: excavations at the Athenian Acropolis found a tripod imported from 
Vulci during the fifth century.191 As at Lucanian Paistos, the material evidence from Etrurian Vulci 
shows that it too was a major center of production and Mediterranean trade. 
In the countryside to the west of Vulci, the city of Doganella was also thriving as a 
regional center of production. The joint Italian and British team that surveyed the site found that 
the Etruscans inhabited around 70 hectares spread out over an area of 240 hectares, making it one 
of the largest settlements in central Italy at the time.192 Like Vulci, Doganella was an inland 
settlement, located some 6 km from the coast. But whereas the craftsmen at Vulci produced fine 
                                                        
189 For the Painter of the Swallows, the Bearded Spynix Painter, and foreign craftsmen at Vulci more generally, see Camporeale 2013: 
890-891. For ceramic production, see Ambrosini 2013: 950-957; Morel 2007: 493-495; Gran-Aymerich and Turfa 2013; Camporeale 2016: 75. 
190 For viticulture at Vulci, see Camporeale 2016: 77. See also Gras 1985b; Sourisseau 1997; Spivey and Stoddart 1990: 55; Morel 2007: 493. 
191 For the decline of Etrurian markets in the fourth century, see Camporeale 2016: 80-82. For the tripod at Athens, with Turfa 1986: 73. 
192 Perkins and Walker 1990: 65, 122.  
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wares as well as amphorae to transport wine, those at Doganella focused mostly on the mass 
production of amphorae. Within the urban center, field survey found hundreds of amphorae with 
a fabric unique to the city, likely produced at the four kilns located near the southern end of the 
city.193 Sherds of hundreds more were scattered throughout the lower Albegna Valley, showing a 
wide regional distribution of Doganella production.194 Because the lower valley was also where 
the grape production was strongest, Philip Perkins and Lucy Walker, who led the survey of 
Doganella, figured that the amphorae produced at Doganella “were traded in their own right and 
were used to bottle the wine on the farms, or they were redistributed from the city filled with the 
very wine produced in the country.”195 Also at Doganella, excavations found evidence for 
metallurgy, including copper, iron, and lead slag, lead ingots, and a foundry.196 Doganella was a 
productive center to rival Vulci. But since the earliest traces from Doganella date to the end of the 
sixth century, at least a century after ceramic production took off at Vulci, competition likely 
made Doganella more of an agricultural center, its ceramic industry dependent on viticulture. 
Together, the Etruscan centers in the Albegna Valley were geared to produce agricultural 
surpluses and luxury goods for export on the Mediterranean market. 
When the Roman settlers arrived in 273, they decided to center their land allotments 
around a new urban center rather than share an existing one, as their contemporaries at Paestum 
had done.197 They chose a site atop an uninhabited hill next to the sea, some 15 km south of 
Doganella and 30 km west of Vulci. As was the case for Paestum, there is no way of knowing how 
                                                        
193 For the amphorae, see Perkins and Walker 1990: 41-45, 71-72. Survey and excavations have not found any complete amphorae. 
194 For the distribution of the amphorae, see Perkins and Walker 1990: 71-72, 124. For the catalogue of finds, see Perkins 1999: 139-140. 
195 Perkins and Walker 1990: 72.  
196 For the slag and ingots from Doganella, see Perkins and Walker 1990: 49-52, 70-71. For the bronze foundry, see Gentili 1968: 116-117. 
197 Excavations at Cosa have found no trace of any earlier settlements atop the Ansedonia hill, see Brown 1980: 8; Fentress et al. 2003: 13. 
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many Romans received land allotments at Cosa; however, the urban center was considerably 
smaller than Paestum. At 13 hectares, Cosa was a ninth the size of Paestum; its forum measured 
some 3,300 m2, less than half the size of the one at Paestum, and with no adjoining shops.198 As at 
Fregellae and Interamna, the urban center at Cosa remained highly undeveloped for the first 
generation or so: to the excavators’ surprise, as Elizabeth Fentress confessed, “no evidence for the 
third-century colony was recovered…the fact that no building of the third century is known from 
Cosa is indeed remarkable.”199 Likewise, excavations have found almost no trace of urban activity 
from the early colonial period; for example, there are almost no utilitarian wares at all dating from 
before the later third century.200 The main exception is the evidence at Cosa for local production of 
bowls with petites estampilles, similar to those at Paestum: excavations in the south of the city 
found some 42 examples in a style distinct from those found near Rome, leading Enrico Stanco to 
suggest that there may have been a workshop at Cosa during its first generation.201 But even with 
a small ceramic workshop, Cosa, like Fregellae and Interamna before it, was probably more of an 
agricultural business center than anything else.    
This was probably because land allotment in the valley seems to have also reoriented the 
region’s economy. The Albegna Survey Project found that, before the Romans arrived, the 
valley was fairly densely inhabited on sites mostly connected to Doganella’s wine industry. But 
in the generation after the Romans arrived, about a half of those sites, which had been 
continually occupied since the fifth century, disappeared. This is probably because the 
                                                        
198 For the size of Cosa and its forum, see Brown et al. 1994: 9; Carandini 2002: 105. The forum’s layout dates to the colony’s foundation. 
199 Fentress et al. 2003: 13. For a similar sentiment, see Scott 2008: 207. Scott concluded that the third century material culture “show 
the development of the essentials for political and religious activity in the colony but not the activities of a large resident population.” 
200 For utilitarian wares, see Dyson 1976: 173. 
201 For the bowls with petites estampilles, see Scott 2008: 26-27, 36-46. For the possibility of a local workshop, see Stanco 2009: 66-67. 
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Etruscans at Doganella abandoned the city in the first quarter of the fourth century, probably 
sometime after the war in 280 against the Romans.202 If the economy at Doganella was primarily 
centered around wine exports and amphorae production to transport that wine, and the 
Romans confiscated much of the agricultural land in the lower valley, then the arrival of the 
Roman landowners would have irreversibly undercut the city’s economy.  
Consequently, amphorae from Doganella no longer appear in the valley, and with them 
the last signs of their wine industry. But other Etruscan sites within the valley remained in use: 
a cluster of 19 sites in the Valle d’Oro some 4 km from Cosa formed around an old Etruscan kiln 
site.203 Survey at the site found all kinds of coarse wares and ceramic wasters dating back to the 
sixth century.204 Though it is impossible to say who was working at the site, the Romans could 
have used the goods produced there just as the Etruscans before them, which may help explain 
why the site continued to be used well into the Roman period. Surrounding it, Roman settlers 
probably worked land allotments no bigger than 16 iugera (about 4 hectares), as Mariagrazia 
Celuzza estimated based on later centuriation patterns.205 By replacing Doganella with Cosa as 
the main business center for agricultural exchange, this still may have been enough for the 
settlers to specialize in viticulture and slowly take over the wine industry.    
                                                        
202 For settlement patterns in the Albegna valley, see Perkins 1999: 30-39; Carandini et al. 2002: 85 tav. 8, 115 tav. 14, with site catalogue: 
The latest pottery dates from the first quarter of the third century, see Perkins 1999: 25. Further up the valley from Doganella, the city of 
Saturnia seems to have been actually destroyed, judging by the destruction layer from the same period found during excavations. 
203 For early Roman sites in the Valle d’Oro, see Carandini et al. 2002: 117, tav. 16. For the kiln site at CAP46, see Perkins 1999: 25, 195. 
204 For the coarse wares, see Perkins 1999: 118-138. Unfortunately, the catalogue of finds is organized only by type, not also by site.  
205 Carandini et al. 2002: 122-123. Pelgrom (2008: 365) has convincingly argued that the centuriation at Cosa cannot be dated with any 
certainty to the third century. The surveyors noticed that the limites did not align with the via Aurelia, which passes through Cosa, and 
was built in 241. Celuzza and others have assumed that the limites must have predated the via Aurelia because their orientation does 
not match the path of the road. However, the limites in the ager Campania, which post-date the via Appia, do not align with the road. 
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Over time, the Albegna Valley again became known for its wine-export industry. 
Excavations at the Roman villa at Settefinestre, built around the middle of the first century BCE, 
have revealed an enormous operation, with hundreds of stamped amphorae, 80 dolia for wine 
fermentation, and three wine presses.206 This kind of production was only possible with the help 
of slave labor, and upwards of 500 iugera (about 125 hectares) of land to work with.207 Though 
much had changed at Cosa between the initial allotment of land in 273 and the villa economy at 
Settefinestre over two hundred years later, Settefinestre was an extreme example of intensified 
specialization—what land allotment within a network of commercial citizenship began in the 
fourth century. It was because land allotment reoriented exchange within the region around Cosa, 
I argue, that specialized wine production was able to expand so much in the second and first 
centuries. Still, this likely would have been a fairly slow process. The earliest amphorae found 
during excavations in and around Cosa came from the harbor down the hill, and only three date 
from the third century.208 For several generations after 273, exchange was probably much more 
regional, and less oriented towards Mediterranean markets, judging by the lack of evidence for 
transport amphorae for several generations after the Romans arrived. Again, this may well be a 
problem of preservation, but it also may suggest that much of the Etruscan population still living 
in and around the valley were now producing agricultural staples for local consumption while 
the Roman settlers, or at least some of them, specialized in what they were producing.  
                                                        
206 Will 1979; Brown 1980: 71; Carandini 1985a. For Settefinestre and the villa economy, see also Hoyer 2009. For wine presses and 
dolia, see Rossiter 1981. About 10 percent of the stamped amphorae bore the stamp of merchant named Sestius (SES, SEST, or 
SESTI), whose amphorae have also shown up in shipwrecks off the coast of Marseilles and elsewhere across the western Mediterranean. 
207 For the land worked from Settefinestre, see Carandini 1985a: 1.168. Another estimate puts it at around 250 iugera, see Rathbone 
1981: 12.  The land worked from Settefinestre amounted to the land allotments of several dozen of Cosa’s original settlers, most of 
whom would have struggled without wage or slave labor to work much more than 4 hectares anyway. 
208 McCann 1979; Will 1987: 217. Excavations at the harbor found just three Greco-Italic Type 1c amphorae, all three of them imported.  
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This may help explain why the Etruscan centers that remained in the region after the 
Romans’ arrival show signs that they too were caught up in the economy centered at Cosa. 
Unlike Doganella, the Etruscan center at Orbetello, just 5 km northwest of Cosa, shows signs 
that it was inhabited well into the Roman period. At 17 hectares, the Etruscan center was larger 
than Cosa, though little is known of its history because a modern city sits atop the ancient site.209 
Still, limited excavations have found black gloss wares with petites estampilles, which likely came 
from the first generation of colonists at Cosa.210 Likewise, at Vulci, evidence for local ceramic 
production dropped significantly by the middle of the third century, with no evidence for the 
kind of amphora production the city was known for prior to the Roman conquest. At the same 
time, examples of Roman black gloss with petites estampilles start showing up in abundance.211 
The changes in ceramic production at Vulci led Gianfranco Gazzetti to conclude that 
“L'artigianato ceramico sembra subire una crisi” (ceramic craftsmanship seems to have suffered 
a crisis).212 Regardless of whether the Roman black gloss was produced at Rome or at Cosa, in 
all likelihood the Roman wares flowed through Cosa to Orbetello and Vulci. So even though 
Cosa had little in common with Paestum, it too reoriented the region’s economic outlook from 
Mediterranean markets to regional exchange. 
What we have seen at Paestum and Cosa suggests that Roman land allotment reoriented 
existing regional economies around Roman business centers. Though the archaeological data is 
far from conclusive, it seems reasonable to think that the dispersal of Roman human capital 
                                                        
209 For Orbetello, see Carandini 1985b: 91-94; Perkins 1999: 23. Brown (1980: 8) suggested that the Etruscan center at Orbetello, which 
dated back to the Archaic period, may have originally been called Cusi or Cusia in Etruscan, hence the name Cosa for the Latin colony. 
210 Ciampoltrini 1995. 
211 Carandini 1985b: 59-63. Sgubini Moretti (apud Carandini 1985b: 59) observed that the black gloss had a “fabriche romane consistenti.”  
212 Carandini 1985b: 62. 
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undermined existing production and replaced it with what I have called “intensified 
specialization,” which would have worked more to the benefit of the Roman settlers anyway. 
Some settlers were probably specializing in things like wine and olive oil production. Others were 
probably producing pots to distribute that wine and olive oil. They could do so only because they 
could rely on enough of the existing communities, and maybe also some of their fellow settlers, to 
grow agricultural staples, which were sold at the Roman business centers. With the help of their 
commercial citizenship, the settlers probably found it relatively easy to see their goods to regional 
elites and to consumers back at Rome, where demand only continued to grow. Over time, the 
settlers reoriented economic activity around themselves before they could start meeting demand 
back at Rome. When we compare what the Romans were doing in central Italy to the Athenians’ 
and Syracusans’ imperial territory, the Italian peninsula appears to be remarkably regional, even 
as the Roman army was becoming ever more powerful.213  
 
5.7. Conclusions 
 During the Romans’ transition to empire, land allotment made and unmade their state. On 
the one hand, land allotment was the central part of how non-elites experienced the Roman state: 
far more Romans received land allotments than ever held public office in the mid-Republic. In 
this sense, land allotment was more central to Roman political culture than it was to Athenian or 
Syracusan culture. On the other hand: the majority of Romans who put their name in for a land 
                                                        
213 In his analysis of Italian ceramics during the fourth and third centuries, Morel (1988: 51) argued that there was no “colonial 
preference” for Roman goods, that Roman colonists did not seem to import Roman goods any more than they traded with the existing 
communities closer to them. He argued that “la diffusion des produits romains ne reflète pas la colonisation…On n’observe donc pas de 
lien direct entre le commerce des produits artisanaux et la colonisation.” For regionalism in the third century, see Morel 1989: 484-485. 
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allotment ended up moving away from Rome and giving up their right to vote. In fact, between 
338 and 264 more Romans received land allotments far from the Roman state than all the 
Athenians and Syracusans who received land allotments in the Classical period combined. For 
many of those Romans, land allotment meant that they would live among, and sometimes even as 
fellow citizens with, people who were defeated by the Roman army.  
As we saw for Athenian and Syracusan land allotment, the way the Romans allotted land 
in the fourth and third centuries had a lot to do with how their community developed through 
the contingencies and crises of the Archaic period. Beginning as far back as the sixth century, the 
Romans had grown used to people moving in and out of their community, so long as the elite 
could restrict access to the agricultural economy within their territory. By the middle of the fourth 
century, Rome’s new political class of nobiles won prestige from military victories and, by 
consequence, confiscating land from the people they defeated. What emerged was a sort of 
compromise between Rome’s elite, who competed for prestige among each other, and the 
plebeians, who hoped to take advantage of an expanding network of commercial citizenship 
across central Italy. As a result, Roman land allotment became the primary catalyst for movement 
away from Rome, a trend that took Romans and their human capital away from the imperial 
center at an unprecedented rate in the history of Mediterranean empires up to that point.  
What distinguished Roman land allotment was that it dispersed Roman human capital 
across the Roman’s imperial territory: the Romans who received land allotments moved away 
from Rome and then used their commercial citizenship to rework existing networks of exchange 
to their benefit. At places like Fregellae and Interamna, we see how the settlers made their colony 
into a central hub in the Liri Valley for exchange among Romans and non-Romans. At places like 
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Paestum and Cosa, we also saw how the settlers reoriented existing production and distribution 
networks so they could specialize what they were growing and exploit the region’s wealth. 
Consequently, the dispersal of Roman human capital across the rural areas of Italy created 
imperial territories that were not necessarily imperial peripheries in the same sense as Athenian 
and Syracusan imperial territory—that is to say, they were not subject to the same kinds of 
centralized exploitation from back at a metropole that fueled Athenian and Syracusan 
imperialism. Instead, the Romans were creating a much more intensive, and indeed exploitative, 
kind of empire by entrenching Roman human capital within the regions where defeated 
communities continued to live.  
If we think back for a moment to when the members of the Latin League went to war 
against Rome in 340, it is easy to see how they thought the Roman state was expanding at their 
expense. In the generation since the crisis of 387, the people of central Italy saw how Roman 
power came first and foremost through violence, and was continually reinforced through 
oppressive bilateral treaties; but most days of the year, Roman power was more local, more 
decentralized across a network of exploitative economic hubs. Far away from Rome, Roman 
settlers created economic communities with defeated peoples in a way that, over time, their 
economic lives became implicated with one another. To be sure, this is not to say that Roman land 
confiscation was any less heavy-handed than its Greek predecessors, or that the Romans’ arrival 
allowed defeated peoples to “debate” the terms of their imperial relationship with Rome. In no 
way should Roman land allotment be sanitized. The movement of Romans away from Rome was 
still premised on the confiscation of land, which was only ever possible at the business end of a 
military campaign. And just because non-elite Romans were leaving Rome to start a new life, 
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often in areas where members of a defeated community continued to live, the defeated people 
had no say in the matter. As Emmanuele Curti mused, “it would be interesting to see if modern 
colonized peoples would accept the term ‘debate’ as a description of their relationship with 
colonial powers.”214 Even so, what see now is that Roman land allotment was not extractive like 
Athenian land allotment, nor was it unsettling like Syracusan land allotment. Rather, Roman land 
allotment was distinctive for what it did not do: it did not only privilege the central Roman 
economy over regional economies outside of Roman territory. 
After the First Punic War, the Romans continued to allot land up and down both coasts 
of Italy through the end of the second century BCE, and then across the Mediterranean for 
another five hundred years. As long as the Romans continued to confiscate land from their 
enemies, land allotment remained a fundamental institution of the Roman state. For many 
modern historians, this kind of Roman mobility away from Rome to land allotments in the mid-
Republic may seem unremarkable—a well-known plot in the story of Roman success. It is 
ironic, however, that Roman land allotment emerged as an institution at a time when the 
Roman state was in political and economic crisis, but by the late Republic it had become the 
hallmark of Roman state power. In this regard, Roman land allotment in the mid-Republic is a 
cautionary tale for modern historians who seek to explain Roman political culture as uniquely 
imperialist, or uniquely prepared to create a Mediterranean empire. In a way, Roman land 
allotment created an intensive form of imperialism not because it was particularly heavy-
handed and controlling, rather because the elite at the top of Roman society were particularly 
willing to let their own citizens move across Italy.  
                                                        
214 Curti 2001: 24-25. 
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Chapter 6  
CONCLUSION 
We began this study with two fanciful depictions of land allotment from Aristophanes 
and Ovid, who both saw power in the division of land. The two authors portrayed their surveyors 
as if they were conquering the natural landscape, carving it up and defining new boundaries. 
They also joined their power to conquer nature with a willingness to share it. Together, we are led 
to imagine, confiscation and allotment was what empowered citizens living in imperial republics: 
collectively, they had the power to control an imperial territory; individually, they had the power 
to exploit it for their own personal gain. For many Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, this was a 
central part of their citizen experience. We have now seen many ways in which their histories 
became intertwined, in fact, through land allotment.  
Yet we have also seen many ways in which land allotment could vary greatly among the 
three groups, all while living in the same Mediterranean world. The full extent of those points 
of contact and divergence are too often neglected, I think, because land allotment was such a 
common expression of imperial power in Greco-Roman history. Ironically, the ubiquity of land 
allotment seems to have made it easier for historians to overgeneralize and flatten Greco-Roman 
empires, even romanticize their histories to focus more on imperial success. Even so, it is not 
enough to conclude simply that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land in 
different ways. Rather, historical difference was always meant to be our point of departure: only 
by thinking through contrasts, I hoped to show, can we understand why each group allotted 
land the way they did. 
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For that reason, in the preceding chapters I have tried to reconstruct the political, cultural, 
and economic contexts from which the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land. By 
doing so, I wanted to recapture what they hoped to get from their land allotments, both 
collectively and individually, during their initial transition to empire—free from narratives of 
success and failure. I have not attempted to systematically catalogue and categorize all the 
technical aspects of land allotment, like how exactly each group may have measured their land 
allotments or managed the actual event when lots were taken.1 Instead, I have argued that we 
need to consider land allotment on two much broader levels: imperial territory and human 
capital. I found that those two heuristics, in particular, allow us to fully appreciate what 
distinguished the three patterns. It has now come time to summarize what we have learned from 
using this approach. 
When we considered the shape of the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperial territory, 
we found that there was a logic to each that cannot be explained by strategies of security and 
control alone. We saw how the Athenians compartmentalized their imperial territory because 
they tended to think of imperial land as something to be exploited individually and by new settler 
communities, distinct from the interests of Athenian state. What the Athenians seem to have 
collectively wanted from their land allotments was money to rebuild and invest in their 
metropole, which is why they created a centralized tax structure whereby tribute from coalition 
members and most taxes from land allotments flowed directly to Athens. This was quite different 
from what the Syracusans were doing when they externalized their imperial territory: by moving 
dispossessed people within Syracusan territory, and then allotting land to them as citizens, the 
                                                        
1 Not only is there not enough evidence to do so, but those kinds of details, though fascinating, are tangential the purpose of this study. 
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Syracusans were trading imperial land for imperial people. They externalized their imperial 
territory the way they did because they needed skilled labor and specialization more than they 
needed more taxable land. Then there were the Romans who decentralized their imperial 
territory: as Rome’s generals returned home from war with riches, slaves, and the prestige from 
confiscating land, they gave away the land to hundreds of thousands of Roman citizens who 
hoped to take advantage of an expanding network of commercial citizenship. By creating new 
communities out among existing ones across central Italy, the Romans were generating more and 
more regional hubs of exchange outside of the Roman center. In all three cases, each group drew 
from their own relationship with imperial territory when they went to allot land. 
We also found that each pattern of land allotment had drastically different effects on how 
each group accumulated and organized human capital. The Athenians, first of all, centralized 
human capital: because both colonies and cleruchies directed annual payments back to Athens, 
over time settlers and the lotholders also directed trade back to Athenian markets, where 
craftsmen, merchants, and bankers from around the eastern Mediterranean gathered to do 
business. In particular, they were able to do so by experimenting with new ways of allowing 
citizens to collect imperial rents from their land allotments while also living in Attica, thereby 
ensuring that more citizens remained in and around the metropole than if they had only pursued 
settler colonialism like other Greeks during the Archaic period. The Syracusans, however, only 
concentrated human capital: by transferring entire merchant, craftsman, and entrepreneurial 
populations to Syracusan territory, and then replacing them with mercenaries or foreign allies, the 
Syracusans were concentrating an empire’s share of human capital while leaving the people who 
received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory to start over. In stark contrast, the Romans 
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dispersed human capital: the Roman settlers who received land allotments moved away from 
Rome and then used their commercial citizenship to rework existing networks of exchange to 
their benefit. By creating new business centers, land allotment entrenched Roman human capital 
within the regions where defeated communities continued to live.  
 
6.1. Rethinking Land Allotment and Human Capital  
Now, to return to my initial hypothesis at the end of Chapter 2, we are better equipped at 
this point to consider the relationship between land allotment and human capital. Based on my 
initial treatment of imperial territory and human capital theory, I hypothesized that the more 
politically and economically centralized a community was at the time of its imperial transition, 
the more likely it was to concentrate human capital at the imperial center. What I meant by 
“centralized” was simply that activity and decision-making be focused within a single group, 
living at a single place. Broadly speaking, we found the hypothesized relationship between land 
allotment and human capital to be mostly true. However, the important differences that 
distinguished one pattern of land allotment from another, can be found in the types and degrees 
of centralization.  
As we have seen, Athenian politics was remarkably centralized thanks to the Athenian 
Assembly, and yet Athenian settlers still moved away from Athens, thereby dispersing some of 
Athens’ human capital. Compared to Syracuse, there was not nearly as much available land in 
Attica at the time of imperial transition; also, the Syracusans’ willingness to give command of all 
military affairs to a single general certainly made it easier to centralize economic decisions 
affecting land allotment. For that reason, the Athenians’ pursuit of their private interests allowed 
 320 
them to disperse human capital when the shortcomings of the Syracusan labor market 
encouraged the Syracusans to do the opposite. Even so, Athenian settlers did not reorient existing 
networks of exchange as the Romans did, so human capital remained centralized at Athens, but 
not nearly as concentrated as we saw with the Syracusans. In fact, under both tyrants and 
democrats, the Syracusans were the most politically and economically centralized of all three 
groups. Of course, I do not mean to imply that Syracusan citizens had more say in the political 
process, or that they spoke with one voice about matters of the state. Rather, where it mattered 
most for decisions about land allotment, the Syracusans were comparably centralized, both 
politically and economically. By comparison, the Romans were still politically and economically 
decentralized at the time of their imperial transition. Not only did the plebeians constitute a state 
within a state, but the elite economy at Rome developed out of the power of individual clans and 
opportunistic raiding, not some centralized economic initiative. Paradoxically, it was probably 
because the Romans were so decentralized at the time of their imperial transition that they created 
such an intensive form of imperialism. Had the Romans not defeated the Carthaginians in the 
Punic Wars, and had the Athenians not been defeated when they invaded Sicily, later historians 
may have actually puzzled over why the Romans were so willing to allot land far away from 
Rome rather than celebrate it as their key to success.  
 
6.2. Old Paradigms, New Considerations 
Our new understanding of land allotment in the ancient Mediterranean world leads us to 
three broader considerations about how we study Greco-Roman empires. First, questions about 
imperial success and failure are not helpful lines of historical inquiry when we are trying to 
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explain why ancient empires developed the way they did. Though historians should, without a 
doubt, be curious about why certain empires lasted longer than others, we should not impose on 
our historical sources and archaeological data narratives that only make sense in hindsight. Take 
the example of Athenian land allotment: many historians have tried to fit a model of Roman 
imperialism on Athenian history, leading them inevitably to conclude that the Athenians failed at 
their chance of building a Mediterranean-wide empire. But if we move beyond the premise that 
land allotment was universally an instrument of control, the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman 
empires start to make a lot more sense. In fact, we saw that the Athenians and Syracusans do not 
seem to have actually set out to create an empire in the same way as the Romans: land allotment 
for them was a means to a very different end than what we have come to expect from Roman 
history. To say that the Athenian and Syracusan empires were less successful, or less stable, than 
the Roman empire is to miss the point.  
Rather, historians’ lasting interest in stability and success may say more about us and our 
relationship with the Greco-Roman canon than it says about the Athenians, Syracusans, and 
Romans themselves. Though we live today in a mostly postcolonial society, Greco-Roman 
empires are implicated in so many concepts central to our own political culture—like equality, 
justice, citizenship, foreignness, and slavery—that we seem to ask questions about the Athenians, 
Syracusans, and Romans that we want answered about ourselves: How does a community 
balance its internal divisions at home with warfare abroad? How, as citizens, do we go on 
together successfully? How should we even define success? By learning about Athenian, 
Syracusan, and Roman land allotment, we have a responsibility, I think, to think critically about 
what it means to live in a participatory, revisable society that faces difficult decisions about citizen 
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identity, inclusiveness, and foreign policy. But, as ancient historians, I think we also have a 
responsibility to be more aware of our own hindsight so we do not overgeneralize, flatten, and 
romanticize Greco-Roman empires.  
Second, republicanism played a necessary part in the development of Greco-Roman 
empires and Greco-Roman empires played a necessary part in the development of republicanism. 
That is to say, the development of republican institutions in the ancient world went hand-in-hand 
with a very specific kind of imperialism that centered around the confiscation and allotment of 
land. As we have seen, some historians have tried to disassociate participatory and egalitarian 
institutions from the realities of imperialism, emphasizing instead individual historical actor’s 
greed and political machinations as the true engines of imperialism. Other historians have rightly 
emphasized the systems of anarchy and violence in the ancient Mediterranean world that seem to 
have encouraged imperial behavior more than any republican institutions.2 Of course, there was a 
lot more going on in Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperialism than just republicanism and, 
historically, there have been many more states with nothing in the way of republican institutions 
that created empires than city-state republics. Nevertheless, we have seen that citizenship and 
participatory institutions played a very important role in each pattern of land allotment. And 
even though citizens had a different place in each empire, questions about citizenship and 
community remained central to land allotment at Athens, Syracuse, and Rome. 
Third, economic power could be just as important as military and political power in how 
ancient empires developed. This may seem all too obvious to those who study early-modern joint-
stock companies and modern empires, and also perhaps to historians of the later Roman Imperial 
                                                        
2 For anarchy and violence, see Eckstein 2006. 
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period, but economic power is often overlooked and neglected for the initial period of transition. 
One possible reason for this is that our historical sources for economic history are notoriously bad, 
even by the standards of ancient history. Another reason is that ancient historians are typically 
not well trained to use archaeological data which, compared to historical sources, are much more 
representative of economic goods. A final reason is that it has only been in the last generation that 
questions about economic agency, intentionality, and performance have become popular 
among—and perhaps also feasible for—ancient historians. As we have seen in this study, many 
decisions that shaped the economic history of the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires many 
not have been intended to do as such. This makes it that much more difficult to untangle the 
many layers of causation that went into the development of ancient empires.  
Yet with that in mind, I found that much of what distinguished the Athenian, Syracusan, 
and Roman patterns of land allotment started to come into focus when we “people the land”—
that is to say, when we start considering the recipients of land allotment in all their economic 
complexities. I have argued that the three patterns of land allotment are best distinguished by 
how they affected the accumulation and concentration of human capital: the Athenians 
centralized human capital, the Syracusans concentrated it, and the Romans dispersed it. Human 
capital is, of course, a modern concept and probably would have been foreign to Athenian, 
Syracusan, and Roman decision-making. Even so, we found that the movement of people to and 
from confiscated land could create new forms of economic power that worked alongside or 
even stood in for military and political power.  
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6.3. Questions for Future Work 
For all that we have learned about land allotment in Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman 
history, I have left many questions unanswered about human capital, comparative land 
allotment, and the historiography of Greco-Roman imperialism. In this study, I have treated 
human capital as a fairly static category that moves across space: it can be accumulated, 
concentrated, dispersed, and so on. It would be important, I think, to consider how land 
allotment may have affected education, training, and health—all of which are fundamental to 
human capital development. For example, we could consider how human capital might develop 
differently at a metropole as opposed to a rural community. Richard Saller has recently shown 
for the later Roman Imperial period that “Cities facilitate education and, more generally, the 
exchange of information and ideas, because denser populations generate more interactions… 
Beyond formal education, cities were sites of concentrated demand that encouraged the 
development of specialization and sub-specialization.”3 For the Athenians, Syracusans, and 
Romans, we could consider to what extent the recipients of land allotments had access to 
apprenticeships, informal imitation training, and formal education, before and after receiving 
land. I have also not considered how women’s work and human capital fit into land allotment. 
Walter Scheidel has shown how hard it is to reconstruct the economic lives of women in Greco-
Roman antiquity because we have almost no historical evidence to work with.4 Even so, we could 
do more with comparative and ethnographic sources to consider how women impacted, and were 
impacted by, land allotment. 
                                                        
3 Saller 2013: 80. See also Hawkins 2016: 66-129. 
4 Scheidel 1995; 1996. For a recent attempt to reconstruct how women were involved in urban production and trade, see Lovén 2016. 
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To continue on the topic of comparative history, we can still learn more about Athenian, 
Syracusan, and Roman land allotment by broadening our field of vision even further. I argued 
back in the Introduction that we needed to study land allotment within a highly specific context 
of ancient Mediterranean city-state republics, only during the periods of imperial transition. 
Now that we have an historical methodology for comparing patterns of land allotment, we 
could try to determine the relative importance of citizenship and republican institutions in 
Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment by comparing them to other city-states with 
more autocratic forms of government, like the Inca or the Third Dynasty of Ur. Looking outside 
of the Mediterranean would also help us consider more programmatically the role of 
environment and climate. In another tack, we also saw how much the Athenians, Syracusans, 
and Romans had to experiment with land allotment because they were confiscating land in 
areas with no prior history of imperial land allotment. Hence, we could test the relative 
importance of existing systems of imperial land allotment by comparing them to later city-state 
republics within the Mediterranean like Venice, whose lotholders could draw from earlier 
systems of land tenure. Each set of questions will help us continue to refine our understanding 
of land allotment.  
Finally, we could do more to understand the metahistories that frame the way we study 
land allotment. We saw in the Introduction that comparative empires and land allotment were 
already important lines of historical inquiry in Machiavelli’s Florence. Roman narratives of 
success and stability remained entrenched in many Europeans’ imperial consciousness during the 
early modern period of global empires. We know, for example, that British classicist-turned-
imperialist Thomas Smith drew lessons from Roman land allotment to model British plantations 
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in Northern Ireland at the end of the sixteenth century. The sense of land allotment as an 
instrument of imperial control became engrained in Anglophone histories of Roman colonization, 
as people like Smith used Roman imperialism to think with alongside British imperialism. 5 It 
would be important for us to consider how early modern ideas about land allotment shaped the 
way historians at the time wrote about ancient Greco-Roman land allotment. To understand how 
our standard narratives of ancient land allotment were transmitted might help us see other 
aspects of Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperialism in a new light as well.  
Even though the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires may not have been much to 
look at during their imperial transitions, I hope to have shown how comparative history can 
enrich the study of the distant past. By reframing our historical sources with archaeological 
case-studies, we have recaptured some of the many ways people in antiquity reconciled empire 
with citizenship and, in doing so, how land allotment helped shape the political and economic 
history of the ancient Mediterranean world.  
 
 
                                                        
5 Canny 2001. 
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